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# ANCIENT CORINTH



THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY  
STUDIES IN ARCHAEOLOGY

No. 8

EDITED BY DAVID M. ROBINSON

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ANCIENT CORINTH

WITH A TOPOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE CORINTHIA

PART I

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO 404 B. C.

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BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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TO  
UNCLE FRANK  
*a bhailigh*  
*Ceol na hÉireann*



## PREFACE

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Just as the city of Corinth itself, with its sea to eastward and to westward and its towering citadel behind, occupied a site unrivalled among the cities of Greece, so the Corinthian folk, an aristocracy of colonisers and merchants, though rarely putting themselves forward as leaders but preferring to act in apparent subordination to some other state whose policy they could influence or thwart from within, possessed beyond most Greek states a clearly defined national character and occupy in history a place more important than any except the Athenians and the Spartans.

Hence there seems to be room for a monograph in which the history of Greece, too often treated as if it were merely the history of Athens and Sparta, would be surveyed with Corinth as the central figure. The contributions to the history of Ancient Corinth made by Wilisch and Curtius in the last century are now in many respects out of date, especially in view of the archæological and topographical information made available by the excavations of the American School at Athens. The present work brings the story of the city down to the end of the Peloponnesian War. In a second volume I hope to continue the narrative to the fatal year 146.

It may surprise the reader to find that in dealing with Mycenean times I have devoted so much space to a criticism of the views of the late Dr. Leaf. In his *Homer and History*, a work exhibiting a knowledge of Homer which few scholars could claim, and written with a charm of style which a writer of fiction might envy, Leaf set out to prove, among other revolutionary hypotheses, that there never was a Mycenean Corinth and, further, that the references to the city in the *Iliad* are late accretions forming no part of the genuine Homeric tradition. The first of these suppositions has been by now pretty well refuted in view of recent archaeological discoveries in the Isthmian region; but the imposing array of

arguments, derived from Homer for the most part—which if accepted would profoundly affect our conception of the nature of Mycenaean civilization—seemed to call for detailed treatment. This detailed examination, necessitating as it did an enquiry into the authenticity of the Homeric catalogue of ships, has, I am conscious, somewhat impaired the symmetry of my work, but the matter was too important and too complicated to be conveniently relegated to an appendix. I would like to add that my views on this matter had been formed in 1920—before the spade had yet vindicated the traditional accounts of ἀφνειὸς Κόρινθος.

On the other hand, an appendix seemed the appropriate place to deal with Curtius' theory of the Lelantine War and Corinth's alleged share therein. Curtius' work was written a good while ago, but his views have never been thoroughly examined; and an hypothesis is not necessarily refuted by the mere lapse of time.

In my chapter on the Cults and Myths of Corinth I have consulted with no little advantage the works of such authorities as Frazer, Farnell and Nilsson. But in discussing origins one enters the realm of hypothesis—it is a question of greater or less probability, and a theory which seems to its propounder a reasonably adequate explanation of known facts may be dismissed by a critic—as Beloch has dismissed Ridgeway's Achaean hypothesis—in two words: "sehr fantastisch."

In dealing with geographical and topographical issues I feel on firmer ground. A thorough exploration of the Corinthia, undertaken with the advice and assistance of members of the American School at Athens, has enabled me to satisfy myself on several problems hitherto inadequately examined or confusedly stated.

Let me here thank Americans at home and abroad with whom I have had the privilege to be associated. It was my good fortune to be able to consult at the site of Ancient Corinth the excavators of the American School who were always extremely kind and helpful. To Messrs. Meritt and



Broneer, in particular, I would express my deep appreciation of their hospitality and interest. Dr. Harold N. Fowler of Western Reserve University, as general editor of the School's publication on Corinth, generously permitted me the use of photographs which I selected from the collection of the American School at Athens. I wish to acknowledge the kindness of the publishers, R. Friedländer und Sohn, Berlin, in allowing me to reproduce part of one of the maps which accompany Dr. Alfred Philippson's *Der Peloponnes*. Professor R. J. Bonner of the University of Chicago has at all times taken an interest in the work and made a number of useful suggestions. Dr. H. R. Fairclough, Professor Emeritus of Classical Literature, Stanford University, Professor W. A. Oldfather of the University of Illinois, Professor W. A. Goligher of Trinity College, Dublin, and Professor D. M. Robinson were good enough, in spite of many preoccupations to read the greater part of the book in MS., and their encouraging criticisms gave me confidence to proceed with the task. Before going to press I had the advantage of securing from Dr. George E. Mylonas and Professor David M. Robinson of the Johns Hopkins University, very valuable criticisms and suggestions for improvement or correction. Such faults or errors as remain are altogether my own; indeed I feel that many more would have appeared if it had not been for the painstaking efforts of Dr. Robinson. I thank him most cordially for his liberal assistance. I am deeply indebted also to Dr. P. J. McLaughlin and Mr. Ranson of Maynooth College and to Dr. Robinson for their aid in proof-reading.

Finally, I wish particularly to record here an indebtedness and lasting gratitude to my former professor and always my devoted friend, Mr. W. H. Porter, M.A., of University College, Cork, at whose suggestion this study was originally undertaken and without whose unfailing and unselfish help so readily given at all times, it might never have been continued.

J. G. O'NEILL.



# CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE . . . . .	vii
CHAPTER	
I. TOPOGRAPHY OF CORINTH AND ITS TERRITORY . .	1
Extent and Boundaries of the Corinthia . . .	2
Gulf of Corinth . . . . .	5
Peraea . . . . .	7
The Isthmus of Corinth . . . . .	10
The Diolkos . . . . .	10
The Isthmian Wall . . . . .	13
Lechaeum . . . . .	19
The Other Coast Towns of Corinthia . . . .	23
Inland Towns . . . . .	26
II. THE CITY AND ITS CITADEL . . . . .	30
Temple of Apollo . . . . .	42
III. PREHISTORIC CORINTH . . . . .	59
IV. EARLY ACCOUNTS, CULTS AND MYTHS . . . .	89
Cults and Myths . . . . .	98
V. THE TYRANNY AND THE CONSTITUTION WHICH SUC- CEEDED IT . . . . .	115
VI. THE COLONIAL SYSTEM OF CORINTH AND EARLY FOREIGN RELATIONS . . . . .	148
Colonies . . . . .	148
Foreign Relations during the Same Period . .	159
Argos and Corinth . . . . .	164
VII. THE PERSIAN WAR: BEFORE AND AFTER . . .	175
The Persian Wars . . . . .	181
VIII. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR . . . . .	195
APPENDIX I. The Coinage of Corinth . . . . .	243
APPENDIX II.—The Lelantine War and the Naupactian In- scription . . . . .	246
ABBREVIATIONS . . . . .	253
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	255
INDEX . . . . .	261



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PLATE	FACING PAGE
I. Map of Corinthia, indicating the adjoining States. (From Dr. A. Philippson's <i>Der Peloponnes</i> , Typo- graphische und Hypsometrische Karte, Blatt II, Berlin, 1891.) . . . . .	2
II. Acrocorinth, from Penteskouphia, . . . . .	24
III. General view of Excavations from the East, showing ascent to temple area, . . . . .	32
IV. Peirene, general view taken from top of north apse, .	34
V. View of Fountain of Glauce from N. E., showing front and east face, . . . . .	36
VI. Plan of Glauce (1909) by W. B. Dinsmoor, . . .	38
VII. View of Excavations (as left in 1907) from west pier of Propylaea—showing top of Triglyphon Fountain in centre foreground, . . . . .	40
VIII. Temple of Apollo from N. E., showing Acrocorinth, .	42
IX. Korakou, with view of New Corinth in the distance at the left, . . . . .	78
X. Main Excavation Area, 1896-1927, William B. Dins- moor del., <i>folded, at the end.</i>	





# ANCIENT CORINTH

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## CHAPTER I

### TOPOGRAPHY OF CORINTH AND ITS TERRITORY

Standing on the summit of Mount Aroania a traveller can readily understand why the Greeks called the southern portion of their country the Isle of Pelops. As he gazes northwards he might fancy himself upon an island separated by a huge gulf from the mainland opposite. Northeastward the long rift is seemingly continued till in the distance its outline fades from view beneath the land of Attica.

Had Peloponnesus been really an island, the whole course of Greek history would have been very different. The narrow neck of land which makes it a peninsula possesses an importance not to be measured by its scanty area. This little territory and the character and fortunes of its inhabitants form the subject of our present enquiry.<sup>1</sup>

Of particular importance for Corinth are the publications of the German geographer, Philippson, who travelled extensively in the Peloponnesus and has published the only maps of that region which can claim exactness. He speaks of the time when Ancient Hellas stood in "Mittelpunkt des Weltverkehrs", when it was, like England in the nineteenth century, the market place and communication centre between the old civilizations and the new lands and colonial settlements. East and West met "on the natural transverse line of the Gulfs of Aegina and Corinth and the isthmus lying between them . . . which was all the more preferable since there was always a dread of sailing round the stormy southern

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, I, p. 21: "Der korinthische Isthmos ist so schmal im Verhältnisse zu der breit entwickelten Blattform des Peloponneses, dass die Alten ihn als Insel ansahen und benannten."

caples of the Peloponnese.”<sup>2</sup> To the same author’s special study on the Isthmus of Corinth<sup>3</sup> it will be necessary to recur frequently but for the present let us consider the general geographical features.

#### EXTENT AND BOUNDARIES OF THE CORINTHIA

The exact extent of the Corinthian territory seems never to have been definitely investigated. Clinton<sup>4</sup> gives the total area as 248 square miles. On the northwest it is separated from Sicyonia by the lower reaches of the river Nemea. The Nemea<sup>5</sup> flows northeast and southwest. At the bridge over the river on the way from New Corinth to Vasiliko (the ancient Sicyon) I observed that Acrocorinth is S. E. and Phouka directly S. W. Here the peasants informed me that the distance to old Corinth is eleven kilometres and to new Corinth twelve. The site of ancient Sicyon is eleven to twelve kilometres from the bridge of Nemea so that the river is therefore about half way between these two ancient sites.<sup>6</sup> The boundary line may be regarded as leaving the river about midway between its mouth and its source and as turning southeast so as to exclude the town Cleonae which belongs to the Argolid and at the same time to include within Corinthian territory the village of Tenea. The southern boundary may be marked by a line drawn in an easterly direction between the modern village of Hagios Vasilios and Tenea and near the northern slopes of the Argive Mountains till it reaches their northern extremity, where it turns southward to embrace in the Corinthian area the territory lying along the Saronic Gulf in the direction of Epidaurus. Bursian<sup>7</sup> places the boundary line between Corinth and

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Philippson, *Das Mittelmeergebiet*, pp. 42, 79.

<sup>3</sup> *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde*, 1890, pp. 1-98.

<sup>4</sup> *Fasti Hellenici*, II, p. 514.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Bursian, *Geog. von Griech.*, II, 9, 23; Strabo, 382.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *British Admiralty Handbook of Greece*, Route 95, pp. 625 f. and Baedeker,<sup>4</sup> p. 314.

<sup>7</sup> *Geog. von Griech.*, II, 9.



Map of the Corinthia indicating the adjoining States. (From Dr. A. Philippson's *Der Peloponnes*,  
 Typographische und Hypsometrische Karte, Blatt II, Berlin, 1891.)





Epidauria in the Epidaurian mountain ranges, "on the ridge of which probably the boundary line between Corinthia and Epidauria passed."

Between the Megarid and Corinthia the boundary line is still more indefinite. Strabo<sup>8</sup> informs us that Crommyon is a village in Corinthia though in earlier times it was in Megaris, and, strangely, appears to contradict himself in a later passage.<sup>9</sup> A reference in Scylax<sup>10</sup> would indicate that at least as early as the fourth century Crommyon had already been annexed by Corinth. Pausanias<sup>11</sup> observes that in his own day a temple of Apollo Latous, situated to the east of Crommyon at the western end of the Scironian Rocks, marked the boundary between the Megarian and Corinthian territory. It is not obvious why Bursian<sup>12</sup> extends Megarian territory westward of Crommyon to include the plain of Sidus. It may be said here that the accounts<sup>13</sup> of the various geographers, ancient and modern, do not agree in this matter of boundary lines when they attempt to give some factual information. Generally they evade the issue, being carefully non-committal and making recompense by a generous interspersion of historical or legendary information. Not indeed that they deserve blame, for, even when one makes careful inquiries on the spot it is impossible today to get any more information than the ancient writers so scantily supply. There is some satisfaction, however, in recognizing the fact

<sup>8</sup> 380; Cf. also Scylax, *Periplus*, 55.

<sup>9</sup> 390. The text however is uncertain.

<sup>10</sup> Müller, *Geog. Gr. Min.*, pp. XLIII ff. Cf. Smith, *Dict. Geog.* s. v. who in this connection obviously drew from Hoffmann, *Die Alterthumswissenschaft*, p. 274.

<sup>11</sup> I, 44, 10.

<sup>12</sup> *Geog. von Griech.*, I, p. 384.

<sup>13</sup> H. Kiepert, *Lehrbuch der Geog.*, p. 273 f.; Neumann-Partsch, *Geog. von Griech.*, p. 179 et passim; Bursian, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 9-23; Lolling in I. Müller's *Handbuch*, III, pp. 159 ff.; Bunbury, *Hist. of Ancient Geography*; Tozer, *Lectures*; and a host of older writers like Dodwell, Leake, Curtius, Clark, Beulé, Forbiger, Hoffmann, etc.

that we have no precise knowledge of some of these matters and that we are not likely to have any.

One cannot help regarding as wisdom the remark of so old an author as Hoffmann when he says: "The area was not the same at all periods," and contents himself by concluding that at the period of its greatest extent the Corinthia was bounded on the north by the Halcyonian Sea and Megara, on the east by the Saronic Gulf, on the south by Argolis and on the west by Sicyon. I have failed to find any definite information on the position of the dividing line in the mountain ranges to the north and east. A journey into the fastnesses of Perachora was not successful as far as that particular purpose was concerned. We are not to assume, however, that the whole Geraneian range was included in Corinthian territory, although that part of it obviously must have been which comes down close to the Isthmus and Bay of Lechaëum.<sup>14</sup> At the northern end of this range and at the southeastern extremity of the quadrangular peninsula of Peraea (Perachora) was situated Oenoe, seemingly the last Corinthian outpost on the confines of Megara.<sup>15</sup>

This seems the best that can be done in assigning the boundary lines of the Corinthia. Yet in ancient days the Greeks had very clear lines of demarcation. Of this we are reminded by Xenophon<sup>16</sup> in his account of the Corinthian war, when he tells us that the boundary stones between the Corinthian and Argive territories were torn up so that the Corinthia was incorporated in Argolis. He does not mention the position of these stones. He probably did not know. They certainly lay somewhere among the intervening mountains. We must, then, be content with this approximate determination of the boundaries of the Corinthia and proceed to discuss its internal topography.

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<sup>14</sup> Cf. map in Baedeker,<sup>4</sup> p. 315.

<sup>15</sup> For a recent study of this region, cf. "Topographical Notes on Perachora," a paper read in December 1926 at a meeting of the Archaeological Inst. of Amer. (*A. J. A.*, XXXI, 1927, p. 96).

<sup>16</sup> *Hell.*, IV, 4, 5 ff.

## GULF OF CORINTH

At the outset, however, it would be well to describe the Corinthian Gulf inasmuch as it bounds the Corinthian coast on the north and west. This gulf may be likened to a great inland lake, extending according to Strabo<sup>17</sup> from the mouth of the Evenus in Aetolia and the promontory of Araxus in Achaea as far as the Isthmus. At its eastern extremity the gulf is divided by the projecting quadrangular promontory called Peraea into two inlets, the Halcyonian Sea on the north, and the Bay of Lechaeum on the south.<sup>18</sup>

The whole gulf may be considered as divided into an outer and an inner sea by the promontories of Rhium in Achaea and Antirrhium in Aetolia, distant apart only one and a half miles according to Leake and Dodwell, and less according to the ancients, Thucydides<sup>19</sup> giving seven stadia and Strabo<sup>20</sup> five. We know from the Homeric Hymn to Apollo<sup>21</sup> that the eastern portion of the gulf was originally called the Crissaeon Gulf. Thucydides<sup>22</sup> uses the same name. All the later historians,<sup>23</sup> however, agree in calling it by the more general name of the Corinthian Gulf. Strabo names the whole sea from Cape Araxus to the Isthmus the Corinthian Gulf and distinguishes the inner portion as the Crissaeon Gulf whilst Seylax calls the latter the Delphian Gulf. Quite a distinct view in regard to the place names is held by Pliny.<sup>24</sup> He calls the inner waters the Corinthiacus Sinus and assigns the name Crissaeon to the Bay of Oeanthe, the modern Gulf of Salona.

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<sup>17</sup> 335.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Philippson, *Der Peloponnes*, p. 15. The modern names are the Bay of Livadostra and the Bay of Corinth.

<sup>19</sup> II, 86.

<sup>20</sup> 335.

<sup>21</sup> 431, cf. Sikes and Allen's note here.

<sup>22</sup> I, 107; II, 86 where he obviously used Crissaeon in reference to the Corinthian Gulf as a whole.

<sup>23</sup> Xen., *Hell.*, IV, 2, 9; Polyb., V, 3; Livy, XXVI, 26; XXVIII, 7, 8.

<sup>24</sup> *N. H.*, IV, 2, 3; 3, 4; cf. Strabo, 390, 391.

Strabo sets down the whole circuit of the gulf from the promontory of Araxus to the Isthmus as 2,230 stadia. The modern measurement of the length is about 78 miles with an average breadth of  $12\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

The Corinthian Gulf was surrounded on the north and south by mountain chains. As Philippson<sup>25</sup> has well described it: "It is a long, narrow arm of the sea, on both sides of which high mountains descend very steeply and which itself has very considerable depths." The mountains on the west shut out the view of the open sea, so that to dwellers in Corinth and the surrounding districts, the Gulf actually presented the appearance of a beautiful inland lake of large dimensions. Many travellers agree that in charm of scenery it surpasses the most picturesque lakes of Switzerland and northern Italy and Philippson<sup>26</sup> well describes the unforgettable impression made on one by a sojourn on the shores of these fair waters:

the two azure seas with their frequently broken coastlines on which the surf breaks with a silver-white foam under the force of the sea winds or the Etesian winds. When the sun sets there are added manifold tints to the quickly darkening evening sky, which through their rapidly changing reflexes call forth every moment surprisingly new colour nuances even in the already variegated scenery. The charm of such a summer evening-hour in the eastern Greek landscape can be only seen, not described.

A traveller sailing from Corinth sees in the distance the tapering peaks of Erymanthus, where the boundary lines of Arcadia, Elis and Achaea converge. Across the gulf, gleaming in the sun, appear the snow-clad tops of Parnassus and Helicon and on the southern side are seen the rivers of Achaea running along their parallel courses to contrast with the irregular and rugged coast-lines of Phocis and Locris on the north. Every visitor to Greece has been struck by its

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<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 426 ff.; for those interested in a complete geological discussion of the gulf, this is the place to look. Cf. also pp. 452 ff.

<sup>26</sup> *Der Isthmos von Korinth*, *Zeitschr. d. Ges. für Erdkunde*, 1890, p. 77.

beauty. "Its coasts broken into an infinite variety of outline by the ever changing mixture of bold promontory, gentle slope, and cultivated level, are crowned on every side by lofty mountains of the most majestic forms."<sup>27</sup>

#### PERAEA

The two bays at the eastern extremity of the Gulf are separated from each other by the mountainous Peraean promontory which cuts far into the blue waters.<sup>28</sup> From these mountains, still forest-clad as in ancient days, the Corinthians obtained timber for their dockyards. Among the fertile glades their flocks found abundant pasturage when the light-soiled plains of the lowlands were baked dry by the burning sun.<sup>29</sup> It is a great mistake to assume that the region was agriculturally unproductive.<sup>30</sup> From Corinth the Peraea looks like one immense and barren mountain. The few travellers who take the trouble to climb beyond its steep fastnesses are greeted by smiling vineyards and glittering olive groves that enrich the happy valleys among the pine-clad hills where the fragrance of the resin and the calling of the cicada are never wanting. For anyone living in Corinth today this region names itself, Perachora, "das jenseitige Land" as Philippson calls it. And it was over these steep hills that the road through Pagae to Boeotia and Phocis and all northern places passed.<sup>31</sup> The most important place in this district was Peiraeum, in ancient days one of a chain of strong fortresses intended to check the incursions of the Athenians and Megarians. Peiraeum is generally identified with the modern Perachora, lying almost in the centre of the peninsula, though

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<sup>27</sup> Leake, *Morea*, III, p. 397.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Philippson, *Der Peloponnes*, p. 15.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, II, pp. 551 ff.; also the remarks of Curtius in *Rhein. Mus.*, 1846, p. 202.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Philippson, *Der Peloponnes*, pp. 25, 27.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Philippson, *Der Isthmos von K.*, in *Zeitschr. d. Ges. für Erdk.*, 1890, p. 80; Byvanck in Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. Korinthos, p. 995.



Mr. Robinson places Peiraeum at Asprokambos.<sup>32</sup> Indeed the remarks of Curtius<sup>33</sup> about the uncertainty of our topography of this region still hold. "This peninsula lies distant from the great military road . . . and is therefore less mentioned by ancient writers just as it has been less visited by modern travellers." However, certain points are more or less clear. In addition to Peiraeum there were the fortresses of Oenoe and the Heraeum which stood on the extreme western point of the promontory.<sup>34</sup> Mr. Robinson has discovered a splendid triple fortress at the former, and disagreeing with Leake, shows that the temple of Hera was at the tip of the promontory. Here was situated the oracle of Hera Acraea<sup>35</sup> which will be mentioned in connection with the cults in a later chapter. The temple was fortified with strong walls embracing the very extremity of the promontory and these with the remains of the building have been investigated and discussed by Mr. Robinson. The Heraean promontory is now called C. Hagios Nikolaos from a chapel of St. Nikolaos which is situated a little way inland from the fortress. Here, also, remains of ancient walls are in evidence. It may have been the site of an ancient sanctuary of Poseidon for whom as protector of sailors we find St. Nikolaos substituted in early Christian times.

There are two other places of interest in the peninsula. Therma derives its name from the hot springs found there. They are situated at the northeastern corner of the Bay of Lechaeum and on the seashore. The road from Corinth to Peiraeum passed this way and from early times these springs must have been extensively used. The modern village and port of Lutráki which has arisen on the spot takes its name

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Topographical Notes on Perachora*, as cited above.

<sup>33</sup> *Die Peräa von Korinth und die Eschatiotis in Rhein. Mus.*, 1846, p. 200.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, II, p. 597, A. 95 and also in *Rhein. Mus.*, l. c., where long if not illuminating lists of ancient references are quoted.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Strabo, 380; Xen., *Hell.*, IV, 5, 5; *Livy*, XXXII, 23.

from these waters and is a favourite health resort, the water, which is tepid, possessing medicinal qualities.<sup>36</sup> No more pleasant place for a quiet rest by a sea which laves the feet of pine-clad hills could be found in Greece, despite the damage done by the earthquake of 1928.

The other place of importance is the lake near the Heraeum in the extreme west of the peninsula beside which Agesilaus was seated when he heard of the destruction of his Lacedaemonian mora by the peltasts of Iphicrates. It is a salt lake and is now named Vuliasméni. Curtius<sup>37</sup> conjecturally identifies it with Lake Eschatiotis, where legend relates that Gorgo, the daughter of Megareus and wife of Corinthus, drowned herself on hearing of the murder of her children; whence it was afterwards called Gorgopis. Curtius thus brings Vuliasméni into the well-known system of fire-signals described in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*<sup>38</sup> by which was announced to Mycenae the fall of Troy. One cannot help being influenced by his glowing assurances:<sup>39</sup>

The position of Aegiplantus, of which mention is made here only, is given by the context. It can be only a part of Geraneia,

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<sup>36</sup> Cf. Philippson, *Der Isth. in Zeitschr. d. Ges. für Erdk.*, 1890, p. 36. Things are much improved since Philippson's time. Lutraki today is a delightful place. As to the Greeks' belief in the potency of warm springs it is no more unreasonable than our faith in most doctors' bottles!

<sup>37</sup> *Rhein. Mus.*, 1846, pp. 203 ff. where the ancient references are quoted. Cf. also his *Peloponnesos*, II, pp. 553, 598, A. 96.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *Rhein. Mus.*, I. c., pp. 202 ff. For a criticism of Curtius' view in regard to Aegiplantus see A. C. Merriam, "Telegraphing Among the Ancients," *Papers of Am. School of Cl. Studies in Athens*, 1890.

<sup>39</sup> *Rh. Mus.*, I. c., p. 206. The same author's remarks (*Peloponnesos* II, p. 552) on the importance of the Peraea from a strategic point of view are very much to the point: It commanded the west coast route to Boeotia and Phocis. "Darum war dies Bergland so wichtig für die bewaffneten Interventionen der Peloponnesier in Nordgriechenland und für ihre Verbindung mit den dortigen Bundesgenossen; darum war es unausgesetzt das Ziel attischer Eroberungspläne welche sich vorzugsweise auf Pegai, die erwünschteste Flottenstation im korinthischen Meerbusen, richteten."



and indeed not the northern slope of the same as mentioned by Müller and Kiepert, but it must be, as I have assumed, a peak of Peraea in order to permit of sending the fiery reflection unhindered over the Isthmus and the Saronic Gulf.

### THE ISTHMUS OF CORINTH

In its stricter sense the name is applied only to the narrowest portion of the link connecting Peloponnesus and the mainland. It is best defined by a line drawn from the eastern extremity of the Bay of Lechaëum to the port of Schoenus on the Saronic Gulf. In this sense Corinth is not on the Isthmus at all—the only town thereon being Schoenus. In the wider sense of the word, as applied to the whole stretch of territory lying between the Geraneian and Oneian ranges,<sup>40</sup> Corinth is on the Isthmus; *Κόρινθος ἐπὶ τῷ Ἰσθμῷ κείμενος καὶ δυοῖν λιμένων κύριος*, as Strabo has it. In the more extended sense of the term the Isthmus is about ten miles in width at Corinth, the length being about the same. Schoenus, the only port on the Isthmus proper, was a most important place in ancient times. Situated on the shore of the Saronic Gulf, it was a ready port of call for eastern merchantmen, and goods not intended for the Corinthian market were sent from Schoenus by the “diolkos” to the Bay of Lechaëum.<sup>41</sup>

### THE DIOLKOS

The “diolkos” was a level ship-road on which smaller vessels were transported by a system of rollers from one sea to another.<sup>42</sup> The cargoes of larger ships were unloaded and

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<sup>40</sup> For the geological conditions of the Isthmus cf. Philippon, *Pelop.*, pp. 28 ff. A complete study of the region is given in his “Der Isthmos von Korinth (Eine geologische-geographische Monographie)” in *Zeitschr. d. Ges. für Erdkunde*, Berlin, 1890, pp. 1-98. Cf. also Curtius, *Pelop.*, I, pp. 8-16, and II, p. 539, where the different senses of the “Isthmos” are discussed and p. 595 A. 87 where the ancient references are quoted.

<sup>41</sup> Philippon, *Isth. von K.*, p. 85.

<sup>42</sup> Curtius, *op. cit.*, II, p. 546, with A. 91 (p. 596) where a long list of ancient references is given.

taken across to other vessels on the opposite coast by this same roadway. It seems, however, to have been a common practice to transport warships by the diolkos. We find mention of the practice in Thucydides and Polybius.<sup>43</sup> Cassius Dio<sup>44</sup> relates how Augustus in his pursuit of Anthony and Cleopatra after the battle of Actium conveyed his ships across the Isthmus. Remains of the causeway are still to be seen at the cutting leading to the ferry across the canal on the way from New Corinth to Lutráki. Some have thought that the diolkos was used only for ships of war. This view is not supported by the historical evidence. Though Strabo in two passages<sup>45</sup> refers to the use of the diolkos, he does not specify exactly the kind of ships hauled across but in another place<sup>46</sup> the word *πορθμεία* indicates that he had in mind not merely warships. Besides, his anecdote about merchantmen avoiding the dangerous route around Cape Malea is fairly conclusive. It is a reasonable inference that in ancient times small ships of burden were regularly dragged on rollers or wagons across the Isthmus by means of the diolkos.<sup>47</sup>

The ship-road occupied the narrowest portion of the Isthmus from the Bay of Lechaëum to Schoenus. Thus the shortest breadth of the Isthmus was the diolkos.<sup>48</sup> It has been superseded in modern times by a canal contemplated by various rulers since the days of Periander but only carried out in 1882 of our own era. Such a mode of conveyance would have had for the ancients two great advantages. It would

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<sup>43</sup> Thuc., VIII, 7; Polyb., IV, 19; V, 101.

<sup>44</sup> LI, 5.

<sup>45</sup> 369, 378; Cf. Hesychius *s. v.* *Διολκος*; Mela, II, 48; Pliny, *N. H.*, IV, 10.

<sup>46</sup> 335. Cf. Philippson, *Zeitschr. d. Ges. für Erdkunde*, 1890, pp. 85 ff.

<sup>47</sup> Curtius, *l. c.*, clears up this point excellently. Cf. also Rogers' note on Aristoph., *Thesmoph.* 648 f. with Scholium which is absolutely convincing. Cf. Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work*, p. 307.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Strabo, 335. According to the French Survey, the exact breadth at the narrowest point is 5,950 metres (Boblaye, *Recherches*, p. 37, N. 1). The estimates of the ancients are most varied.

have formed an additional line of defence for the Peloponnese and it would have obviated the danger and loss of time involved in the circumnavigation of the southern end of the peninsula.<sup>49</sup>

The scheme did not materialize however. It was a difficult undertaking for the ancients, who were not skilled engineers, whilst it was an easy process enough to drag their light ships across the diolkos. What perhaps more than anything else prevented the proposal being carried out was the silly belief of the engineers that the Corinthian Gulf was higher than the Saronic. This notion, we learn from Eratosthenes,<sup>50</sup> deterred Demetrius Poliorcetes. The Egyptians on his staff told Nero the same story of the inequality of the heights of the two seas.<sup>51</sup> Julius Caesar, Caligula and Herodes Atticus had all formed the plan of cutting the canal.<sup>52</sup> We have also Pliny's words<sup>53</sup> "perfodere navigabili alveo angustias tentare Demetrius rex, dictator Caesar, Gaius princeps, Domitius Nero, infausto (ut omnium patuit exitu) incepto." Periander<sup>54</sup> seems to have been the first to resolve to do so, but we do not know why this successful ruler did not carry his intentions into effect.

Nero, then, evidently was the only one who actually made the attempt. He opened the work with great ceremony in A. D. 67, digging the first sod himself with a golden spade. His staff was only six days engaged when news of Vindex's

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<sup>49</sup> Cf. the interesting remarks of Philippson, *Zeitschr. d. Ges. für Erdkunde*, 1890, pp. 11 ff.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Strabo, 54.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Lucian, *De Foss. Isthm.* This idea about the belief in the difference of levels of the two seas deterring the ancients is rejected by M. Georgiades who explains otherwise—"parceque ces travaux de longue haleine exigent les loisirs d'une longue paix, bienfait, dont ne jouirent jamais nos ancêtres dans l'antiquité" (*Les Ports de la Grèce dans l'Antiquité*, p. 5).

<sup>52</sup> For Caesar, cf. Cassius Dio, XLIV, 5; for Caligula, Suetonius, s. v. 21; for Herodes, Philostratus, *Vit. Sophist.*, II, 1, 10.

<sup>53</sup> *N. H.*, IV, 4.

<sup>54</sup> Diog. Laert., I, 99, s. v. *Periander*.

revolt obliged him to return home. Some vestiges of his attempt were still to be seen at the time of Colonel Leake's<sup>55</sup> travels. They were near the diolkos on the shore of the Bay of Lechaëum. "The excavation," he tells us, "has now little depth but it is 200 feet wide and it is traceable for about 1,200 yards in a direction at right angles to the shore crossing the level ground which here borders on the sea and extends not much further than the end of the trench."

#### THE ISTHMIAN WALL

Immediately west of the diolkos, was the Isthmian wall. It extended across the narrowest portion of the Isthmus from the Bay of Lechaëum to the Bay of Schoenus. The date of its erection has always been a puzzle.<sup>56</sup> The first wall mentioned in history was that built by the Peloponnesians to oppose the progress of Xerxes.<sup>57</sup> Most authorities (e. g. Colonel Leake, Sir J. G. Frazer) think that the wall built to resist the Persians cannot have been that of which the remains are still extant. Such a fortification, they think, must have been a hastily executed fieldwork of which the present traces cannot have formed a part, displaying, as they do, carefully wrought plan and good finish. Curtius started this view and he has been followed by most writers since.<sup>58</sup>

I see no reason for this view since I assume that Herodotus means what he says. The Peloponnesians, he relates, began building the wall very soon after the announcement of Thermopylae.<sup>59</sup> This was early in 480. They kept on building uninterruptedly until the spring of 479, finishing the work sometime before the advance to Plataea.<sup>60</sup> They, therefore,

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<sup>55</sup> *Travels in Morea*, III, p. 300 f.; cf. also Monceaux, *Gaz. Arch.*, 1885, pp. 213 f.; and Gerster, *B.C.H.*, VIII, 1884, pp. 229 ff.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Curtius, *Pelop.* I, pp. 14 f; II, p. 547.

<sup>57</sup> Hdt., VIII, 71. Cf. Diod., XI, 16.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Philippson, *Zeitschr.* as cited, p. 87.

<sup>59</sup> Hdt., VIII, 40, 71.

<sup>60</sup> Hdt., IX, 8.

were engaged in the building for a whole year. The workers were most enthusiastic; willing hands—perhaps not so many as Herodotus says, tens of thousands—did not spare themselves in making an excellent line of defence. Not a moment was lost in the building, the work going on both by day and by night. If a big Peloponnesian army could not build a wall four miles long in a district where there was plenty of suitable material <sup>61</sup> and at a time when all their hopes and prospects were centred in its impregnability, it is a poor tribute to their building powers. We must remember that actually a double wall, right around Plataea with battlements and towers to boot, was erected in 429 B. C. in the course of the summer. Mr. Macan's amusing observation is indeed very much to the point: "This wall at the Isthmus has been a most unconscionable time a-building, if it is only now, about mid-summer, receiving the finishing touches, in the shape of battlements (*ἐπάλξεις*)."<sup>62</sup> These battlements <sup>62</sup> in themselves point to the fact that it was a carefully wrought building. Traces of them remain to the present day and are the most ancient looking parts of the structure. In general, then, the existing remains, as Bursian <sup>63</sup> says, "belong, without doubt, to the original structure." Dr. Grundy,<sup>64</sup> too, seems to regard the Isthmian wall built to ward off the eastern invaders as a carefully wrought and well-finished work. It is reasonable therefore, while admitting that this wall was more than once renewed or rebuilt during the centuries of successive invasions that came by this way, to question the view of those who regard the extant remains as posterior to the defence against the Persians.

A mile to the southwest of Schoenus and immediately south of the Isthmian wall was the Isthmian sanctuary containing

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<sup>61</sup> One finds today numerous quarries on the road between Isthmia and Hexamilia.

<sup>62</sup> Hdt., IX, 7.

<sup>63</sup> *Geog.*, II, 18.

<sup>64</sup> *Great Persian War*, pp. 378 f., 441.



the famous temples of Poseidon and Palaemon. A strong wall, in some places twelve feet thick, surrounded it on all sides, the northern wall of the peribolus forming part of the Isthmian fortification mentioned above. We may assume that the sanctuary wall was used in constructing the line of defence. This area, though somewhat better known since 1883 owing to the labours of the French School, is still little understood. Almost everything was found in a ruinous condition so that Bursian's<sup>65</sup> remark is still almost valid: "Of neither of the two temples has there hitherto been discovered a certain trace on the plateau covered with rubbish-heaps of different kinds; among which stands a small ruined chapel." Hence, one appreciates all the more the brilliant description of Curtius<sup>66</sup> who reconstructs from the literary evidence the sacred enclosure, its contents and surroundings, and relates the historical memories that linger round this hallowed spot. All that can be said, however, from an archæological or topographical standpoint is that the surrounding wall traces the form of an irregular pentagon, adjoining the Isthmian wall as I have mentioned, with which, in fact, it coincided to the north and northeast for a distance of 220 yards. The fragments of the old Doric temple of Poseidon discovered by the French show great antiquity.

The construction of this monument must be attributed to the middle of the sixth century; it is certainly subsequent to the temple of Corinth but it is anterior to several of the old temples of Sicily. It was, like the sanctuaries of Syracuse and of Delphi, the work of the Dorian School of Corinth.<sup>67</sup>

That the temple was Doric is further evidenced by coinage<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> *Geog.*, II, pp. 20 f.

<sup>66</sup> *Pelop.*, II, pp. 541-3, and p. 595 with A. 87 and 88. Note the curious remark of Hdt., VIII, 121, about the Phœnician ship dedicated by the Greeks and see Macan's note. Cf. also VIII, 123; IX, 81, and Thuc., V, 18.

<sup>67</sup> Paul Monceaux in *Gaz. Arch.*, IX, 1884, pp. 359 ff.

<sup>68</sup> Imhoof-Blumer and Gardner, *Num. Comm. on Pausanias*, p. 16, with pl. D xlix.; D l.; also p. 11 with pl. B, xi, xii, xiii.

which shows that the Palaemon temple on the other hand was Ionic. Admittedly the evidence from coins is exceedingly late; nevertheless M. Monceaux brings his "débris ioniques" into relation with the numismatic testimony and supposes that we have the two great styles of architecture represented in the Isthmian sacred precinct. The sanctuaries are thought to have lain near the chapel of St. John in the North part of the precinct. M. Monceaux<sup>69</sup> is of the opinion that the temple of Poseidon occupied the site of this little chapel. But whatever we may say about the respective position of the buildings within the sacred enclosure it will be remembered as one of the most historic spots in Greece:

Resting against the defense wall of the Peloponnese, this sanctuary commanded one of the strategic routes of the region. The big towers gave to the enclosure the aspect of a small fort. The fortifications which we have just described are the work of the Romans. But it is probable that the latter preserved the original arrangement. It is around the temple of Poseidon that the Peloponnesians assembled to await Xerxes. It is also near there that, a century later, Agesilaus and the Athenian generals unfolded all the resources of their skilled tactics. Thereafter the sacred enclosure dominated proudly the valley from its high wall and its powerful towers.

So writes M. Monceaux.<sup>70</sup> Outside the sacred enclosure the remains of the theatre and stadium may still be seen a little distance south of the fortification wall and near the sanctuary of Poseidon.<sup>71</sup> M. Monceaux thinks that the remains of the theatre date from the Roman occupation and that the Greek theatre was on the slope of the same low hill but higher up.<sup>72</sup> The Stadium, the place of the famous Isthmian games now looks merely like a natural hollow. What memories cling round this desolate spot—the temenos of Poseidon, the "lord

<sup>69</sup> "Fouilles et recherches archéologiques au sanctuaire des Jeux Isthmiques" in *Gaz. Arch.*, IX, 1884, pp. 273-285, 352-363.

<sup>70</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 276; cf. also Beulé, *Études sur le Pel.*, pp. 441 ff.; Leake, *Morea*, III, pp. 286-296; Welcker, *Tagebuch*, I, pp. 166 ff.; Clarke, *Peloponnesus*, pp. 47 ff.; *Travels*, III, pp. 751 ff.

<sup>71</sup> See excellent plan in *Gaz. Arch.*, IX, 1884, p. 274.

<sup>72</sup> *Op. cit.*, X, 1885, p. 208.



of Isthmus.”<sup>73</sup> Here was Isthmus in its special sense which is so frequently referred to in Pindar. For when Pindar says Ἴσθμοῖ he does not mean on the Isthmus but “at Isthmus”. It is ἁθία Ἴσθμός sacred for ever to Poseidon since he was welcomed there when he came from Aegae.<sup>74</sup> “It is interesting to observe,” says Prof. Bury,<sup>75</sup> “the variety of expressions which Pindar uses to designate the scene of the Isthmian games. We hear of victors crowned ‘by Corinthians in the folds of noble Pelops’ or ‘in the corner of the Bay of Greece’, or ‘on Corinth’s inmost gulf’, or ‘on the sea bridge in front of Corinth’s walls’, or ‘on the bridge of indefatigable ocean.’ The Isthmus is called the ‘neck of Corinth’, ‘the gate of Corinth’, ‘the sea-fenced neck of Isthmus’, the ‘portal of Poseidon.’” Who will not recall that here too Alexander the Great caused himself to be hailed as the leader of the Greeks before he set out on his world conquest in 336 B. C. and that there were Corinthians still living at the time of the ruthless destruction of their glorious city who as young men “nearly killed Flamininus by the exhibition of their gratitude”<sup>76</sup> when with the best of intentions, I suppose, that good soldier perpetrated one of the great jokes in history, Rome’s proclamation of the “Freedom of Greece”?

The narrow part of the Isthmus in general formation may be described as a great tract of elevated land composed for the most part of sand and tertiary marl with two alluvial plains at each end, on the shores of the Gulfs of Corinth and Aegina.<sup>77</sup> Frazer well describes the place:

the central part is a flat table-land which shelves away in steep terraces to the sea on the southern side. Its surface is rugged, barren and waterless; where it is not quite bare and stony, it is

<sup>73</sup> Pindar, *Nem.*, VI, 40; *Isthm.*, V, 5.

<sup>74</sup> *Nem.*, V, 37. Cf. *Isthm.*, III, 11; *Nem.*, X, 42, etc.

<sup>75</sup> *Isthmian Odes*, Introd., p. xxxiv.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Polyb., XVIII, 46.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. A. Philippson, *Der Peloponnes*, pp. 28 f.; B. Gerster in *B. C. H.*, VIII, 1884, pp. 229 ff.

mostly overgrown with stunted shrubs and dwarf pines or with thistles and other prickly plants of grey arid aspect. There is no underwood and no turf. In spring some grass and herbage sprout in patches among the thistles and afford pasture to flocks. The niggard soil where soil exists is cultivated in a rude imperfect way and yields some scanty crops, mostly of wheat and barley.<sup>78</sup>

I myself observed on several occasions that the land immediately surrounding the canal is bare and sandy providing apparently only very poor crops of corn. And as to trees, Curtius<sup>79</sup> remarks:

Considering the present state of the soil, scarcely another conifer may be imagined as native to the Isthmus than the *pinus maritima* (shore-pine) whose fresh, juicy green is the last remaining ornament of the rocky shores of Greece.

The plain, then, is not a perfect level. There is a gradual incline from both shores towards the centre. The rise is more marked from the eastern than from the western side. One realizes today how the train has to climb quite a gradient on starting out from New Corinth for Athens. This is especially noticeable on the way up to the bridge across the canal. The highest point according to Curtius is 246 feet above the sea level. This physical feature was, no doubt, another deterrent to the would-be canal cutters. To make an excavation more than 200 feet deep was a big undertaking in those days. Hence the narrow neck of land which bridges the seas between northern and southern Greece remained, as Philippon<sup>80</sup> so well describes it:

Always a bone of contention between the inhabitants on both sides, an admission gate for hostile attacks from both directions, an object of continual fear and worry especially to the Peloponnesians, who therefore tried repeatedly to blockade the pass by fortifications; in the Middle Ages and modern times the key by which hordes of barbarians could get possession of the Peloponnese,—it

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<sup>78</sup> Comm. on Pausanias, III, 4.

<sup>79</sup> *Peloponnesos*, II, p. 543; cf. Philippon, *Der Isth.*, pp. 74 ff.

<sup>80</sup> *Der Isthmos von Korinth*, in *Zeitschr. d. Ges. für Erdkunde*, 1890, p. 11.

has been much less of service to the Peloponnesians as well as to the central Greeks for peaceful intercourse between north and south than for war and its disasters.

### LECHAEUM

Now that we have noticed the importance of Schoenus let us discuss the other ports in Corinthia. The most important was Lechaeum on the bay of that name. It was the northern port of Corinthia, the port par excellence of the city with which it was connected by long walls running due north about twelve furlongs in length.<sup>81</sup> These walls formed an excellent fortification, and were under the very eyes of the Acrocorinthian garrison. In fact they were an extension of a line of defence from the citadel of Corinth to the harbour of Lechaeum. This line guarded the road which passed southwest between the citadel and the Corinthian Gulf and thus provided an almost perfect strategic position.<sup>82</sup> There were gates in the long walls to permit of ready passage for the Corinthians themselves and their friends.<sup>83</sup>

The port of Lechaeum was not a natural harbour. Built on the sandy stretches along the shore in which the plain between Corinth and Lechaeum here terminates, the harbour was artificial, a λιμὴν χωστός<sup>84</sup> improved from time to time as Corinth grew in wealth and mercantile importance. The

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<sup>81</sup> Cf. Strabo, 380; Xen., *Hell.*, IV, 4, 7 f.; Paus., II, 2, 3; Skias, *Πρακτικά*, 1892, pp. 112 f., who describes the existing traces of the long walls to Lechaeum. See also the discussion of American Excavations (*infra*).

<sup>82</sup> The only other passes, at either end of the Oneian range, could be easily held by small garrisons at Acrocorinth and Cenchreae, respectively. Cf. the last paragraph of Xen., *op. cit.*, VI, where he blames Iphicrates for the final feature of his otherwise good generalship. Xenophon condemns his leaving the pass of Cenchreae unguarded while attempting to control the way at Oneion on the west. Hence the stricture which Grote, IX, 457, ascribes to Xenophon's phil-Laconism.

<sup>83</sup> Xen., *Hell.*, IV, 4, 7-12.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Dionysius, *Descr. Gr.*, v. 108, in Müller, *Geog. Gr. Min.*, I, p. 242.

remains of the port today have been fully investigated by M. Georgiades <sup>85</sup> who gives not only a valuable historical introduction to the use of this port (as well as Cenchreae and the four other Greek ports he describes) but with the skill of an "Ingénieur en Chef" of Athens provides excellent plates of the harbours of Lechaëum and Cenchreae with descriptive texts. In the plates the extant remains are marked in red "und so deutlich hervortreten" as Dr. Dörpfeld says in his review.<sup>86</sup> To the casual traveller of today the position of Lechaëum is plainly indicated by a lagoon surrounded by dreary sand-dunes.

Lechaëum was to Corinth what Peiraeus was to Athens, but it was much more conveniently situated, being separated from its city scarce one-third of the distance. It was thus more favourable to the commercial pursuits of Corinth, and could be more easily brought within a system of military protection. On the other hand it was too near the city to become an important town like the Peiraeus; yet it was from the earliest times famous for commercial greatness. Besides being the chief station for the fleet <sup>87</sup> it was the emporium of trade with western Greece, the Ionian Sea and the Greek settlements in Italy and Sicily.<sup>88</sup>

The eastern port on the Saronic Gulf was Cenchreae. It was distant about 70 stadia in a south-easterly direction from Corinth and was the emporium of trade with Asia. Sir Thomas Wyse <sup>89</sup> was of the opinion that it had in ancient

<sup>85</sup> *Les Ports de la Grèce dans l'Antiquité*, Athènes, 1907, Plates I, II, with texts pp. 4 and 5.

<sup>86</sup> *Wochenschr. für klass. Philologie*, 29 Mar., 1909, 349.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Xen., *Hell.*, IV, 4, 12, with remarks of M. Georgiades *l. c.* Cf. also remarks of Imhoof-Blumer and Gardner, *Num. Comm. on Paus.*, *Suppl.*, No. 11 (coin of Corinth).

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Leake, *Morea*, III, p. 234; Curtius, *Pelop.*, II, pp. 536 f.; Bursian, *Geographie*, II, p. 18; Miliarakis, *Γεωγραφία*, p. 112; Boblaye, *Recherches*, p. 37; Vischer, *Erinnerungen*, p. 266. Propertius proposed to make his love-sick journey to Athens via Lechaëum and the "Isthmos qua terris arcet utrumque mare" (*Prop.*, III, 21).

<sup>89</sup> *Excursion in Peloponnesus*, II, p. 326.

times a mussel fishing industry, evidenced by the mussel on the old coins of Corinth. Cenchreae no doubt was one of the centres for the purple-fisheries commonly carried on by the Phoenicians, for unlike Lechaeum it was a beautiful natural harbour, regarded in antiquity as no less commodious than the land-locked haven of Athens.<sup>90</sup> As for its remains to-day, "we have but little to say of this port, for only a few traces of it remain," says M. Georgiades.<sup>91</sup> These he has described with great accuracy. It may not be amiss to add that Cenchreae has a natural advantage in having its bay protected by two promontories, north and south; the Corinthians made it still more sheltered by building curved moles, facing each other, out into the sea, from each of these promontories. Pausanias' <sup>92</sup> description, though referring to a much later time, probably holds good for the classical period.

In Cenchreae there is a temple of Aphrodite with a statue of stone, and near it upon a rock in the sea, a brazen statue of Poseidon. On the other projection of the harbour are temples of Aesculapius and Isis. Over against Cenchreae is the bath of Helen. This is an abundant source of salt tepid water flowing from a rock into the sea.

This brief and rather indefinite description is elucidated somewhat by a coin of Antoninus Pius.<sup>93</sup> On this coin the port of Cenchreae is represented as a semicircular basin enclosed by two promontories. On the extremity of each of these stands a temple. In the sea, at the entrance to the harbour, is depicted a brazen Poseidon standing with a dolphin in one hand and a trident in the other. On the sea,

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<sup>90</sup> Cf. Philippson, *Der Isthmos von Kor.*, pp. 83, 85; Kiepert, *Lehrbuch der alt. Geog.*, p. 274; Strabo, 380; Ptol., III, 16, 13; Thuc. IV, 42, VIII, 20. As Propertius is associated with Lechaeum, Ovid is with Cenchreae (*Trist.*, I, 10, 9).

<sup>91</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 5, with Pl. II.

<sup>92</sup> II, 2.

<sup>93</sup> Imhoof-Blümer and Gardner, *Num. Comm. on Paus.*, p. 17, with Pl. D, lx.



outside the entrance are represented three ships, one opposite each of the promontories and one opposite the statue. Combining the information obtained from this coin with what Pausanias tells us, we infer that at one extremity of the harbour there was a temple of Aphrodite, at the other, sanctuaries of Aesculapius and Isis, whilst at some intermediate point at the entrance to the harbour, the statue of Poseidon was erected. The position of this latter is a matter of dispute. It seemed to me when I examined the place that the rock one sees from the shore at Cenchreae may have supported the Poseidon.<sup>94</sup>

The warm springs referred to by Pausanias are thus described by Leake:<sup>95</sup>

The bath of Helene is found a mile to the southward of the port of Kekhriés (Cenchreae) near a cape forming the termination of the ridge which borders the Isthmus on the south, and which at the western end, is separated from the Acrocorinthus by a ravine watered by a small river. The cape separates the bay of Kekhriés from that which takes its name Galatáki from a village near the shore. The water of the bath of Helene rises at such a height and distance above the sea that it serves to turn a mill in its passage. The water is tepid as Pausanias has remarked.

Some extant remains of antiquity on the high ridges to the left of the harbour suggest that the town of Cenchreae was situated on these slopes above the modern hamlet Kekhries. The few dwellings which make up this place mark one of

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<sup>94</sup> This view conflicts with the usual translation of the passage (which depends on the reading). Cf. Curtius, *Pelop.*, II, p. 594 A. 86, and Hitzig and Bluemner's ed. of Pausanias, I, pars II, p. 386; Frazer, *Pausanias*, III, p. 17. Quite a distinct view of the location of the Poseidon statue is presented by M. Georgiades, *op cit.*, p. 5, with pl. II.

<sup>95</sup> *Morea*, III, p. 235 ff. Cf. Curtius, *op. cit.*, II, p. 537 ff. When I visited the place recently I found the mill and the old miller. The mill wheel was of the "undershot" variety and the power supplied from a dam containing sea-water. This perhaps was a summer device, as the water power from the heights above would be enough at other seasons.

the points along the shore of the bay on the route of the pass known to the ancients as the pass of Cenchreae. This famous way being one of the three possible entrances to the Peloponnese by way of the Isthmus, was of the greatest military importance and I have already referred to Xenophon's<sup>96</sup> blame of Iphicrates for having left it unguarded in 369 when he was sent to shut up the Boeotian army in Peloponnese.

Thus—to recapitulate—Corinth completely commanded the three passes which alone led over the Isthmus into the Island of Pelops, the first—along the shores of the Corinthian Gulf—being occupied by the Long Walls, the second—between the western end of the Oneian range and the Acrocorinthus—lying under the very eye of the citadel garrison, and the third—along the Saronic Gulf—passing beneath the walls of Cenchreae. Corinth was in truth one of the fetters of Greece.<sup>97</sup>

#### THE OTHER COAST TOWNS OF CORINTHIA

None of these was in any sense a port. Close to the boundary line of Megaris beyond the western extremity of the Scironian rocks was a town called Crommyon. It was 120 stadia distant from the city according to Thucydides.<sup>98</sup> His estimate approximates closely to the modern measurement ( $13\frac{1}{2}$  miles). The site is occupied to-day by the little village of H. Theodori.<sup>99</sup> It stood close to the seashore and was possessed of a small but fertile plain stretching from the southwest reaches of the Geraneia towards the sea, with vineyards and olive plantations and cypress groves which look

<sup>96</sup> *Hell.*, VI, 5, 51; 'Cf. Philippson, *Der. Isth.*, pp. 82, 95; Curtius, *Pelop.*, II, 537 ff.; Leake, *Morea*, III, pp. 234 ff.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. *Polyb.*, XVIII, 11, Cf. II, 52; Livy, XXXII, 37 (remark of Philip V of Macedon).

<sup>98</sup> IV, 45; Cf. Strabo, 380, 391.

<sup>99</sup> For Crommyon Cf. also Philippson, *Der Pelop.*, pp. 19, 28; Boblaye, *Recherches*, p. 35; Curtius, *op. cit.*, II, p. 555; Bursian, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 371, 384. Crommyonia is celebrated in mythology as the haunt of the wild boar destroyed by Theseus, Paus., II, 1, 3; Strabo, *l. c.*; Plut., *Thes.*, 9; Ovid, *Met.*, VII, 435.



southeast upon the gulf of Aegina. Crommyon seems to have formed the chief town of this picturesque tract which extends for several miles along the shore to the west. One notices to-day when travelling by train from New Corinth to Athens how the plain converges to the east, and after some stretches of fragrant pine woods between the mountains and the sea, one reaches the narrow passes where the steep-towering Geraneia begin to hang their precipitous crags in the direction of the Scironian rocks and Megara.

In this district Pausanias mentions only the town of Crommyon, but Xenophon,<sup>100</sup> Ps-Scylax,<sup>101</sup> and Pliny<sup>102</sup> all speak of a town or fortress called Sidus between Crommyon and Schoenus. Athenaeus<sup>103</sup> quotes Rhianus and Apollodorus to prove "that Sidus is a village of the Corinthians" and cites some verses from Nicander and Euphorion to show that it was famous for its apples. "These," says Leake, "it is probable, grew upon the mountains above Sidus, for no good apples are produced in the lower and hotter situations of Greece." Passing Schoenus<sup>104</sup> we find on the western side of the Saronic Gulf a place called Solygeia by Thucydides,<sup>105</sup> one of the scenes of Nicias' campaigns during the Peloponnesian war. It lay to the south between the promontory of Chersonesus (which is really a continuation of the Oneian range on the east) and the stream Rheitus. On the coast between these two points the Athenians landed, and

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<sup>100</sup> *Hell.*, IV, 4.


<sup>101</sup> *Periplus*, 55.

<sup>102</sup> *N. H.*, IV, 7.

<sup>103</sup> III, 22. The writers above referred to have also discussed Sidus (Σιδούς). It probably stood in the plain of Susáki.

<sup>104</sup> The ancient site of Schoenus (*supra*) is just to the northeast of the modern canal on a small plateau over the sea. About one-quarter to one-half mile further to the east is Kalamakion (Kalamáki).

<sup>105</sup> In prehistoric days the place then occupied by the village of Solygeia was a bare mountain called Solygeius which the Dorians used as their base of operations against Corinth. *Thuc.*, IV, 42 ff. Cf. *Polyaen.*, I, 39. Cf. *Bursian, op. cit.*, II, p. 12, n. 1.



Acrocorinth from Penteskouphia.



though the attempt of Nicias failed, it was not without considerable loss to the Corinthians. Curtius was of the opinion that the sepulchres between Mertési and Galatáki probably belonged to Solygeia. Near Mertési was found the famous vase which Dodwell secured at Corinth,<sup>106</sup> now in Munich.

Further down the coast to the southeast was the harbour of Peiraeus which, though uncertain in name, was destined to be rendered memorable by Thucydides' references in the opening chapters of the last book of his history. It was here in 412 B. C. that the Peloponnesian fleet, which sailed from Cenchreae to help Chios, Athens' revolting ally, was compelled to return by the Athenian squadron before it had gone very far to sea. Chased into Peiraeus, it was forced to fight and the Peloponnesian admiral, Alcamenes, was killed. Twenty Peloponnesian ships were afterwards blockaded here by an equal number of Athenian vessels for the greater part of the summer, until at last the Athenians were taken unawares and their prisoners escaped to Cenchreae. Thucydides describes Peiraeus as an uninhabited harbour near the boundary between Corinthia and Epidaurus.<sup>107</sup> Instead of a port Peiraeus on this coast, both Pliny and Ptolemy speak of a Cape Speiraeum, and this is what we generally find on the maps,<sup>108</sup> "by which perhaps", says Leake, "they meant the projection of the coast at which the harbour of Frangolimióna is situated." Others assume two distinct places, Peiraeus, and Cape Speiraeum, though Müller proposed to read Speiraeus instead of Peiraeus in Thucydides.<sup>109</sup>

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Dodwell, *Classical Tour*, II, p. 197; Curtius, *Pelop.*, II, p. 597, A. 94; Sieveking-Hackl, *Die königliche Vasensammlung zu München*, No. 327.

<sup>107</sup> Thuc., VIII, 10, 11.

<sup>108</sup> Pliny, *N. H.*, IV, 5; Ptolemy, III, 16; Steph. Byz., s. v. Πειραιός. Richard Kiepert in his *Formae Orbis Antiqui, Karten*, XIII (Berlin, 1906) marks both harbour Peiraeus and Cape Speiraeum. Cf. Leake, *Morea*, III, pp. 312 f.; Boblaye, *Recherches*, p. 54.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. West in 1852 edition of Pauly's *Real-Encyclop.* s. vv. Piraeus and Speiraeum. Cf. now the article "Speiraion" in Pauly-Wissowa and the Admiralty map there reproduced.

## INLAND TOWNS

Finally let us glance at the only two inland towns of which we have any account. The more important, Tenea, lay, as has been stated above, directly south of Corinth on the northern slope of the Argive mountains. The site was discovered by Lolling<sup>110</sup> to the left of the modern road and railroad to Argos at a point a little to the north of the twin-villages of Kleniaes, on the flat-topped hill above them and about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles south of Chiliomodi railway station. Here is the end of the pass near the summit of the watershed between streams flowing north to the plain of Corinth and those flowing south to the plain of Argos. This position accords with the statements of both Pausanias<sup>111</sup> and Stephanus Byzantius (s. v. *Τεvéα*), the former of whom gives the distance from Corinth as 60 stadia, while the latter tells us that Tenea lay to the south between Mycenae and Corinth. It was undoubtedly a place of some importance when in ancient times these two places were intimately connected. Further evidence of an ancient settlement here is found in the discovery of several potsherds both of the coarser and finer types, and by the rock-hewn graves on the slopes of the hill to the north. It was here that the youthful Oedipus was said to have been reared by Polybus. From Tenea also it was that Archias took most of his followers when setting out to found the great colony of Syracuse.

Here was a temple of Apollo Teneates according to Strabo,<sup>112</sup> who refers to Aristotle as authority for kinship between the peoples of Tenedos and Tenea. Strabo regards the similarity of the worship of Apollo by both peoples as no slight proof of this relationship. Pausanias,<sup>113</sup> however, says

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<sup>110</sup> Cf. Steffen's *Karten von Mykenai, Erläuternder Text*, pp. 46 f.; Philippson, *Der Pelop.*, pp. 34 f.; Curtius, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 549-551; Leake, *Peloponnesiaca*, pp. 400 ff.; *Morea*, III, pp. 320 ff.

<sup>111</sup> II, 5, 4.

<sup>112</sup> 380.

<sup>113</sup> II, 5, 4. Cf. remarks of Bursian, *Geog. von Gr.*, II, p. 22, n. 2.

that the Teneates assigned their origin to Troy. Brought by Agamemnon as prisoners to Greece, they were given Tenea as a home, and in consequence of their Trojan extraction they worshipped Apollo beyond all the gods. The one time importance of Tenea is attested by the anecdote about the Asiatic Greek who contemplated migrating to Corinth and received an oracle to the effect: *εὐδαίμων ὁ Κόρινθος, ἐγὼ δ' εἶην Τενεάτης*.<sup>114</sup> In the days of the Achaean League the Teneans revolted from Corinth and accepted Roman dominion. When Mummius destroyed Corinth, he spared Tenea.

An interesting example of an archaic statue, perhaps of an athletic victor found in this vicinity, is the great art-treasure known as the Apollo of Tenea.<sup>115</sup> It was found really at Athikia, a village near-by among the hills to the northeast. It is now in the Glyptothek at Munich and typifies an epoch in the history of art. An outstanding example of the archaic statuary of early Greece, it shows in a striking way the characteristics of this early development under the foreign influences, especially Egyptian, which many critics have seen in such works as the "Apollos" of Thera, Orchomenus and Melos.<sup>116</sup>

In concluding this enquiry into the topography of Corinthia, Petra must be mentioned, the only other town of ancient days of which we have any account. We do not know exactly where it was, but it may be assumed to have been situated in the same mountain district as Tenea. But for Herodotus<sup>117</sup> we should perhaps know nothing about it. To Petra belonged Etion, the father of Cypselus. A Bacchiad, named Amphion had a lame daughter called Labda. None of the nobility, consequently, wished to marry her. She was forced to marry out of her own class and so we have the

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<sup>114</sup> Strabo, 380.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Hyde, *Olympic Victor Monuments and Greek Athletic Art*, pp. 100-109.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Fowler and Wheeler, *Greek Archaeology*, pp. 198 ff.; Collignon, *Histoire de la Sculpture Grecque*, pp. 201 ff.

<sup>117</sup> V, 92.



interesting story attributed to the Corinthian envoy, Socles, when the latter made his great harangue against restoring the Athenian tyrant.

In conclusion a word on the general geography of Corinthia may be added. One thinks of it always in three sections—the barren Isthmus region, the fertile plain along the shore of the Corinthian Gulf, and the highlands to the south and east which slope down in successive terraces from the vast fastnesses of Acrocorinth and Oneium. There has been a great deal of confused writing about the so-called poverty of the Corinthia. Leaf's well-known argument against the authenticity of the Homeric Catalogue is based mainly on the assumption that Corinth was, agriculturally speaking, an impossible abode until the development of trade and colonization called it into resurrection.<sup>118</sup> His contentions are further at fault because they involve a disregard of Philippson's results as a whole. Dr. Blegen<sup>119</sup> has very justly taken Philippson to task for the very passage which Leaf quotes. If I may add my own opinion I should say that I am entirely in accord with Dr. Blegen. Corinth is a pleasant place of abode. Finally, in view of the loose statements made by some writers which have produced the impression that the Corinthia is an impoverished area, let me say that while the Isthmus proper is barren and the highlands bare, the plain of Vocha along the gulf is of outstanding fruitfulness. This district, the eastern part of which was held by Corinth and the western by Sicyon, is described by the author of the British Admiralty Handbook of Greece<sup>120</sup> as "one of the most fertile and best populated districts in the Peloponnese." One who walks in early summer, along the fertile plain, even if he confine himself to the path from New to Old Corinth, cannot easily forget that verdant scene of endless acres of luxuriant vineyards with their fresh young tendrils spreading over all their profusion a flagree of bewildering charm against the background of the

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<sup>118</sup> *Homer and History*, pp. 209 ff.

<sup>119</sup> *A.J.A.*, XXIV, 1920, pp. 1-13.

<sup>120</sup> Vol. I, p. 405.



sunset haze of the gulf beyond. Though Philippson has very correctly characterized the Isthmus as 'sehr wenig fruchtbar', Leaf's conclusions about the district of Corinth as a whole are altogether unjustifiable. To quote Philippson <sup>121</sup> himself for instance: "Moreover the surroundings of the little village of Old Corinth are distinguished for their specially luxurious growth of cereals, which must strike every traveller who passes here in the Springtime. The cause lies, perhaps, on the one hand, in the moisture which the springs at the foot of Acrocorinth furnish, as also, especially in the unusually abundant nutritious content of the soil; for here was the old metropolis of Corinth, and up to the year 1858, at any rate, a considerable town."

The alleged impossibility of an early settlement at Corinth because of the barrenness and infertility of the surrounding districts had better be denied, finally here and now. Also Strabo's <sup>122</sup> characterization of Corinthian territory as

οὐκ εὐγενὴν σφόδρα ἀλλὰ σκολιάν τε καὶ τραχεῖαν

is apt to give a wrong impression. For it would appear to exclude the fertile plain of Vocho which, as I have said, Corinth shared with Sicyon as far as the river Nemea. This was the richest land in all Greece—"Ager nobilissimae fertilitatis", Livy <sup>123</sup> calls it, and Athenaeus says that the possession of it became a proverbial expression for great wealth. Right through its centre runs the river Nemea and it is in addition irrigated by numerous streams which, issuing from the glens among the hills, have cut into its deep and heavy soil their pathways to the sea.

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<sup>121</sup> *Zeitschr.* as cited, 1890, p. 76.

<sup>122</sup> 382.

<sup>123</sup> XXVII, 31; Athen. V., p. 219 a. Cf. Cic. *De Leg. Agr.*, 1, 2, 5; Lucian, *Icaromenippus*, 18; *Navigium*, 20; Zenob., III, 57; Schol. on Aristoph., *Birds*, 968. Cf. especially Goebel, *Ethnica*, I, p. 33. "Fons autem divitiarum Corinthiacarum erat cum mercatura tum agrorum fertilitas. 'Ἀμᾶν Κορινθικόν est messis uberrima haud secus atque apud Horatium "quidquid de Libycis veritur areis."

Dr. Goebel quotes all the proverbial references.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CITY AND ITS CITADEL

Wilisch<sup>1</sup> very truly remarked: "For the knowledge of the genuinely Greek life, to be sure, we would gain more if the history of the city ended with Mummius and no Romanization had followed." Of the city of Corinth with which our succeeding chapters deal, precious little remains to-day. The vandal Romans did their work thoroughly, and though Mummius<sup>2</sup> himself was "magnanimous rather than fond of art" his magnanimity was not extended to any of the Corinthians. Corinth was utterly despoiled by him and his ruthless robbers. When their destroying hands had passed away, she remained in ruins for a century till Julius Caesar built a new city on the old site. Of this Roman Corinth both Strabo and Pausanias have left us accounts. I shall have very little to say about them except to make some reference to the main outlines of the topography, in order to illustrate the few extant landmarks of the Greek city and especially the wonderful results of the excavations of the American School whose archaeologists have achieved so much in reconstructing what had been thought to be lost beyond recall.

Let me quote the words of the late Professor Richardson<sup>3</sup> when he set out on his magnificent task:

If the Corinth of that time could have been blotted out by an earthquake or a pestilence and left waste until now it would seem almost unfair to excavate its site because it would be impossible to avoid finding a temple at least once a week and a statue more frequently than once a day . . . but this is not the city that we are about to seek. This Corinth perished not by the hand of God but

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<sup>1</sup> *Zehn Jahre amerik. Ausgrabung. in Korinth, Neue Jahrb.*, XXI, 1908, p. 438.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, 381.

<sup>3</sup> *New York Independent*, Feb. 6, 1896, "The proposed excavations at Corinth," by Prof. Rufus B. Richardson, Ph. D., Director of the American School at Athens.

by the 'tender mercies' of the Roman soldiers. Not realizing the power of Rome, the Corinthians treated some Roman ambassadors bringing Rome's ultimatum to the Achæan League 'rather haughtily' (*superbius*) as Cicero says. As we learn from Strabo, it went to the point of throwing mud. Mummius then came and 'pacified' Corinth; as Caesar afterwards 'pacified' Gaul only rather more so . . . Mummius put most of the men to death and sold the women and children as slaves. The city was totally destroyed by fire. . . . The world has heard with pity the story of bloody Roman soldiers throwing dice on priceless paintings among burning buildings and throngs of captives too delicate to endure their hard lot.

But had Corinth been left a desert after this so-called 'total destruction' and after the exportation of statues to Rome by the shipload we should still have had a place for excavation better than Olympia or Delphi. Where there was so much it was impossible to destroy or carry off all. The worst thing however which could happen from the archaeologist's point of view did happen. Julius Caesar who rebuilt Carthage, rebuilt also Corinth a century and two years after its destruction. Then it was that the new settlers, mostly freed-men, filled the market of Rome with statues and vases exhumed from the ruins and from graves, not one of which, according to Strabo, did they leave unransacked.

When speaking of Roman Corinth, however, for outline purposes in passing, it must be remembered that we are speaking of a city the new foundations of which occupied exactly the same natural position as the Corinth of Grecian days. Old Corinth to-day, in spite of all its vicissitudes from earthquakes and invading hordes, marks the site of the ancient city which lay upon a broad plateau of two different levels at the foot of Acrocorinthus.<sup>4</sup> Between this table-land and the edge of the Gulf stretches a lower level extending along the sea-shore on one side to the Isthmus, on the other to Sicyon. This is the fertile plain of Vocha already referred to. Across it ran due north from Corinth the long walls to Lechæum. The city walls were 40 stadia in circumference or about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles. These were very thick and lofty. The Spartan Agis<sup>5</sup> son of Archidamus on seeing them exclaimed: "What women dwell in this place!"

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Byvanck in *P. W. s. v. Korinthos* (Lage), pp. 992 f.; H. N. Fowler in *Art and Archaeology*, Oct., 1922, p. 195.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, *Apophth. Lacon.*, p. 215.

On the eastern side of the city was the suburb Craneum, the aristocratic quarter. But here also resided the famous cynic Diogenes, in his pithos, and here he was visited by Alexander.<sup>6</sup> Diogenes praised the summer climate of Corinth; the breezes from the sea on both sides cooled the air and though I believe Dio Chrysostom<sup>7</sup> has drawn on his imagination for the rest of the description, I repeat that Corinth is a pleasant dwelling place. Diogenes took up his residence there because he considered more fools passed that way than anywhere else in Greece—διὰ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἐταίρας. And as Corinth lay ὥσπερ ἐν τριόδῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος it behooved a wise man like Diogenes on the analogy of a good doctor, who sets up his clinic where there is most need of it, to establish himself where he would be available to the greatest possible number of foolish ones. At any rate, Craneum was the favourite suburb of Corinth,<sup>8</sup> famed for the purity and serenity of its air, and Alciphron<sup>9</sup> has depicted for us what a haunt it was for fashionable loungers and those who catered for and lived by them. I fear that Götting's attempt to associate Craneum with Peirene would confine the limits of the city too much.<sup>10</sup> But of this later.

Through Craneum a street led out into the road to Cench-

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Dio Chrysost., *Or.*, VI, vol. 1, p. 66 (ed. Dindorf); *Or.*, VIII, p. 144; IX, p. 152. Cf. also Diog. Laert., VI, p. 77; Lucian, *Quomodo hist. conscrib.*, 3; Timaeus, *Lexicon*, s. v. Κραίων; Plutarch, *Alexander*, 14.


<sup>7</sup> *Or.*, VI, vol. 1, p. 96, ed. Dindorf. I have already referred to Philippson's remarks on the climate and Dr. Blegen's answer and very justifiable correction, *A.J.A.*, 1920, p. 9.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *De Exilio*, 6; Theophrastus, *De Causis Plant.*, V, 14, 2.

<sup>9</sup> III, 24, ed. Schepers. Cf. also Xen., *Hell.*, IV, 4, 4; Athen., XIII, p. 589.

<sup>10</sup> "Die Quelle Pirene auf Akrokorinth und das Kraneion unterhalb Korinth", *Archäologische Zeitung*, II, 1844, pp. 326 ff. Götting apparently makes the same mistake as Frazer about the location of Peirene. See on Peirene infra. The tomb of Diogenes, the grave of Lais, and the Craneum, however, need not lie beyond the walls. Cf. *A.J.A.*, XXXIII, 1929, p. 346.





General view of Excavations from the East, showing ascent to temple area.





reae. It was along this road that Pausanias<sup>11</sup> coming from Cenchreae made his entrance to Corinth. His description of the various streets and ancient remains is the best that we have, though, obviously, it describes the Roman city almost exclusively. Yet he prefaces his account with the remark that Corinth contained many things worthy of note, some belonging to the ancient (Greek) city and some produced in the flourishing later period.

Entering by the Cenchreae gate, he first visited the Agora where he noticed several temples, statues and a fountain. From the Agora four principal streets branched off, one through Craneum leading to Cenchreae, the second to Lechaëum, the third to Sicyon and the fourth to Acrocorinthus. At the ends of the streets, in the city walls were gates opening into the various roads. Along each of these roads Pausanias saw several ancient monuments which he names in order. He next ascended the citadel and instead of going back to the city, on descending, left by the Teneatic gate, the only gate that did not lead seawards but conducted into the mountainous country of the interior. Pausanias' description is becoming daily clearer owing to the work of the American excavators—"to whom the world owes a debt of heartfelt thanks for their joyful sacrifice and perseverance in work which is often laborious." So Wilisch<sup>12</sup> wrote as far back as 1908. A great deal has been achieved since in spite of the interruption of the European war and the lack of financial patronage. I shall confine myself, however, to those results which are distinctly Greek in character. To give any account of the vast excavations of remains of the Roman city would not only be irrelevant to my present work but quite impossible because of their extent. Strabo,<sup>13</sup> who saw the city soon after the Roman restoration, remarks that it was trapezium-shaped and

<sup>11</sup> II, 2, 4.

<sup>12</sup> *Neue Jahrb.*, XXI, 1908, p. 438. I, who have had the privilege of studying with them in Egypt, Palestine, and Greece, can heartily subscribe.

<sup>13</sup> 379.

lay close by the foot of Acrocorinthus. All of it that was unprotected by the citadel was enclosed by a wall. The citadel too was surrounded by a wall in so far as it was possible to build one on its precipitous edge, so that the entire perimeter of wall area including both city and citadel was eighty-five stadia. The photographs and subjoined plan will best indicate the outlines of our study. The plan of Corinth in 1927, given in the little new *Guide to Corinth*, indicates practically everything of importance in both the Greek and Roman cities, and with its aid (pl. X) it is easy to distinguish what we regard as distinctly belonging to the classical period.

We had better begin our study with Peirene not only because it is so characteristic of Corinth and so much associated with it in literature<sup>14</sup> but because the determination of its exact location and identity by the excavations of 1898-9 gave the key to the puzzle of Corinthian topography which until then had been "nothing but a structure of error piled upon error" as Professor Richardson<sup>15</sup> said.

Hence the importance of the work of the spring of 1898 when the excavators of the American School first discovered an ancient fountain façade in the valley just to the east of the well-known ruined temple whose lonely columns on the hill mark the tragic fate of what once was "totius Graeciae lumen". Richardson and his companions at first hesitated to declare the identity of this fountain with Peirene. But further excavations revealed it as the fountain described by Pausanias.<sup>16</sup> The deep chambers behind the six arches through which we look today were found to have walls of the fifth century B. C. and are adorned at the back with Ionic architecture of the third century. Further back still are three narrow deep basins and behind them four cemented reservoirs with elliptical vaulted ceilings which Dr. B. H.

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<sup>14</sup> Pindar, *OL.*, XIII, 61; Simonides in Bergk, *Lyrici Graeci*, No. 96; Hdt., V, 92; Eur., *Med.*, 69.

<sup>15</sup> *A.J.A.*, 1900, p. 475.

<sup>16</sup> II, 3, 3.



Peirene, general view taken from top of north apse.



Hill ascribes to the great days of the Cypselids.<sup>17</sup> Then we can trace the successive improvements of the Corinthians of Roman days when their city, destined by its new founder as "laus Iulia Corinthus" to be the capital of the province of Achaëa, was one of the most luxurious places in the world, and even the traces (a revetment of marble) of that most interesting man Herodes Atticus are clearly to be seen.

Professor Richardson discusses the excavation of Peirene in great detail. There was an open air quadrangle and basin with arrangements for the reception and flow in the open of water from Peirene. He concludes, however, that this was not the *ἱπαιθρος κρίνη* mentioned by Pausanias. The quadrangular basin was filled with water for dipping bronze only; otherwise it was dry and women drew from pipes as is indicated by the wearing of the floor and gutter. Dr. Hill points out that we must not assume that because Peirene was such a complicated structure, even in early times, it was essentially an artificial fountain and not a copious natural spring. "So in spite of its present appearance", writes this authority, "it is a *spring* of immemorial antiquity." He is further of the opinion that the traditional stories about Peirene may well have applied to this very spring, though it is more probable that they concerned a less copious, though very famous, source on Acrocorinthus from which indeed the lower Peirene was assumed to originate. Strabo calls the spring on the citadel-top Peirene and Pausanias related that he was told this was the real Peirene given to Sisyphus by the River God Asopus. This storied well has been now completely excavated, cleared and restored since the season of 1926.<sup>18</sup> One can descend by stairs to the cool, clear depths which are so deceptive in their calm translucence that one steps right into it before realizing that the water line has been reached. The origin of

<sup>17</sup> See excellent plan (with photograph) in *Art and Archaeology*, XIV, 1922, p. 201.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Stillwell, *Upper Peirene on Acrocorinth*, paper read at Archaeological Inst. of Amer. Dec., 1926, abstract in *A.J.A.*, Jan.-Mar., 1927, p. 94.



the spring is variously ascribed to Asopus or to Pegasus whose stamping hoof called it forth.<sup>19</sup>

But to return to Peirene proper. It is fitting to recognize here that its final identification was the starting-point of a true and adequate idea of the allocation of the various important points in Ancient Corinth. "Damit ist der Eckstein zur Topographie von Korinth gelegt"—wrote Prof. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.<sup>20</sup> Richardson has pointed out that not only did it determine the Agora according to Pausanias' description but corrected the errors so long prevalent about the temple of Apollo which even the ingenuity of Dr. Dörpfeld could not avoid, and finally, it put an end to the fancies that were rife about its own location. For instance, Frazer's "Bath of Aphrodite",<sup>21</sup> to say nothing of the diversified accounts of a host of earlier topographers and travellers, have now to be abandoned. Hence Richardson's boast: "The period of groping is ended; by securing a fixed point, we know more of the topography of Corinth than all the great guessers of the past."<sup>22</sup>

The next year (1899) witnessed the uncovering and identification of a second old Corinthian fountain, Glauce,—another indisputable landmark in Corinthian topography. It lay about eighty metres to the west of the Temple of Apollo, and Pausanias' remarks about its location leave us no grounds for

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
<sup>19</sup> Cf. Dio Chrysost. *Or.*, XXXVI, vol. 2, p. 62 (ed. Dindorf); Statius, *Thebais*, IV, 60; Götting, *op. cit.*, p. 328; Curtius, *Pelop.*, II, pp. 525-8; Imhoof-Blumer and Gardner, *Num. Comm. on Paus.*, 13, with pl. C. xxix (for imperial coinage representations); Mahaffy, *Rambles and Studies*, pp. 244 ff.; Strabo, 379; Pindar, *Ol.*, XIII, 63 ff.

<sup>20</sup> *Deutsche Lit.-Zeitung*, May 6, 1899.

<sup>21</sup> Frazer, *Pausanias*, III, p. 24.

<sup>22</sup> *A.J.A.*, 1900, p. 228. Cf. also Wilisch, *Neue Jahrb.*, 1908, I, pp. 431, 434. The remarks of von Wilamowitz in *Deutsche Lit. Zeit.*, XX, 701, do not any longer apply as regards the inadequacy of results, but this great scholar had even already given his highest praise to the American excavators. So did Dr. Dörpfeld in a private letter of congratulation.





View of Fountain of Glauce from N. E., showing front and east face.



uncertainty.<sup>23</sup> Pausanias, by the way, is the only ancient authority we have for this fountain, but his testimony is so clear that the excavators had no doubt in their minds. Richardson thought that it was probably built in connection with the temple and that therefore it goes back at least as far as Periander. He gives other instances of the tyrants' interest in fountains—

We thus have a most natural historical origin for the fountain: as Peisistratus at Athens, Polycrates at Samos, Theagenes at Megara and tyrants generally, recognizing that an abundant supply of water was the one thing that pleased the people, laid out great water-works, so the clever Periander may be supposed to have thought to strengthen his hold on Corinth by furnishing Glauce at a crowded part of the city.<sup>24</sup>

Exactly the same opinion is expressed by Wilisch,<sup>25</sup> and Dr. Hill thinks that the fountain may go back to Cypselus.<sup>26</sup>

In plan the fountain had a considerable resemblance to Peirene, having four huge reservoirs with three draw-basins in front, to which led a portico with three square pillars between *antae* supporting a stone ceiling in the form of an elliptical vault. The water was brought from a source at the foot of the citadel. The whole structure was, in the main, cut out of the solid rock—not unlike the famous Sphinx outside Cairo.<sup>27</sup> A complete account of Glauce is presented by Dr. G. W. Elderkin.<sup>28</sup> He points out that the identification of the fountain house was absolutely determined by the finding of the Odeum which according to Pausanias was just beyond Glauce. Glauce is the best preserved fountain of the

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Wilisch, *l. c.*, p. 430.

<sup>24</sup> *A.J.A.*, 1900, p. 471.

<sup>25</sup> *Neue Jahrb.*, XXI, 1908, p. 430.

<sup>26</sup> *Art and Archaeology*, Oct., 1922, pp. 222 f., with plan by Mr. W. B. Dinsmoor.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. A. S. Cooley, *Records of the Past*, I, 1902, pp. 81 f.

<sup>28</sup> *A.J.A.*, XIV, 1910, pp. 19-50, with a fine set of photographs and plans. During the earthquake of April, 1928, the western chamber of Glauce was destroyed.

time of the tyrants. Glauce, while being one of the very earliest "is the most abundant source for information about the *Krene* which proved so important a political asset of the tyrants of the seventh and sixth centuries."<sup>29</sup> But this is not the place to attempt any reproduction or even synopsis of the excellent survey and architectural account given by Dr. Elderkin and his collaborators.<sup>30</sup> I would like, however, to refer my readers to his very interesting discussion on the kinship of fountains in the age of the tyrants, dealing particularly with the fountain of Theagenes in Megara<sup>31</sup> and the Enneacrunus of Peisistratus. He contrasts the Greek underground conduit system with the Roman arched aqueduct.<sup>32</sup>

It is as well to mention here, though somewhat anticipatively, the problem of the supposed discrepancy in the accounts of Strabo and Pausanias in regard to the position of the lower fountain of Peirene.<sup>33</sup> We have seen that, on the one hand, Strabo describes Peirene on the citadel top as a spring which, though it has no outlet, is always full of clear and drinkable water. And with this was connected, he thought, a spring at the base of the mountain which flows out into the city in such quantity that it supplied sufficient water. These are the crucial words—*τὴν πρὸς τῇ ῥίξει τοῦ ὄρους κρήνην ἐκρέουσιν εἰς τὴν πόλιν*. Is this the great Peirene of the city which I have already described? I do not think so. And how does Strabo's description tally with Pausanias' allocation of the lower fountain as on the right of the Lechaëum Road leading from the Agora and beyond the Propylaea, which is obviously the great Peirene revealed by the American Excavators? Not at all. I think Leake's supposition "that there


<sup>29</sup> Cf. Elderkin, *l. c.*, p. 19. Cf. Cooley, *l. c.*, p. 86.

<sup>30</sup> Messrs. Hill, Dinsmoor and Wood. Cf. especially Plate VI for ground plan.


<sup>31</sup> Cf. Highbarger, *Megara* (*Johns Hopkins University Studies in Archaeology*), p. 9.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Gräber, *Ath. Mitt.*, 1905, pp. 25-60.

<sup>33</sup> Curtius' remarks quoted by Elderkin are very apposite if we could be sure that Pausanias did actually make the ascent.



THE FOUNTAIN OF GLAUKE  
PLAN AT FLOOR OF RESERVOIRS.



PLAN AT STYLOBATE LEVEL  
OF INNER COLONNADE





were three sources at Corinth all of which at some period of time at least, were known by the name of Peirene" seems more satisfactory. "All the three are still observable", as Leake says,<sup>34</sup> "namely the well in the Acrocorinthus, the rivulets which issue at the foot of that hill as described by Strabo, and the single source below the brow of the height on which the town is situated, in the position alluded to by Pausanias." Tozer<sup>35</sup> on the other hand does not agree with Leake but regards Pausanias' definition of the location of the spring as more exact than Strabo's. According to Tozer they both mean the same spring. But this is manifestly incompatible with Strabo's words quoted above, which could not refer to the Peirene of the Agora. Hence Dr. Elderkin very correctly remarks: "The former (Strabo's location) lies at the foot of Acrocorinthus, from which it could flow out into the city while the latter (Pausanias' location) is not situated at the base of the mountain, but so low in the heart of the city as not to be able to flow out to it." I would further suggest that the next sentence in Strabo fairly implies that he has not up to the present been referring to any source of supply within the city. I favour Leake's suggestion that between the times of Strabo and Pausanias a change may have taken place in the application of the name Peirene in the lower city in consequence of the water of the Agora having been found by experience better than the source at the foot of the citadel. Pausanias, too, speaks of the good drinking qualities of Peirene.<sup>36</sup> But the Corinthians discovered that it gave excellent temper and colour to bronze and it was used largely for that purpose. Hence probably Periander decided to have another fountain of superior 'drinking' qualities only, and so, "if he was the builder of Glauce, rendered the Corinthian

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<sup>34</sup> *Morea*, III, pp. 242 f. The validity of Leake's hypothesis is not affected by the mistaken identity of the city Peirene of which Richardson complains.

<sup>35</sup> *Selections from Strabo*, p. 218, n. 1.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Athenaeus, IV, 156e.

public a service by bringing to the heart of the city water which offered no attraction to coppersmiths.”<sup>37</sup>

‘No year without a fountain,’ the Americans could say when they discovered in 1900 in the Agora, about 30 metres to the west of the western end of the Propylaea, a third ancient well which, on account of its peculiar construction and good preservation, must be considered as one of the most interesting monuments of the old city.<sup>38</sup>

The ‘triglyphon fountain,’ so well known now to all visitors to Corinth and indeed to any who have read the picturesque account published by Dr. H. N. Fowler,<sup>39</sup> takes its place alongside the fountain of Peirene and the Temple of Apollo as one of the most interesting monuments of the old city. Here, sunken deep beneath the ruin left by the ruthless Romans, forgotten meanwhile and apparently destined to utter oblivion when the city of Julius Caesar was built on the ground level above, is this cool secret shrine where the lustral water of the old days flowed for devout worshippers.<sup>40</sup> We distinguish to-day two parts, the sunken fountain chamber and a painted Doric frieze of triglyphs and metopes which encloses it overhead. This consists of a long east front and a short southerly front which meet at an obtuse angle.<sup>41</sup> The original stucco and painted decoration were still preserved at the time of discovery. They conform to the usual laws of ornamentation of Doric Temples.<sup>42</sup> Through the east front of the triglyphs penetrates the passage way from which descends a flight of seven steps to the original level of the

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<sup>37</sup> Elderkin, *l. c.*, p. 40.

<sup>38</sup> Wilisch, *l. c.*, p. 430. Cf. A. S. Cooley, *Records of the Past*, I, 1902, pp. 77 f.

<sup>39</sup> *Art and Archaeology*, Oct., 1922, pp. 213-218. See plan (pl. X) reproduced from *A Guide to the Excavations and Museum of Ancient Corinth*, with recent account, pp. 23-34.


<sup>40</sup> Cf. Richardson, *Director's Report 1899-1900*, *A.J.A.*, 1900, Suppl., pp. 22-26.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. plate IV in Richardson's report, *l. c.*

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Fenger, *Dorische Polychromie*, Taf. 7.



View of Excavations (as left in 1907) from west pier of Propylaea—showing top of Triglyphon Fountain in centre foreground.



fountain chamber. On the face of the low wall before us we see two bronze lion-heads, the spouts of the water-pipes, still *in situ*, while along the base of the wall are gutters.<sup>43</sup> It is obvious that there was a time when the fountain was open to approach at a lower level and that the surplus water flowed off on the surface. The archaeologists are satisfied that the first construction of the ancient fountain with its lion-head spouts dates from about 500 B. C. This date is evidenced by general architectural considerations and particularly by the fact "that two of the triglyph blocks were joined by a clamp of a peculiar kind which was customary before the Persian wars and does not occur any more after the fifth century."<sup>44</sup> Subsequent improvements were carried out on and around the triglyphon but not later than the fourth century B. C. as is shown by the presence of certain statue-bases which are bedded on the triglyphon or in line with it, two of which are inscribed with the name of Lysippus, one perhaps a renewal of the late third century B. C.<sup>45</sup> "It is a wonderful chance", says Prof. Richardson,<sup>46</sup> "that has preserved this fountain intact down to our own day. It is, be it remembered, the only case of the kind."

With the sacred fountain was connected the little shrine on the terrace north of the wall with the triglyph frieze. This

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<sup>43</sup> For full account cf. Richardson, "An Ancient Fountain in the Agora at Corinth," *A.J.A.*, 1902, p. 306, plates VII-X, with three plans and photographs. In pl. IX is a restoration of the Doric polychrome on the frieze.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Wilisch, *op. cit.*, p. 431, *Art and Archaeology*, XIV, 1922, p. 213 f.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *A.J.A.*, VII, 1903, pp. 29 ff.; XXIII, 1919, p. 392; Richardson, *ibid.*, 1902, p. 316, where both inscriptions are discussed; Johnson, *Lysippos*, p. 64, 70, 92.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Wilisch, *l. c.*, p. 431, who says of the triglyphon fountain: "Aber in der Hauptsache stand die Anlage, wie sie jetzt sich zeigt, schon im V. Jahrh. und das gibt ihr trotz ihrer Kleinheit einen besonderen Wert." A. S. Cooley, *l. c.*, pp. 78-80, quotes from Richardson in *Independent*, Aug. 2, 1900, p. 1859. Cf. *Arch. Anz.*, 1902, p. 9; 1908, p. 137.



sanctuary (Temple "B", on plan), also dates from the fifth century B. C., and has part of the apse and altar preserved. Dr. Hill has shown that in all periods communication was maintained between the spring and the sanctuary. What with the "holy water," the altar of the shrine with its strange water supply, the warning to the uninitiated, not to pry too curiously <sup>47</sup> lest they should discover the secrets, especially the "trick" door formed by one of the metopes in the frieze, and so perhaps detect the origin of the voices from heaven which the archaeologist imaginatively suggests may have emanated through a megaphone-like arrangement from a priest lying in the subterranean tunnel under the floor of the oracular shrine, this must have been indeed a mysterious place.

NOTE: Since this was written, we find Mr. Bonner (*A.J.A.*, XXXIII, 1929, pp. 368-375) preferring a Dionysiac wine-miracle to a false oracle as an explanation of the peculiar apparatus of Temple "B".

#### TEMPLE OF APOLLO

And now we come to *the* Temple of Corinth, *par excellence*—the time-honored and majestic ruin whose seven lonely Doric columns, with only their architraves preserved, crown its deserted hill where they are set in their solemnity against the background of the towering citadel. Who has seen them from the sea or from the plain and not been impressed? Those few columns that remain have withstood the ravages of time, the shock of earthquakes and the hands of marauders.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. K. K. Smith, "Greek Inscriptions from Corinth," *A.J.A.*, 1919, pp. 353-357. The inscription reads:

[Ὁρος ἱερὸς] ἄσυλος.

μὴ κατα-


βιβασσκ-

έτω· ζαμί-

α |||||

The style of letters is the large old-fashioned type of ca. 500 B. C. The strokes refer to the amount of the fine. Dr. Smith thinks "the recondite form (καταβιβασσέτω) may have been employed to enhance the solemnity of the injunction."





Temple of Apollo from the N. E., showing Acrocorinth.



When Spon (*Voyage*, II, p. 173) and Wheler (*Journey*, p. 440) visited Corinth in 1676 there were standing twelve columns. These were still preserved when Chandler (*Travels* II, p. 239) saw the Temple, and Stuart has left us a picture of them.<sup>48</sup> At the end of the eighteenth century, however, only the seven columns of to-day were still standing, a Turkish owner having removed four. Four others have been found in the excavations and lie prone on the ground as they fell and were buried before the first modern description of the temple was written. These have preserved on the lower surfaces the thin Greek stucco with which the soft limestone was originally coated and a thicker plaster from the Roman restoration. The temple measured about 70 by 175 feet on the stylobate. It was hexastyle with 15 columns on the sides and six at the ends, the latter being of larger diameter and more widely spaced than the former. The shafts are massive monoliths 24 feet high, each with twenty flutings and somewhat less than six feet in diameter. More than one traveller has remarked on the squat appearance of the temple when seen at close quarters—for it looks most graceful at a distance, perched as it is on the hill where its foundations were everywhere bedded in the solid rock, as the lines of the cuttings revealed by the excavations show.<sup>49</sup> The inner temple was divided into two main rooms, set back to back, with an adytum behind the cella which had two rows of interior columns to support the ceiling and roof. The peristyle of 38 columns enclosed at each end a porch *in antis*, a pronaos and an opisthodomus. At the western end were found traces of what appeared to be a basis for a cult statue—no doubt of Apollo in whose honor there was already an important sanctuary in the time of Periander.<sup>50</sup> In fact, some authorities ascribe the present remains of the temple of Apollo to this successful tyrant. Dr. Hill, for instance, remarks that the curi-

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Stuart and Revett, *Antiquities of Athens*, III, ch. 6, with pls. 1, 2, 3, and drawing by Stuart with excellent sketches and plans.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. plate VIII.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Hdt., III, 52; *O.I.L.*, III, 534.

ously flat archaic capitals suggest the age of Periander "as the approximate time when this venerable structure was built."<sup>51</sup> The new *Corinth Guide* (1928), p. 48, says that "Their ponderous outline and strikingly flat, archaic capitals suggest the Age of Periander as their most probable date." In the opinion of Dr. Dörpfeld,<sup>52</sup> it belongs to the sixth century and perhaps earlier. The horizontal curvature, which occurs in the front and back of the temple at Corinth, not only in the stylobate but in the rock cuttings below the foundation, however, is rare before the fifth century B. C., and the capitals can hardly be older than the middle of the sixth century B. C. The terra-cottas too, which survive, do not date before the sixth century B. C.

The errors connected with the identification of this temple before the excavations of the Americans gave the key to Corinthian topography and established beyond doubt that this was the temple of Apollo mentioned by Pausanias, are now

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<sup>51</sup> Byvanck says: "Er datiert aus dem 6 Jhdt. oder möglicherweise noch älterer Zeit" in *P. W. s. v. Korinthus*, p. 999.

<sup>52</sup> *A.J.A.*, IX, 1905, p. 62. Other writers wrongly demand a still earlier date, e. g. Leake concludes that the latest date to which the temple can be attributed is the middle of the seventh century B. C., but that it may be a good deal earlier. Of the columns he says: "We not only find in them the narrow intercolumniation, tapering shafts, projecting capitals and lofty architraves, which are the attributes of the early Doric, and which were perpetuated in the architecture of the western colonies of Greece, but we find also that the chief characteristic of those buildings is still stronger in the Corinthian temple than in any of them, its shaft being shorter in the proportion to the diameter than in any known example of the Doric order, and, unlike that of any other Doric column of large dimensions, being composed of a single block of stone" (*Morea*, III, pp. 250 f.). Powell, *l. c.*, on the evidence of the bizarre animal decoration of a vase fragment (a peculiar Corinthian motif of the period) found amongst the foundations, suggests early sixth century. But Robertson, *Handbook of Greek and Roman Architecture*, p. 325, gives the date as c. 535 B. C. So Dinsmoor in the revision of Anderson and Spiers, *Architecture of Greece*, pp. 87, 193, dates about 540 B. C., dissenting from Anderson and Spiers (pp. 30 ff.), who held for the middle of the seventh century B. C.

so well known that there is no occasion to refer to them.<sup>53</sup> Besides, the matter has been discussed fully in the very complete account by the late Mr. B. Powell where he explains how the work of even Dr. Dörpfeld had to be completed if not superseded.<sup>54</sup> I do not propose to discuss special architectural details, but there is one feature of great interest. In the *pronaos* under the floor at the southwest corner was a rectangular strong-box lined with water-proof cement of which two walls and the floor were preserved. For the other two walls the foundations of the temple were used. What curiosity this discovery arouses! What did this treasury contain? Periander's gold? Or the vessels of Apollo's service? We do not know. To the south and east stretched the market-place from which there was a flight of steps, at the southeast corner of the sacred precinct, leading to the temple. Ascending this flight to-day from the Agora to mount the hill on which the ruins stand, one imagines what a commanding view the temple in the old days possessed of the town which lay at its feet, the busy streets, and Peirene with its flowing waters. One is reminded of the forgotten days when Lais and her companions beguiled the rich merchants who thronged that Agora. Plato warns his young men against the 'damsels of Corinth'<sup>55</sup> and ancient literature<sup>56</sup> is full of references to their wiles. If only they could speak, how many a tale could they tell—these Seven Doric Columns.

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<sup>53</sup> For older authorities cf. Blouet, *Expédition de la Morée*, II, with pl. 77; Leake, *Morea*, III, 245, 249, 268; Vischer, *Erinnerungen*, p. 264; Curtius, *Pelop.*, II, pp. 525 f.; Perrot et Chipiez, *Hist. de l'Art*, VII, p. 420; Dörpfeld, *Ath. Mitt.*, XI, 1886, pp. 297-308, with Taf. VII. Dörpfeld has been erroneously followed by Frazer (*Pausanias*, III, pp. 35-38).

<sup>54</sup> Benjamin Powell, "The Temple of Apollo at Corinth," *A.J.A.*, 1905, pp. 44-63, with plates II, III, excellent photographs and reproduction of Stuart's drawing and another made about the year 1820; Cf. Richardson, *ibid.*, 1900, pp. 226, 458, 474, in connection with the topographical results of the excavations of Peirene and Glauce already mentioned.

<sup>55</sup> *Rep.*, 404 d. 5.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Goebel, *Ethnica*, I, pp. 32-40.



The rest of the topographical features of the Greek city, in so far as they have been ascertained definitely by the archaeologists, need not long detain us. There are many other discoveries, indeed, either pre-historic in date or not relevant to topography, which I have not referred to here. They will be taken up in the succeeding chapters. Here I have consistently confined myself to what dates from the early Greek city, though it may be admitted that these features are trifling in comparison to the magnificent results of the American excavators which are mainly concerned with Roman remains. But I am sure that they themselves would admit a greater pride in what belongs to the city of ἀφνεὺς Κόρινθος than in anything, no matter how fine, which dates from Roman times. This attempt to distinguish clearly the few remnants that belong to the classical period from the great mass of discoveries belonging to the city of Julius Caesar has the advantage of showing how little we do know of the old site and what thorough specialists the Romans were in destruction.

What else, then, escaped their attempt at utter obliteration? Just two things,<sup>67</sup> if even these may be said to have escaped. For we have merely traces of their foundations. Just at the foot of the Temple Hill that we have been studying above, are the remains of a Greek market dating from about the end of the fifth century B. C. In the plan it is marked the "North Building," and its position is clearly indicated by the angle at which it lies to the line of the Lechaëum Road and the Roman portico immediately to the west of it. Here it is, packed in, as it were, against the side of the Temple Hill which was excavated to accommodate it. This Greek Porticus had two rows of columns, Corinthian on the inside, Doric on the outside. In fact, the south end of the building was a Doric

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<sup>67</sup> Prof. D. M. Robinson, in publishing an account of a very interesting deposit of Greek terra-cottas, argues that they come from a Greek heroum, but no remains of the shrine have yet been found. Cf. *A.J.A.*, X, 1906, pp. 159-173. For some early Greek ointment vases cf. also Robinson, *A.J.A.*, X, 1906, pp. 420-426.



stoa of which one drum of the western column may still be seen to-day in position with a piece of stylobate also preserved.<sup>58</sup> Now we step across the Lechaem Road directly to the East where, in front of what is marked in the plan as the Peribolos of Apollo (a Roman building) we see the foundations of a little fifth-century Greek Temple. It is indicated in dark shading on the plan, partly underneath, partly behind the colonnade bordering the Lechaem Road. Its remains show a square cella and a pronaos, from which Dr. Hill concludes that its architectural classification was *distyle in antis*. He believes that it probably was sacred to Apollo because of the large 'Peribolos' to the same deity which was constructed here afterwards.<sup>59</sup>

This, then, is practically all we know of the architectural remains of the Greek city. I do not deal with the important excavations in the Theatre district, for though it is admitted that it already existed in Greek times,<sup>60</sup> yet the remains to-day really belong to the Roman colony. More important is the fact that in the neighbourhood the American archaeologists have found indications of the site of the temple of Athena Chalinitis. In the season of 1926 they excavated a heavy wall surrounding a large precinct close to the theatre, and in it they discovered a considerable number of votive objects. There were, of course, many art objects found in the Roman theatre. Particularly interesting are the so-called head of Sappho, part of a frieze of a Gigantomachy, and a copy of the head of Polyclitus' Doryphorus.<sup>61</sup> We must remember, however, that

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<sup>58</sup> Cf. Byvanck in P. W. s. v. Korinthos, topographie, p. 1001; B. H. Hill, *l. c.*, p. 197.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Byvanck, *l. c.* See *Plan*. pl. X, 9.

<sup>60</sup> At least as early as 394 B. C. Cf. Xen., *Hell.*, IV, 4, 3; Plut., *Arat.*, 23; Curtius, *Pelop.*, II, p. 532. Cf. especially Richard Stillwell in *A.J.A.*, 1929, pp. 77-97, who thinks that the Greek theatre, as the archaeologists have revealed it, was constructed about the middle of the fourth century B. C. Cf. T. L. Shear, *A.J.A.*, 1925, pp. 381-388; *ibid.*, 1928, pp. 474-495; *id. Illustrated London News*. July 28, 1928, p. 168.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. T. L. Shear, "Excavations in the Theatre District of Corinth

it is quite possible that future work will throw a great deal of light on some of the suburban features of the Greek city. Great as are the results at Corinth, yet only a fraction of the area has been excavated. The men on the spot are themselves the first to admit how little has been achieved in comparison with what there is to be done. We may, therefore, look forward to most important results in the years to come—especially in the districts to the east of the Agora, for instance, the Craneum, the aristocratic quarter where we may hope at the very least for some valuable inscriptions. It is unfortunate that few of all the epigraphic fragments that have been yet unearthed are of any importance for the history or topography of the city.<sup>62</sup> "The fact that all the inscriptions except possibly the first nine", says Mr. Powell, "date from the rebuilding of the city by Julius Caesar in 46 B. C. shows how complete was the destruction of the older town by Mummius one hundred years before."

Let us, then, leave it in its hopeless ruin and ascend the citadel, that glorious pile of nature's fashioning which savage Romans could not destroy nor even earthquakes shatter—Acrocorinthus. It rears its majestic form immediately to the

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in 1926," *A.J.A.*, 1926, pp. 444-463, with pl. VI; *A.J.A.*, 1928, pp. 487 f. Cf. D. M. Robinson on an Athena Parthenos mould used in Athena Chalinitis sanctuary, *A.J.A.*, 1911, pp. 482 ff. Beazley, *Greek Vases in Poland*, p. 9, says "that the marble head from Corinth is a portrait of Sappho, there is no evidence." Cf. also *Ausonia*, VI, pp. 88-100.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. B. Powell, "Greek Inscriptions from Corinth," *A.J.A.*, 1903, pp. 26 ff.; continued by K. K. Smith, *A.J.A.*, 1919, pp. 331 ff., also published in *I. G.*, IV. Many fragments of Greek vases have been found in the excavations, even a complete Fikellura vase, showing trade with Rhodes and Ionia. But we must await the publication of the vases by Dr. Stephen B. Luce. The architectural terra-cottas have been published by Mrs. B. H. Hill, the Greek lamps are to be published by Mr. Oscar Broneer, the sculptures by Prof. F. P. Johnson, the Greek coins by Miss Edwards, the Greek Inscriptions by Professor Meritt. For the Craneum area hope is aroused anew by Rhys Carpenter, *A.J.A.*, XXXIII, 1929, pp. 345 ff.

south. Livy's<sup>63</sup> "*arx intra moenia in immanem altitudinem edita*" brings to our mind very clearly how the mountain towered above the city which nestled at its feet. A particularly striking impression of its vast size and height is presented to one standing at the Seven Doric Columns. With what confidence must the Corinthians have contemplated this tower of defence should they ever be called upon to fight for their city or harbours. It commanded the whole surrounding country for miles, and, in particular, the narrow pass which lay between it and the western end of the Oneian range of which it was itself properly an offshoot. Statius<sup>64</sup> gives us some conception of its lordly greatness when he says:

*Litora . . . "qua summas caput Acrocorinthus in auras  
Tollit et alterna geminum mare protegit umbra."*

Both Strabo and Pausanias have left us accounts of their visits. The former gives the perpendicular height as  $3\frac{1}{2}$  stadia and the length of the path to the top as 30 stadia.<sup>65</sup> The modern measurement of the height is 575 m. One makes the ascent on the west side; it takes about an hour and a half. The walls which one sees to-day, forming as it were a crown upon the hill-top, date from successive occupations of Byzantine, Frank, Venetian and Turk, and in part still rest on foundations dating from Greek times. Skias claims to have discovered even Cyclopean masonry.<sup>66</sup> Indeed, this impregnable position must have been chosen from the very earliest times. The area on the top is of very considerable extent, grown wild with weeds and covered with innumerable ruins of

<sup>63</sup> XLV, 28.

<sup>64</sup> *Theb.*, VII, 106. But this idea of the protecting shadow is, of course, the fond imagination of the poet. Dio Chrysostom's exaggerations in this connection have already been mentioned.

<sup>65</sup> 379. The question has been raised, did Pausanias go up? He is carefully non-committal. Many deny that he made the ascent, though Smith takes it for granted and says so. Byvanck in *P. W. s. v. Korinthos*, p. 998, implies the same.

<sup>66</sup> *Πρακτικά τῆς Ἀρχ. Ἑταιρ.*, 1892, p. 117.

Greek and Turkish buildings of the last two or three centuries through which one with difficulty makes one's way. Besides Peirene there were several other springs and wells of various kinds so that to modern travellers explorations on the Acrocorinthus are a positive danger. Strabo quotes Euripides when referring to this.<sup>67</sup> Indeed, its extraordinary water supply is the most striking characteristic of the mountain. The Corinthians boasted that there was a well there for every day of the year. These are hidden away in the tall grass and weeds, so that one unused to the place has to pick his steps very carefully.

I have noted that there are three outstanding summits on the citadel plateau which, determined by a compass on the spot, are southwest, northwest and north. On this last was the famous *ναῖδιον* of Aphrodite,<sup>68</sup> to the south of which was the equally famous Peirene which has already been described. The whole citadel was sacred to Aphrodite, the charms of whose worship brought untold wealth to her shrine. Crowds of courtesans took part in the service of the goddess. Strabo tells us that it actually owned more than a thousand such *ιεροδοῦλοι*, whom both men and women had dedicated to Aphrodite's service. When private persons made vows to her they promised that in thanksgiving for an answer to their prayers they would bring courtesans to the temple.<sup>69</sup> "And therefore it was" says Strabo, "that because of these women there was always a crowd in the city and it grew rich. The ship captains spent all their money on them freely; hence the proverb:

οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐς Κόρινθον ἐσθ' ὁ πλοῦς."

Any person further interested in these ladies may look up the story which Strabo tells following the above paragraph. We have to remember that they were held in great honour. It

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<sup>67</sup> 379.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Paus., II, 5; Strabo, 379.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Strabo, 378; Athen., XIII, p. 573; Plutarch, *De Herod. Malig.*, 39 (871 B.).

was an ancient custom that whenever solemn prayers were made for the safety of the city, the *πολύξεναι νεανίδες* were always foremost in the devotions and were afterwards present at the sacrifice.<sup>70</sup> It has already been related, however, what Plato thought of the *Κορίνθιαι κόραι*.<sup>71</sup> When the Persians invaded Greece these women flocked to their temple and prayed for the freedom of Greece—prayed to Aphrodite. In memory of the efficacy of their prayers, Simonides composed an epigram which was set up on the left hand side of the entrance to the temple.<sup>72</sup>

The question arises, how were these "maidens" accommodated in the little temple. Unfortunately we do not know exactly its extent, and recent investigations on its supposed site failed to establish anything of importance about its architecture.<sup>73</sup> For its place was taken by a Christian church whose builders took care that not a stone of a building so obnoxious to Christian sentiment should remain in position. Some of these, well worked poros blocks, were found scattered about, indicating the identity of the spot. Nor does numismatic evidence help us to any extent. In fact it is full of contradictions in its representations. Imhoof-Blumer and Gardner remark that it appears "sometimes as tetrastyle, sometimes as hexastyle, sometimes as pro-style and sometimes as peripteral; all of which proves that in matters of architectural detail coins are not trustworthy."<sup>74</sup> But

<sup>70</sup> Cf. evidence in *Jahrb. d. arch. Inst.*, IX, 1894, p. 185. Cf. Curtius, II, 534.

<sup>71</sup> *Rep.*, 404 d. For a complete discussion of the proverbial references to Corinthians in general and their *κόραι* in particular, cf. M. Goebel, *Ethnica*, I, pp. 32-40.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Schol. on Pindar, *Olymp.*, XIII, 32, ed. Drachmann.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. B. H. Hill, *A.J.A.*, 1927, p. 70.

<sup>74</sup> *Num. Comm. on Paus.*, p. 27 (*J. H. S.*, 1885, p. 76, with pl. LIII, G. cxxvi-cxxxii.). These coins, of course, are of the Imperial Age, and are of value only for determining the statue representation of the goddess, naked to the waist with the shield of Ares held as a mirror and sometimes with a winged love beside her—"a motive natural to Roman rather than to Greek art."



all the authorities are agreed that the sanctuary was a very small place and one inclines to think, therefore, that the Hieroduli did not live there.<sup>75</sup>

Let us turn from this unsavoury subject to something more inspiring—the view from the Acrocorinthus which one sees best from this very point.<sup>76</sup> Sir J. G. Frazer very truly remarked “It is, though not the loftiest, certainly the grandest acropolis in Greece.” I should like to quote the words of one of the older travellers, Colonel Mure:

The Acrocorinthus—whether in point of majesty or singularity—is by far the most striking object of its class I have ever seen, either abroad or at home. Neither the Acropolis of Athens, nor the Larissa of Argos, nor any of the more celebrated mountain fortresses of western Europe—not even Gibraltar—can enter into the remotest competition with this gigantic citadel.<sup>77</sup>

Surely one would think that a city, which possessed such an unequalled fortress guarding like a vast bastion its approach on the south and, on the north, the narrow passage of the Isthmus, was destined to be the mistress of Greece. But the Corinthians never had the warlike spirit. The riches which their exceptional commercial situation brought them produced only habits of luxury and ease.<sup>78</sup> They paid merce-

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<sup>75</sup> Cf. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Pindaros*, p. 374.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Strabo, 379, one of the few descriptions of a view in Greek literature.

<sup>77</sup> *Tour in Greece*, II, p. 137; cf. Fiedler, *Reise*, I, 243; Beulé, *Études*, p. 401; Mahaffy, *Rambles and Studies*, p. 343; Philippon, *Zeitschr. d. Ges. für Erdk.* (Berlin), XXV, pp. 41 ff., 96 ff.

<sup>78</sup> In this respect they differed completely from the Athenians for whom Pericles claimed: φιλοκαλοῦμεν μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας (Thuc., II, 40), possibly intending a contrast with their enemies the Corinthians in particular. “So blühend und mächtig das alte Korinth als Handel- und Fabrikstadt gewesen war, so fehlte ihm das, was seine glückliche Nebenbuhlerin Athen vor allem gross gemacht hat, eine der materiellen entsprechende geistige Entwicklung. Alles, was zum sinnlichen Lebensgenuss gehört, fand man in Korinth, alle die Künste, die für die Bequemlichkeit des Lebens und den Luxus arbeiten, wurden schwunghaft betrieben;



naries to defend their territory and when the Persians invaded Greece it was, as we have seen, to Aphrodite they turned with prayers and sacrifices to be saved from servitude. After the victories of Salamis and Plataea when Greece raised statues to its glorious heroes, it was to its prostitutes that Corinth expressed its thanks.

Hence the Corinthians never became what their position might have made them, the foremost power in Greece.<sup>79</sup> Corinth's reputation as being one of the fetters of Greece, has already been mentioned. Nothing better illustrates its absolutely unique strategic position than the passage in Strabo<sup>80</sup> where he is discussing Messenia and Ithome.

The city of the Messenians is like unto Corinth. For over each city is a high and precipitous hill, which is enclosed by a common wall so that it can be used as an acropolis—the one mountain being known as Ithome, the other as the Acrocorinth. And hence it seems to me that Demetrius of Pharos spoke very appropriately when he advised Philip, the son of Demetrius, to get a hold of both these cities if he desired control of the Peloponnese. "For if you grapple both horns," said he, "you will hold down the cow," meaning by "horns" Ithome and Acrocorinth and by "cow," the Peloponnese.

Corinth did not choose to avail herself of the powers which nature gave her. Instead

"the lust of the eyes and the pride of life" were encouraged and found plenty to feed upon. Aphrodite reigned from Acrocorinth and to her sweet sway the city resigned itself. To Corinthianise became a proverb. Strangers visiting Corinth—and they came in crowds—yielded to the delicious intoxication. Abstemious merchants caught by the contagion found themselves suddenly parting in one day with the gains of a whole year. "It was not safe for

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man lebte ohne Zweifel in Korinth viel comfortabler, als in Athen zur Zeit des Perikles, der an den Athenern rühmt dass sie das Schöne ohne Luxus liebten." (Vischer, *Erinnerungen*, p. 256).

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Kromayer, *Schlachtfelder*, I, 1903, 33, with sketch. Cf. Byvanck in P. W., l. c., "Wegen der hohen, schwer zugänglichen Lage ist Akro-Korinth bis in die Neuzeit eine der wichtigsten Festungen Griechenlands gewesen."

<sup>80</sup> 361.

every man to go to Corinth." And was not Lais there to beguile the very elect? It is said that even the cold-blooded water-drinking Demosthenes was for a moment half ready to purchase at her hands remorse at a high price.<sup>81</sup>

All these considerations, however, are causing us to wander away from what we set out to do—to enjoy the inimitable view from the site of the vanished shrine of luxury and pride. I remember reading long ago in Mahaffy's *Rambles and Studies* that one gains a greater insight into Greek geography by one hour's enjoyment of the glorious panorama from Acrocorinthus than from years of study. I thought it was merely Mahaffy's rhetoric until I had the actual experience myself. Nor shall I soon forget the mystery which seemed to haunt these straggling battlemented walls ascending and descending, turning and doubling back upon themselves as they follow the slope of the ground, while through the breaches could be heard the music of the sweetly tinkling bells of little sheep which were nibbling far below in the deep sun-lit valley. Instead of trying to convey in my own words some idea of the world-famed prospect unsurpassed by any other that I know, I quote Sir J. G. Frazer's description no less accurate than brilliant.<sup>82</sup>

The view from the summit of Acrocorinth has been famous since the days of Strabo, who has accurately described it (VIII, p. 379 sq.). The brilliant foreground, indeed, on which he looked down has vanished. The stately city with its temples, its terraced gardens, its colonnades, its fountains, is no more. In its place there is spread out at our feet the flat, yellowish expanse of the Isthmus, stretching like a bridge across the sea to the point where the Geranian mountains, their slopes clothed with the sombre green of the pine forests, rise abruptly like a massive barrier at its further end, sending out on their western side a long promontory, which cuts far into the blue waters of the Corinthian Gulf. Across the Gulf, tower on

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<sup>81</sup> Cf. Richardson in *N. Y. Independent*, Feb. 6, 1896.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Paus., III, 30. For an almost equally eloquent description cf. Sir Thos. Wyse, *An Excursion in Peloponnesus*, II, p. 323. Cf. Belle, *Voyage en Grèce*, p. 258, with an engraving showing the view looking east; Philippson, *Zeitschr. d. Ges. für Erdk.*, 1890, pp. 96 f.

the north the bold, sharp peaks of Cithaeron and Helicon in Boeotia. On the northwest Parnassus lifts its mighty head, glistening with snow into late spring, but grey and bare in summer. In the far west loom the Locrian and Aetolian mountains, seeming to unite with the mountains of Peloponnese on the south and thus apparently converting the Gulf of Corinth into an inland mountain-girdled lake. To the southwest, above ranges of grey limestone hills dotted with dark pines, soar the snowy peaks of Cyllene and Aroania in Arcadia. On the south the prospect is shut in by the high tablelands and hills of Argolis, range beyond range, the lower slopes of the valleys covered in spring with cornfields, their upper slopes with tracts of brushwood. Eastward Salamis and the sharp-peaked Aegina are conspicuous. In this direction the view is bounded by the hills of Attica, the long ridge of Hymettus, and the more pointed summits of Pentelicon and Parnes, while below them in clear weather the Parthenon is distinctly visible on the Acropolis nearly fifty miles away, the pinnacle of Lycabettus rising over it crowned with its white far-gleaming chapel.

Let us, then, before we leave this vantage point consider Corinth's place in Greece. From this spot we can best realise the true significance of its situation. "Erat posita in angustii atque in faucibus Graeciae sic, ut terra claustra locorum teneret et duo maria, maxime navigationi diversa, paene conjungeret cum pertenui discrimine separentur" says Cicero.<sup>83</sup> The control of the transport system of the 'diolkos' must have realised a considerable sum yearly for Corinth. Controlling this transit, her custom officers levied a toll on every cargo of merchandise taken across from one gulf to another; and thus the Isthmus, the greatest highway of commerce in ancient times, was perhaps a large source of Corinth's extraordinary wealth. Corinth was by its very nature a commercial state. The Corinthians, as Mahaffy said, were the shopkeepers of Greece and their trade instincts, to a great extent the result of position and environment, always debarred them from taking the interest in military affairs necessary to make them what their position might have made them, the foremost power in Greece.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> *De Leg. Agr.*, II, 32.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Philippson, *Das Mittelmeergebiet*, p. 215.

Curtius wrote a very picturesque characterisation of the commercial cosmopolitan Corinthians, in the course of which he observed:

Thus Corinth was indispensable to the inland regions. It was the common port of the Dorian peninsula, while its citizens themselves were more cosmopolites than Dorians and Peloponnesians. Growing up in unhampered luxuriance, Corinth lost more and more the character of a Dorian city and did not allow itself to be deprived, by any laws, of the good things of life which streamed into it.<sup>85</sup>

And then, to say nothing of the income from the legalised prostitution which was carried on in the interest of the state finances as early as the days of Periander, the fair held every second year in connection with the Isthmian games to which merchants flocked from every land was a huge source of wealth.<sup>86</sup> Where can we realise better than from the spot where we are now standing what a gathering-place this must have been—the Isthmus, called the “gate of the Peloponnesus” by Xenophon, the “bridge of the sea” by Pindar, and the home of Poseidon, the head-quarters of his restless majesty, by all antiquity. There it lies before us to the east. I cannot help thinking of the scene of the games which nestles amid its pine woods by the sea as the corner of Argos to which Homer referred when Corinth was already ἀφνειός.<sup>87</sup> With Pindar<sup>88</sup> then, let us from the citadel top survey

τὰν ὀλβίαν Κόρινθον, Ἴσθμίου πρόθυρον Ποτειδᾶνος ἀγλαόκουρον.

In the fourth book of his *Politics* Aristotle sets forth the characteristics which he considered the ideal city should have. All these Corinth possessed and even more. As we look down upon Corinth, we can see how favourably it is placed

<sup>85</sup> *Op. cit.*, II, p. 520.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Thuc., VIII, 7-9; G. F. Unger, *Philologus*, XXXVII, pp. 1-42; Nissen, *Rhein. Mus.*, XLII, pp. 46 ff.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Aristides, *Isthmikos*, p. 37, ed. Dind.

<sup>88</sup> *Ol.*, XIII, 3.

not only in regard to the sea and to its territory but also in relation to the continent on which it lies. How compact it is, how well under the eyes of the authorities, how hard of entrance for foes though easy of exit for forces of the State. Aristotle "feels strongly—more strongly than Plato—the value of a maritime frontier both for the supply of commodities and for military strength, defensive and offensive."<sup>89</sup>

Corinth faced the northeast. It was certainly abundantly supplied with water. It was guarded by its towering citadel and from that height the Corinthian garrison held easy watch over the Isthmus, the two gulfs and a vast stretch of country from the great table-land of Sicyon in one direction to the Parthenon of Athens in the other. As we look down from its citadel, Horace's<sup>90</sup> 'bimaris Corinthi moenia' comes immediately to our mind. Let us recall also what Lucan<sup>91</sup> says:

qualiter undas  
Qui secat et geminum gracilis mare separat Isthmos  
nec patitur conferre fretum, si terra recedat,  
Ionium Aegaeo frangat mare;

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<sup>89</sup> Cf. Newman, *Politics of Aristotle*, I, p. 317. The passage of Aristotle on the ideal city is 1327 a-1331 b. 18. For a fine excursus on this passage see Newman, I, pp. 335-340. His notes on the Greek text will be found in vol. III, p. 354-421. It is indeed strange that in searching for examples to illustrate the Aristotelian ideal, Corinth apparently never occurs to him in spite of such points of recommendation as (1) convenient distance from the sea; (2) Lechaëum (in contrast to Peiræus, cf. Newman, I, 317 f.); (3) good and unailing water supply [Cf. Newman, I, 335, for a rather naïve note from Mahaffy, but Newman, III, 400, does recognize Peirene. There was a "profuse provision of water" in Corinth before Rome was thought of, in spite of what Strabo says]; (4) strategic position (*δυσπρόσδοτος*, which Newman admits Athens was not); (5) impregnable system of walls (cf. what has already been said about the remark of Archidamus); (6) positions and nature of Agora and Acropolis. The latter would be a far more apt illustration than the church towers of Norfolk and Suffolk. The whole passage in Newman, I, 337-340, makes one wish that he had used Corinth to illustrate both Aristotle's and his own text.

<sup>90</sup> *Carm.* I, 7.

<sup>91</sup> *Pharsalia*, I, 101 f. Cf. *γέφυραν ποτιῶδα*, Pind., *Isth.*, III, 38.



Was not Corinth, as Aelius Aristides describes it, the ὁδὸς καὶ διέξοδος πάντων ἀνθρώπων? <sup>92</sup>

This is no more eloquent tribute than that contained in this writer's Ἴσθμικὸς εἰς Ποσειδῶνα. It is however, impossible to quote so long a text here.

But if this was Corinth in her days of dependence, what must she have been in the days of her glory? <sup>93</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Ed. Dindorf., I, p. 38.

<sup>93</sup> We may, indeed, agree with Professor Boulanger that the Sophist's praise is excessive (*Aelius Aristide et la Sophistique, etc.*, pp. 346-347, 443); but so are most "panegyrics" and "addresses." It is a long call from the writer of the second century to the editorial and kindred exponents of the "greatest in the world" qualities of a modern city, but the balance in good taste is, to say the least, in favour of the former; and we have the deliberate Philippson asserting of the site of Corinth: "Das, was ihn zu Zeiten zu dem Sitz einer grossen und reichen Weltstadt, zu dem Boden, auf dem eine zahlreiche, hoch civilisierte Menschenmenge ein üppiges Wohlleben führen konnte, gemacht hat, ist seine Eigenschaft als wichtiges Passageland und damit als natürlicher Mittelpunkt eines bedeutenden Verkehrs, einer lebhaften Handelsbewegung." (*Zeitschr. as cited, Der Isthm. von Korinth*, p. 78.)



## CHAPTER III

### PREHISTORIC CORINTH

The burden of proof is now more than ever on the shoulders of those who assert that Corinth was inhabited in the days of the Atridae. (Walter Leaf, *A.J.A.*, 1923, p. 152.)

The name Korinthos is of unknown antiquity. Modern philologists agree that before the Greek language<sup>1</sup> was spoken in the Peloponnesus, the primitive dwellers in its north-eastern corner employed this name, but whether to designate a settlement or merely some natural feature, perhaps the hill known in history as Acrocorinthus, is uncertain, as we do not know the meaning of the word. Many<sup>2</sup> believe that the pre-Hellenic population of Greece belongs to the Anatolian family, the unity of which may be seen in certain place- and personal-names common to Greece and Asia Minor, especially those in *-vθ-* and *-σ(σ)-*, for example Parnassos, Perinthos, Kerinthos (in Euboea); Korinthos (Tirynth-); also, in certain common nouns, e. g., *asaminthos*, *erebinthos*, *lebinthos*, *terebinthos*. We may, perhaps, add *labyrinthos*. Some of these, as Burrows<sup>3</sup> remarks, are "earthy of the soil, the words for dung,

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Giles, *Cambridge Ancient History* (to be referred to hereafter as *C.A.H.*), II, 27.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Thumb, *Handbuch der griechischen Dialekte* (1909), pp. 6 seq. A similar view is expressed by Meillet, *Aperçu d'une Histoire de la langue grecque* (1913), pp. 57 f.; Fick, *Die vorgriechischen Ortsnamen* (1905); Hoffmann, *Geschichte der griechischen Sprache*, pp. 11-14; Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die griechischen Sprache* (1896), pp. 401 ff.; Pauli, *Altital. Forsch.*, II, pp. 44 ff.; Arkwright, *J.H.S.*, 1918, pp. 45 ff., disagrees. An expert's discussion of this whole matter will be found in "The Language Situation in and about Greece in the Second Millennium B. C.", by C. D. Buck, *Cl. Phil.*, XXI, 1926, pp. 1-26. Cf. also Haley in *A.J.A.*, 1928, pp. 141-145, with map accompanying C. W. Blegen's article on "The Coming of the Greeks", pp. 146-154.

<sup>3</sup> *Discoveries in Crete*, p. 120.

barley-cake and basket, or names of the common animals, hedge-sparrow, cock and worm, which never penetrated Greek literature, but were unearthed by the lexicographers from the language of the country people." In a later passage <sup>4</sup> Burrows hints at the possibility that the primitive inhabitants of Greece and the coast of Asia Minor may have been a non-Indo-European race akin to the 'Minoans' of Crete. Sir Arthur Evans believes <sup>5</sup> that a language of Anatolian and Cretan affinities was that of the dominant population of Continental Greece down to the last days of the Mycenaean civilization. Excavations, while not proving Sir Arthur's opinion as yet, have revealed the fact that related tribes occupied the north-east part of the Peloponnese, the Cyclades and Crete during the early part of the Bronze Age, while Haley and Blegen have shown the common distribution of topographical names of the same non-Greek character. These scholars would place the *-vos* and *-sos* suffixes in the early Helladic period.<sup>6</sup>

It is beyond doubt that Corinth was inhabited from the very earliest times. In the words of Dr. Leaf,<sup>7</sup> who strangely set out to prove that there was no Mycenaean or Homeric Corinth:

There is already evidence to show that at the very dawn of the Bronze Age, when some countries were still in the neolithic stage of culture, while others were passing through the Chalcolithic, and the more advanced had already entered into the Bronze period, there existed conditions which would explain the occupation of the site of Corinth as an emporium. That is to say, there is evidence of a wide and active commerce between the Aegean basin on the one hand, and Sicily and Southern Italy on the other. . . .

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 198. Cf. Wace, *C.A.H.*, II, p. 467.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *London Times*, April 8, 1924.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Blegen, *Korakou*, *passim*, esp. pp. 110-126; Zygouries, pp. 209-272; *A.J.A.*, l. c.

<sup>7</sup> *Homer and History*, p. 354, Appendix G. For neolithic remains cf. Wace in *C.A.H.*, I, 603, 608 (who plainly assumes the existence of a Mycenaean Corinth and marks it as such in his map facing p. 614). Cf. *A.J.A.*, 1897, p. 313. Cf. the recent study of Dr. G. E. Mylonas, *Ἡ Νεολιθικὴ Ἐποχὴ ἐν Ἑλλάδι*, Athens, 1928, pp. 80 ff.

It is reported that the early ware found at Corinth supports the idea of a trade in the Chalcolithic period between Corinth and the northeast, at least as far as Thessaly; but as the evidence is still unpublished, I can only point out that so far such discoveries would confirm what I have said.

The same scholar says elsewhere, "There was never any doubt in my mind that for a considerable period of pre-history Corinth was an important settlement."<sup>8</sup>

Though the complete evidence still remains unpublished and is soon about to appear from Dr. Alice L. Walker Kosmopoullos, we have sufficient preliminary testimony from Messrs. Blegen and Mylonas<sup>9</sup> to justify the statement that all are now agreed about the neolithic occupation of Corinth.

The same is true of the early Helladic period, roughly the equivalent of Leaf's Chalcolithic.<sup>10</sup>

As for the Middle Helladic period, there is again a consensus of opinion that Corinth was a centre of considerable importance. It is likely, indeed, that Leaf would have begun to dissent at this stage but, definitely in the next period, the late Helladic, both Meyer and Leaf deny the existence of Corinth, the former, possibly, considering the poverty of its hinterland, the other, either because there was no trade with the west or because Corinth went down side-tracked by Minoan Crete.<sup>11</sup>

In the absence of historical documents we are dependent on the results of archaeological discovery as interpreted by the combined efforts of archaeologists and their critics, and on the study of Homer in the light of the results. Let us assume, therefore, as a "working hypothesis":

<sup>8</sup> *Cl. Rev.*, Aug.-Sept., 1918, p. 135.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Blegen, *A.J.A.*, XXIV, 1920, pp. 1 and 6; Mylonas, 'Η Νεολιθική Έποχή ἐν Ἑλλάδι, pp. 77, 80 f., 87-8, 159. Cf. *A.J.A.*, I, 1897, p. 313; Wace in *C.A.H.*, I, pp. 603, 608.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Blegen, *Korakou*, passim, and his work at Gonia, which is briefly summarized in Mylonas, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Meyer, *Ges. des. Alt.*, II, p. 155; Leaf, *Homer and History*, p. 212; *J.H.S.*, XXXV, 1915, pp. 161-172.

(a) The civilization known in Greece as Mycenaean is pre-Dorian and, following the now generally accepted and well-known divisions of Wace and Blegen,<sup>12</sup> late Helladic, i. e. about 1580-1100 B. C., in which there would appear to be contributions from various sources, pre-Greek, Greek and Minoan to form the magnificent synthesis, the origins of which puzzle us still.

(b) The Achaeans, whose arrival was probably about 1400 B. C., formed three main kingdoms and were the dominant folk in Greece.

(c) The Trojan War is historical and is to be dated early in the twelfth century B. C.

(d) The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as we have them, whenever, however, and by whomsoever composed, preserve a genuine tradition, and their chief characters are historical.

Professor Meyer is perhaps the most outstanding example of those who were unwilling to admit the existence of Corinth in Mycenaean times. Writing in 1893,<sup>13</sup> he says:

It is significant that Corinth in the oldest times plays no part, neither in Saga nor as evidenced by ruins. For a self-supporting place of trade and industry it is very favourably situated, and with traffic highly developed it is the obvious thoroughfare between East and West. But it has no hinterland; for sea-farers who wish to dispose of their wares and receive in exchange the products of the country, the Isthmus of Corinth has no significance; they seek the harbours in the plains of Laconia and Argos, Attica and Thessaly.

As no later edition of this portion of Dr. Meyer's work has appeared at the time of writing, I cannot be sure that he has not revised his opinions. Leaf, however, his disciple, till his death clung to the view of the non-existence of Corinth and developed the thesis with a great wealth and acuteness of argument which must be examined later. But in order to do so he must get rid of Homer's references to Corinth. These are three in number.

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. Glover, *Hdt.*, pp. 85-89; Meyer, *Forsch.*, I, 1-124; Myres, *J.H.S.*, XXVII, pp. 170 ff.; How-Wells, *Hdt.*, I. p. 442, App. XV, espec. p. 446; Wace and Blegen, *B.S.A.*, XXII, pp. 175-189; Blegen, *Korakou*, p. 124; Wace, *C.A.H.*, I, pp. 604 ff.; Harland, "The Peloponnesos in the Bronze Age," in *Harv. Stud. in Class. Phil.*, XXXIV, pp. 1-62; Buck, *l. c.*

<sup>13</sup> *Geschichte des Alterthums*, II, p. 55.

(1) In the Greek Catalogue Corinth is mentioned as having furnished a part of the particular division which Agamemnon commanded at the review of the troops in the tenth year of the war before Troy.<sup>14</sup>

(2) In the thirteenth book a passage of ten lines is devoted to the story of the death of a certain Corinthian, son of the prophet Polyidas.<sup>15</sup>

(3) In the sixth book<sup>16</sup> we have the account of the meeting of Glaucus and Diomedes. Glaucus was grandson of Sisyphus of Ephyre. From the time of Aristarchus scholars have regarded Ephyre as an old name of Corinth, and this can be the only explanation of the appearance of the name twice in this passage in connection with Sisyphus. For all the legends agree in making Sisyphus king of Corinth.

Leaf has to explain away these Homeric references. Let us first take the two passages in which the word Corinth itself occurs. The first of these is rejected completely by Leaf as belonging to the Greek Catalogue which is spurious and a late insertion in the *Iliad*. In the Catalogue Corinth is called ἀφνειός. This is nonsense, Leaf says. Corinth was not in existence at all, much less ἀφνειός. When the Cataloguer in Hesiodic days wrote of a Corinth that was ἀφνειός in the time of Agamemnon he was simply "projecting into the past an epithet belonging to his own time."

Let us hear how Dr. Leaf gets over the reference in Book Thirteen:<sup>17</sup>

The town of Corinth is named once, and once only, in Homer, whom, of course, I am still keeping clear of complicity with the Greek Catalogue. In a single episode, destitute of any organic connection with what precedes or follows, an otherwise wholly unknown hero, who appears only to be killed, is said to have dwelt at Corinth. It will not, I hope, shock the strictest unitarian if I say that the mention of the name shows that this episode is post-Achaian.

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<sup>14</sup> *Il.*, II, 570.

<sup>15</sup> *Il.*, XIII, 663-672.

<sup>16</sup> *Il.*, VI, 152-210. Aristarchus observed that when Homer speaks in his own name (as in the two former passages) he calls the city "Corinth" but in this passage in the sixth book puts in the mouth of the hero Glaucus the older name Ephyre.

<sup>17</sup> *Homer and History*, pp. 215 f.



I must absolutely avoid becoming involved in the controversy of unitarians and separatists, but it may not be inopportune to remark here that the trend of the best recent scholarship is a distinct reaction from the higher criticism of the last century—a particular speciality of the Germans who, it seems, had a lasting influence on Leaf.<sup>18</sup> His reason for rejecting the passage is no reason. He complains of the passage not being in organic connection with its context. If that be the objection, we ought to make a complete revision of the text of the poem, for there are many such seemingly disconnected passages. I would therefore say with Mr. Shewan:<sup>19</sup>

Dr. Leaf hopes, but hopes in vain, I feel sure, that the strictest unitarian will not be shocked if he says “that the mention of the name shows that this episode is post-Achaian.” That seems to beg the question at issue, and the only other reason given, that the episode is not ‘in organic connection’ with what precedes or follows, need not be regarded.

But there is the bigger and more important problem which arises from the reference to Corinth in the *Boeotia* or *Catalogue of the Greek ships*. So we must discuss whether the catalogue is consistent with the rest of the *Iliad*, and is valid as evidence for the existence of Corinth. I hope that the discussion will not seem to be irrelevant or to overbalance the main theme. It is a matter of primary significance to Corinthian history whether the Homeric evidence is to be relied upon or not.<sup>20</sup> Mr. Shewan speaks plainly on Leaf’s

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<sup>18</sup> Witness the works e. g. of T. W. Allen, John A. Scott, and above all the almost alarming “faith” of such a professional “rationalist” as Bury. His contributions, before his recent untimely death, in *C.A.H.*, II, pp. 473 ff., show a willingness to accept almost all the old beliefs. See especially his chapter on Homer where he “out-critics the critics,” and holds strongly for the unitarian position.

<sup>19</sup> *Cl. Rev.*, Feb.-Mar., 1918, p. 2; *Ibid.*, 1924, p. 67, where he repeats his criticisms.

<sup>20</sup> Such points as I make are independent of the results of T. W. Allen, *The Catalogue of the Ships*. Bury (*l. c.*, pp. 497 ff.) accepts



purpose in trying to establish its non-existence when he remarks:

If there was no ἀφνειὸς Κόρινθος in Mycenaean days, it is one more nail in the coffin of the Cataloguer, whose whole scheme must be discredited when we find him "projecting into the past an epithet which belonged only to his own time."

If then we can show that the *Catalogue* stands in its place and is not inconsistent with the rest of the poem, we shall have gone a long way towards proving the existence of Corinth in the Mycenaean-Achaean period. We have in this enquiry to consider some, at least, of Leaf's arguments for its rejection.

After a preliminary skirmish against the form of the Catalogue, in which the reader's agreement or disagreement must depend upon his personal conception of how a story ought to be told, Leaf proceeds to his main charges. These are:

Whereas the picture in all the rest of the poem is consistent alike with itself, with geography, and the Greek tradition, the Catalogue contradicts all three,<sup>21</sup>

The notion that the Catalogue contradicts the rest of the *Iliad* seems to be based on a misinterpretation of the evidence of the Catalogue. For instance, Leaf holds that Agamemnon held the supreme power in Greece. Though we should grant him this position we need not in the least lose faith in the Catalogue, which sets up no rival king to dispute his supre-

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the Catalogue, as do a great many recent scholars, directly or by implication. Cf. Buck in *Cl. Phil.*, XXI, 1926, p. 19, who says "Allen, *Hom. Cat.*, has shown convincingly that the Catalogue is an important geographical survey of pre-Doric Greece." Cf. also e. g. M. S. Thompson in *Annals of Arch. and Anthropol.*, IV, pp. 128-139, where he has demonstrated that the Catalogue coincides in a marked degree with the distribution of Mycenaean remains. "Thus this Catalogue seems to be in the first instance a national list of the Mycenaean dominions" (p. 135).

<sup>21</sup> *Homer and History*, p. 79. See in general for the following discussion Ch. III.

macy. It does not speak, at all, of the home powers of the various chiefs who fought at Troy. It is simply an enumeration of the different divisions of the army whom Agamemnon had bidden the clear-voiced heralds assemble. We are told the names of the several captains and the divisions they led. Nowhere in the catalogue is it said or implied that the captains were lords, much less kings, of the places which sent the men who constituted their particular commands. But Leaf tells us that the 'Cataloguer' sets up Diomedes as a rival king to Agamemnon. Unless leading a division of the army (the words are ἡγεμόνευε and ἡγείτο) constitutes kingship, we are reluctantly driven to conclude that Leaf is misinterpreting the words of the 'Cataloguer.'

To turn to the graver accusation that the Catalogue is inconsistent with geography. Leaf argues at great length to prove that the assemblage of the fleet at Aulis did not take place at all; that either the *rendezvous* was Lemnos, or the separate contingents sailed direct for the Trojan coast. Now to begin with, the Catalogue says nothing of an assembling at Aulis. It does not profess to give any account of the gathering which took place before the fleet started for Troy, whether that gathering took place at Lemnos, Aulis, or somewhere else. It is simply a list of the various divisions of the army in the tenth year of the war, with their various captains. But Leaf thinking that Aulis was an unsuitable place for the mustering of a fleet, attributes the passage where it is referred to, not to the impeccable Homer, but to the Boeotian interpolator who, not content with foisting in his catalogue, has gone out of his way to insert his nonsense in another part of the text.

Nor does it follow that because a certain man is named in the Catalogue as leader of one of the divisions, he is king of the towns or districts from which that division has been recruited.

Leaf claims that the partition of the Argive plain between Agamemnon and Diomedes is unthinkable. Mr. Shewan (*l. c.*)

has brought forward several arguments to show that such a partition is quite feasible. Were not Tegea and Mantinea in the same plain of the Arcadian tableland? Mr. Shewan might have used with equal effect Leaf's own description of the contemporaneous existence in the previous generation of the Adrastid monarchy at Argos with that of Atreus at Mycenae.<sup>22</sup> But our point is that, whatever the precise relation of Diomedes to Agamemnon, he appears in the Catalogue merely as the leader of the men of Argos at Troy.

There remains the alleged contradiction between the 'Cataloguer's' account and Greek tradition. According to the latter as recorded by Thucydides,<sup>23</sup> 'in the sixtieth year after the fall of Troy the Boeotians were expelled from Arne by the Thessalians and settled in the land which is now called Boeotia.' Thucydides accepting both the tradition and the Catalogue,<sup>24</sup> explains, ἦν δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποδοασμός πρότερον ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ ἀφ' ὧν καὶ ἐς Ἴλιον ἐστράτευσαν. Leaf thinks this was by way of "concession to the patriotic feelings of his countrymen." If the Catalogue was wrong about the Boeotians in the Trojan war, it was also wrong about Salamis, and thus Athens lost her title-deed.

When he (Thucydides) states as an undoubted fact that the Boeotians came sixty years after the war, and adds in a parenthesis, "but there must have been a detachment of them there before," can we not almost hear the sarcastic aside, the *eppur si muove*?

It is most unlikely that Thucydides in Chapters IX and X gave his credence to the catalogue, and in Chapter XII rejected it in a 'sarcastic aside.' Does not Thucydides' parenthesis mean 'there *was* a part of them in the land before, whence they made the expedition against Troy,' referring back in explanation to Chapters IX and X? If it be objected that an ἀποδοασμός could not occupy all the places in Boeotia mentioned in the catalogue, we reply that the Achaeans were themselves no greater in number than an ἀποδοασμός (as is

<sup>22</sup> *Homer and History*, pp. 226 f.

<sup>23</sup> I, 12.

<sup>24</sup> This is apparent from Thuc., I, 9-10.

shown by their speedy absorption and disappearance), and yet they ruled the whole native population. There is nothing Galilean about Thucydides' parenthesis.

We now turn to Leaf's difficulty about the three main kingdoms of the Homeric world.<sup>25</sup>

These seem to have been so completely distorted and disarranged by the Cataloguer, that they are not only inconsistent with the true *Iliad* as Leaf conceives it, but mockeries and unimaginable things. We shall begin with the kingdom of Peleus.

This, then, is Homer's picture of the realm of Peleus. It stretches from the head waters of the Spercheios the whole way to Iolkos, Pherai and Pelion; it is bounded on the south by Oeta and the sea, on the north by a continuous line of mountains, overhanging the central plains of Thessaly. By land Othrys divides it, somewhat awkwardly, into two distinct parts; but it is more compact than may appear at first sight. For all of it is easily accessible from the coast, and the whole coast is linked by the sheltered waters of an inland sea. In such a case communication by water is as safe and regular, and more rapid and convenient, than by land.

We admire the beautiful picture which Leaf has drawn from his *Homer*, but let us say a word in defence of the 'Cataloguer.' He is accused of dividing it up among a number of barons till it is a veritable tangle of enclaves. I see no reason for assuming 'baronies' with Mr. Allen, or for rejecting, with Leaf, the Catalogue account as inconsistent with *Homer*. Again, the Catalogue only gives us a description of the army before Troy, with its various divisions and captains. Leaf's intersecting straight lines in his sketch of the baronies are not fair to the 'Cataloguer.' Achilles, in fact, is assigned at the outset "Pelasgian Argos, those that inhabited Alos and Alope and Trachis and possessed Phthia and Hellas, the home of fair women, and were called Myrmidons and Hellenes and Achaeans." Thus Achilles is given a general leadership at the outset. But the particular towns of his command are Alos, Alope and Trachis, and in addition

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<sup>25</sup> For the dominion of Peleus cf. Ch. IV.

some men picked here and there throughout the whole kingdom. Then come his various captains who led the inhabitants of the towns assigned to them; it is not implied that they possessed the places themselves.

The gathering at Aulis, referred to in *Iliad*, II, 303, is, as we have said, assumed by Leaf to be an insertion of the 'Cataloguer.' He objects (1) to *χθιζά τε καὶ πρωιζά* and (2) to Aulis as a place of muster. As to (1) we should remember that Odysseus is trying to cheer the drooping spirits of the army, and, therefore, with a rhetorician's subtlety, uses the bold phrase to minimize the prolongation of their exile. On (2) we may remark that in spite of the difficulties of the Euripus Channel, which Leaf describes in such detail, the Athenian corn ships habitually used this route in importing supplies from the Pontus.<sup>26</sup>

I may also quote a passage from Dr. Hall,<sup>27</sup> bearing on the same point:

A very ancient alliance, which probably dated from *Mycenaean times*, connected the cities which lay on the coast route, running through the Euripus, which connected the old Mycenaean centres on the Pagasaean Gulf and in Boeotia with those of Argolis.

This passage, though not very felicitously expressed, at least suggests that ancient ships found less difficulty in using the Euripus Channel than Leaf would have us believe.

To return to the Kingdom of Peleus. Leaf takes particular exception to the appearance of Lapiths in the Greek army before Troy.

It is not to be expected that inland tribes like those of Thessaly, wholly cut off from the sea by the high ranges of Ossa and Pelion, backed by an iron-bound and harbourless coast, should have taken part in a maritime expedition like that of Troy, and it has often been noticed that the historic doubt, "Where did they get their ships," is even more pertinent in their case than in that of the Arcadians.

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<sup>26</sup> Cf. Thuc., VII, 28; Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of His Age*, p. 79; Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, p. 33.

<sup>27</sup> *Oldest Civilisation of Greece*, p. 256.



We are told, definitely, however, that Agamemnon provided the Arcadians with ships (*Il.*, II, 610), because they had no care for naval affairs being an inland people. Is it not quite reasonable to assume that Achilles did the same for his neighbouring allies? <sup>28</sup>

The reappearance of the Lapiths in *Homer* outside the Catalogue is a tremendous difficulty for Leaf. He tries to minimise the importance of the passages in which they appear (*Il.*, XII, 127-136, 181-194; XXIII, 836-849).

When therefore we find two Lapiths making a passing appearance in the Achaean army before Troy, we cannot but wonder if this is not another anecdote introduced in the process of adapting and rounding off by the Catalogue when it was taken into the *Iliad*.

The references are much more than 'a passing appearance.' The whole passage of sixty-seven lines (XII, 127-194) is devoted to the noble fight of two Lapiths, Polypoites and Leonteus, whereas according to Leaf we have two short references of nine lines in one case and eleven in the other. To minimise thus the significance of the appearance outside the Catalogue of these Lapiths who made so brave a fight as even to gain words of praise from the Trojan leader, Asios, is not fair. Honour where honour is due! In XXIII, 836-849 Polypoites won the casting competition by long odds. This passage seems very apposite and the reference can scarcely be called 'passing.' And what object could a Boeotian 'Cataloguer' have in inserting this long section of sixty-seven lines in the *Iliad* as a set-off to a mention in the Catalogue? Were the Lapiths in the Cataloguer's days so important that in deference to their national pride and their athletic tradition they were introduced into the Trojan war? At any rate they cost the poor 'Cataloguer' a huge anecdote in Book XII, to smooth over their insertion in Book II.

There are just a few more points raised by Leaf in his Chapter, "The Dominion of Peleus." On p. 135 he says:

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<sup>28</sup> Bury, *C.A.H.*, II, p. 480, accepts the truth of the Arcadians being supplied with ships by Agamemnon.



There is a possible argument which may be worth consideration, though I do not think that it has been actually used. It might be said that the Catalogue does not deny Peleus his larger kingdom, that Achilles, Protesilaos, Eumelos, Philoctetes, are his subordinate barons, chieftains who are the wardens of his different cities, like Phoinix among the Dolopes. But this will not stand examination. For if they all commanded armies of Myrmidons, they must have retired from the war when Achilles withdrew the Myrmidons, or been guilty of flat mutiny.

This suggestion can stand a little examination. By continuing the fight they are not 'guilty of flat mutiny.' Achilles is not a modern Commander of the Forces. He is simply a Homeric chief in a bad temper because he has had a 'tiff' with Agamemnon about a damsel. He organizes no secession. He simply stops fighting, and because he stops fighting, his own particular division is left leaderless. This is implied in the words of the Catalogue (*Il.*, II, 686-7) :

ἀλλ' οἳ γ' οὐ πολέμοιο δυσηχέος ἐμνώοντο·  
οὐ γὰρ ἔην ὅς τις σφιν ἐπὶ στίχας ἡγήσαιοτο.

They would have been fighting but they had no one to lead them. Achilles was too wroth to do so, but he made no manifesto of general revolt against Agamemnon. Further, we have Achilles' threat (*I.*, 169-171) : "Now will I depart to Phthia seeing it is far better to return home in my beaked ships, nor am I minded here in dishonour to draw thee thy fill of riches and wealth."

Not a word that he would order the contingent to withdraw. Here, if anywhere, would have been the place to give utterance to a threat of general revolt. Again, in the passage 233-244, where we have Achilles' most vehement words of menace and defiance which he says he will confirm with a mighty oath, there is not the slightest implication that he will withdraw his forces—even his own particular division. Nor in his final ultimatum, 293-303, is there any hint of such a determination. It seems then, that having got rid of the only possible objection which occurred to Leaf against

the "subordinate barons" theory, we are on pretty sure ground.

Another matter to which Leaf takes exception (p. 124) is the question of the number of Protesilaus' ships. The Catalogue gives forty, but "*Homer* knows of one only" (*Il.*, XV, 704-746; XVI, 286). In neither of these two passages is it necessarily implied that Protesilaus had only one ship. In the first of these passages "Hector seized hold of the ship which carried Protesilaus to Troy." This is just one of Protesilaus' ships. He could not have come bodily to Troy in more than one. In fact, Leaf himself translates the passage "'a' fair ship, swift on the brine, that had borne Protesilaus to Troia." In the second passage the translation 'a' ship, is quite admissible.

Let us now take the dominion of Odysseus which is next in Leaf's line of inquiry.<sup>20</sup>

But we have something besides Homer to consider; there is the Catalogue. We turn for further information to see how the domain of Odysseus is treated there. . . . The leading place, it appears, really belongs to a certain Meges, who not only rules Dulichion, the largest of the group, but outweighs Odysseus in the proportion of five to two; for he leads to Troy no less than thirty ships, against the poor dozen of Odysseus. And still worse . . . the presence of Meges . . . is not mentioned from the beginning of the *Odyssey* to the end. . . . We do, in a passing mention, hear who is king (*βασιλεὺς*) of Dulichion—it is not Meges but Akastos.

Here again the true interpretation is that Meges was simply leader of the forces from Dulichium and the Echinades. There is no word in the text of the Catalogue which would lead us to suppose that Meges ruled Dulichium. I am indeed prepared to concede to Leaf that Acastus was king of Dulichium; the Catalogue is not affected by such an assumption. It is strange that Leaf admits he was. It seems diametrically opposed to his view of Odysseus' supremacy. The reasons assigned by Leaf for the mention of the Echinades by the 'Cataloguer' are hardly convincing. Their

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<sup>20</sup> For the dominion of Odysseus cf. Ch. V.

conjectural connection with Boeotia scarcely seems motive enough for a Boeotian poet to have included them in his lay. I cannot exactly understand what Leaf means by "the district in which the islands lie." An enthusiastic and patriotic poet would certainly have inserted the actual coast line where the legendary Teleboai, his ancestral enemies, dwelt, and not contented himself with the mention of "islands in the district." Neither did it give them a prestige in Boeotian eyes that the matricide Alcmaeon found refuge in the delta of the Achelous. In short, absolutely no motive has been assigned for the supposed faking of the Catalogue.

But let us follow the fortunes of Meges outside the Catalogue.

In the action of the *Iliad* itself Meges plays a respectable though not a very brilliant part among the minor heroes. He begins by killing Pedaïos, otherwise unknown (V, 69-75). In XV, 518 ff., he is more prominent, Polydamas kills his "comrade, Otos of Kyllene, leader of the great-hearted Epeians." Meges attacks Polydamas in vain. . . . He is in turn attacked by Dolops. . . . In reply he shears the crest off Dolops' helmet. In XV, 302, he receives casual mention with others. In the Doloneia (X, 110, 175) he is honoured by a summons to the emergency council . . . but never appears. In XIX, 239, he is commissioned with others to bring the gifts destined to appease Achilles.

Leaf admits, then, that Meges played a part of some importance in the action of the *Iliad*, though he perhaps minimises it. Outside the Catalogue, XV, 518 ff., Meges is found fighting in company with Otus, leader of the great-hearted Epeians. In the Catalogue<sup>30</sup> he leads the men of Dulichium, and an explanation of the fact is given. His father in consequence of a family quarrel had retired to Dulichium. This does not necessarily mean, as Leaf tries to maintain, that Meges was also an exile in Dulichium. It may be that being a warrior of distinction who had connections with the island he was appointed to lead the Dulichian contingent. At the same time we need not wonder if in a particular

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<sup>30</sup> *Il.*, II, 625-630.

engagement he is found with a fellow-countryman. Lastly, there is no difficulty in the fact that his father Phyleus was once beaten by Neleus in a javelin contest in his native country. For as Neleus was father of the aged Nestor, the contest obviously took place before Phyleus ran away from home. I say 'ran away from home' because there is nothing said of his having committed any crime or suffering any penalty.

The most astounding remark of all is Leaf's concluding statement.

But the general upshot seems to be this—the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and the *Ionian* (as Leaf calls *Il.*, XIII, 685-722) say that Meges was at home in Elis. The *Boeotia* says that he was in Dulichion. Can our conclusion be in doubt?

In the *Odyssey*, to use Leaf's own words (p. 158), "he is not mentioned from beginning to end." And Leaf rejects the *Ionian* as spurious, being a 'catalogue in embryo.' In any case it does not say that he was at home in Elis. All it says is that at this particular crisis in the fight, Meges and others led the Epeians, which is quite possible. The *Boeotia* says, not that Meges was in Dulichium, but that he led the Dulichian division at Troy; and we are asked 'can our conclusion be in doubt?' We are forced to admit that it is, and to give, at the very least, the Scots' law verdict of "Not Proven."

I have already said something about the realm of Agamemnon, and even for argument's sake granted Leaf the supremacy of Agamemnon. Yet he was not 'supreme' but only 'superior.' A list of reasons for this view is not relevant to our present inquiry. I would refer to Mr. Shewan's article,<sup>31</sup> *The Realm of Agamemnon*. A few remarks here on some passages in *Homer and History*, are sufficient. The Catalogue account certainly seems to be consistent with the rest of *Homer*. It has been pointed out before that the Catalogue

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<sup>31</sup> *Cl. Quart.*, XI, p. 146.

claims no kingship for Diomedes, that it only mentions him as a leader before Troy; but granted that Diomedes was King of Argos, does it follow that Agamemnon could not still retain an overlordship and have a perfect right of way through the territory of his subordinate? Diomedes, being an Achæan, would be entirely sympathetic. The Adrastid kingdom is, according to our supposition, now in his hands, but it would be natural for him to be on the friendliest terms with Agamemnon. We might compare the relations of the French and Spanish Bourbons in the eighteenth century. This point has been raised for the following reason. Leaf says (*Homer and History*, pp. 235-236):

The loss of his stronghold can hardly have been so severe a blow as deprivation of every harbour in his realm. Agamemnon, as we are told by the cataloguer, provided a hundred ships for his own troops. Where did he put them and keep them? When he ruled the Argolid he had harbours and to spare; but every one of these numerous bays and creeks has been taken from him, and has passed under the power of Diomedes. All the seaboard left him is the southern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, the one portion of the Greek coast south of Thessaly which, in its whole length from west to east, is entirely devoid of any natural shelter for a ship.

This is a serious statement, and an unwarranted deduction from the Catalogue. There is not the slightest mention in the catalogue of harbours at all, much less that Agamemnon was deprived of any within his realm. Briefly, Agamemnon is not debarred from any harbour in the *Iliad*, even if Diomedes were actually king of Argos. In any case, it is wrong to say that all the seaboard left him is the southern shore of the Corinthian Gulf. He had the two ports of Schoenus and Cenchreae on the Saronic Gulf. It may be said that Schoenus and Cenchreae did not exist at that time. At any rate, the sea was there, and they were natural harbours. Besides, recent archaeology has shown that Cenchreae was an 'heroic' port.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. Allen, *Hom. Orig.*, app. pp. 334-337.



The foregoing discussion may have appeared irrelevant to my subject, but I may point out that, if I have succeeded in justifying the catalogue as a genuine Homeric document, not 'inconsistent with the rest of the *Iliad*, with geography, and with Greek tradition,' I have gone far towards proving the existence of a Corinth, of some degree of importance at least, in the Achæan period. It will be left for later inquiry to consider the extent of this importance. Here I am content to be able to state that on the authority of Homer, Corinth did exist, and that Leaf's statement of its non-existence, based on his arbitrary rejection of the catalogue, and on his view that the mention of Corinth outside the Catalogue is an insertion incidental to the 'rounding-off process,' is entirely unfounded.

We have now to ask, "Is Ephyre Corinth"? Aristarchus thought it was, and so far as I know all the ancients thought with him.<sup>33</sup> Leaf thinks otherwise, and tries to justify his dissent.

The whole legend of Sisyphus and Bellerophon was claimed by Corinth and it seemed necessary therefore that Ephyre should be Corinth.

Now this is a mere assumption in support of his case for the non-existence of Corinth in the Achæan period. There are no reasons for it. He remarks further,

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<sup>33</sup> Already Simonides sang of Ἐφύρη πολυπιδᾶς (see *Reliquiae*, ed. Schneidewin, pp. 82 ff.). Cf. Allen, *Hom. Cat.*, p. 65, and Cobern, *Arch. Discoveries*, p. 500. Monceaux and the French School thought Ephyre was near the Isthmian Sanctuary (See *Gaz. Arch.*, 1884, p. 273; 1885, p. 402). The same opinion is held by Philippson, *Zeitschr. d. Ges. für Erdk.*, XXV, p. 83. This view would fully dispose of Leaf's and Lenschau's objection about the "nook of horse-bearing Argos," because there could not be a better description of the scene of the games near the sanctuary of Poseidon. Cf., however, Bursian, *Geog. von Griech.* II, pp. 10 f., and Blegen, *A.J.A.* 1923, 157, n. 1. What greater objection is there to the μυχῶ Ἀργεὺς ἱπποβότῳ of Homer than to Pindar's Κορινθὸν ἐν μυχοῖς (*Nem.*, X, 42) and μυχῶ Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσας (*Nem.*, VI, 25)?



Now Sikyon itself was only ten miles from Corinth, and it does not seem possible to suppose that two old towns named Ephyre lay close to one another. In other words, if Strabo is right in giving us to understand that there was in the small territory of Sikyon a known town called Ephyre lying on a known river Selleis, the conclusion seems inevitable that this Ephyre was the original Corinth. There is no improbability in such an idea; indeed it almost seems to follow of itself from the proof that in Achaian times the town of Corinth did not exist (p. 217).

There were several towns named Ephyre in Greece, and it has been suggested by Meineke that the name is derived from ἐφοράω. Curtius and others also prefer to connect it with ἐφοράω rather than ἐχρά, as Wagner does.<sup>34</sup>

Turning to Strabo, we find reference to an Ephyre on the Selleis in Elis and to another (Leaf's *protégé*) in Sicyonia (VIII, 3, 5). Now if it is unlikely that there were two towns named Ephyre in the small territory of Sikyon, it is also unlikely that there were two rivers Selleis, each with its own Ephyre, in the small territory of Peloponnesus. Nothing further is known about either Selleis or either Ephyre. One or both must be rejected; on the whole there is a greater probability for the Elean Ephyre. Phyleus would be likely to have a guest-friend in his old home. This was what Strabo thought at any rate. Speaking of the Elean Ephyre, he says that it was from here came the armour of Meges, and quotes the Homeric passages given above. Leaf, however, when writing *Homer and History* preferred the Sicyonian, as it seemed to provide a solution of the kind he desired for the Ephyre-Corinth problem.

Since the appearance of his book, however, the progress of archaeology has placed a mark of interrogation after Leaf's theory. He himself abandoned, provisionally at least, Strabo's 'Ephyre on the Selleis in Sicyonian territory.'

"What Strabo says as to this particular Ephyre may have to go with the other fables he talks about the name of Ephyre."<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Meineke, *ad Steph. Byz.*, p. 275; Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, II, p. 593, A. 84.

<sup>35</sup> *Cl. Rev.*, May-June, 1918, p. 87.

This change of mind was brought about by the results of the American excavators at Corinth, especially by the excavation of Korakou which Blegen (*Korakou*, p. 54) calls the "Homeric Ephyre." "The new site is, in fact, a few miles from Corinth in the direction of Sikyon. It lies on the coast of the Gulf somewhere near Lechaion." (sic, Leaf) But unfortunately the "new site is not on any stream;" so Leaf had to abandon his 'Ephyre on the Selleis.' He would, however, insist that the new site is the 'Ephyre' which gave its name to Corinth "when the great western movement of colonisation opened markets for commerce in Sicily and Magna Graecia" and gave it cause for existence. The new site is the 'Ephyre' which so kindly provided the upstart "settlement with its first inhabitants, local legends and all."

But Leaf should have remembered that the newly found Mycenaean 'Ephyre' spoils his whole theory. As he admits himself, it is 'on the coast of the Gulf somewhere near Lechaion.'<sup>36</sup> That is, as is clear from our first chapter, it is in a northerly direction from Acrocorinth, but close to Lechaum. This site is neither in Sicyonian territory nor in the direction of Sicyon, and, therefore, it cannot serve the purpose of his 'Ephyre' at all.

But at the time that Leaf wrote full results were not yet available, and since 1918 many a change has taken place at Corinth. Dr. Blegen in his *Korakou*<sup>37</sup> has provided us with an excellent publication of the archæological results in pottery, architecture, tombs and miscellaneous finds in what was un-

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<sup>36</sup> *Cl. Rev.*, May-June, 1918, p. 87. As a matter of fact, the site referred to is really Korakou (below). The only site to the west of Lechaum (No. 4 in Dr. Blegen's list below) had not been excavated. In the field about the chapel of St. Gerasimus several Early Helladic sherds were picked up. Hence Dr. Blegen's correction of Leaf, *A.J.A.*, 1920, p. 5. But I am arguing against Dr. Leaf on his own ground even if (as in *Cl. Rev.*, 1922, p. 55) he decides to take his stand on Aetopetra (No. 3 in Dr. Blegen's list). From what I know of the region, this site is less helpful still for his Ephyre search.

<sup>37</sup> Boston, 1921.



Korakou, with view of New Corinth in the distance at the left.



doubtedly the port of Corinth in Mycenaean times. This is accepted by such an authority as Wace.<sup>38</sup> A like attitude is taken by Bury,<sup>39</sup> Fimmen, Dussaud, Wilcken and indeed by every serious interpreter of the archæological results who has not a particular case to make. To quote one of the most recent, the Professor of Greek History in the University of Paris:

Finally, the Gulf of Corinth is surrounded by pre-historic sites . . . to the east is all the Corinthia. By numerous excavations, amongst others those of Zygouries and Korakou, the Americans have shown the important rôle played very early by the region of the Isthmus.<sup>40</sup>

It is not at one place only that Mycenaean occupation was revealed. Dr. Blegen has given us an account of eleven sites located at various points in the vicinity of Corinth.<sup>41</sup> But even so Leaf was unwilling to relinquish his position. Three years afterwards burst forth anew the Leaf-Blegen controversy.<sup>42</sup> The difference is between the man on the spot who states the facts clearly as he finds them and the theorist who tries to make these facts fit his own preconceived notions. Quite apart from the archæological evidence, enough has been said to show that Leaf's assumptions about Corinth and kindred matters were unfortunate. With regard to his insistence on the fact that no Mycenaean finds of importance

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Crete and Mycenae in *O.A.H.*, II, pp. 459 ff., 462. Cf. pp. 454, 457, 468.

<sup>39</sup> *Op. cit.*, Ch. XII, "The Achaeans and the Trojan War," pp. 477 ff., 483 et passim; Fimmen, *Die kretisch-myken. Kultur*, pp. 9, 59, 70, 81; Dussaud, *Les Civilisations Prehelléniques*, pp. 147, 148; Wilcken, *Griech. Gesch.*, p. 33.

<sup>40</sup> Gustave Glotz, *La Civilisation Egéenne*, p. 20, *Engl. tr.*, p. 18; cf. pp. 34 f, 47, 186; *Histoire Grecque*, I, pp. 71, 76, 80, 98.

<sup>41</sup> *A.J.A.*, 1920, pp. 1-13. For resumé see Allen, *Homer*, App. p. 334.

<sup>42</sup> *A.J.A.*, 1923, p. 151. Cf. also *Cl. Rev.*, 1922, pp. 52-57 (Leaf v. Allen), *ibid.*, p. 195 (Shewan v. Leaf); *Cl. Rev.*, 1923, pp. 65 f. (Leaf v. Blegen) and *Cl. Rev.*, 1924, pp. 65-68 (Shewan's parting shot).



were found on the exact site<sup>43</sup> of the Classical city, we must remember

that a Mycenaean settlement and an extensive one might have existed some considerable distance from the excavated region and still have been within the circuit of the city of the historic period; and that, moreover, the excavations have been made almost wholly in the ancient Agora and the districts adjoining it—that is, in the part of the ancient city which was most liable to change, and in which evidence already existing might have been very easily obliterated by the processes of destruction and building that went on through the many centuries of subsequent occupation.<sup>44</sup>

We must not forget what the Romans did and the tales that are told of the Necrocorinthia. There is another point for which I have received a suggestion from Thucydides' introductory sketch. It need not be demanded that the position of Mycenaean Corinth coincide absolutely with the Corinth of historical times. It is very probable that the remark of Thucydides about prehistoric cities applies here—that ancient Corinth was built *κωμηδόν*.<sup>45</sup> Corinth was the great emporium and had trading stations at various positions along the shore of the Bay of Lechaem. Why then blame Homer for calling it *ἀφνειός*?

I would add a few words from Mr. Shewan:<sup>46</sup>

The soil and climate, which Dr. Leaf misdescribes in his book in terms so disparaging that one must marvel that a great city was ever founded and flourished there, did not deter the Mycenaean. They, like their predecessors and successors, appreciated the importance of the locality for trade. We always knew that there was a

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<sup>43</sup> See, however, below, end of chapter.

<sup>44</sup> Dr. A. L. Walker Kosmopoulos, quoted by Blegen, *l. c.*, p. 162.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 5. This view is well illustrated by the archaeological results.

<sup>46</sup> *Cl. Rev.*, Nov.-Dec., 1918. Cf. Allen, *J.H.S.*, 1910, pp. 292 ff., and especially Thompson, "The Distribution of Mycenaean Remains and the Homeric Catalogue," *Ann. Arch. and Anthropol.*, IV, pp. 128-139, who says: "In the case of Corinth, considering how long Mycenaean culture was domiciled at Mycenae and taking into account also the significant position of Mycenae on the road to the Isthmus, no argument based on negative evidence can be admitted."

"natural harbour at Cenchreae," but we now know it was a Mycenaean port. About Lechaum also I believe Dr. Leaf is wrong. There is in the tradition a claim by the Corinthians that it was the first artificial port ever created. It may well have been created in Mycenaean times; its creation would surely have been a trifle to the builders of Mycenae (*Cl. Rev.*, November-December, 1918).

Having now established the existence of Corinth, at least, in the Achaeae period, it remains to consider its importance. Here we can only offer probabilities for examination. Nothing can be definitely stated about its position in the Homeric age. We say 'definitely stated' because both the references to Corinth in the *Iliad* are few, and of no informative value, and in addition we have not yet obtained the complete results of archaeological discovery. That Agamemnon led the men of Corinth before Troy, that Euchenor, a Corinthian, was killed in combat, or that Glaucus was a descendant of Bellerophon, a quondam resident in Ephyre, does not enlighten us as to its greatness or insignificance.

It is admitted that Corinth was a place of trade in Chalcolithic days. In *Homer and History* (p. 212) Leaf accounts for its (hypothetical) desertion in Mycenaean-Achaeae days by the inference derived from the *Odyssey* that there was no trade with the west. In an article entitled "On a History of Greek Commerce" (*J. H. S.*, XXXV, 1915, pp. 161-172) he has a different view:

Corinth went down, side-tracked by the growth of Minoan Crete which carried on its own trade to east and west without needing any emporium on the Greek mainland. Corinth, in fact, disappeared; and, what is very remarkable, it did not reappear through the whole of the Minoan period, not even in its latest Mycenaean stage.

We do not know which of these two theories represents Leaf's final opinion. Neither of them now seems tenable, in view of the archaeological evidence summarised above. The second theory seems incredible. Was there absolutely no trade for Corinth to carry on either in the Corinthian or Saronic Gulf, even if her more distant commerce were side-tracked?

In *Homer and History*, Leaf answers the question, 'Why was there no trade between Greece and the West?' by asking another: "Where was Taphos and who were the Taphians?" Leaf identifies Taphos with Coreyra. The Taphians, a race of free-booters, stopped all traffic with the West. Hence, for all the *Odyssey* can tell us, "beyond Thesprotia is a region of mist where we would gladly find a definite shape but can only see dim glimpses of distant lands" (p. 169).

It is a wrong principle to infer that because Homer does not mention a certain thing, that thing did not exist. The wanderings of Odysseus in the West, Leaf tells us (p. 157) are a fairy story:

We can say definitely where Odysseus passes out of reality to fancy and where he returns to it again. On his voyage from Troy he leaves reality between the Kikones and the Lotus-eaters; on his way home he re-enters it between Scheria and Ithaka.

Now if a poet locates his fancy-story in a certain region, he will be very careful not to admit into his poem any prosy details of fact relating to that region. So we should expect the poet not to give us much information about trade between Greece and the West. However, a few facts slip out. In Leaf's words, "the Sikels offer a safe slave market, to which can be sent any suppliants whom it may be convenient to betray and sell for a large price;<sup>47</sup> and in the same market slaves may be bought as well as sold." What more does Leaf require? In fact the *Odyssey* gives him more than his Taphian theory can well stand. If the Taphians stopped trade with the West, was the slave trade an exception? Some other points against the theory may be urged:

(1) The close intimacy implied in the *Odyssey* (and emphasized by Leaf himself) between Mentès and Odysseus seems inconsistent with the embargo on all Western commerce which Leaf attributes to the Taphians. Mentès might at least have given a free pass to his Ithacan crony.

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<sup>47</sup> For slaves sold, cf. *Od.*, XX, 383; for slaves bought, cf. *Od.*, XXIV, 211.

(2) Can we suppose that the Taphian navy was sufficiently strong to enforce this embargo against all ships from 'Achaea'? There is no suggestion of anything of the kind in Homer.

(3) It is admittedly a mere conjecture that the Taphians dwelt in Corcyra.<sup>48</sup>

Finally, archaeology seems to be against Leaf.

R. M. Dawkins has described four vases now in one of the small museums in the island of Torcello in the lagoon of Venice. They are of a late Mycenaean type and are said to have come from one of the adjacent islands in the lagoon.

If these vases were really found where they are said to have been, they give a proof of Mycenaean trading right up to the top of the Adriatic. In the lower part of the Adriatic we have proofs of such trade at Taranto, Oria, Coppa Nevigata, and on the opposite coast in the islands of Cephallenia and probably Ithaca. It is interesting though not surprising that the South-East corner of Italy was throughout all the prehistoric period the greatest centre of trade in the country.

Finally must be considered certain fragments of supposed Mycenaean architecture found in Istria. They were discovered in excavating an iron-age cemetery at Nesazio.<sup>49</sup>

In addition to these, Mycenaean sites have been discovered in Sicily. Leaf comments:

... The distribution of sites suggests that the communication of Sicily in the late Mycenaean period was with the south-west, and that trade spread thence to Taranto, and not *vice-versa*. The conclusion I draw is that it was the Phoenicians of the African coast who at this period carried on the trade between Crete and Sicily, and that there was no direct communication from Greece westward with the Italian peninsula (p. 187, n.).

Now it is evident that this explanation is part of his gen-

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<sup>48</sup> For a defence of the ancient equation, Scheria = Corcyra, cf. A. Shewan in *Cl. Quar.*, 1919, p. 1.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Peet, *The Stone and Bronze Ages in Italy*, p. 512; *The Early Aegean Civilization in Italy*, *B.S.A.*, XIII, pp. 405-422; also in *P.B.S.R.*, IV, pp. 283-296, and *Annals of Arch. and Anthropol.*, II, pp. 72-90. Cf. Harland, "Aegean Influence in Sicily in Bronze Age" at Arch. Inst. of America, Dec., 1928, summarized in *A.J.A.*, 1929, p. 106.

eral scheme for the exclusion of Corinth from any reason for existence in this period. It must be denied the slightest possibility of serving as an emporium. Even granted that the Phoenicians acted as 'intermediaries', this explanation holds only for the finds in Sicily and Southern Italy. It fails to explain the discoveries (mentioned by Peet) along the eastern coast of Italy and in Istria at the top of the Adriatic. The 'Phoenician intermediaries' could get to Matera and Taranto right enough, but they could not get round the heel of Italy, on Leaf's own showing (p. 187). The Taphians would have stopped them unless we suppose that the 'Phoenician intermediaries' had a right of way to the Adriatic in their mission of introducing Mycenaean culture.

Leaf cannot have it both ways. If he believes in his 'Phoenicians' he must drop the 'Taphians.' Here is the dilemma. He must keep his 'Phoenicians' to explain the Mycenaean remains on the Adriatic shores. This necessitates his abandoning his Taphian theory. But the Taphians were set up as the only explanation of the absence of trade between Greece and the West. As the Taphians have disappeared trade between the West and Corinth must be admitted. This removes another reason alleged in *Homer and History* against the existence of Corinth. But once the Greeks are admitted to the West there is no longer any necessity to ask the Phoenicians to act as intermediaries. Therefore, as there was trade between Greece and the West, what is more reasonable to suppose than that Corinth was either the source or the emporium of that trade? As we have seen, this is confirmed by the discoveries, though still incomplete, of the American archaeologists.

A supporter of Leaf's might of course argue that the Adriatic trade was exclusively in the hands of the Taphians—that the Phoenicians did not sail beyond the heel of Italy. The dilemma would not then arise.

But besides the fact that it is clear from the *Odyssey* that the Taphians had no trade connections with the Achaeans,



which would lead one to regard them as possible importers of the Mycenaean finds on the eastern shores of Italy and at the head of the Adriatic, it is quite evident also from Leaf's treatment of the subject that he does not suppose them to have had anything to do with the Adriatic finds. If he really thought they were the bearers of Mycenaean influences to the West at all, he certainly would not have gone out of his way to bring in the Phoenicians as intermediaries in Sicily, for his Taphian friends could have filled the same *rôle* there as on the coasts of the Adriatic. But though we know that this is not what Leaf intends, we might infer from his argument that the Mycenaean objects found on the shores of the Adriatic were brought thither by the Taphians, those found on the east coast of Sicily were carried from Crete by the Phoenicians, while the Greeks were only allowed to buy and sell slaves in Sicily. The Taphians, who were not really pirates, but merely high protectionists who "imposed a tax of one hundred per cent in kind on all goods passing up the straits in foreign bottoms," were, no doubt, quite sufficiently up-to-date in their commercial practices to make a combine with the Phoenicians to restrain the Greeks from trading in anything except slaves. The strange thing is that the Greek trade in slaves is the only part of the business for which we have any authority; the Taphian monopoly and the Phoenician trade in Sicily at this period are, both of them, mere conjectures. Lastly, if the Taphians imported Mycenaean or Minoan manufactures to Italy, where did they obtain them? Leaf in one passage (p. 188) almost suggests that Greek traders could proceed with their wares as far as Corcyra, whence we must understand they were trans-shipped into Taphian bottoms. The more it is examined, the more fantastic the whole Taphian theory becomes.

Though we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Corinth existed as an important Mycenaean settlement, our work would not be complete without considering a few remaining points.

(1) The evidence of Thucydides <sup>50</sup> for Corinth as an important emporium from the earliest days for overland traffic across the isthmus between Peloponnese and Northern Greece cannot be denied.

Leaf's arbitrary rejection of the evidence of this passage cannot be justified. He thinks that the reason why an overland trade between south and north could not have existed was because the sea must have been 'an overwhelming competitor.'

From the Argolic Gulf eastwards the coast bristles with the little ports which early coasting trade requires, and Sunium is the only point which was likely to cause the navigator any serious trouble (p. 221).

Leaf does not lay proper stress on the fear of Sunium. The ships of those days would not have dared to adopt a coasting route round Sunium. The Thucydidean passage <sup>51</sup> has already been referred to with regard to the Euripus corn route. Here we are told that even in historical times, eight hundred years afterwards, the corn ships would not go round Sunium because there was a much quicker and less expensive route overland *via* Decelea.

Mr. Shewan <sup>52</sup> gives excellent reasons for the overland trade across the Isthmus and points out that:

The danger to the traffic on the narrow road along the Isthmus is reflected in the legend of Theseus, the Attic Herakles, who clears the country side of robbers—Sciron, Sinis, Kerkyon and others.

The same scholar continues:

From seaport to seaport water carriage might be preferred. But from inland site to inland site *much will depend on the distances of these from the coast*. The journeys to and from the sea will operate against navigation, especially if there is a dangerous headland to be negotiated and if there is cheap land carriage. A trader

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<sup>50</sup> I, 13; note that it was not Homer alone who called Corinth ἀφνειός, but "the ancient poets."

<sup>51</sup> VII, 28.

<sup>52</sup> *Cl. Rev.*, Feb.-Mar., 1918, pp. 7 ff.

sending goods from the middle of Boeotia to Mycenae, Tegea, Sparta or Pylos, would not choose the long sea-route round Sunium to Epidaurus or Nauplia, with two land journeys added, but would take the cheap route overland.<sup>53</sup>

(2) If there was no Corinth in the days of Agamemnon, the city must have grown up between the decay of the Achaeen supremacy and the incoming of the Dorians. But does this period coincide with the years of the western colonisation of which Leaf speaks? "Till the great western movement of colonization opened markets for commerce in Sicily and Magna Graecia, Corinth had no cause for existence" (p. 212). We have always been taught to regard this western movement as at least post-Dorian, and Corinth as playing an early and prominent part therein. Therefore, on Leaf's showing, there was no Dorizing of Corinth. But Leaf regards the Dorian invasion as an 'undoubted historical fact' (pp. 329 f.). Are we to conclude then that the Dorians founded Corinth? Such, however, was not the Greek tradition.

(3) It will be seen from our next chapter that the cults and myths of Corinth are of Helladic origin and therefore attest the occupation of Corinth from very early times.

(4) There have been discovered at least three roads of the prehistoric type from Mycenae to the site of Corinth.<sup>54</sup> Leaf regards these as military roads connecting Mycenae with northern Greece, for northern Greece had to be reckoned with 'either as friend or foe'. The fact that the roads go no further than the site of Corinth militates against his theory, and favours the view that there was a place of importance at the terminus. The presence of watch towers along one of them suggests that along this route passed caravans that required to be protected. One of these forts—on the summit of St. Elias, "which served at the same time as a watch-tower and a beacon station, commanding a wide prospect in all directions"—seems to have been intended to

<sup>53</sup> Cf. the same scholar's remarks in *Cl. Rev.*, 1924, pp. 65 f.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Tsountas and Manatt, *The Mycenaean Age*, pp. 16 ff., 35 ff., 345; Hall, *O.C.G.*, p. 289.

watch against all possible smuggling across the Isthmus. For it must have been the rich toll taken here that made Mycenae 'rich in gold.'

"From this eminence the whole Argolid plain and gulf, and the mountain region to Corinth and beyond can readily be watched" (Tsountas and Manatt, *The Mycenaean Age*, p. 38).

The same writers also point out "that the three different roads to Corinth witness the great and prime importance which the Mycenaeans attached to easy communication with that city." This is Mr. Hall's opinion also:

That at one period Corinth was very closely connected with Mycenae and probably under the direct control of the Mycenaean rulers seems to be indicated by Captain Steffen's discovery of the ancient "military" roads which run between Mycenae and the Isthmus (cf. the map in Tsountas-Manatt, p. 12).

In conclusion, besides what has been already said about the classical site, it must be pointed out that there are definite traces of Mycenaean occupation. These will be fully published in the promised account by Dr. A. L. Walker Kosmopoulos.<sup>55</sup> Wilamowitz implied his belief in the existence of a Mycenaean Corinth when, as yet, nothing of prehistoric importance had been revealed.<sup>56</sup> Corinth's position as "un entrepôt" is taken for granted by Guiraud<sup>57</sup> who quotes the passage in Strabo (378), and Mr. Heurtley has shown the existence of a sea-trade between Boeotia and Corinth in prehistoric times.<sup>58</sup> As Mr. Shewan says,

The theory that there was no Corinth in Mycenaean days is one of a number of novelties in the three Dominion chapters of *Homer and History*. . . . But for the reasons given I think we may still preserve our belief in the *Kόρινθος* of the Catalogue and its epithet *ἀφνειός*.

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<sup>55</sup> Cf. Blegen, *A.J.A.*, 1920, p. 274; Karo, *Reallexikon der Vorgeschichte*, s. v. Korinth, and B. H. Hill, *A.J.A.*, 1927, p. 73.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Wilisch, *Neue Jahrb.*, 1908, p. 434.

<sup>57</sup> *Propriété Foncière*, p. 132.

<sup>58</sup> *B.S.A.*, XXVI, pp. 38-45.

## CHAPTER IV

### EARLY ACCOUNTS, CULTS AND MYTHS

It has been taken for granted by many writers that the lewd cult of Aphrodite at Corinth reveals a Phoenician settlement of the place. We shall show reasons in our next section for rejecting this view on the ground that we can trace the origin of this lewdness to other and earlier causes. It is also held that the worship of Melicertes reveals a Phoenician occupation, on the ground that Melicertes is the Phoenician Melkarth.

Dr. Farnell,<sup>1</sup> who believed this when writing *Cults of the Greek States*, has revised his opinion in later years. He now <sup>2</sup> avers that

We need not greatly concern ourselves with Phoenicia. The days are past when we believed in Kadmos the Phoenician; and we are not now deceived by the accidental resemblance in sound of Melikertes and Melqart, seeing that Melqart, the bearded god, had no affinity in form or myth with the child- or boy-deity, and was, moreover, always identified with Herakles; nor do we know anything about Melqart that would explain the figure of Ino that is aboriginally inseparable from Melikertes.

Besides Maas <sup>3</sup> has shown very conclusively the futility of beliefs in Phoenician origins and maintains:

the similarity of name between the Tyrian Melkart and Melicertes (to speak only of one similarity) would also then remain an accident, even if a convincing etymology from the Greek should not be found later . . .

which Maas goes on to explain.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Cults*, II, p. 637.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Farnell, "Ino-Leucothea," *J.H.S.*, 1916, p. 43.

<sup>3</sup> *Griechen und Semiten auf dem Isthmus von Korinth*, pp. 15 f., 42 f. and passim.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. pp. 17-43. Cf. Lenschau in *P. W. s. v. Korinthos*, p. 1010; Wilisch, *Beiträge zur Ges. d. alt. Korinth*, II (Zittau, 1901), pp. 4 ff.



Its comparative antiquity (1876) is perhaps the only justification for the reference to Sidonian Astarte in the following statement<sup>5</sup> of Curtius:

The unique evolution of the Greek folk life in Corinth is essentially connected with the fact that here the Phoenician influx took place in especial strength. This is shown by the Sidonian Astarte in Acrocorinth, the Tyrian Melkarth on the Isthmus; it reveals itself in the very ancient purple and textile industry, in the quickness and many-sidedness of the people and in the mercantile elements pervading public life. For even the help which Corinth, as ally, granted to the other states, was clothed in the form of a money transaction (Her., VI, 89). Also the ships of war must have been regarded as rent-producing capital. In its Phoenician blood was rooted the cosmopolitan spirit through which Corinth was separated from all the other states, and, no less, the denial of the spirit of nationality, as was most sharply brought out by the fact that by the ruler of the town a disgraceful trade in Hellenic youth was driven with the court of Sardis.

The generalisations in the foregoing passage have no basis of fact. There is no evidence for Phoenician blood in Corinth, but to this we shall return presently. Curtius sees Orientalism in the cults of Aphrodite and Melicertes, and immediately concludes that there is Phoenician blood in the population, which is evidenced by "the quickness and many-sidedness of the people, and the mercantile elements pervading public life." He then gives an explanation of the last characteristic which he wrongly ascribes to Herodotus. The reference is to the famous loan of ships to Athens, of which we shall have much to say in a later chapter. What we are told by Herodotus is that they could not legally supply the ships as a gift, so they sold them at five drachmas apiece. This merely nominal sum, about £4 for twenty ships, fulfilled the letter of the law. This is the letting out on hire of which Curtius speaks, a mere technical conformity to a law which

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Hermes*, X, "Studien zur Geschichte von Korinth," pp. 215-243. The same remark applies to Haacke, *Ges. Kor. bis zum Sturz der Bakchiaden*, pp. 5 ff., who naturally follows Curtius and Duncker.

proves that the Corinthians did not use their ships as 'rent-producing capital!'

The second generalisation is equally unsound. The 'disgraceful trade in Hellenic youth with Sardis' is based on the well-known story in Herodotus<sup>6</sup> of the revenge taken by Periander on the Corcyraeans for their murder of his son Lycophron. From an isolated act of vengeance on the part of a single individual, a tyrant, in his rage and despair hardly responsible at the moment for his actions, Curtius has drawn the inference that the Corinthians conducted a regular trade in Hellenic youths with Sardis, and did so because they had Phoenician blood in their veins!

We spoke of its 'comparative antiquity' when referring to Curtius' statement about the "Sidonian Astarte in Acrocorinth," for, in recent years, the Phoenicians, who in Curtius' time were held responsible for almost everything un-Greek in Hellenic life, have in most cases been eliminated and the Minoans substituted. As Mr. Hall<sup>7</sup> observes:

Many arguments for Phoenician activity in the Aegean can now be taken as referring equally well to the Minoan Greeks; in view of what we are now beginning to know of early Aegean religion, it is unsafe to regard the worship of an Astarte-like goddess, for instance, as indicative of Phoenician influence. Aphrodite of Paphos may have been a Minoan, not a Phoenician deity at all.

More will be said later about the supposed Minoan origin of the Corinthian Aphrodite. Our present purpose is to deny the supposition that there was any Phoenician settlement at Corinth. As Bury<sup>8</sup> remarks:

It has been held that there were Phoenician settlements on the Isthmus of Corinth, under the Acropolis of Athens, and even at inland Thebes. There is no assurance or probability that such settlements were ever made. The Phoenicians, doubtless, had marts here and there on coast and island; but there is no reason to think

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<sup>6</sup> III, 48-53.

<sup>7</sup> *Ancient Hist. of Near East*, p. 523 (4th ed.).

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. of Greece*, p. 77.

that Canaanites ever made homes for themselves on Greek soil or introduced Semitic blood into the population of Greece.

And Speck observes:

As regards the occurrence of Phoenician cults, Aphrodite has certainly taken the place of a Phoenician Astarte in Cyprus and Cythera; but whether that also happened in Corinth and Sparta cannot be proved.<sup>9</sup>

One might indeed be prepared to admit that the Phoenicians did some trading with the Corinthians, but that they ever influenced Corinthian religion, and above all that they settled down there and intermarried with the natives is most improbable. As Mr. Hogarth says,<sup>10</sup> they were "mere huxtering traders who followed sea ways opened long ago by others. At most they established factories rather than colonies at a few points, such as Citium in Cyprus, and these on sufferance." Practically identical views are expressed by a recent writer in the *Cambridge Ancient History*,<sup>11</sup> Dr. Giles.

This writer regards the Phoenician influence on Greece in its true light. It was very small. A nation of sea-rovers who borrowed most of their conceptions—perhaps even the alphabet, with which they are particularly credited<sup>12</sup>—could not have influenced in any marked degree an original people like the Greeks. Cyprus where, most of all, one would expect to find evidence of their occupation, Mr. Hogarth points out, is practically devoid of such. *A fortiori* then, there can hardly have been any extensive settlement of Greece. From the quotation given above we might infer that Mr. Hogarth does not believe that the Phoenicians had even a factory at Corinth.

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<sup>9</sup> *Handelges. des Altertums*, I, p. 478. Cf. the remarks of Mr. Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.*, II, p. 538, and Cavaignac, *Histoire de L'Antiquité*, I, pp. 257 ff.

<sup>10</sup> *Ionia and the East*, p. 92.

<sup>11</sup> II, p. 27. Cf. the remarks of Autran, *Phéniciens*, p. 8.

<sup>12</sup> Hogarth, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 ff. Cf. Giles, *l. c.*, pp. 29 ff., and the mass of recent literature on the origin of the alphabet. Cf. Ullman, *A.J.A.*, XXXI, 1927, pp. 311-328.

In examining Corinth's legendary history we find that any attempt to disentangle the mythical mazes or to assign any definite historical significance to the stories told would prove futile; we cannot hope to add anything to the treatment by Grote and Wilisch.<sup>13</sup> It is possible that in Corinth as in the rest of Greece they have a real historical background. Thus of Sisyphus the Aeolid, ancestor four generations back of the Homeric hero Glaucus, the traditional cunning may typify the commercial enterprise of the early maritime population who overreached the simple inhabitants of the interior. As regards the legend of Jason and Medea, Grote remarks:

We may consider the legend of Medea as having been originally quite independent of that of Sisyphus, but fitted on to it in seeming chronological sequence, so as to satisfy the feeling of those Aeolids of Corinth who passed for his descendants.<sup>14</sup>

The words "Sisyphos Aiolides" raise the problem of the Aeolians.<sup>15</sup> Is it possible that they represent an Helladic stock which at an early date amalgamated with the Achaeans? We might compare the Minyans of Pylos whose king, Nestor, takes his place, as though unconscious of any racial difference, among the Achaean chiefs.

The traditional date of the Dorian invasion of Peloponnesus is 1104 B. C., a date which seems to accord approxi-

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<sup>13</sup> *Die Sagen von Korinth nach ihrer gesch. Bedeut., Neue Jahrb.*, 1878, pp. 721-746. Cf. Porzio, *Corinto, Critica della leggenda*, and Robert, *Griech. Heldensage*, pp. 174 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Grote, I, Ch. VI, p. 115.

<sup>15</sup> On the Aeolian invasion cf. Schubring, *De Cypselo Tyranno*, pp. 7 ff. He argues for Thessalian origins. Cf. Giles in *C.A.H.*, II, p. 30, and Haacke, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-11. Pindar (*Ol.* XIII, 20) calls the Corinthians "Children of Aletes." Cf. Wilamowitz on *Eur. Herakl.* I, 268 and cf. Wilisch, *Beiträge z. inn. Ges. des alten Kor.*, I, p. 3. T. W. Allen remarks how the Corinthian writers (especially Eumelus) purposely ignored the Pelopid history in favour of the Sisyphid and, "as it were, foreshortened history and continued the Sisyphid dynasty to meet Aletes" (*Hom. Cat.*, pp. 69 ff.).

mately with the probabilities of the case.<sup>16</sup> How long, in reality, it was before the invaders established themselves, we do not know. It may have been generations, it may have been centuries. Nor do we know whether there is any truth in the story which makes the leaders of the invasion the descendants of the exiled chiefs of the ancient race—the Heracleidae. Tradition tells us, however, that Corinth was captured a generation after the first invasion of Peloponnese.<sup>17</sup>

It came about in this way. When the Dorians were gathered in assembly at Naupactus, Hippotes, a descendant of Heracles, but not through Hyllus, slew the prophet Carnus. Banished and forced to wander for a period of ten years, says the tradition,<sup>18</sup> he begat a son and called him Aletes, or the Wanderer. Thirty years after his father had murdered Carnus, Aletes appeared with his Dorian hosts before Corinth. Seeing that he could not take the city by direct assault, he posted himself upon the mountain called Solygeius, by the Saronic Gulf, and from here harried the citizens into submission. This mountain, described by Thucydides,<sup>19</sup> must have been an excellent base for operations against Corinth, and Meyer thinks that the tradition which makes this the place from which the city was attacked may contain a memory of fact. We shall see how again in the Peloponnesian War Nicias attempted to use it for the same purpose.

The little that can be gleaned of the organisation of Dorian

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<sup>16</sup> Cf. Blegen, *Korakou*, pp. 120-123; Lenschau, *l. c.*, pp. 1012 ff. for valuable criticism of the traditions about the Dorization of Corinth and its relations to Argos.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Giles, *C.A.H.*, II, p. 30, and Wade-Gery, *ibid.*, pp. 520, 529 ff.

<sup>18</sup> Apollodorus, II, 8.

<sup>19</sup> IV, 42. See especially remarks of Mr. Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.*, II, pp. 529 ff., 534, on Aletes. He asks: "Is, then, Aletes a part of this early Dorian seafaring?—The tradition (in writers after 400 B. C.) puts Aletes in the generation after the conquest; but the archaeological evidence suggests that the sites round Corinth were destroyed at least as early as those in the Argolid."



Corinth will be dealt with when we come to speak of the constitutional history of the city. It will be shown that the Dorization was of a very partial character.

It was impossible to preserve in a city like Corinth the regular Doric institutions, since the wealth acquired by commerce greatly exceeded the value of landed property and necessarily conferred upon its possessors, even though not Dorians, a great influence and power.<sup>20</sup>

"Among these cities," says Mr. Wade-Gery, "Corinth is an exception. The famous Corinthian Apollo may or may not be Pythaeus; certainly Corinth knew no Temenid founder, but a Heraclid of her own, Aletes, who came by sea, and, likely enough, as we have seen, was already on the Isthmus when the other Dorians reached Peloponnese. The soundest element in the tradition, the early settlement on Solygeum, implies at least that the Corinthians arrived by sea separately, and that Corinth was no daughter of Argos. There is no reason to think that early Dorian Corinth was particularly important: the list of kings from Aletes to Telestes is probably worthless."

Aletes is said to have ruled in Corinth for a period of thirty-eight years. Tradition represents his rule as mild. Under him there seems to have been no distinction made between the Dorians and the Aeolian inhabitants. Müller even thinks that the Dorians "were probably only admitted by a fresh division *ἐπ' ἀναδασμῶ* of the land with the original inhabitants." Nothing definite is known of the serfs called variously cynophali or cynophyli. Müller sees in them a kind of Corinthian helots, but they play no part in the subsequent history of the city.

Corinth gradually departed altogether from the Dorian simplicity and became the centre of luxury and magnificence. As Müller observes: "Corinth, like Aegina, Rhodes and Cyrene gave up its national customs for the sake of trade."

The outstanding event in Aletes' career was his invasion of Athens. Tradition represents him as the head of a Peloponnesian confederacy against Attica. The attack, however, was repulsed through the self-sacrifice of Codrus. But the expe-

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<sup>20</sup> Cf. Haacke, *op. cit.*, pp. 7 ff.

dition had an important consequence in the Dorization of Megara,<sup>21</sup> which soon after became a Corinthian colony.<sup>22</sup>

The names of Aletes' successors are given as Ixion, Agelas, and Prymnis, but nothing is known about them.<sup>23</sup> Bacchis came next, the most important of the Doric dynasty, who gave his name to all his successors, so that instead of calling themselves any longer Aletidae, they were called Bacchiadae. Bacchis reigned for a period of thirty-five years. The traditional dates are 926-891. Diodorus<sup>24</sup> gives us a list of the Heracleid kings in which he insinuates that Bacchis was a lineal descendant of Aletes. Pausanias (II. 4.) on the other hand, conveys the impression that Bacchis was the founder of a new, though still a Heracleid dynasty. Six Bacchiads reigned in succession of whom we know nothing. The last, Telestes, was murdered by two members of his own family (the date is given as 748). Diodorus and Pausanias suggest that the murder of Telestes was but part of a widespread conspiracy among the Bacchiad clan to win for themselves a larger share of power than they had hitherto enjoyed under the regal constitution.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Her., V, 76; Lycurg. in *Leocrat.*, pp. 84 ff.; Strabo, 393.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *Schol. Pind., Nem.*, VII, 155; Paus. I, 39, 4. Cf. also Rawlinson on Her., V, 76.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Haacke, *op. cit.*, p. 8. In fact, as Porzio (*Corinto*, pp. 1-45, 69 ff.; *R.S.A.*, 1907, pp. 557-570) and Lenschau (*l. c.*) have shown, the traditional king-lists are full of interpolations and nothing really historical may be hoped for from them; cf. Busolt in *Rh. Mus.*, XXXIX, 1884 and *Gr. Ges.*, I<sup>2</sup>, pp. 631-633. Porzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 ff., ascribes the formation of the lists to the period when the ruling nobility felt the desire of connecting themselves with the highest possible ancestral stock. This would have been in the seventh century and perhaps Eumelus had a good deal to do with the inventions. It was from a later prose rendering of Eumelus that Pausanias (II, I) got his data. On Eumelus, the famous Bacchiad poet, cf. Wilisch, *Die Fragmente des Epikers Eumelos*, Zittau, 1875; Kinkel, *Epic. Graec. Frag.*, I, pp. 185-193; Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.*, III, p. 534; Ure, *Origin of Tyranny*, p. 195.

<sup>24</sup> VII, Frg. 9.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Busolt, *Gr. Ges.*, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 631, for remarks on the list of Diodorus.

A close oligarchy was now established, but a year elapsed before the scheme got going. Automenes, Diodorus tells us, was king for this year. At its expiration the oligarchy came into power. This consisted of the Bacchiads who, by inter-marriage inside their own house,<sup>26</sup> preserved themselves as an exclusive and aristocratic caste. Their government was by prytanes annually elected.<sup>27</sup> Each annual prytanis was compelled to administer the government according to the will of his house, into which he was, at the expiration of his year of office, to return. These magistrates Müller<sup>28</sup> likens to the Cretan *cosmi*. At this stage there was also doubtless a gerusia, perhaps consisting only of Bacchiadae.

Diodorus assigns to the oligarchy a period of ninety years (747-657), till their deposition by Cypselus. Their government was characterized by excessive exclusiveness and cruelty to the populace.<sup>29</sup> The most notorious instance of their cruelty was the atrocious act of Archias, which led him to leave Corinth for Sicily.<sup>30</sup>

As Corinth grew in wealth the Bacchiads<sup>31</sup> grew in luxury and insolence till at length the people reached such a state of exasperation and madness that they were glad to rally to the standard of Cypselus, who rose against the government and deposed them in the thirtieth Olympiad.<sup>32</sup> But it must be remembered that they gave Corinth a prosperous period.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Her., V, 92.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Busolt, "Die Kor. Prytanen," *Hermes*, XXVIII, pp. 312-320 and Guiraud, *Propriété Foncière en Grèce*, p. 129.

<sup>28</sup> *Dorians*, II, p. 37.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Her., V, 92; Paus., II, 4.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Plut., *Amat.*, II, p. 772; Diod., VIII, 10; Alex. Aet. in Parthenius, *Amat. Narr.*, 14; *Schol. Apoll. Rhod.*, IV, p. 1212.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Aelian, *V. H.*, I, 19.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Wilisch, "Der Sturz des Bakchiadenkönigtums in Korinth," *Neue Jahrb.*, CXIII, 1876, pp. 585-594. According to Busolt (*Gr. Ges.*, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 638) Cypselus began to reign in 657 B. C. This is as good a date as any other, as Porzio (*I Cipselidi*) has very amusingly shown.

As Guiraud says: "Under the oligarchic government of the Bacchiads, it had a very prosperous industry; it extended its commercial relations very far, and the nobles took a very active part in them."<sup>33</sup> We shall discuss later the colonization which the Bacchiads undoubtedly initiated. The Corinthians were the first to build triremes.<sup>34</sup> Of the greenish chalk from their cliffs they manufactured their pottery which had an extraordinary vogue.<sup>35</sup> Woven fabrics and carpets of fine material and colours went all over the world.<sup>36</sup> First from Euboea, and later from Etruria, they imported the metals required for a profuse manufacture of weapons, vases, mirrors and utensils of every kind.<sup>37</sup> Though they never settled on the west coast of Italy, their close relations with Etruria are proved not only by their lasting friendship with Syracuse but by the story of Demaratus.<sup>38</sup>

#### CULTS AND MYTHS

The purpose of the present section is to give some account of the cults and myths of Corinth and to inquire what can be learnt of their provenance. We shall see in discussing the

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<sup>33</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 132. Cf. *id.*, "La Main d'Œuvre Industrielle dans l'Ancienne Grèce," pp. 27 ff. 39; and his *Études Economiques*, p. 50; Busolt, *Griech. Ges.*, I, pp. 387-388; Glotz, *La Cité Grecque*, p. 82.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 13; Francotte, *L'Industrie dans la Grèce Ancienne*, I, pp. 30, n. 5, 101 f.; discussed by Thalheim in Hermann's *Lehrb. der Griech. Antiquitäten*, II, 2, pp. 271, 288; Blümner, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 484.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Rayet et Collignon, *Histoire de la Céramique Grecque*, pp. 58 f.; Wilisch, *Die altkor. Thonindustrie*, passim; Francotte, *op. cit.*, pp. 61, 115; II, p. 89. Fowler and Wheeler, *Greek Arch.*, pp. 442-454.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Barth, *Corinthiorum commercium*, pp. 24-29.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Guiraud, *La Main d'Œuvre*, p. 27; Francotte, *L'Industrie*, I, pp. 91, 94-108. A very full account is given by Wilisch, *Beiträge zur Ges. d. alt. Korinth*, II, pp. 18-25.

<sup>38</sup> Dion. Halicar., III, 46; Strabo, 219, 378; Liv., I, 34; Polyb., VI, 2; Cic., *Tusco. Quaest.*, V, 37; Tac., *Ann.*, XI, 14.

different cults that most of them point to a pre-Dorian origin. They show evidence in almost every instance of Mycenaean or Minyan origins. They consequently attest the occupation of Corinth at a time when, in Leaf's view, Corinth did not exist. We are hardly to suppose that if Corinth was 'definitely deserted' in the Mycenaean age, it appropriated in some mysterious way Mycenaean or Minyan forms of worship when the opening of intercourse with the west "called it forth to sit astride the isthmus."<sup>39</sup>

Aphrodite's worship is always associated with Corinth as its distinctive cult. We have seen already that on the very citadel top her temple rose. It was thought by some<sup>40</sup> to have been founded by Medea. But there are reasons for rejecting this tradition. Medea certainly had no cult-connection with Aphrodite. In this temple resided the famous *πολύξεναι νεανίδες*,<sup>41</sup> who were actually, as we have already explained, a state institution, a special element of the civic pride of Corinth. These hieroduli<sup>42</sup> constituted a veritable religious guild. It would appear that they were to Corinth what the vestal virgins were to Rome, though the distinctive characteristics of the colleges were diametrically opposed.

Of the origin of this lewd though authorized cult of Aphrodite, there are many opinions. Müller says:

It seems probable that the worship of that deity had indeed a native origin in Greece, but that it had been extended and modified by Phoenician settlers in some of the maritime towns. The institution of the "hospitable damsels" whom the goddess, their mistress, herself, ordered to be at the disposal of strangers, was undoubtedly of Asiatic origin and unknown to the ancient Greeks.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>39</sup> In this connection cf. the opening chapter of Nilsson's *Greek Religion* and his recently published *Minoan-Mycenaean Religion*, pp. xxi f. for the newly discovered Mycenaean house sanctuary at Asine. Also cf. pp. 2 f., 6 f., 10 f., 41-46, 414, 415-461, 505 f., 512 f.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *De Hdt. Malig.*, 39.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. fr. 87 of Pindar.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Strabo, 378.

<sup>43</sup> *Dorians*, I, p. 405. Cf. Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, p. 376; Gruppe, *Griech. Myth. und Religiones.*, pp. 132 ff.; Cook, *Zeus*, I, p. 292.



Dr. Farnell, on the other hand, will not allow that Aphrodite was an aboriginal Greek goddess.

"In spite of its wide prevalence in the Hellenic world," he says, "there is no valid evidence that the cult of Aphrodite belonged to the aboriginal religion of the Hellenic nation. The comparison of texts and monuments leads to the conclusion that she was originally an Oriental divinity, and that after her adoption into Greece she retained in many local worships many traits of her Oriental character."<sup>44</sup>

What we are concerned with is how the Aphrodite cult acquired its peculiar "Orientalism" at Corinth, where it had a peculiarity unique in Greece. It is unlikely that there is any Phoenician modification of a Greek cult either aboriginal or adopted from the East. The Corinthian worship of Aphrodite is due probably to natural development in so cosmopolitan a place.

The view that the Mycenaean civilisation in general is a complex of various contributions, pre-Greek, Helladic, and Minoan is now winning its way into widespread acceptance. To those who hold that there was a Mycenaean Corinth, it would be natural to look to its commercial relations with various foreign centres for the origin of Corinth's most distinctive cult. Now we have literary evidence of Aphrodite worship in Crete. Diodorus tells us that the Cretans claimed their island as its original home.<sup>45</sup> *C. I. G.* 2554 attests the existence of an ancient Aphrodisium in the territory of the Latii. Hesychius (s. v. Antheia) gives proof of a cult of Aphrodite of that epithet at Cnossus. *C. I. G.* 2555 states that Aphrodite is mentioned in the federal oath sworn by the men of Hierapytna.

Why, at Corinth alone, in Continental Greece, is religious prostitution a characteristic of Aphrodite worship? That it

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For collected textual references, see Odelberg, *Sacra Corinthia*, etc., pp. 57 ff.

<sup>44</sup> *Cults of the Greek States*, II, 618.

<sup>45</sup> V, 77.

can be due to intercourse between the city and Phoenician traders merely, is not convincing. Probably Corinth was from the first a cosmopolitan emporium, and, consequently, just the place where lewd rites, once introduced in order to cater to a sea-faring centre, might be expected to grow and flourish. The Dorians, it is true, who "showed the most faithful adherence to the usages handed down to them from their ancestors, and hence were little inclined to the adoption of foreign ceremonies" were strangers to this practice; yet "in commercial towns, as for instance at Corinth, such rites were willingly admitted."<sup>46</sup>

The foregoing conclusion as to the origin of the peculiar Aphrodite cult at Corinth finds support in the following corroborative passage in Mr. Hall's *Aegean Archaeology*. He says:

The origin of the goddess Aphrodite has long been taken for granted. It has been regarded as a settled fact that she was Semitic and came to Greece from Phoenicia or Cyprus. But the new discoveries have thrown this, like other received ideas, into the melting pot, for the Minoans undoubtedly worshipped an Aphrodite. We see her, naked, with her doves, on gold plaques from one of the Mycenaean shaft-graves which must be as old as the First Late Minoan Period (c. 1600-1500 B.C.) and—not rising from the foam, but sailing over it—in a boat, naked, on the lost gold ring from Mochlos. It is evident now that she was not only a Canaanitish-Syrian goddess, but was common to all the peoples of the Levant. She is Aphrodite Paphia in Cyprus, Ashtaroth-Astarte in Canaan, Atargatis in Syria, Derketo in Philistia, Hathor in Egypt; what the Minoans called her we do not know, unless she is Britomartis. She must take her place by the side of Rhea-Diktyнна in the Minoan pantheon.<sup>47</sup>

Lest it may be thought that the Minoan period in Greece is too early to date either the introduction of religious systems or the modification of pre-existing ones, let us recall that Mr. Hall's chapter on "Temples and Tombs" (especially pp. 147-150) goes altogether to prove the contrary, that is,

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Müller, *Dorians*, I, p. 410.

<sup>47</sup> *Aegean Archaeology*, p. 150.

that Greek religion was influenced by the Minoans. Sir J. G. Frazer has recently written in an eloquent introduction to Prof. M. P. Nilsson's *Greek Religion*:

He shows how the seeds of its glorious efflorescence were planted deep in the fruitful soil prepared for it by the people of another race and another tongue, the possessors of a far more ancient civilization, the builders of those frowning fortresses and splendid palaces whose ruins, cleared of the dust and mould of ages, have arisen up as by magic in our own day to reveal the glories of a vanished and almost forgotten world. Not the least interesting and original part of Professor Nilsson's book is that in which he indicates how all the familiar cycles of Greek myth and legend, which have long been deemed the peculiar creation of the Hellenic genius, cluster round the great centres of Minoan and Mycenaean culture in Crete and on the mainland, and therefore presumably drew much of their inspiration from these seats of a civilization which, by its antiquity and its splendour, must have cast a glamour on the eyes of the still barbarous Greeks when they emerged from the gloom of their native forests into the sunlight of the South, and voyaged, as in fairyland, from island to island of the blue Aegean.

Another passage to the same effect may be cited from Mr. Hogarth's *Ionia and the East*.<sup>48</sup> Speaking of the Cypriote Nature goddess he says:

Whatever the Semitic features in the worship of the Cypriote goddess, her chief local seats evidently remained predominantly Greek to the end. Nay, more, it may fairly be questioned whether, as a matter of fact, there were any certainly Semitic features in her cult. A similar Nature goddess has now been recognised as a paramount divinity throughout the Aegean world. If she was especially honoured in the western isle of Crete in which Aegean civilization seems to have developed itself from a remote antiquity without serious modification from outside, the common views of a past generation concerning the Eastern origin of the Hellenic Aphrodite everywhere, and the Cypriote Queen in particular, seem to call for radical revision. Many features of the latter's cult, for which parallels used to be sought on the Syrian coast, have earlier parallels in the western Aegean. The cult-use of "baetyls," for instance, was old in Crete before we have any actual evidence for it on the Phoenician coast. Why then affiliate the sacred Paphian stone to Byblus?

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<sup>48</sup> p. 88.

The dove was a divine attribute of the Aegean goddess alike in Mycenae and Crete, and rested in her hand or on her head, and perched atop the sacred "baetyl." What need, then, to look to Syrian Ishtar for the inspiration of the dove-bearing figurines of Idalium and Golgoi? The orgiastic practices of the Paphian temple, such as ceremonial prostitution (for which, by the way, our only evidence is Christian), find parallels of course over all West Asia, even Armenia and Babylon. But they can be paralleled also at Corinth and in Sicily.

Before leaving the Aphrodite cult, mention should be made of the worship of Black Aphrodite at Corinth—probably a very late development—cited by Pausanias <sup>49</sup> and Athenaeus.<sup>50</sup> We learn from Plutarch that in Delphi there was a small image of the Sepulchral Aphrodite beside which the dead were invoked to come and partake of the Libations offered to them. Holwerda <sup>51</sup> is inclined to see in black Aphrodite a tomb goddess such as Plutarch speaks of. He likens her to the Venus Libitina of the Romans, and inclines to the view of Engel that there was an Aphrodite Fury like the Demeter Fury of Thelpusa.<sup>52</sup> Dr. Farnell evidently sees no difficulty in the conception of an Aphrodite Epitymbia when he writes: "Both in Greece and the East the connection between the powers of life and nature and the powers of the lower world and death was natural and close, and needed to be expressed in worship."<sup>53</sup>

Another worship which shows the close connection of Corinth and Minoan Crete is the festival of the Hellotia. It is now recognised on many sides that Europa is not Phoenician <sup>54</sup> but Minoan. We are told that Hellotia or Hellotis was her old name. Now the festival of the Hellotia whose chief ceremony was the carrying of Europa's bones in pro-

<sup>49</sup> Pausanias, II, 2.

<sup>50</sup> Ath., XIII, p. 588c.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Holwerda, *Die alten Kyprier in Kunst und Kultur*, pp. 56 ff.

<sup>52</sup> Pausanias, VIII, 25, 4; cf. Hesych. s. v. 'Επιτύμβις.

<sup>53</sup> *Cults*, II, p. 650.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Hall, *Aegean Archaeology*, p. 259; Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, p. 96, and Cook, *Zeus*, I, pp. 525 f.

cession was common to Crete and Corinth.<sup>55</sup> In Corinth the worship of Hellotis was grafted on the worship of Athena, and thus we have the festival of Athena Hellotis of which a torch race seems to have been a special feature. The traditional explanation is that when the Dorians took Corinth, a maiden named Hellotis took refuge in Athena's temple. The conquerors set fire to it and she perished in the flames. Such a pollution of the sacred precincts angered the goddess, who sent a pestilence on the land and demanded a new temple and a propitiation. Thus originated the temple and games to Athena Hellotis.<sup>56</sup> We have here, no doubt, an instance of the familiar aetiological myth. The important thing to bear in mind is that both Athenaeus and the author of the *Etymologicum Magnum* connect the name and the festival with Europa. The latter's explanation of the origin of the word as being Phoenician for 'maiden' is interesting. In the light of Athenaeus' statement and the results of modern investigation we may assume that "Hellotis" is some form of Minoan cult epithet.

We have next to deal with the worship of Hera.<sup>57</sup> With her, as we shall see, is closely connected Medea,<sup>58</sup> so that we may almost speak of a Hera-Medea cult. "The Corinthian fables of Medea", says Müller, "refer to the indigenous worship of Hera Acraea." There are many such fables. Euripides, towards the close of his *Medea*, makes mention of the solemn rites and festival performed at Corinth in honour of the heroine's slaughtered children, and of their burial in the

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Ath., XV, p. 678 b; Hesychius, s. v. Ἑλλώτια; *Et. Mag.* s. v. Ἑλλώτια, p. 332.

<sup>56</sup> *Schol. Pind., Olymp.*, XIII, 56.

<sup>57</sup> For textual references see Odelberg, *Sacra Corinthia*, pp. 7 f. The Medea texts will be found p. 181, with discussion pp. 182-184; cf. Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, pp. 57-61; Cook, *Zeus*, I, p. 445; Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol. u. Relig.*, pp. 128, 183.

<sup>58</sup> For full account of Medea and her relations to Corinth see Cook, *Zeus*, I, pp. 244-252. Cf. also "La Légende de Médée," by Louis Séchan, in *Revue des Études Grecques*, XL, 1927, pp. 234 ff.



temple of Hera Acraea. We have different accounts of their death. To quote the scholiast on the *Medea*, 273:

Parmeniscus writes word for word as follows. The Corinthian women, loath to be ruled by a woman, who was both a stranger and a witch, laid a plot against her and slew her children, seven males and seven females. But Euripides says that she had only two children. Being pursued, the children fled to the temple of Hera Acraea and sat down there. But even this did not protect them, for the Corinthians slew them all upon the altar. Now, a pestilence fell upon the city and many people sickened and died, so the Corinthians inquired of the oracle, and the god bade them expiate the pollution caused by the murder of Medea's children. Wherefore, the Corinthians annually celebrate the following rites down to this day. Seven boys and seven girls of the most distinguished families spend a year in the sanctuary of the goddess, and with sacrifices appease the anger of the murdered children and the wrath which their murder excited in the breast of the goddess. Didymus, however, controverts this account and quotes the story told by Creophylus which runs thus. When Medea resided in Corinth she killed by her spells Creon, the ruler of this city. So, fearing the vengeance of his friends and kindred, she fled to Athens; but her children being too young to accompany her, she seated them upon the altar of Hera of the height, thinking that their father would look to their safety. But Creon's kinsmen slew the children and spread the report that Medea had slain, not only Creon, but also her own children. A similar myth is told about Adonis.

Of these accounts Creophylus' is, of course, the earliest, but the divergence of his account from Parmeniscus' does not call for discussion. Whatever the reason given by legend for Medea's leaving Corinth, there is a general agreement in the tradition that it was the Corinthians who murdered her children.<sup>59</sup> The sole exception is Euripides, who says that the murderess was Medea herself. Aelian, however, records the tradition (which I believe to be a true one) that Euripides invented this at the request of the Corinthians, and that it was only through the poet's influence that this prevailed over the original version. Indeed, Euripides himself betrays the

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<sup>59</sup> Cf. Apollod., I, 9; Philost., *Heroica*, XX, 24; Aelian, V, H., V, 21.

fact of having changed the early tradition by some lines in his play, especially 1378 ff.,<sup>60</sup> which better suit the story that Medea's children were murdered by the Corinthians than that Medea murdered them herself.<sup>61</sup>

The obvious conclusion is that which O. Müller,<sup>62</sup> Schömann and Dr. Farnell have drawn, namely, that Medea is a divinity closely connected with Hera, and that the sacrifice of children was part of her primitive ritual. Various ancient writers refer to the annual rites performed by the Corinthians for the supposed purpose of appeasing the angry spirits of the murdered children. The rites are described as of wild, mystic and mournful character.<sup>63</sup> We hear also of the annual sacrifice of a goat to Hera which, no doubt, formed part of the expiatory rites in honour of Medea's children. The ceremony seems to have been a peculiar one in that the sacrificial knife was brought and concealed by some hired persons, and the goat to be sacrificed was made in some way to discover the knife, and thus to be in a manner guilty of its own death.<sup>64</sup> But the most important thing to notice is that the feast of Hera Acraea was a 'feast of mourning' as the scholiast on Euripides calls it, and we further gather from Pausanias that the hair of the consecrated seven boys and seven girls was shorn, and that the raiment they wore was black.

In what way are those ancient ritualistic peculiarities to be interpreted? Medea was herself a goddess. The most ancient authorities attest this. The scholiast on Euripides' play<sup>65</sup> tells us that Musaeus declared her to be immortal, whilst Athenagoras<sup>66</sup> testifies to the fact that both Hesiod

<sup>60</sup> Eur., *Med.*, 1378 ff.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Nilsson, *Greek Religion*, p. 64.

<sup>62</sup> *Orchomenos*, pp. 264 ff.; Schömann, *Griech. Alterth.*, II, p. 491; Farnell, *Cults*, I, p. 203.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Philost., *Heroica*, l. c.; Aelian, l. c.; Schol. on Eur., *Medea*, 1379.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Zenobius, I, 27; Apostolius, I, 60; Diogenianus, I, 52; Suidas s. v., αἰξ ἀγρός; Hesychius s. v. αἰξ ἀγῶ.

<sup>65</sup> Schol. Eur., *Medea*, 10.

<sup>66</sup> *Leg. Pro. Christ.*, c. 14.

and Alcman called her a goddess. The various forms of the tale of the death of her children show simply a religious myth which colours the whole of the cult. The worship of Medea, brought from outside, and containing at some time in its ritual the sacrifice of children, was engrafted upon an indigenous worship of Hera Acraea. "The strikingly foreign trait in the service of Hera Acraea," says Dr. Farnell, "is the ritual of sorrow and mourning, the shaven head and the dark robe. There is nothing in the character of the Greek goddess that can explain this; but at Byblus men shaved their heads for Adonis, and we find grief and lamentation mingled in the service of the Oriental Aphrodite at Cyprus, Naxos and Athens. In the face of these facts we must assign some weight to the legend of the foreign and barbarous origin of Medea. Her father, Aeetes, may be genuine Corinthian, as O. Müller maintains, but this would prove nothing about the daughter, for in the confusion and syncretism of myths and cults, paternity is a slight matter. We have also more than mere legend; the Corinthians themselves, while honouring the children of Medea as divinities, called them *μυσοβάβραποι*."<sup>67</sup>

Having pointed out many non-Hellenic elements suggesting Oriental provenance in the stories that haunt the Medea cult, Dr. Farnell writes:

there are reasons for believing that the Medea who was engrafted upon the Hera of Corinth was one of the many forms of that divinity whose orgiastic worship we can trace from Phoenicia to the Black Sea, and from Phrygia and Caria on the coast far into the interior, and who appears in Greece chiefly in the form of Cybele and Aphrodite. The Minyan settlements in Lemnos were probably the results of the earliest Minyan colonisation which, as O. Müller rightly maintains, took the north-east of the Aegean for its route. It may have been from this island that they brought the Oriental worship to the shores of Corinth, and Lemnos seems to have been remembered at that city, in the religious legend of Medea.<sup>68</sup>

The cult of Poseidon on the Isthmus next demands our

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<sup>67</sup> *Cults*, I, 204; Schol. on Pind., *Ol.*, XIII, 74.

<sup>68</sup> Farnell, *l. c.*

consideration, but we cannot deal with it without considering a substratum of worship on which it was superimposed. This is the cult of Melicertes, *alias* Palaemon.<sup>69</sup> "The festival of the Isthmia," says Dr. Farnell, "which Poseidon came to appropriate, was not originally associated with him but with some buried daemon of vegetation, Palaemon or Sinis." In a succinct and scholarly foot-note he then declares:

Palaemon belonging through Ino to the Minyan Athamantid cycle, takes on a maritime character which was probably not original; his leap into the sea belongs to vegetation ritual and his burial and tomb point to the deity of vegetation. Sinis is more than an ordinary robber: the story of his hanging his victims on pine-trees may be a vestige of a primitive aboreal ritual: his tree is specially the pine, as it is also of Adonis, Pentheus and other tree-divinities; and the pine became the crown of the Isthmian games.<sup>70</sup>

The ordinary story of Melicertes is as follows: He was a son of Athamas, legendary king of Orchomenus, and Ino, daughter of Cadmus. His mother was driven mad by Hera and threw herself with her boy into the sea from the rock called Molouris on the Isthmus. Both became marine divinities, Ino receiving the name Leucothea, and Melicertes that of Palaemon.<sup>71</sup> The body of Melicertes, according to the common tradition, was washed by the waves, or carried by dolphins, into Port Schoenus in the Corinthia; or to that spot on the coast where subsequently the altar of Palaemon stood. There the body was found by his uncle Sisyphus, who buried it and instituted the Isthmian games and sacrifices of black bulls in honour of the deified Palaemon.<sup>72</sup> On the Isthmus of Corinth there was a temple of Palaemon, and near the same place was a subterranean sanctuary believed to contain his bones.

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<sup>69</sup> For texts on Ino and Melicertes see Odelberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 135, 137 ff., and discussion by Maas, *Griechen und Semiten auf dem Isthmus von Korinth*, pp. 92-101.

<sup>70</sup> *Cults*, IV, p. 39.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Apoll., III, 4; Hygin., *Fab.* 2; Ovid, *Met.*, IV, 542; XIII, 918.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Paus., I, 44; II, 1, 3; Philostratus, *Her.*, 19; *Icon.*, II, 16.

Dr. Farnell thinks Melicertes got the name Palaemon, which seems to have characterised his cult on the Isthmus alone of all places in Greece, because of his association with the Isthmian games there. This is indeed the only possible explanation; a child could not otherwise be called "wrestler," except in the rôle of child- or boy-spirit who presided over the local athletic contests.<sup>73</sup> The connection between Palaemon and Sinis is evident when we consider the story of Sinis' tree in Pausanias.<sup>74</sup> This was doubtless the pine at the foot of which the body of the drowned Melicertes is said to have been washed ashore. Plutarch informs us that the spot was near the Megarian border and was called the Path of the Fair Damsel, because here Ino had rushed with Melicertes in her arms when she plunged into the sea. It is significant to note also that the first prize at the Isthmian games was a crown of pine leaves, though for a while a crown of parsley seems to have been substituted.<sup>75</sup>

Dr. Farnell has satisfied himself that Melicertes is a fertility spirit. I can do no more than give the opinion of so distinguished an authority on ancient ritual:

The ritual and the legend, so far as they have been at present examined, appear to reveal Ino and Melikertes as an aboriginal couple of mother and child, and as belonging to the earth rather than to the sea, probably to the company of vegetation powers. The legend of the leap discloses and attests a fertility—or purification—rite that we find widespread in the Mediterranean area (p. 41). "It is told," he tells us in another part, "of divinities, Dionysos, Aphrodite, or 'heroic' personages with divine names, such as Molpadias (or Hemi-thea), and Parthenos of Caria, Diktyнна Britomartis of Crete; and none of these are primarily sea-divinities, but vegetation-powers, and the ritual is vegetative, not marine, to be interpreted as the casting-out of the decaying image of the vegetation deity so that it might be refreshed by the quickening waters and brought back to land with renewed powers. The 'leap' in nearly all these cases is

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<sup>73</sup> Cf. Paus., I, 44, 8.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Paus., II, 1, 4.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *Quaest. Conviv.*, V, 3; *Timoleon*, 26.



preceded by a pursuit, which in legend might be amorous and angry, but in reality was solemn and 'hieratic'.<sup>76</sup>

This is an interesting explanation of the Melicertes myth. But what is particularly significant is the origin assigned by our authority to Melicertes. He again turns to the north of Greece and the Minyae and regards Melicertes as "belonging through Ino to the Minyan Athamantid cycle." Athamas, it will be recalled, was king of Minyan Orchomenus. In fact, Dr. Farnell himself seems to have had a haunting suspicion of the ultimate Minoan origin of the cult.

And yet the names Ino and Melikertes arouse our suspicion that the Minyans may only have been its chief propagators, having received it from elsewhere. Here, as often in our quest of Hellenic origins, we find ourselves on a track that leads to Crete and the adjacent lands. The ritual-story of Ino's sea-leap occurs again in the legend of Diktyнна-Britomartis; and the central figure in the pre-hellenic religion of Crete was an earth-goddess associated with a youth or a child.<sup>77</sup>

He then goes on to adduce proof from the ancient authorities attesting the very considerable influence of Crete on Hellenic forms of worship, and finally states: "Creto-Carian influences have had most to do with the emergence of the cult of Ino-Leucothea and Palaemon-Melicertes." As the Minyan stock of legend is regarded by most archaeologists to-day as contemporary with the Mycenaean civilisation, we see clearly in the Melicertes cult at Corinth an early origin, and, what is more important, the necessity for the existence of Corinth in the Mycenaean age.

On this cult was superimposed that of Poseidon.<sup>78</sup> The god of the sea was naturally associated from time immemorial with the *bimaris Corinthi moenia*. On the Isthmus was his famous temple, and with him in the temple were associated Palaemon and the sea divinities. That his con-

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<sup>76</sup> *J.H.S.*, 1916, p. 39.

<sup>77</sup> *J.H.S.*, 1916, p. 43.

<sup>78</sup> For texts in reference to Poseidon cf. Odelberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-18.

nections with Corinth were close and numerous is evident to the most casual reader of Pausanias.<sup>79</sup> Himerius<sup>80</sup> actually speaks of the Pan-hellenic nature of his worship on the Isthmus, which seems to have been the home *par excellence* of his restless majesty. The latter authority remarks a distinctive cult-title 'Hippios.' Pindar also seems to preserve a 'horse' cult-name when he associates Damaios with the locality.<sup>81</sup> Poseidon seems to have been very closely connected with horsemanship.<sup>82</sup> "In one art and one alone," says Dr. Farnell, "was Poseidon a master, the art of horsemanship and the training of horses."<sup>83</sup> Legends in abundance connect him with horses, for he is even represented by the Corinthians as having produced Pegasus by stamping on the rock with his foot.

But the most important consideration for us is the origin of the cult. Dr. Farnell says in reference to the Isthmian cult of Hippios: "The belief that here, as elsewhere, the cult which we are examining has been brought from the north of Greece appeals more strongly to us when we note the close association in pre-historic days between Corinth and Thes-saly."<sup>84</sup> He then refers us to another passage<sup>85</sup> where he explains that

The prevailing trend of the oldest Corinthian and Isthmian legend leads us back to North Greece and the Minyai. Thucydides recognises the original Aeolic character of Corinth (IV, 42), and its old name Ephyre appears to have been a Thessalian place name (Steph. Byz. s. v. 'Εφύρη). Poseidon is connected with the family of Sisyphos, and is the father of the great Bellerophon, whose horse Pegasos was as much at home on the soil of Corinth as on Helikon or Troezen. (Paus., II, 31, 12). The Corinthian stories of Ino, Jason, Medea and Argo have come from the Minyan settlements in the north. And the grave of Neleus the Minyan, the brother of Pelias,

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<sup>79</sup> We would draw particular attention to such passages as II, 1, 6-9; 2, 1.

<sup>80</sup> *Orat.*, 3, 10.

<sup>81</sup> *Ol.*, XIII, 69.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Aris., *Equites*, 551 ff.

<sup>83</sup> *Cults*, IV, p. 14.

<sup>84</sup> *Cults*, IV, p. 17.

<sup>85</sup> *Cults*, IV, p. 38.

was believed to exist, but was guarded as a mystery at Corinth (Paus., I, 2, 2).

There was, no doubt, a close connection in pre-historic times between Corinth and northern Greece, and a great deal of evidence to justify Dr. Farnell's conclusions.<sup>86</sup> It may be that this cult came to the Isthmus from the northern Minyan settlements, but I do not think there is any evidence for the supposition. I am rather inclined to think that Corinth, as well as all the 'Minyan' settlements, was not a little influenced by Crete, that their cults were not after-developments arising when the Minoan civilisation had established itself in Greece. Dr. Farnell arrives at his conclusion of the transmission to the south of northern forms of worship from his discoveries at Athens, Corinth, and various parts of the Peloponnesus, of elements closely akin to the primeval cults at the Minyan headquarters. If we ask, might not the process have been quite the reverse, he will answer that the cults may indeed have been borrowed from Crete, but it was the Minyans of Northern Greece who were at any rate responsible for their dissemination. But if Dr. Farnell admits Crete at all, is it not *à priori* probable that the places in Greece likely to be touched by the sea-kings from the south were, no less than the northern settlements, endowed by them with certain cults.

This, it appears, is the view also of Mr. Hall,<sup>87</sup> who remarks:

That Poseidon himself was a Greek inheritance from the Minoans is not improbable. He was the chief deity of the Ionians, who more than the other Greeks preserved the old blood.

In another work the same author maintains that Poseidon is most likely a pre-Hellenic (Mycenaean) deity.<sup>88</sup> Elsewhere<sup>89</sup> he refers with approval to "an elaborate paper by Miss Jane

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<sup>86</sup> Cf. Harland, *Prehistoric Aigina*, pp. 47 ff., 51-54, 112.

<sup>87</sup> *A. H. N. E.*, p. 52.

<sup>88</sup> *O. C. G.*, p. 298.

<sup>89</sup> *Aegean Archaeology*, p. 149. Cf. Miss Harrison, *Greek Mythology* (Series "Our Debt to Greece and Rome"), chapter on Poseidon.

Harrison to the same effect, read before the Hellenic Society, February 10th, 1914."

As a matter of fact, Dr. Farnell himself cannot entirely get rid of the idea of the Cretan origins of many Greek cults. Speaking of the epoch-making discoveries of Sir Arthur Evans in the field of Cretan religion, he writes:

The curtain seems to be partly lifted that concealed the pre-historic past of Hellenic life. The influence of so brilliant and long-enduring a civilisation as that which he has revealed and is still revealing at Knossus must have been potent and far-reaching in religion as well as in art and politics. The boast of the Cretans which Diodorus unsuspectingly records, that Greece derived most of its religion from their island, need not now be set down merely to that characteristic which St. Paul and others deplored in the people of Crete; though the claim was, no doubt, excessive, there was an element of reason in it.<sup>90</sup>

Much of what has been discussed in the foregoing chapter—especially in tracing the cults back to Minoan-Mycenaean origins—has been described as fanciful. I am, however, in good company. To refer only to a few, Sir A. Evans, Sir J. G. Frazer and Professor M. P. Nilsson may surely be regarded as competent to speak on the subject of the origins of Greek Religion. What is here maintained will find support in their recent researches.<sup>91</sup> Particular attention should be drawn to Professor M. P. Nilsson's latest work,<sup>92</sup> where he elaborates what he had already said in the first chapter of his general work on the History of Greek Religion:

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<sup>90</sup> *Cults*, III, p. 295. Cf. Cavaignac, *Histoire De l'Antiquité*, I, pp. 223 ff. "Les Grecs," says this author, "ont été profondément influencés par la civilisation minoenne—mycénienne dans leur développement religieux."

<sup>91</sup> Even the Oedipus saga appears to be of Minoan or Mycenaean rather than purely Greek origin. Cf. Sir A. Evans in *The Times* and *Manchester Guardian* of the 5th Nov., 1924, and Sir J. G. Frazer in his introduction to Nilsson's *Greek Religion*.

<sup>92</sup> *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and Its Survival in Greek Religion*, Lund, 1927.

Where Greek religion and myth show a peculiar non-Greek character, we have a natural right, supposing that we are dealing with districts saturated with pre-Grecian and especially with Minoan culture, to assume that this special character is due to the influence of the pre-Grecian religion.<sup>93</sup>

And again: <sup>94</sup>

Just as the Greek people were formed by a fusion of the immigrants and the indigenous population and perhaps even as much pre-Greek as Greek blood flowed in the veins of the historical Greeks, so also the historical Greek religion was formed by a fusion of pre-Greek and Greek religion. Moreover some few names of Greek mythology are certainly of pre-Greek origin, and in the chapter on the Continuity of Cults, we shall see positive reasons of an archaeological order for the survival of old pre-Greek cults.

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<sup>93</sup> *Greek Religion*, p. 29; cf. Halliday, *C.A.H.*, II, Ch. XXII, pp. 612 ff., 615, 631, 638.

<sup>94</sup> *Minoan-Mycenean Religion*, p. 3. See especially recent criticism by L. R. Farnell in *Essays in Aegean Archaeology* (presented to Sir Arthur Evans), pp. 8-26, particularly pp. 15, 16 ff.; 24, on Corinthian cults.



## CHAPTER V

### THE TYRANNY AND THE CONSTITUTION WHICH SUCCEEDED IT

Mahaffy,<sup>1</sup> speaking of the too great credulousness of modern sceptical historians in chronological matters, pointed out the untrustworthy character of the Olympian register and the generally accepted early dates in Greek history. Incidentally he paid a tribute of praise to Sir George Cox, who is the solitary exception and "will not set down any date earlier than 660 B. C. as worthy of acceptance." Now comes Mr. Wade-Gery, following Brinkmann in disputing the position taken by Mahaffy, Beloch and Körte and restoring the reputation of the Victor Lists.<sup>2</sup> In any case we are by this time in the realms of history. Cypselus overthrew the Bacchiad oligarchy about 655 B. C.<sup>3</sup>

Now this date is just as good as any other.<sup>4</sup> If 657, however, is preferred, you may have it, or any of the long list enumerated by Porzio.<sup>5</sup>

As the Italian scholar says:

To follow upon the footsteps of writers in their manifold gyrations, above all, to weigh one by one the reasons which support the traditional chronology . . . would be the most vain of labours (p. 119).

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<sup>1</sup> *Problems in Greek History*, p. 57.

<sup>2</sup> *C.A.H.*, III, app. 3, pp. 762 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Müller, *s. v.* Kypselos in *P.W.*, XII, pp. 119-121.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Wade-Gery, *C.A.H.*, III, p. 550.

<sup>5</sup> *I Cipselidi*, pp. 114-118. The variations with profuse notes require four pages. Certain writers were not satisfied with their first choice, e. g. Wilisch, "che prima aveva giurato sull' anno 657" (*Die alt-Kor. Thonindustrie*, p. 142, in 1892), asserts "che Cipselo appareve dominatore in Corinto nel 655" (*Beiträge*, II, 1901). "Non si creda che qui finisca," continues Porzio, "Sarebbe troppo bello." Then he goes on to enumerate the "sfumature o gradazioni" of some thirty odd different scholars. A worse tangle still arises in connection with the dates of accession and death of Periander.

Then after singling out Diels for a special castigation, he concludes:

The conclusion is obvious: to digest such chronological pastry one requires indeed the stomach of an ostrich. When one looks into the laboratory of ancient chronography one has the feeling of being present at the mysterious work of a mediaeval alchemist (p. 125).

The hypothesis of Beloch<sup>6</sup> which brings forward the standard dates connected with the Corinthian Tyrants fifty years all round is untrustworthy. Porzio argues for it with great enthusiasm. He regards it as the 'parola decisiva' and is at pains to show that it was an entirely original thought on the part of the "storico illustre dell' Ateneo romano," though Larcher<sup>7</sup> had, ninety years before Beloch, at the beginning of the last century, given expression to it. Lenschau, too, enumerates the points in its favour, but they seem unconvincing.<sup>8</sup> They are not accepted by three prominent English students of the subject in recent times, Mr. P. N. Ure (*The Origin of Tyranny*, Ch. VII), Mr. H. T. Wade-Gery (*C. A. H.*, III, 550 ff., app. 4, pp. 764 ff.), and Mr. Wells (*Studies in Herodotus*, pp. 70-73). It would be vain to discuss the further confirmations of Beloch's hypothesis which Porzio imagines he has discovered in the Herodotean passages referring to Periander's sending of the Coreyrean youths to Sardis and the stealing of the brazen bowl by the Samians.<sup>9</sup> Why should Porzio trust Herodotus in this connection when he has rejected him and all the other Greek writers *en bloc* in so far as the history of the Cypselids is concerned?<sup>10</sup> For example, at one time we find him praising Steinmetz for his vindication of the account of Nicolaus as against Herodotus,<sup>11</sup> and then

<sup>6</sup> *Rhein. Mus.*, L, 1895, pp. 261-263; *Gr. Ges.*, 1<sup>a</sup>, 2, pp. 275 ff.; cf. the criticisms of Glover, *Herodotus*, pp. 80 f.

<sup>7</sup> *Histoire d'Hérodote*, III, pp. 314-317.

<sup>8</sup> P. W., Supplement, IV, s. v. *Korinthos*, p. 1016.

<sup>9</sup> Hdt., I, 70; III, 47, 48; Porzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 139 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. pp. 152-192.

<sup>11</sup> Pp. 70 ff.

repudiating the Damascene's account in the general condemnation mentioned above involving every writer from Herodotus to Diogenes Laertius excepting only Thucydides who escaped, I presume, by the good fortune of having written nothing about the Cypselids. In answer let us quote Porzio's own words as regards both chronology and the facts:

The one and only conclusion that should satisfy us is that offered by Julius Beloch: "This is the truth—we know nothing, absolutely nothing, of the time at which the tyranny was overthrown at Corinth." And, a little before: "Concerning the years in which Periander lived, we know nothing for certain; or, what is the same, the chronology of the Cypselids is perfectly unknown" (p. 126).

"In one word, in the history of the Cypselids . . . with difficulty would one be able to find a single piece of information which is not pushed aside by another, one testimony which may remain unshaken. Everything reels and jumps about and seems dragged along in the whirls of a wild dance" (p. 164).

Well does Professor Ure remark: "In uncritical incredulity Porzio rivals Pais" (p. 194).<sup>12</sup>

Cypselus' action is no isolated phenomenon. There were tyrants in one quarter or another of the Greek world right through history, but the tyrannies of the seventh century exhibit a particular form of political disease, the causes of which are not far to seek. In Grote's words, "the like phenomenon seems to have occurred contemporaneously throughout a large number of cities, continental, insular and colonial, in many parts of the Grecian world."<sup>13</sup> But we need hardly go beyond the bounds of our present subject to find two striking examples of his contention—Sicyon and Megara. Thus Holm says: "The centre of the tyranny in Greece was

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. the same remarks of Ure, *Origin of Tyranny*, p. 195. "We are learning to take our ancient records more on their face value than was done by our grandfathers in the nineteenth century. The classical historians, using the word in its widest sense, are still suffering from the reaction against the doctrine of verbal inspiration." Cf. Wilisch, *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, 1880, pp. 1196-1199, and recently Wells, *Studies in Herodotus*, Preface and App. IV.

<sup>13</sup> III, 5, 2nd. ed., 1849-56.

the country round the isthmus." It is interesting to recall Thucydides' words,<sup>14</sup> "As Greece grew in power and acquired greater riches, in many cases tyrannies began to be established in the city states." That he seems to have Corinth in particular in mind when he wrote thus is proved by the fact that he devotes the following passages to a description of the early importance of Corinth in naval and commercial pursuits.

What was the position there? The commercial classes had no part in the ruling of the state, of which they rightly conceived themselves as the most important constituent. Their claims for a voice in the government were rejected, or even treated with insolence by the Bacchiads. As they grew in wealth and importance they chafed more and more at their unreasonable exclusion. They only wanted a leader to champion their cause, and such a one they found in Cypselus, at once a military specialist and an able demagogue.<sup>15</sup> Many historians, it is true, have not thought of the tyrannies at all as the outcome of commercial wealth, e. g., Müller simply assigns the overthrow of the oligarchy to the fact that they had become odious through their luxury and insolence.<sup>16</sup> Curtius gives somewhat similar reasons:

Broils amongst the families themselves (Bacchiadae) led to the overthrow of the government at Corinth; for the Bacchiadae had excluded ancient families who could trace their pedigree back to the founders of the state, from all share in the government, and had broken off all closer intimacy with them.<sup>17</sup>

He then goes on to say that Cypselus was a member of one of these families, whose natural claim to participation in the government was heightened by the fact that his mother Labda was one of the Bacchiads.

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<sup>14</sup> Thuc., I, 13.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Nic. Dam. fr. 58. For sound criticisms on the Cypselidae see Wells, *Studies in Herodotus*, pp. 70-73.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Müller, *Dorians*, I, p. 181.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Curtius, *Hist. of Greece* (tr. Ward), II, p. 276.

I quite agree with these views of Müller and Curtius, but they miss the main reasons. A poor, dependent people could never raise itself to contend with a powerful ruling clan for its rights. With the growth of wealth, however, they attained to opulence and independence.<sup>18</sup> They had already developed liberal ideas, and were wroth to have a narrow and insolent oligarchy of 200 men ruling their own and their country's destinies, abusing the power which they held by no right, and unscrupulously appropriating the fruits of the commercial greatness which the people had succeeded in establishing. The Bacchiads, being aristocrats of pure Dorian stock, were themselves averse from commerce and lived the life of a land-

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<sup>18</sup> See remarks of Ure, *Origin of Tyranny*, pp. 184 ff., who discusses the great development in the seventh century of Corinthian trade and mercantile marine. A study of Wilisch's *Die alt-Kor. Thonindustrie* makes us realize the tremendous importance of the Corinthian pottery industry, which, according to Ure (*Origin of Tyranny*, pp. 197 ff., with App. B), was the origin of Cypselus' name. We know the names of at least three Corinthian painters of vases or pinakes, Timonidas, Milonidas, and Chares (all of seventh century); cf. Hoppin, *Handbook of Greek Black-Figured Vases*, pp. 8-17. Cf. Wilisch, *Beiträge*, II, 1901, p. 7. An excellent appreciation of the Corinthian potter's craft will be found in Glotz, *Le travail dans la Grèce Ancienne*, pp. 164-167, and Guiraud, *La Main d'Oeuvre Industrielle*, pp. 26 f.; cf. Fowler and Wheeler, *Greek Archaeology*, pp. 442-454; Rayet et Collignon, *Hist. de la Céramique Grecque*, pp. 58 f.; Pfuhl, *Malerei und Zeichnung der Griechen*, I, pp. 201 ff. Professor D. M. Robinson says that there is little doubt now that even the "Proto-Corinthian ware" was made at Corinth, as shown by the recent excavations. For Corinthian ointment vases, cf. Robinson, *A.J.A.*, X, 1906, pp. 420-426. For recent important finds of Corinthian vases in graves at Corinth, showing the output of Corinthian factories from the geometric period to the latter part of the fifth century, cf. Shear, *A.J.A.*, XXXIII, 1929, pp. 538-546. Miss Platner will publish in book form this new material, including specimens of black-figured and red-figured vases found with Corinthian ware and necessitating a new chronology. One black-figured early cylix is signed by Neandros. Soon will appear on Corinthian vases a book by Mr. Payne, *Necrocorinthia*.



lord class. So in Sparta it was the *perioeci* who constituted the business people of the place.<sup>19</sup>

Cypselus, therefore, when he came forward as the protector of the people's rights, was the idol of the day. We need hardly delay over the interesting story of his infancy. The tale of his having been hidden in a chest by his mother in order to escape the emissaries of the Bacchiadae who had been sent to slay him is more amusing than historical.<sup>20</sup> Of course the legend goes that he got his name from this experience of his childhood. Curtius well says that it was rather the name which gave rise to the story.<sup>21</sup> We may also regard as fable the myth which Pausanias relates. Aletes was originally warned by an oracle against receiving within the city Melas, the ancestor of Cypselus, who, Pausanias<sup>22</sup> tells us, appeared before Corinth, having come from Gonussa near Sicyon. Aletes, however, coaxed and wheedled by Melas, finally disregarded the oracle and received the importunate stranger. Thus he took in the man whose descendant was one day

<sup>19</sup> Plut., *Lyc.*, 4; Aelian, *V. H.*, VI, 6.

<sup>20</sup> Cf, however, Ure, *Origin of Tyranny*, pp. 197 ff., who has a long discussion of the "Cypsele" (which he thinks was not a chest but a large vessel of pottery), and its relation to Cypselus who, he thinks, was so called to denote his connection with the Corinthian potteries which at this time were supplying a great part of the civilized world. Cf. Ure, App. B, on Corinthian pottery; Wilisch, *Die alt-kor. Thonindustrie*; Buschor, *Griech. Vasenmalerei*, pp. 39, 48 ff. The proto-Corinthian ware has been thought to be Sicyonian in origin, but then during the eighth and seventh centuries it became the monopoly of Corinth, whose merchantmen took it all over the west to Sicily, Carthage, Etruria, South Italy. Cf. Beloch, *Gr. Ges.*, I, 2, pp. 224 ff.; Johansen, *Les Vases Sicyoniens*, especially Ch. VI; Glotz, *Le Travail dans la Grèce*, pp. 151 f., 164-167; Id., *Ancient Greece at Work*, pp. 135-140, 143; Wade-Gery, *C.A.H.*, III, pp. 536, 538 f.; Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, pp. 80 ff.; Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb Tragedy and Comedy*, pp. 263 ff. Cf. Ure, *op. cit.*, pp. 194 ff., for criticism of Busolt and Porzio and a defence of Nicolaus.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Schubring, *De Cypselo*, pp. 29 f.

<sup>22</sup> V, 18, 7.

destined to overthrow the dynasty of which Aletes was the founder.<sup>23</sup> This is, of course, a *vaticinium post eventum* of the Cypselid tyranny.<sup>24</sup>

We cannot exactly trace the steps by which Cypselus overthrew the oligarchy. He must, however, have had something more than popular favour on his side in order to subvert the close and well-ordered government of the nobles. Further, some combination of circumstances must have given him the support of the people besides the mere coming forward and saying he was their friend. We must remember that he was a noble himself, half-Bacchiad from his mother and of a noble family, though non-Dorian, on his father's side. There was, therefore, no particular reason why the people should trust him. Even if they did, and commissioned him with the work of freeing them from their task-masters, his success implies an acquaintance with the inner workings of the oligarchy. A stray hint<sup>25</sup> in Nicolaus Damascenus gives us the answer to both difficulties. Cypselus held the office of polemarch under the Bacchiads. During his term he took advantage of the opportunity of ingratiating himself with the people. It was the duty of the war-minister to exact legal fines, and the traditional mode of procedure had been harsh and oppressive in the extreme. Persons were kept in prison who could not pay the mulcts. Cypselus, however, no doubt looking ahead to the day when he would be glad to have the popular support, would imprison no one. He always accepted security and often became security himself, and then remitted the portion of the fine which belonged to him. Thus we see that Cypselus' official position had made him aware of state conditions. More than that, he was an able militarist. Polyænus<sup>26</sup> relates a strategem which he carried out on the occa-

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<sup>23</sup> Paus., II, 4, 4.

<sup>24</sup> On this whole matter see Schubring, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-50, who obviously has no faith in the fables or oracles so dear to the Greeks.

<sup>25</sup> Nic. Dam., fr. 58.

<sup>26</sup> Polyænus, V, 31.

sion of his overthrow of the government. Beloved by the people as being the only kindly person in a government exceedingly tyrannical, he readily obtained their support, as they trusted alike in his ability and friendship. The people whose cause he undertook, however, were no longer the poverty-stricken classes which the Dorian conquest had produced, but the rich population of merchants and traders who had grown up in latter years and whose whole-hearted support gave their leader success.<sup>27</sup>

We hear conflicting testimonies of Cypselus's reign. Herodotus represents him, by the mouth of the Corinthian envoy Socles,<sup>28</sup> as a tyrant of the worst type. Aristotle, however, gives us quite a different picture from Herodotus. Whatever cruelty Cypselus displayed was restricted to the Bacchiads alone, whom he naturally looked upon as dangerous to his newly-acquired power. Their goods he confiscated, but probably employed them in relieving the wants of the poor.<sup>29</sup>

Many of the nobles left Corinth voluntarily. Those who remained behind were themselves responsible for the consequences. Some he evidently left in peace, for we shall see in our chapter on the colonies that towards the end of his reign a Bacchiad went forth as oecist of Epidamnus. To Aristotle, Cypselus appears of a mild and peaceable disposition, ruling without a bodyguard or any of the instruments of the tyranny which Herodotus would have us believe characterized his reign. He always preserved the memory of his accession to power by the people's help, and tried to elevate the condition of the poor by every means possible. Thus he opened up important public works such as the building of Peirene. He made the construction of splendid monuments of the most stately art a means of equalising the conditions of his sub-

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<sup>27</sup> Arist., *Pol.*, V, 10, 6 (1310b); V, 12, 3 (1315b). Meyer also compares Arist. ap. Diog. Laert., I, 98. He thinks that Aristotle's source was Ephorus, but that the account cannot be traced further back.

<sup>28</sup> Hdt., V, 92.

<sup>29</sup> Meyer, *Ges. d. Alt.*, II, pp. 620 ff.

jects. He taxed the property of the rich to pay the expenses of his artistic designs, and then employed the poorer classes in the building of the monuments. There must have been scarcely any poverty in his reign. In the impulse he gave to trade and colonisation he found another means of making his subjects happy. Discontented persons and those who wanted to better their lot could find more comfortable homes abroad.

It is, then, likely that Aristotle's estimate of his reign is more correct.<sup>30</sup> Even were we to suppose that Herodotus was not biassed and did not invent the speech of Socles, it was but natural that the spokesman of the post-Cypselid aristocracy should represent Cypselus as a cruel ruler who banished, robbed and murdered wholesale.

Fiscal measures, one of which is rather legend than history, are ascribed to him. In the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* it is said that he had vowed the whole property of the Corinthians to Zeus if he obtained the sovereignty, and that he paid his vow by imposing a property tax of ten per cent for ten years.<sup>31</sup> Grote indeed regards this statement as having no historical foundation while Curtius,<sup>32</sup> seeing in it a tradition of the institution of a "census," points to it as one among many indications of the progressive spirit prevailing at Corinth in the seventh century. Cypselus, however, as we shall see later, earned the favour of Zeus in another way. He served Apollo too, dedicating at Delphi the chapel and treasury of the Corinthians with the bronze palm tree in commemoration of his victory over the oligarchy.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Porzio, *I Cypselidi*, pp. 169 ff., 200; Porzio accepts nothing. But cf. Newman, *Arist. Pol.*, IV, pp. lxiv f., 329, 339, 479.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Arist., *Oec.*, II, 1346 a-b; see Grote on Cypselus.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Curtius, "Studien," *Hermes*, X.; cf. Riezler, *Finanzen und Monopole im alt. Gr.*, pp. 12 f., 67, and Knapp, *Korrespond.-Bl. Gelehrt.*, Württ., 1888, p. 120, who points out that Cypselus' subjects were prosperous and able to pay. He compares the fourteenth century Italian tyrants.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Plut., *Conviv. Sept. Sap.* 21 (= *Mor* 164 A). Cf. Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, pp. 124, 126, 163. It would appear that

Thus he had Apollo on his side in all his doings. But his greatest gift was the magnificent colossus of Zeus, wrought in beaten gold, which he erected at Olympia.<sup>34</sup> This, set up near the temple of Hera, was looked upon as a wonder-work of art even in later times, and ranked among the most precious treasures in the rich inventory of Olympia. To the god of the Dorians, and to the national deity of the Peloponnesus these were gifts of grateful homage; Delphi and Olympia were ever ready to further the interests of the house of Cypselus.

Periander,<sup>35</sup> his eldest son, succeeded Cypselus as tyrant of Corinth in 625. More brilliant than his father, achieving greater reputation as statesman and promoter of culture, he yet lacked the kindly feelings of the latter towards the people and learned to forget that the masses had raised his family to power. The discontent which had already manifested itself towards the end of Cypselus' reign was aggravated rather than repressed by the methods used by his son against it. It became necessary for the security of his tyranny that he should smother popular aspirations to freedom. Thus it came about that Periander, unlike his father,<sup>36</sup> had from the outset of his reign, to fortify the acropolis and employ a bodyguard,

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Cypselus held the first Beauty Contest in which Mrs. Cypselus won the first prize (Ath., XIII, 609 f.). On the Corinthian treasury, in which were later placed the gifts of Alyattes and Croesus, cf. Her. 1, 14, 50, 51; IV, 162; Paus. X, 13, 5; Poulsen, *Delphi*, p. 71; Pomtow, *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1909, 318 f.; Karo, *B.C.H.*, XXXIII, 1909, pp. 201 ff.; Robinson, *A.J.P.*, XXXI, 1910, p. 219.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Strabo, 353.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Holle, *De Periandro*, p. 13; Busolt, *Die Lakedaimonier*, I, pp. 202 f., 211; Barth, *Corinth. Comm.*, pp. 14 ff. Cf. Wilisch, *Jahrb. Gym.*, Zittau (*Beiträge*, II), pp. 13 f., for program of the Cypselids and especially Periander.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Arist., *Pol.*, V, 12, 4 (1315b).



the mercenary band of *epikouroi*, for the support of which the subjects were taxed.<sup>37</sup> Nor did he restrict his measures of repression to the city alone but proceeded against Corcyra, which had overthrown the authority of the metropolis in 664. (This happened, of course, towards the close of the Bacchiad dynasty, and is looked upon by some as hastening the popular measures for their overthrow).<sup>38</sup> Periander seems, however, to have created an opening for discontented citizens by founding under another son, Evagoras, the colony of Potidaea on Pallene, one of the Chalcidian promontories.<sup>39</sup>

Whilst we may recognise the fact that his reign was extremely harsh, and perhaps cruel, let us remember that the accounts which we have of his doings are obscured and tinged by the later Greek conception of Tyranny. Notwithstanding his antipathy to anything approaching this form of government, Grote can speak in regard to tyrants as follows:

"It is not to be imagined", he says, "that all were alike, cruel and unprincipled, but the perpetual supremacy of one man and one family had become so offensive to the jealousy of those who felt themselves to be his equals, and to the general feeling of the people, that repression and severity were inevitable whether originally intended or not."

This estimate, I think, is very applicable to Periander, and though we may believe that circumstances forced him to be oppressive, we must bear in mind that the envoy's speech in Herodotus<sup>40</sup> is our authority, and that the inglorious picture

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Heracleides Pont., V.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Meyer, *Ges. d. Alt.*, II, p. 623, who dates the first sea-fight between Corinth and Corcyra circ. 660 and remarks: "Vielleicht haben diese Handel den Anstoss zur Begründung der Tyrannis gegeben. Jedenfalls hat Kypselos Korkyra unterworfen; bis zu Perianders Tod ist die Insel den Korinthern unterthan gewesen, wenn auch Aufstände vorkamen." I follow Holm, I, p. 308 rather than Meyer.

<sup>39</sup> This is the view of Holm (I, p. 308) and of Meyer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 624.

<sup>40</sup> V, 92. See the very severe criticisms of the Herodotean account by Porzio, *I Cipselidi*, pp. 169 f., 200. Further Porzio says, "Quando Erodoto scriveva, primi vortici di fumo caliginoso, annunziatori

there drawn is simply a confirmation of Herodotus' personal prejudices and the expression of the antipathy to tyranny of the post-Cypselid oligarchic party. We may, therefore, take the strong partizan account there given with reserve.

Curiously enough, the envoy ascribes the change to the advice given by Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, whom Periander had consulted as to how he should best preserve his power. The former took the Corinthian messenger through a field of corn, lopping off, as he went along, the tallest ears. He then sent him back to Periander without any verbal reply to the latter's inquiry. The messenger in wonder related this strange procedure to his master, who rightly interpreted it as an advice to rid himself of the most prominent men in the state. Thenceforward his reign was marked by the extremest cruelty. Aristotle,<sup>41</sup> on the other hand, knows nothing of this change of character, but, on the contrary, assigns the above advice as given by Periander to Thrasybulus. Nor has he anything to say about the heinous cruelty which Herodotus would have us believe Periander displayed. He only credits him with having been the first in Greece to systematise the art of tyrant craft,<sup>42</sup> and pays him the tribute of being "a great soldier although he was a tyrant." Aristotle's account is the more probable. The Herodotean is too good a story to merit credence. The change, if it did take place in Periander's rule, was a political necessity. He was drawn to tyrannical expedients by the altered attitude of the people, who had by now forgotten the evils of oligarchy from which Cypselus had freed them, and had come to chafe under the rule of an individual.<sup>43</sup> To quote the opinion of Holm:

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dell' incendio che doveva avvolgere il Peloponneso e tutta la Grecia, si profilavano sinistri all' orizzonte." Corinth put all its efforts into trying to convince Athens that it was itself, Corinth, which frustrated the attempts of Hippias.

<sup>41</sup> *Pol.*, III, 13, 16; V, 10, 3; 11, 4. See Newman's ed., vol. III, p. 247.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 12, 4.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Diog. Laert., I, 96, and the remarks of Busolt, *Die Lakeda-*

The character of Periander's rule is illustrated, as was the case with most of the tyrants, by a number of more or less apocryphal anecdotes. Executions, a numerous bodyguard, seizure of women's ornaments, belong to this class of stories. Others represent him as a ruler of extremely moral tendencies. . . . If we bear in mind that an ancient tradition places Periander with Solon and Pittacus among the Seven Sages, we may perhaps conclude that the tyrant of Corinth was remarkable, not only for his power at home and influence abroad, but also for a certain originality in his mode of government, and that he really was able to make the Corinthian citizens happy in his own way; but how much of these evidently exaggerated stories is true no one can say.

We may state in detail some of the accounts of Periander's character and administration, repressive or otherwise.<sup>44</sup> He abolished the public tables and the ancient education.<sup>45</sup> This, says Müller, was a policy intentionally anti-Dorian and "prompted by the wish of utterly eradicating the peculiarities of the Doric race." Grote rightly disagrees with him and remarks that "it cannot be shown that any public tables (syssitia) or any peculiar education, analogous to those of Sparta, ever existed at Corinth." The people he kept in a state of fear by his bodyguard and military display, whilst at Lechaeum and Cenchreae he maintained fleets of triremes.<sup>46</sup>

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monier, I, p. 207: "Die einzige Andeutung über einen Wechsel in der Regierungsweise des Periandros findet sich in der Rede des Sosicles." Cf. however, Busolt's remarks on the account of Ephorus (ap. Nic. Dam.), *Gr. Ges.*, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 646; Nic. Dam. in *F.H.G.*, III, p. 393; Ure, *Origin of Tyranny*, p. 190, n. 2.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Porzio, *I Cipselidi*, pp. 45 f.: "I frammenti poi dei filosofi greci, editi dal Mullach, presentano senz' altro coacervati i detti del figlio di Cipselo, tiranno di professione e sofo a tempo perso" (cf. pp. 169 f.). Be it known, however, that Porzio is the arch-sceptic of the historians of the Corinthian Tyrants. His book, in the main devoted to proving that we do not know anything about them, as we cannot trust any of the ancient authorities, not even Aristotle, ends up in a triumphant claim that the author has restored their reputation.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Müller, *Dorians*, I, p. 182, who quotes Arist., *Pol.*, V, 9, 2. But cf. criticisms by Grote, III, p. 59 (4th ed.).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Nic. Dam., fr. 59.

Migration from the country into the city was forbidden. To accustom the citizens to bear agricultural and mechanical labour he decreed that they should wear the light dress of peasants.<sup>47</sup> His expulsion of people from the city was perhaps part of his general purpose of suppressing popular clubs.<sup>48</sup> He issued sumptuary laws forbidding the citizens to live beyond their means or to possess an immoderate number of slaves.<sup>49</sup> Towards checking luxury and extravagance he instituted a court for the punishment of those who squandered their patrimony, recognising that such persons are often the readiest for innovation. In particular he indicted idleness, which he considered especially dangerous to his power. Very frugal in his personal expenses, whilst maintaining a high degree of military splendour, he did not exact direct taxes. The harbour and market tolls sufficed to defray the cost of the government. Private procuresses throughout the city he caused to be flung into the sea.<sup>50</sup> The idea seems to have

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<sup>47</sup> Cf. Müller, I, p. 183; cf. also Heracl. Pont., V.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Arist., *Pol.*, V, 10, 11; Diog. Laert., I, 96. See Busolt, *Die Lakedaïmonier*, I, pp. 201 ff. The various ancient references for Periander's doings are collected in Wilisch, *Beiträge zur inn. Ges. des alt-Kor.*, I, pp. 12 ff., with critical observations. Steinmetz (*Herodt. und Nikol. Dam.*, p. 11) and Holle (*De Periandro*, p. 23) think the expulsions from the city affected only the Bacchiads or other dangerous elements likely to subvert his power. Cf. Porzio, *I Cipselidi*, p. 235 n., and see the criticisms of Busolt, *Gr. Ges.*, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 646; Pöhlmann, *Grundr. Gr. Ges.*, pp. 62, 79.

<sup>49</sup> "Pour combattre les privilégiés," says Glotz, *Le travail dans la Grèce*, p. 106. The large number of Athenaeus, VI, 272b, is not accepted by Guiraud (*Études Économiques sur l'Antiquité*, p. 129). Referring to the enormous figures for Attica, Aegina and Corinth, he says, "il est évident que ces chiffres sont faux," and concludes that we cannot be sure what number they possessed, as the numeral emendations are purely arbitrary. See Guiraud, *La main d'oeuvre*, p. 104; Blümner in Hermann's *Lehrbuch*, IV, pp. 4 ff., and especially Glotz, *Le travail dans la Grèce*, p. 239, who remarks, "que dans les villes commerçantes et industrielles, la population servile dépasse la population libre." Cf. Cavaignac, *Population et Capital*, p. 69; Sargent, *Athenian Slave Population*, pp. 9, 13, 20.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Herac. Pont., V.

been to uphold the monopoly of the official attendants on the citadel top whose earnings found their way into the state coffers.

Among the most important of his administrative achievements was his patronage of literature and art. His efforts in this line were distinctly popular. Curtius thinks that the rustic cult of Dionysus was substituted as a state religion for the aristocratic and exclusive worship of the nobles.<sup>51</sup>

Under the auspices of this movement, perhaps, the great artist, Arion of Methymna, introduced his hymns to Dionysus called dithyrambs. He soon gave them the strict form of the choral ode, the several strophes of which were recited by the divisions of the chorus as they stood around the altar of the god.<sup>52</sup> Chersias the poet, mentioned by Plutarch,<sup>53</sup> is said to have sung during one of Periander's banquets. Anacharsis, too, the Scythian 'philosopher', was in favour at his court.<sup>54</sup> Thus we find Periander, like many of his contemporary tyrants, the liberal and cultured patron of literature and philosophy. He himself wrote the *Hypothekae*, a poem containing upwards of 2,000 verses and of the didactic type, which probably laid down what he thought the principles of good government.<sup>55</sup> Nor were his artistic tastes inferior to his literary. The lustre which accrued to his court in the eyes of the Greek world by his patronage of such persons as Arion and Anacharsis, was increased by the magnificent temples

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<sup>51</sup> Cf. Hdt., I, 23. But this is like many more of Curtius' thoughts. He certainly cannot get it out of the passage in Hdt. The best account is given by Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb Tragedy and Comedy*, pp. 18-22, where he discusses the place of Arion in the history of the dithyramb.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Her. l. c.; Suidas s. v. Arion; Gellius, XVI, 19; Aelian, V. H., XII, 45. All the authorities are quoted and critically discussed by Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 131 ff.

<sup>53</sup> *Sept. Sap. Conv.*, 21, and, strange to say, accepted as historical by the sceptical Porzio, *I Cipselidi*, p. 195.

<sup>54</sup> See Porzio, *I Cipselidi*, p. 34 f., for stories of Periander's associations with other literati.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Diog. Laert., I, 97. Cf. Porzio, *op. cit.*, p. 35.



which he erected. The building of these afforded a pretext for draining the riches of the wealthy and employing the money so raised in paying the poorer classes whom he employed on the work. This was an extremely popular procedure and had the additional advantage of preventing too great accumulation of wealth which would tend to the subversion of his power.

Abroad the brilliant tyrant was the star of his day. Meyer<sup>56</sup> says he was the greatest man in Europe. I have already remarked about his inclusion amongst the Seven Sages. It must have been in this rôle of wise man that he was called upon by the Mityleneans and Athenians to arbitrate between them, about 606 B. C.<sup>57</sup> The Athenians had taken possession of Sigeum. The Mityleneans, whose influence predominated in the Troad, tried to drive them out, and, failing in this, built Achilleum close to Sigeum to counteract their influence. A war was begun which decided nothing. Acting as mediator Periander decided for the *status quo*. Each party retained its own town. At first, to judge from Timaeus, it would seem that Periander took the side of Pittacus and the Mityleneans in the contest, but as Strabo rightly asks, how should they (the Athenians) choose an enemy-in-arms to be an arbitrator? We have already related his connection with Thrasybulus of Miletus. But his friendships extended further afield. We know how his intimacy with Alyattes, King of Lydia, saved Miletus for his Milesian friend<sup>58</sup> when at war with the Lydians (Her. I, 20). Nearer home he was connected very closely with the great family of

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<sup>56</sup> *Op. cit.*, II, p. 625: "Um die Wende des siebenten Jahrhunderts war Periander der mächtigste Mann Europas." Cf. Speck, *Handelsges. d. Alt.*, II, p. 61.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Her., V, 94, 95; Strabo, 600; Diog. Laert., I, 74. Cf. Tod, *International Arbitration amongst the Greeks*, p. 90.

<sup>58</sup> Myres, *J.H.S.*, XXVI, pp. 110 f., considers Periander as an active supporter of the Milesian thalassocracy which he dates at this period. He quotes the story of Arion (Her., I, 23-4; Plut., *Sept. Sap. Conv.*, 18 f.). Cf. Busolt, *Gr. Ges.*, II, p. 466.

Epidaurus, having married the lovely Melissa, daughter of Procles, tyrant of the place.<sup>59</sup> His reign was particularly characterised by a continuation of the vigorous colonial schemes of his father. He planted new colonies (with which we shall shortly have occasion to deal in detail), and we have already noticed his reduction of Corcyra early in his reign.

Like his father, too, he drew down the blessings of the gods on his fair city of Corinth. His construction of splendid works dedicated at Olympia and Delphi was as congenial to his personal refinement as it was in accordance with his wishes to tax the rich under the pretence of religious zeal. It was probably Periander who dedicated at Olympia in memory of his father the famous chest of Cypselus described by Pausanias.<sup>60</sup> We learn from Aristotle and others of the "dedications of the Cypselids." Of these, evidently, there were many others besides the chest, and the dedications at Delphi, and among them were included offerings dedicated by Cypselus himself.<sup>61</sup>

The grandeur and success of Periander's reign was turned into gloom by his domestic troubles which culminated during the closing years of his eventful life. His marriage to Melissa, daughter of Procles of Epidaurus, has already been mentioned. He passionately loved her, but in a fit of anger

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Her., III, 50.

<sup>60</sup> V, 17, 5-19; Stuart Jones has attempted a restoration (*J.H.S.*, 1894, pp. 30-80). Cf. Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, p. 226. Recently W. von Massow in *Ath. Mitt.*, XLI, 1916, issued 1926, pp. 1-117, with 4 pls. and 25 figs., gives a new study of the famous chest, with special notice of the evidence from archaeology gained in the last twenty-five years.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Arist., *Pol.*, V, 11, 9; Suidas and Photius, s. v. Κυψελίδων ἀνάθημα; Ephorus ap. Diog. Laert., I, 96; Plato, *Phaedrus*, 236 B, with schol.; Paus., V, 2, 4; Strabo, 353, 378; Plut., *Pyth. Orac.*, 13. Cf. *Bull. Mus. F. A.*, Boston, XX, 1922, pp. 65-68; *A.J.A.*, 1923, p. 108, for a gold bowl of the Cypselids found to the east of the Altis at Olympia and now in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. It is inscribed as from Heraclea and is an unique ex-voto of the seventh century B. C.

aroused by the calumnies of some courtesans, he caused her an injury which resulted in her early death. His remorse was genuine but unavailing. She had borne him two sons, Cypselus and Lycophron, whom he sent to their grandfather's place at Epidaurus. Here they spent their time entirely unconscious of the cause of their orphanage, but when they were returning home Procles told them the dread tale of their father's cruelty. Cypselus took no notice, but the words of his grandfather rankled in the heart of the younger who there and then resolved to make his father repent his shameful deed. The love of a kind mother was recalled, and the consciousness that she had been so foully done to death made him hate his father. No wonder that when he returned home he refused to speak to him or display the slightest filial devotion. Periander was dumbfounded, and after entreaties and persuasions had failed to win back the affection of his favourite son, he thought to coerce him into duty by harsh means. He sent him away from the court and commanded that nobody should hold converse with him. Any person disobeying had to pay a fine to Apollo. The high-souled boy wandered in beggarly fashion through the streets of the city without a word of comfort from anyone, save for the secret kindness of some friends, bestowed upon him because, as Herodotus says, he was Periander's son. His hatred of his father grew more and more intense, while the latter's love for the rebel increased proportionately. At last, conquered by his feelings and forgetting his original command, he approached the boy who curtly told him that he had incurred the fine to Apollo. In despair the father next sent the youth to Corcyra, hoping that at a distance from home influences, he would forget his rankling hate. In the meantime he proceeded against Procles, whom he rightly regarded as the author of his misery, reduced Epidaurus and, some think, possibly Aegina too, both of which he incorporated in the Corinthian territory. All this time in distant Corcyra, however, loathing even the name of his father, sojourned his

darling son, that son whose affections the father yearned above all else to regain. Again his feelings conquered him. Realising that his lamp of life was nearly extinguished, he sent his daughter to Corcyra to persuade her sullen brother to return home. But Lycophron doggedly declared that he would never set foot on his native soil until his father had left it. The aged tyrant, broken in mind and body, was ready to do even this, so much did he desire the succession to power of the rebel lad. Word was sent to Corcyra of his resolution. He was to come there and Lycophron was to go back to rule in Corinth. So terrified, however, were the islanders at the dread prospect of Periander's advent, that they actually slew the son to foil the father's purpose.<sup>62</sup> The Corcyraeans had in any case to endure the tyrant's visit, and that in rage and despair for the treatment of his beloved son. He proceeded against them with his powerful fleet and punished them most severely, sending in addition 300 of their noblest youths to Alyattes of Lydia to be shamefully mutilated. This barbarous treatment was fortunately anticipated. The boys were rescued on their way to the Lydian court,<sup>63</sup> by the Samians. The aged tyrant, broken-hearted, and disappointed in his most cherished hopes, returned to Corinth and soon lay down upon his lonely death-bed. Here, with the schemes nearest his heart unattained, a prey to terrors of conscience, he died of despondency and grief at the age of 80. So ended the great Periander. Müller's estimate of his character is worth quoting here:

Periander was of a daring and comprehensive spirit, and rivalled by few of his contemporaries, bold in the field, politic in council, though misled by continual distrust to undertake unworthy measures, and having too little regard for the good of the people when

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<sup>62</sup> For another account (based on Nic. Dam.) of Lycophron's death, as he was preparing to establish a tyranny with the Perioeci, cf. Wilisch, *Beiträge*, I, p. 15; Plass, *Die Tyrannis*, I, pp. 156-161. Cf., however, Porzio, *I Cipselidi*, pp. 113 ff., where Duncker's "storia bugiarda delle combinazioni" is severely handled.

<sup>63</sup> For the story of Lycophron, cf. Her., III, 48-54.

it interfered with his own designs; a friend of the arts and of an enlightened mind, but at the same time overcome by the strength of his passions; and, though devoid of awe for all sacred things, yet at times a prey to the most grovelling superstition.<sup>64</sup>

Periander was succeeded in 583 by his nephew Psammetichus. His reign was very short, as already the spirit of revolt against tyrants had taken hold of Greece under the leadership of Sparta. Psammetichus was murdered three years after his accession, and an oligarchial government set up, chiefly carried on by an aristocracy of merchants. We shall soon see, however, that it was a most efficient government, a fact attested by its permanence through all the variations of the chequered history of Greece. It is not clear, however, that Sparta had anything to do with the overthrow of the tyranny in Corinth. Müller, on the authority of Plutarch,<sup>65</sup> sees reasons for stating that she had.<sup>66</sup> Holm, on the other hand, definitely asserts that "there is no record of Sparta's participation in the overthrow of the tyranny in Corinth, etc., as Busolt has exhaustively proved." Meyer has a similar view.<sup>67</sup> This seems the more reasonable assumption, especially when we consider the well-known speech of the Corinthian envoy.<sup>68</sup> No reference is made to Sparta's part in the suppression, and it is clear that if she had taken any, the matter would have been mentioned at any rate in this vehement harangue. We cannot help inferring from Herodotus' silence that he knew nothing of it. Certainly the influence of Sparta was paramount in the overthrow of every tyranny about this time in Greece, but Müller's declaration that "Sparta alone, in most instances at the instigation of

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<sup>64</sup> Cf. Müller, *Dorians*, I, p. 185.

<sup>65</sup> *De Mal. Her.*, 21.

<sup>66</sup> *Dorians*, I, 188.

<sup>67</sup> *Op. cit.*, II, p. 627. His arguments are: Herodotus knows nothing of it; Thucydides has falsely generalized from the case of the struggles against Polycrates and Hippias. Cf. also Grote, II, Ch. IX, p. 417, for rejection of Plutarch.

<sup>68</sup> *Her.*, V, 92.



the Delphian oracle, declared against all these rulers a lasting war, and in fact overthrew them *all*, with the exception of the Sicilian tyrants," is too sweeping a statement. We may admit that Sparta was the leading spirit of the anti-Tyrant movement, but that she actually interfered in Corinth remains unproved. Where it is a choice between Plutarch and Herodotus the latter is preferable.

Let us now consider the development of the Corinthian constitution from the earliest times to the abolition of the tyrannis, when it assumed its permanent form of a commercial oligarchy. Unhappily, of this last phase we have far too little information.<sup>69</sup>

We have no definite account of the nature of the government in Achæan or immediately post-Achæan or Aeolian times. We infer, however, from Homer that in the former period, at least, there was no such thing as a constitution properly so called. Agamemnon, the King of Mycenæ, ruled Corinth without any reference to local bodies or municipal institutions. What there might have been of regulation or law amongst the subject population was simply the primitive social clan-law, which followed a course of its own without attracting the attention of the Lord of *Polychrysos Mykenæ*. Conquered by military superiority and the stronger civilisation of the invaders, the "Pelagic" population never aspired to any right to rule themselves. When the Achæan power broke up, the primitive tribal institutions probably survived and served the purpose of what was in after years organised government. The Dorians next took the place of the former Achæan masters but did not absolutely enforce their mode of

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<sup>69</sup> Cf. Wilisch, *Beiträge, I*, in *Jahresber. des Gymn. Zittau*, 1887, pp. 9 ff.; Grüner, *Korinths Verfassung und Ges.*, pp. 1-8. A very convenient summary of the sources will be found in Gilbert, *Handb. der Griech. Staatsaltertümer*, II, pp. 87-91.

government upon the people. Their conquest of Corinth was characterised rather by the assimilation of the pre-existing state of affairs than by its absolute eradication. The Dorian conquest of Corinth, however, has a particular character of its own. It has in saga an independent place as being the settlement of Aletes, who was directly connected with Antiochus, son of Heracles. All the other places in the Argive inheritance, e. g., the Asopus valley, the fruitful maritime region of Sicyon, Epidaurus, Troezen, fell to the lot of Temenus and rank as the foundations of his sons and grandsons. But we are wandering from our enquiry—the constitution which the Dorians set up.

Suidas reports the tradition that Aletes divided Corinth into eight local tribes.<sup>70</sup> This must mean that at the time when men first began to take notice of constitutional machinery, they found in Corinth eight local instead of the three Dorian tribes; which, being of unknown origin, were naturally ascribed to Aletes. This seems to show that there was no strict Dorizing of Corinth and that after the conquest there remained a large non-Dorian element in the citizen-body. Suidas' information is particularly interesting as it asserts that the tribes were local. Athens had to wait till the days of Cleisthenes before local divisions took the place of clan and phratry. In Corinth it would appear they had already existed centuries before.<sup>71</sup>

The reigns of Aletes and his successors, we may guess, presented nothing novel in constitutional development. Not till the overthrow of the kingship, and the coming to power of the Bacchiad oligarchy, do we find any change in the mode of government. The Bacchiads, as already noticed, formed a very close corporation. It is important to point out clearly that they consisted of one clan and not of many Dorian clans. It is estimated by Diodorus to have contained about 200

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<sup>70</sup> Cf. Wilisch, *l. c.*, p. 6. "So dim a tradition is hardly worth speculation"—Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.*, II, p. 538.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 312, with note.

men.<sup>72</sup> These, says Herodotus,<sup>73</sup> gave in marriage and took in marriage within themselves. Thus they remained a veritable caste, quite distinct from all other families. It is obviously to this system of government that Aristotle is referring when he points out that among oligarchies there is a form of government comparable to tyranny among monarchies.<sup>74</sup> That is, he concludes it is a very extreme type of oligarchy. Such a dynasty the Bacchiadae of Corinth certainly constituted, where apparently the exclusiveness was more marked, and tyrannical methods more in evidence, than anywhere else in Greece. The government was carried out by a system of annual prytanes, and though each of these had supreme power in the state during his year of office, he returned into the body of the house at the expiration of that time.<sup>75</sup> Müller gives an excellent estimate of the Bacchiadae:

With the Cretan Cosmi may be compared the magistrates named prytanes, who, in Corinth, as well as in other states, succeeded in the place of the kings. The numerous house of the Bacchiadae were not content that certain individuals of their number should exercise the government as an hereditary right for life, but wished to obtain a larger share in it, and to give the enjoyment of the supreme power to a greater number. The only difference, however, that existed between a prytanis and a king was that the former was elected, and only held his office for a year, during which he was compelled to administer it according to the will of his house. . . . As Corcyra was founded from Corinth, before the commencement of the tyranny of the Cypselidae, we find that in the latter state annual prytanes, chosen apparently from among the aristocracy, remained the supreme magistrates even in a democratic age.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Diod., VII, fr. 6; cf. Strabo, 378; Her., V, 92; Paus., II, 4, 4; cf. Whibley, *Greek Oligarchies*, p. 121.

<sup>73</sup> V, 92.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Arist., *Pol.*, IV, 5, 2 (1292b.).

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Diod., fr. 6. The annually chosen prytanis was in loco regis. See discussion of views of various German critics by Wilisch, *Beiträge*, I, pp. 4 ff., and cf. Lenschau in *P. W. s. v. Korinthos*, p. 1013; Busolt, *Die Kor. Prytanen*, *Hermes*, XXVIII, pp. 312-320; Whibley, *Greek Oligarchies*, p. 152.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Müller, *Dorians*, II, pp. 137-8.

We now come to the question of the tyranny.<sup>77</sup> It is generally agreed that the oligarchy was of a most oppressive nature. The people were glad to get rid of it by any or every means, and such means they found in the aspiring tyrannus who availed himself of the spirit of the times to rise to power. The tyranny is found in many places in Greece and was, we have no doubt, a welcome relief in its earlier stages. Though it may have gradually become just as harsh and unpopular as the system which it supplanted, we must remember that it was of the greatest benefit to Greece. Our extant accounts of the early Greek tyranny are altogether biassed by the antipathies of the post-tyranny governments, or by the fact that fourth-century writers, who have characterised it as an invidious and detestable institution, are judging by the standard of the tyrannical governments of their own day the more beneficial and efficient systems of the seventh and sixth centuries. A typical instance of this practice is the account of Periander given by Ephorus, which, owing to its discrepancy with the Aristotelian and even Herodotean account, is agreed by most scholars to be due to recollections of the elder Dionysius.<sup>78</sup>

Most students of philology adhere to Boeckh's conclusion that the word *tyrannos* cannot be satisfactorily explained by any Greek etymology, and that therefore it must be an introduction into the Greek language from Lydia or Phrygia, where it is often found in inscriptions.<sup>79</sup> Aristotle defines

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<sup>77</sup> On the Cypselids at Corinth, see Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.*, III, pp. 549-556, with genealogical table, p. 570. Cf. Maentler, *Korinth unter den Kypseliden*; Schubring, *De Cypselo*; Holle, *De Periandro*; Plass, *Die Tyrannis*, I, pp. 147 ff.; Busolt, *Gr. Ges.*, 1<sup>2</sup>, pp. 214 ff., 626 ff.; Beloch, *Gr. Ges.*, 1<sup>2</sup>, 1, pp. 361 ff.; 2, 274 ff.; Swoboda, *Die Tyrannis*, in Hermann's *Lehrbuch der Griech. Staatsaltertümer*, I, 3, pp. 75-105, where all the authorities are conveniently brought together and authoritatively discussed. Cf. Meyer, *Ges. d. Alt.*, II, pp. 620-627.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Wilisch, *Beiträge*, I, p. 13.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Boeckh, on *C.I.G.*, No. 3438: "Constat *τύραννος* vocem esse

tyranny as "the arbitrary power of an individual which is responsible to no one, and governs all alike, whether equals or betters, with a view to its own advantage, not to that of its subjects, and therefore against their will."<sup>80</sup> This is an excellent definition of the popular Greek idea of tyranny, and most comprehensive. It gives all the essentials of the notion. We have also the estimates of the poets which resemble Aristotle's definition. For instance, we find Euripides saying "there is nothing more hostile to a city's interests than the tyrant's rule; for in the first place there are no laws in common but one has arbitrary power, having made himself master of the law, all for himself etc."<sup>81</sup>

Sophocles gives a somewhat similar opinion.<sup>82</sup> Did we not know the good results of the early tyrannis we would be inclined to deduce from such estimates that the tyrannis was a most detestable system. Cornelius Nepos gives a definition of tyrants which certainly does not apply to the Cypselids: "Omnes habentur et dicuntur tyranni, qui potestate sunt perpetua in ea civitate, quae libertate usa est."<sup>83</sup> Still less can we apply to him that description, exaggerated even in reference to Greek tyrants in general, which we find in the speech of Otanes in Herodotus:<sup>84</sup> "He (the tyrant) outrages the country's honoured usages, violates women and puts men to death without trial." As regards the Cypselids, so far as we can interpret the evidence, this would be a total misrepresentation.

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noviciam apud Graecos—non dubito quin vox a Lydis et Phrygibus manaverit ad Graecos etc."

<sup>80</sup> *Pol.*, IV, 10, 16 f. For Aristotle's source, see Endt, *Die Quellen des Arist. in der Beschreib. d. Tyran.*, in *Wiener Studien*, XXIV, 1902, pp. 1-69. Cf. Zeller, "Über den Begriff der Tyran. bei den Griech.," *Sitzungsb. d. könig. Preuss. Akad., Berlin*, 1887, pp. 1137-1146. Since Porzio rejects Aristotle himself, a fortiori, he will not accept Endt's conclusions and takes the view of Nissen and Wilamowitz that Aristotle is not to be trusted as an historian.

<sup>81</sup> *Suppl.*, 429 ff.

<sup>82</sup> *Ant.*, 737 ff.

<sup>83</sup> *Miltiades*, 8.

<sup>84</sup> III, 80.



On the contrary, there is something to be said for the tyranny in Greece. In Corinth, admittedly, it was a relief. But in Greece generally at this period, apparently, it was somewhat of a blessing in disguise. The early tyranny united, as no other development could have done, the different and discrepant elements of the state into an efficient and vigorous whole. It equalised citizens and pulled down the noble from his pedestal of assumed superiority. Herodotus points out that in Athens it was the tyranny that first brought about a national spirit. In Corinth, indeed, democracy did not follow, but the brilliant tyranny had the salutary effect of preparing the state for a far more representative and more equable oligarchy than the ancient narrow-minded Bacchiad dynasty.

As Speck <sup>85</sup> observes:

In its external relations Corinth reached, under the tyrants, the climax of its power. . . . Around 600 B. C., Periander was, without doubt, the mightiest man of Europe, Corinth the first commercial city of the Greek world.

Compare too the remarks of Eduard Meyer already cited. Even Grote, an acknowledged democrat, admitted the good results of the tyranny,<sup>86</sup> and Guiraud <sup>87</sup> has spoken in appreciation of the remarkable achievements of the tyrants of Corinth. Similarly, Wilisch <sup>88</sup> observes:

Aside from individual acts of violence on the part of the house of the Tyrants—which, by the way, were probably directed more against restless noblemen and became more frequent only towards the end of Periander's reign—the rulers bound themselves by the laws which they themselves promulgated, so that, for the great mass of the population, the Tyrannis was, in any case, a more desired condition than the preceding regime of the nobles.

Holm's estimate might be considered too:

Tyrants who had not inherited their power, but had founded it

<sup>85</sup> *Handelges. d. Altertums*, II, p. 61.

<sup>86</sup> III, 29 ff., ed. 2, 1849-56, cited above.

<sup>87</sup> *La Main d'Œuvre Industrielle*, pp. 29 ff.

<sup>88</sup> *Beiträge*, I, p. 14.

themselves, were at all events energetic men, and they generally combined with their energy a correct appreciation of the civilising tendencies of the age, of the paths which should be followed by commerce, of the advantages to be derived from intercourse with foreign countries, and of the benefits to be gained from the promotion of art and science. Each fresh success which they had achieved for their city redounded to their honour as well as to that of the city, and thus created for them a new element of security. Hence the prestige which occasionally the first, but more often the second of his line, managed to give to his court and at the same time to his city, of which we see examples in Corinth, Athens and Syracuse.<sup>80</sup>

Aristotle, it is true, enumerates some distinctly harsh principles in the policy of the tyrant. He humiliates his subjects, for example, as he knows a mean-spirited man will not conspire against anybody. He creates distrust among them, as he knows he is safe until they begin to have confidence in one another. He wants no good man in the state, that is, a preëminent man, as he knows his power is endangered by such a man.<sup>80</sup> That the Cypselids as well as other tyrants practised such methods of government, I am prepared to admit. But the persons against whom such methods of repression were mainly directed, were not the general class of the citizens, but the nobles and would-be plutocrats. The artisans and craftsmen were wholly untaxed and the tyrant made it his business to provide them with employment, thus keeping them content and comfortable.<sup>81</sup> Abroad, too, by a vigorous colonial policy, room was created for discontented citizens, or those who for one reason or another could not make a living at home. Thucydides<sup>82</sup> has a most extra-

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<sup>80</sup> Cf. Holm., I, pp. 262-3.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Arist., *Pol.*, V, 11. For critical discussion of Aristotle and the sources of his accounts of the Tyranny, cf. Endt in *Wiener Stud.*, XXIV, 1902, pp. 41 ff. "Die Quellen des Aristoteles in d. Beschreib. d. Tyran." Endt's view that "Aristoteles hat in der Darstellung über die Tyrannis die ihm vorliegende Litteratur benützt," is regarded as nonsense by Porzio (*op. cit.*, p. 186), who has no confidence whatsoever in the historicity of the Aristotelian account.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Glotz, *Le Travail dans la Grèce*, p. 193.

<sup>82</sup> I, 17.

ordinary generalisation, which is totally inapplicable to Corinth at any rate. He says that the policy of the tyrants was a selfish one; that they only considered the comforts of their own bodies and the furtherance of their personal interests. Nothing worthy of note was done by them and there was no foreign policy. The curious thing is that Grote has accepted Thucydides' statements without reserve and actually quotes the Greek in a footnote.<sup>93</sup> But it can hardly be denied that the reign of the Cypselids at Corinth was a brilliant period, perhaps the most brilliant in the history of the city. Then only did Literature find its way among the bales of merchandise. Art flourished as it did nowhere else in contemporary Greece. We shall see very soon the extraordinary colonial expansion of Corinth under the tyrants, perhaps the most vigorous and systematised in all Greek history. Periander, besides, is variously credited with either the institution or revival of the Isthmian games. As we have said, Corinth during the Cypselid tyranny reached a height of material power and literary and artistic achievement which she certainly had not before and which she never attained after it. Greenidge <sup>94</sup> has an excellent appreciation of the brighter side of the tyranny:

The immediate effect of their rule may be summed up by saying that everywhere they found distraction in their cities, and everywhere they left something approaching unity. We extract from Herodotus, an unwilling witness, the fact that at Athens the rule of the Peisistratidae first created a national spirit. It is after their overthrow that the Demos emerges as a united whole, by alliance with which Cleisthenes created the democracy. As unifiers of their cities they were the precursors of popular government which requires a collective will. It is true that a democratic form of government did not everywhere follow their overthrow; but even in these cases a constitution of any kind was an improvement on the old dynastic rule. Corinth, the city most grievously chastened, and perhaps the most improved by tyranny still remained an oligarchy, but an oligarchy of a constitutional type, which rested on, if it did not express, the popular will.

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<sup>93</sup> Cf. Grote, II, Ch. IX, p. 396.

<sup>94</sup> *Handbook of Gk. Const. Hist.*, p. 29.

To this oligarchy we now turn. It is a matter of regret that the ancient authorities have left us little information on the subject.<sup>95</sup> Though our knowledge is limited to scattered references, we can deduce from these, but still more from the stability and permanence which characterised this oligarchy, that it must have been a very excellent form of government. It was in effect a timocracy, a government by an aristocracy of merchants. Yet it was open to all. Nothing of the Bacchiad spirit of caste exclusiveness was suffered to enter it. It provided an incentive to endeavour and success in the world of commerce, which really was the civic glory of Corinth from very early times, for business men strove to obtain the necessary property qualifications in order to become members. Anybody who reached a certain franchise, which was probably very high, was eligible for participation in the government. We may borrow Strabo's description of it as a constitution of "men ruling in aristocratic fashion on the strength of their wealth." Even artisans and workmen, it may be supposed, were admitted.<sup>96</sup> It was an ideal form of government for Corinth, for it appears but just that there the wealthiest men, who really had a stake in the state, should be governors. In this democratic age there is no need to discuss the validity of the principle, but we give it for what it was worth to a people who had in turn groaned under the dominion of the Bacchiads and the Cypselids. That it was accepted in commercial states alone is attested by the fact

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<sup>95</sup> Fully discussed by Wilisch, *Beiträge*, I, pp. 15 ff. Cf. also Lenschau, *l. c.*, pp. 1021 ff.; Busolt, *Die Lakedaïmonier*, I, pp. 211 ff., and Whibley, *Greek Oligarchies*, pp. 151, 164, who disagrees with Busolt. See Newman's *Politics of Aristotle*, IV, pp. xxiv, xxxi, 216, 246 (*re assembly*), 251, especially 263, 277 f. (in relation to Argos) 359, 387, 392, 477 (*re duration with only a five-year break*, B. C., 392-387).

<sup>96</sup> Cf. Her., II, 167. Cf. Whibley, *Greek Oligarchies*, pp. 131 ff., who quotes from Cicero's *Republic* (II, 36) for evidence of a timocratic constitution.

that it was not tolerated in places of broader outlook where men had higher aspirations than the mere accumulation of commercial wealth.

As to its actual formation, we are informed that the government consisted of a council at the head of which were eight *Probuli*.<sup>97</sup> We do not know the number of the council. It had probably executive powers similar to those of the old gerousia. A unity of administration was affected by the combination of judicial and executive powers, to judge from Diodorus,<sup>98</sup> who mentions a *gerousia* to deal with criminal cases, which presumably was identical with the council. As to election to the government, there are two possible hypotheses. A man may automatically have become a member on reaching the necessary property qualification, without any reference to election. It is more reasonable to assume, however, that the people elected him after he had attained the required standard. In fact the people's voice was not altogether excluded, as Greenidge would lead one to think. He seems to have failed to observe two or three passages in Plutarch which make it very probable that they had the election of magistrates, generals at any rate. In the first place, we are told that "the Corinthians were governed by something like an oligarchy and the people but little concerned in public business."<sup>99</sup> What exactly they were concerned in is told us in the story of Timoleon's popularity and election to the command of the forces sent to Syracuse. "And when they were deliberating about the choice of a captain, and when the magistrates were writing

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<sup>97</sup> Cf. Nic. Dam., fr. 60. Cf. Wilisch, *Beiträge*, pp. 16 f.; Lutz in *Cl. Rev.*, X, pp. 418 ff., with criticisms by Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.*, III, p. 556. Cf. Busolt, *Gr. Ges.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 658, 1, and Lenschau, *l. o.*, pp. 1021 f.; Newman, *Pol. of Aristotle*, IV, p. 263; Glotz, *La Cité Grecque*, p. 102, pp. 107-109.

<sup>98</sup> XVI, 65.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Plut., *Dion.*, LIII, 15; Aristotle, *Pol.*, 1306, a 23, with note by Newman, and Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.*, II, 90, n. 4.



down the names and proposing for election those who were aspiring to a good name in the city, one of the people stood up and named Timoleon.”<sup>100</sup> A little further down in the same chapter, we are informed that Timophanes, Timoleon’s elder brother, “drew the citizens to his side and being a warlike and efficient man was from time to time appointed to commands.” The most convincing passage of all, however, is the following: “When therefore his (Timoleon’s) name was announced and the people accepted, and elected him, a certain Teleclides etc.”<sup>101</sup> These passages, if we may trust Plutarch’s knowledge of the Corinthian constitution, clearly show that the people had in their power the election of generals at any rate, and most probably other magistrates also. Besides the fact that Greenidge’s general account shows that he did not recognize the people as having any part in the government, it is evident he did not consider Plutarch’s remarks when he says, in reference to the council, “that all individual magistracies proceeded from and were directly responsible to this body.” Holden,<sup>102</sup> curiously enough, in his edition of Plutarch’s *Timoleon*, rejects Plutarch’s account for that of Diodorus. He says: “according to Diodorus (XVI, 65, καὶ τῇ γερονσίᾳ τὰς ἐντολὰς δηλώσαντες) the *Gerousia* decided to send Timoleon at once, without the intermediate process recorded by Plutarch. Diodorus’ narrative is so far the more correct, inasmuch as he makes the determination rest with the Council, while Plutarch represents it as emanating from a popular assembly (cf. Chap. 7, 1); for the form of government at Corinth since the Peace of Antalcidas had been oligarchical.” I do not at all agree. For that matter, the form of government had been always oligarchical since the days of the tyrants, except for the short establishment of democracy, B. C. 392-387. Plutarch, it seems to me, is as trustworthy as Diodorus

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<sup>100</sup> Cf. Plut., *Timoleon*, III, 1.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Plut., *Tim.*, VII, 2.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Holden on Plut., *Tim.*, p. 59.

in matters relating to Corinth. The latter represents the application for the help from Syracuse as coming to Corinth soon after the death of Timophanes, whereas Plutarch places a long interval between Timophanes' death and the arrival of the Syracusan envoys, during which Timoleon pined in grief, away from public life, for his brother's death. Plutarch's account is that accepted by almost every historian (e.g. Holm, III, p. 401; Bury, p. 674). Grote actually records his preference for Plutarch and follows his account completely in his section on Timoleon.<sup>103</sup>

It is very probable, then, that the people had the election of some magistracies. We might also entertain the supposition that they elected the Council. This, composed of the most successful business men, had evidently the greatest consideration for its subjects. That excellent law and order prevailed, that justice was impartially distributed, that hospitality was fostered, is attested by Pindar.<sup>104</sup> Therefore Corinth could hold her head high and could dictate policy to Sparta, the great power at this time, when she joined the Peloponnesian Confederacy.

The consistency of its foreign relations," says Greenidge, "was based on the stability of its government, and the narrowness of both is remarkable. The tenacity of purpose with which this city pursued its definite commercial objects at any cost, even at the risk of affronting Sparta, the acknowledged leader of its foreign policy, shows oligarchy at its best in Greece, and exhibits the truth that the narrower and more permanent the executive of a state, the greater the gain in consistency and concentration of purpose, and the greater the power of carrying this purpose into effect, if the circumstances favour a community of interest between the ruler and the ruled."<sup>105</sup>

In conclusion, it might be mentioned that the government of Rhodes, though not the same in formation, affords a striking parallel. It was also an aristocracy of merchants;

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<sup>103</sup> Grote, XI, 200; Vid. Müller, *Dorians*, II, p. 156.

<sup>104</sup> *Ol.*, XIII.

<sup>105</sup> Greenidge, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

it was Dorian too; most of all, it was intensely enthusiastic about the growth of its commerce, and in after years relaxed no efforts to make the sea free for Greek traders.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Cf. P. Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*, p. 438. "So Rhodes grew great, not through her prosperity alone, but also through her calamities. And it cannot be said that her unparalleled good fortune was wholly unmerited. In spite of their great wealth and overflowing commerce, the people of the island retained something of the old Dorian honesty and simplicity. Their government was a mixture of one of the wisest forms, a commercial aristocracy, and the freest, a democracy; for though all votes had to be passed in popular assembly, yet this assembly could only discuss points brought before it by the senate. Rhodian commercial law was adopted by the Romans on account of its justice, and remains to this day the foundation of the Law of Nations. Twice did the Rhodians support in arms the freedom of Greek commerce, standing forth as champions on behalf of weaker powers; once when they put down the pirates who had already begun to swarm in the Eastern Mediterranean, and once when they compelled Byzantium to give up the power which she assumed of levying a tax on all the Greek vessels that passed the Golden Horn on their way to and from the Black Sea."

## CHAPTER VI

### THE COLONIAL SYSTEM OF CORINTH AND EARLY FOREIGN RELATIONS

#### I

#### *Colonies*

I have already referred to the vigorous colonial policy which characterised the Cypselid tyranny, but the two most important colonies, Syracuse and Corcyra, were founded long before Cypselus was born.<sup>1</sup> The traditional date is 734 B. C., but exact dating is uncertain. Mahaffy's remarks on this matter have been already referred to. His arguments have been reinforced by Busolt.<sup>2</sup> Thucydides' chronology in regard to the founding of Syracuse is based on the tradition that Archias was the tenth in descent from Temenus, and the supposition that the date of Temenus was *circa* 1069 B. C. (pseudo-Ephorus) leaves 735 for Archias (ten generations being counted as 334 years). Syracuse and Corcyra were founded during the rule of the Bacchiadae who, to judge from Strabo, kept well under their control the early commercial destinies of Corinth.<sup>3</sup>

Of this we have corroborative evidence in the fact that both Archias and Chersicrates, the oecists of Syracuse and Corcyra respectively, belonged to the ruling class.<sup>4</sup> The story goes

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<sup>1</sup> For Corinthian colonization, see Wilisch, *Beiträge*, II, pp. 13-18; Swoboda in Hermann's *Lehrbuch der Griech. Antiq.*, I, 3, pp. 184-207 *passim*, and particularly the recent excellent conspectus by Kahrstedt, *Griech. Staatsrecht*, I, pp. 357-368. Cf. also Gwynn, "The Character of Greek Colonization," *J.H.S.*, 1918, pp. 88-123; Curtius, *Die Griechen als Meister der Colonisation*, pp. 8 ff.; Myres, "The Geog. Aspect of Greek Colonization," *Proc. Class. Assoc.*, 1911. For most recent account of relations between metropolis and colony, cf. Swoboda, *Griech. Staatskunde* (3 aufl., 26), pp. 1264-1271.

<sup>2</sup> *Gr. Ges.*, 1<sup>a</sup>, pp. 586 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. above, Ch. IV, for progressive character of the Bacchiad rule.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *Narr. Amat.*, II, p. 772.

that they were founded by the same expedition, Chersicrates and part of the emigrants being left behind at Corcyra when *en route* to Syracuse.<sup>5</sup> Archias had recruited a band of followers, chiefly from the village of Tenea<sup>6</sup> but on the journey was joined by some Dorians from Megara.<sup>7</sup> A religious significance was given to the departure of the little band faring forth to try their fortunes in the West by the addition to their company of one of the sacred Iamidae, the prophetic family of Olympia.<sup>8</sup> That this person really joined the expedition is shown by the fact that his descendants were in Syracuse in Pindar's time, and that three distinctly Olympian cults, namely, those of Arethusa, Artemis Ortygia, and Olympian Zeus found their way into the sacred institutions of Syracuse.

Having landed on the islet of Ortygia they expelled the Sikeli inhabitants and divided it among themselves according as the lots had previously fallen out.<sup>9</sup> For the custom seems to have been to cast lots for shares in the new land, either before setting out or on the voyage. An amusing story is told of one of the colonists, Aethiops, who sold his promised lot to a companion for a honey cake. A special feature of the colony was that the great Corinthian poet Eumelus, now in his old age, a Bacchiad, and one of the last of the Cyclic poets, took part in it.<sup>10</sup> Syracuse throughout all its history preserved with great tenacity Dorian customs and language. We recall the words of the women in Theocritus who were quite insulted that speaking their own tongue should be taken exception to.<sup>11</sup> We have also the boast in Thucydides<sup>12</sup> that "here are no Ionians or Hellespontines or islanders who,

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Strabo, 269.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Strabo, 379; *vid. supra*, Ch. I.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Strabo, 269; Scym. Chios, 274.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Boeckh, *Introd. to Pind. Ol.*, VI.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Thuc., VI, 3; Athen., IV, 63.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Clem. of Alex., *Stromata*, I, 21, 131.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Theocritus, XV, 90.

<sup>12</sup> VI, 77.



though constantly changing masters, always are the slaves to somebody, either the Mede or someone else, but free Dorians who came to dwell in Sicily from an independent Peloponnese."

Certain historians<sup>13</sup> assign to the Euboeans of Chalcis an occupation of Syracuse before the advent of Archias. These, Bury thinks, were dispossessed<sup>14</sup> by the Corinthians. We have, however, the express authority of Thucydides for saying that it was the Sikel inhabitants who were expelled, and most historians concur in this view.<sup>15</sup> Some were, no doubt, retained as slaves, for Herodotus speaks of a servile class, Kyllyríoi, who joined the commons in a rebellion against the oligarchs.<sup>16</sup> What people Chersicrates found on the island where he was left by Archias, we cannot definitely tell. Bury (p. 99) thinks they were Eretrians from Euboea, but the more probable view is that they were Liburnians.<sup>17</sup> Plutarch, as far as my search goes, is the only authority for the supposition that the Eretrians were there.<sup>18</sup> The Liburnians had long previously carried on their trading and piratical avocations among the northerly islands of the Adriatic, and along the coast line of Illyria and Dalmatia. The speed with which the Corinthian colony grew to commercial and naval preëminence is probably explained by the supposition that those who had a natural bent in this direction, learned, in addition, the art of the people whom they dispossessed. Thucydides seems to explain the early greatness of the Corcyraean marine by the fact that the Phaeacians of the *Odyssey* had inhabited the island before

<sup>13</sup> E. g., Bury, p. 99; Holm, I, p. 288.

<sup>14</sup> If we are to accept the 'combination' (*q. v.* in appendix) which goes to show that a close friendship existed at this time between Chalcis and Corinth, the supposition is rendered unlikely.

<sup>15</sup> VI, 3; cf. Müller, *Dor.*, I, p. 129; Grote, III, p. 486 (2nd ed.); Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, I, p. 362.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Her., VII, 155.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Strabo, 269; cf. Schol. ad Apoll. Rhod., IV, p. 1216.

<sup>18</sup> Plut., *Quaest. Graec.*, Q. 11. This is the view of Curtius who connects the expulsion of the Eretrians with the fall of their metropolis in the Lelantine war. Cf. Myres, *C.A.H.*, III, pp. 681 ff.

them (I, 25) but considering that these Phaeacians possess but a very misty existence in the world of things, I incline to the Liburnian hypothesis. Corcyra was, as it still is, a lovely land, fertile and fair, where anyone might wish to dwell. Here settled Chersicrates and his little band to build a power which was always rebel and unfilial, always a thorn in the side of the metropolis, always the standing exception to the pious relations which existed between the mother city and her colonies in the Greek world.

Its animosity to Corinth was particularly felt by the latter, as the original intention in founding it was to cover the important trade-route to Italy and Sicily. It was to have another value also. It was to facilitate traffic with the non-Hellenic tribes of Epirus, being separated from the latter by a strait varying from about a mile to two miles in breadth. But these ambitions were never to be realised. Two things chiefly contributed to the estrangement of mother and daughter. These were the early establishment of a democratic party in the latter, and trade jealousies. The colony does not seem to have been founded very long when a popular faction arose.<sup>19</sup> We cannot tell what circumstances brought it about, but are inclined to think it due to the tyrannical and oppressive demands made upon the colony by the Bacchiadae. It is reasonable to suppose that this popular uprising against harsh rule was an early manifestation of what afterwards resulted at home in the establishment of the tyranny. Herodotus tells us that from its very first settlement Corcyra was in enmity with Corinth (III, 49). But matters came to a head when in 664 B. C. a battle took place which ended in the violent rupture of all connection between Corcyra and the mother country.<sup>20</sup> The defeat of the Corinthians in this, the earliest naval engagement on record, gave a vigour to the democratic movement, and now, if it had not been in existence already, a democratic constitution was

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. Müller, I, pp. 130-1.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 13. Cf. Wilisch, *Beiträge*, II, pp. 9 f.

formed. The supreme power belonged to the assembly of the people, and although the senate had perhaps a greater authority than at Athens (for Thucydides speaks of a Bouleutes hoping by virtue of his office to persuade the people into an Athenian alliance) it was manifestly only part of the demos.<sup>21</sup> The *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου* was quite a frequent figure in political life.<sup>22</sup> In fact all the Doric elements in their civic institutions were lost. Democracy was much more congenial to an active, industrious and, in a great measure, merchant population, who cared little for the stationary and stolid system for which the Doric character stood. Consequently, we shall see that in the wars of after years Corcyra invariably took the Ionian side, though she was dutiful enough to join the hated mother city against Hippocrates when he attempted to enslave her sister colony, Syracuse, in 492, an incident which shows that she was not altogether devoid of generous sympathy with her own, and that the alienation from Corinth was perhaps more the fault of the Corinthians.

But an anti-democratic party was always in evidence in Corcyra and caused, in time, terrible and internecine slaughter. It frequently tried, unsuccessfully, to assert itself against the people, spurred on, no doubt, by Spartan influence or money, if it was not actually fostered by the mother city.<sup>23</sup> But the democratic element held the power all the time and was upheld by the jealousies of trade, which aggravated the enmity with Corinth. This trade was carried on particularly with the Epirotes and Illyrians of the mainland, and Corinth was extremely jealous that its colony turned out, quite unexpectedly, a successful competitor for the custom of the inland tribes. The Corcyraeans possessed a most fertile land which grew cereals in abundance. These, along with such products as wine and oil, were readily exchanged for cattle, sheep,

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. Thuc., III, 70.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Thuc., III, 70; IV, 46.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Diod., XIII, 48; XV, 46.

hides, wool, etc., from the Epirotes and Illyrians. The Corinthian merchant was excluded, for the Corcyraeans could sell far cheaper, and for the purpose of facilitating trade, had possessed themselves of a strip of territory on the shore of the mainland, where they fortified various posts for the protection of their property.<sup>24</sup> We shall afterwards see, in discussing the causes of the Peloponnesian War, how the old trade jealousy was kept up, and how Corinth complained of Corcyra's injustice in her dealings with her neighbors.

Cypselus seems to have been unable to reduce to subjection the recalcitrant colony. Bury, however, remarks (p. 150) that "one of the earliest triumphs of Cypselus was probably the reduction of Corcyra"; but the vast majority of historians agree in assigning its subjection to Periander.<sup>25</sup> The shameful punishment, which he inflicted on the place when his son was killed there, has already been mentioned. After the tyrant's death, the Corcyraeans recovered their independence, but we are left without any information concerning them from about 583 B. C. to the Persian invasion. That Corcyra became again independent after the fall of the tyrants, and that it signalised this revolt to the Greek world is shown by its coins.<sup>26</sup>

In discussing the other Corinthian colonies, let us begin with those on the Gulf and continue along the western coastline, as we have not a systematic chronology to guide us. It is likely that Molycreum at the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf,<sup>27</sup> was founded at a very early date. A little further

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Thuc., III, 85.

<sup>25</sup> E. g., Grote, III, Ch. XXIII, p. 214; Holm, I, p. 308; *Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Geog.*, I, p. 676. Meyer, *Ges. d. Alter.*, II, p. 623, assigns it to Cypselus. Neither he nor Bury has any definite authority to go on. They must be arguing from the probability that the successful Cypselus subdued the rebels.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Gardner, in *Cat. of Brit. Mus. Coins (Thessaly to Aetolia)*, Introd., pp. xlvii-xlix; *History of Coinage*, pp. 138 f., 375 f.; Head, *Historia Numorum*, pp. 325 f.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Thuc., III, 102.

to sea was planted Chalcis,<sup>28</sup> perhaps soon afterwards. These were both in Aetolia. More than three-fourths of the way up along the coast of Acarnania was founded Sollium; but by far the most important were Leucas, Anactorium and Ambracia.<sup>29</sup> Leucas was situated near the modern Santa Maura. What is now an island was, according to Thucydides (III, 81), originally a peninsula, and reckoned as belonging to Acarnania. It would seem to have continued so till Thucydides' day, but some time during the next half-century the Leucadians cut through the Isthmus and built a bridge<sup>30</sup> across it. The people whom the Corinthians found there were Acarnanians called Epileucadii. Civil strife had arisen among them, and they called in the Corinthians who violently appropriated the place.<sup>31</sup> Strabo indeed assigns the cutting of the canal to the first Corinthian settlers, but we have the definite authority of Thucydides that the Peloponnesian ships of war had to be transported across it. Leaf reconciles the statements of Thucydides and Strabo in his proof that Leucas was always an island and formed one of the Odyssean quaternion.<sup>32</sup>

All good maps, in spite of this, represent Leukas as an island, and its claim to the name can hardly be disputed, if we accept as the definition of island, a piece of land surrounded by water. That Leukas certainly is. But it is not an island if we take as part of the definition that an island should be circumnavigable. That Leukas is not by nature. The water which separates it from the mainland is a lagoon, generally less than two feet deep, and in one

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<sup>28</sup> Curtius, *Studien*, observes: "Chalcis in Aetolia is without doubt on the site of an Euboean settlement, in which originally a Corinthian population must have shared, so that the place passed readily into the possession of Corinth."

<sup>29</sup> For full references cf. Busolt, *Gr. Ges.*, I<sup>2</sup>, pp. 642 ff.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Scylax, p. 34.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Strabo, 452; Steph. Byz. s. v. 'Επιλευκάδιοι; Scylax, l. c.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Homer and History*, pp. 143 f.: "But before we can make this apparently certain equation, we are met with the objection that the last, Leukas, is not an island at all, but a promontory of the mainland, and we are referred to Strabo who tells us that Corinthian colonists sent by Kypselos 'dug through the isthmus of the peninsula, and turned Leukas into an island.'"



place at least only a hundred yards wide. A channel, however, passable for ships drawing fourteen feet, and kept open by dredging, runs across it from south to north, ending in an artificial cut through a long spit of sand and pebbles. This bounds it on the north, running transversely towards the mainland, without ever reaching it, on the northeast. The cut was probably made first by the Corinthian colonists; it has been silted up and reopened more than once. During the Peloponnesian war it would seem that it was closed and ships were dragged across the spit. The description of Livy still applies to the island: '*Leucadia, nunc insula, et vadoso freto quod perfossum manu est ab Acarnania divisa.*' In short, the conditions some 2400 years ago were substantially the same as to-day, save that the lagoon appears to have grown rather shallower; and geographers and geologists are, I believe, agreed that for centuries earlier Leucadia was just as much an island as it is now.

Bury, it might be remarked, without discussing the problem, implies his adoption of Strabo's account in preference to that of Thucydides.

On the north side of the Ambracian Gulf and about seven miles inland, on the banks of the Arachthus, was founded Ambracia. It became one of Corinth's most important colonies. It contributed seven ships against Xerxes in 480 B. C. and twenty-seven against Corcyra in 432. It was a faithful ally during the Peloponnesian war, till rendered practically helpless by the severe blow inflicted by Demosthenes and the Acarnanians in 426.<sup>33</sup> Almost opposite this settlement, on the southern shore of the Gulf, near its mouth, was planted Anactorium in Acarnania, on the promontory which is now called C. Madonna. It remained in the hands of the Corinthians till 425, when during Demosthenes' western expedition it was taken by the Acarnanians, and the Corinthian settlers were expelled.

These three colonies, Leucas, Ambracia and Anactorium, reveal a distinctly imperial policy on the part of Corinth. Gorgus, one of the Cypselids, variously regarded as brother or son of Cypselus, was installed as oecist and governor of Ambracia, whilst Pylades and Echiades, two illegitimate sons

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. Thuc., II, 68, 80; III, 105-114.

of Cypselus, were appointed rulers of Leucas and Anactorium.<sup>34</sup> The policy was, therefore, to entrust the government of the settlements to the members of the ruling family. The three were founded during the reign of Cypselus. It was his policy to make up for the Corinthian influence lost in the west through the revolt of Corcyra from the Bacchiads.<sup>35</sup> Müller, however, assigns Anactorium and Leucas to Periander, giving Boeckh, *C. I. G.*, n. 43, as his authority for the latter. He seems, however, to ascribe Ambracia to the Bacchiads.<sup>36</sup> Periander, it is true, is mentioned in connection with Anactorium and Leucas by Plutarch,<sup>37</sup> but he does not definitely give him the foundation of them. Bury assigns their settlement to Cypselus.

It is *à priori* likely that Cypselus was eager at the beginning of his reign to extend his power in this region, since the people had been wroth with the Bacchiadae for having let Corcyra slip from their hands. In fact Aristotle's remark on the tranquility which characterised his rule leads one to this inference; for he thus created homes for poor or discontented subjects.

But we have also to bear in mind the part Corcyra played in the founding of these colonies. Notwithstanding her antipathy to the mother city, she seems for some reason or another to have furnished a contingent for two of them at least, Leucas and Anactorium.<sup>38</sup> A reciprocal practice characterised the foundations of Apollonia and Epidamnus, which were, properly speaking, rather Corcyraean than Corinthian, though generally reckoned amongst the latter. Apollonia was chiefly founded by Corcyraeans, but under the command of Gylax, a Corinthian; similarly Epidamnus had for oecist a Corinthian nobleman, Phalius, son of Eratocleides. It was,

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. Nic. Dam. fr. 58; Strabo, 325.

<sup>35</sup> In addition to the list mentioned by Strabo, 325, 452, cf. also Scym. Chios., 454.

<sup>36</sup> *Dorians*, I, p. 130.

<sup>37</sup> *De Ser. Num. Vind.*, 7.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 55; Scym. Chios., 460 ff.; Plut., *Them.*, C. 24.

of course, the universal custom in Greek colonization, or rather it was in some sense a religious obligation that whenever a city, itself a colony, founded a sub-colony, it should take an oecist from its own mother-city. Grote<sup>39</sup> draws a fine distinction between the settlement of Leucas and Anactorium, on the one hand, and that of Apollonia and Epidamnus on the other.

In the settlement of the two latter, the Corcyraeans seem to have been the principals—in that of the two former, they were only auxiliaries; and it probably did not suit their policy to favour the establishment of any new colony on the intermediate coast opposite to their own island between the promontory and the Gulf above mentioned (the Acroceraunian promontory and the Ambraciote Gulf).

It is perhaps relevant here to add a summary of Curtius' observations on the imperial nature of the Corinthian colonial system, as organized by the tyrants. He refers to the practice of sending out the younger scions of the family to what we would call colonial governorships.<sup>40</sup> He points out that the colonies lay along the coast at intervals from the Corinthian Gulf to the Acroceraunian promontory. When, however, he speaks of 'signal stations' without quoting any authority, it is hard to follow him. He emphasises the various measures employed to unify and consolidate this far extending system of colonies.

(1) The Corinthians sought to maintain a peaceful understanding not only with their fellow-citizens in the colonies, but also with the natives of those lands where the colonies were planted.

(2) They associated with their colonies in planting new settlements, thereby strengthening alike the unity of sentiment and interest.

(3) In founding new colonies they called in the assistance of Delphi to supply a religious sanction. He quotes Apollonia, Phoebeus' town, as an example.

<sup>39</sup> III, 544-5 (4th ed.).

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Lenschau, in Bursian, *Jahresber.*, 1928, in the *Bericht über Griech. Ges.*, pp. 22 ff.

(4) Curtius thinks that even under the tyrannis there remained a conservative element which was reflected in the life of the colonies, making for stability. He cites Aelian (*V. H.*, XIII, 16) for the existence of Xenelasia in Apollonia. This was supported by the fact that when Corinth invited colonists from outside her own borders, these were, for the most part, Dorians.

This string of colonies constituted a series of stepping stones to Magna Graecia. The original hope, evidently, of Corinth in founding them was to build an empire. But the unabating hostility of Corcyra rendered futile any developments in this direction. It is noticeable that the Corinthians devoted all their attention to the west. They evidently contemplated forming here a power such as Athens in after years was to establish in the east. All the Corinthian colonies set out from the western harbour of Corinth, with the exception of one, and with this we shall have more to do in succeeding chapters than with any of the Corinthian colonies. Potidaea was situated on the narrow isthmus which connects the peninsula of Pallene with the mainland in Chalcidice. It undoubtedly was one of the colonies founded by Periander, and received as oecist his son Evagoras (*Nic. Dam.*, fr. 60). Its brave stand against the Persians is perhaps the most striking event in its history. After the battle of Salamis it closed its gates against Artabazus who, having convoyed Xerxes in his "homeward hurrying flight" to the Hellespont, returned with his vast escort of 60,000 soldiers to join the main army in Thessaly. On his way he laid siege to Potidaea, of which he would probably have obtained possession, through the treachery of one of its citizens, had not the plot been accidentally discovered. It successfully withstood a siege of three months, enduring the greatest privations (*Her.*, VIII, 127-9). So intensely national was its spirit, that after all its endurance it contributed 300 men to the Greek army at Plataea (*Her.*, IX, 28). Afterwards, Potidaea was enrolled in the Athenian League, but it maintained, at the same time, allegiance to the metropolis, certain magistrates called *epidemiurgi* being sent there from Corinth annually. The rest

of its history is perhaps the most varied of any town in Greece, and will be discussed in its proper place, and we shall see its filial devotion exemplified in a most extraordinarily faithful manner in the opening years of the Peloponnesian War.

In concluding the section on the colonies, let us once more draw attention to the distinctly imperial element in their foundation, from the very earliest down to the last. The oecist in each case was a member of the then ruling house. The governors in after time, as far as our evidence carries us, were also of the royal family. Archias was a Bacchiad. Gorgus, Pylades and Echiades were Cypselids. Chersicrates was a Bacchiad. Evagoras was a Cypselid. When Corcyra was reduced to subjection by Periander, he installed as viceroy there his son Nicolaus. This shows how active the rulers were in keeping firm hold on their colonies, though ambition was always fettered by the inveterate hostility of one rebel daughter.

## II

### FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING THE SAME PERIOD

We have already noticed the conquest of Megara by the Corinthians under Aletes, as the story goes. The event is connected in tradition with the expedition of the Peloponnesians against Athens, where the Dorian invaders were defeated through the voluntary sacrifice of Codrus. But the Corinthians permanently 'dorized' Megara. Strabo <sup>41</sup> speaks of a pillar which marked the boundary-line 'between Peloponnesus and Ionia.' He says:

The Peloponnesians and Ionians, having had frequent disputes respecting their boundaries, on which Crommyonia also was situated, assembled, and agreed upon a spot of the Isthmus itself on which they erected a pillar, having an inscription on the part towards Peloponnesus,

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<sup>41</sup> 392.



This is Peloponnesus, not Ionia;

and on the side towards Megara,

This is not Peloponnesus but Ionia.

After the Corinthian conquest of Megara this pillar was destroyed. Megara was henceforth a Dorian state, and its territory included in the Peloponnesus.<sup>42</sup>

It chafed under the rule of Corinth, and we hear of many struggles for freedom. It was however subjected to most severe treatment, and, from what we know of the Bacchiads, things must have gone ill with the unfortunate Megarians. They were actually compelled to mourn the death of Bacchiad oligarchs.<sup>43</sup>

It is commonly believed that long before the overthrow of the Bacchiad oligarchy, Megara severed the chains of slavery, for we find the Megarian tyrant Theagenes coming almost upon the heels of Cypselus. They are generally regarded as contemporary, but a period of fifteen years separates the dates of their accession to power. Like Cypselus, Theagenes at Megara rose as champion of the lower classes, sorely oppressed by the nobles. "The mercantile development of Megara," writes Bury,<sup>44</sup> "famous for her weavers, had enriched the nobles who held the political power and oppressed the peasants with a grinding despotism." It is argued that if Megara had been in a state of dependence under the Bacchiads right through their dynasty, an oppressive nobility could hardly have sprung up in the short space of fifteen years after their overthrow, and hence the date of Megara's independence is assumed to be considerably before the fall of the Bacchiads.

There is another possible view, which appears to be the more likely—that the nobles were in power from the time of

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Strabo, 393; Scym. Chios., 502.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Schol. Pind., *Nem.*, VII, 155. Cf. Aristoph., *Ranae*, 440. On the "Megarian Tears" see Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.*, III, pp. 535 ff.; Highbarger, *Ancient Megara*, pp. 102 ff.

<sup>44</sup> *History of Greece*, p. 154.

the original conquest of the Megarid, when, as Strabo says, the Corinthians introduced as inhabitants Dorians in place of Ionians. A Dorian oligarchy, of assumed nobility, probably held the power and oppressed the poorer classes right down from the days of the conquest. These formed the ascendancy party in the country and were upheld by the powerful Corinthian government; hence the compulsion upon the poor Megarians to lament the deaths of Bacchiad oligarchs; hence the aspirations to freedom and the consequent suppressions. It was not till the popular party in Corinth led the way that the enslaved Megarians also got rid of the nobles, and thus we may regard it as likely that the governing class which Theagenes overthrew were the descendants of the original Corinthian planters, and that Megara did not regain her independence till the middle of the seventh century. Bury's remark seems to corroborate this theory: "The example of Cypselus and probably his direct influence and help had something to do with the enterprise of Theagenes."

We need not be afraid of the objection that some of the earliest colonies were founded by Megara in the eighth century. It was, no doubt, the policy of the ruling class in Megara to foster colonization as it was of the Bacchiads in Corinth. This colonizing activity abroad reacted on the subject population at home. Wealth increased, and with wealth came the growth of a spirit of independence, resulting, as in Corinth, in the overthrow of their oppressors.

We do not know the exact relations between Corinth and the third Isthmian tyranny, that of Sicyon. The Orthagorids, of whom Cleisthenes was the most famous, seem to have started somewhat earlier than the Cypselids. In fact, it is reasonable to suppose that Cypselus followed their example. I see no reason to assume that they were not on friendly terms; we hear of no wars taking place between them. Curtius in expressing his hatred of the tyranny speaks of "the selfish ambition of individual tyrants, each of whom thought of nothing but increasing the power of his own

dynasty.”<sup>45</sup> Hence, he thinks they could never be friendly to one another, and cites the hostility of the rulers of Sicyon and Corinth. I cannot find any evidence of the alleged hostility.

We know that the relations of Periander and Thrasybulus of Miletus were friendly, and we suspect the same of the houses of Cypselus and Theagenes of Megara. A connection between the tyrannies of Corinth and Megara seems implied in the rancorous reference which the Megarian poet Theognis makes to Cypselus.

A more important problem is the part Corinth played in politics further afield. Chalcis and Eretria, the great merchant and colonizing cities of Euboea during the second half of the eighth and the earlier half of the seventh centuries, had, towards the end of the latter, engaged in a bitter struggle, actually assuming the proportions of a Greek mercantile war. Chalcis was supported by Samos, while on the Eretrian side were arrayed as allies Megara and Miletus. It is probable that Corinth took up arms for her friends the Chalcidians.<sup>46</sup>

It appeared to Thucydides<sup>47</sup> to be the only war, before the Persian conquest, which rose above the level of mere quarrels between neighbouring states; so many peoples interfered in it that it took on an almost Pan-Hellenic character. Noteworthy in this connection is the high and complicated development of international relations at this early stage in the Greek world, consequent chiefly on trade-rivalry and commercial interests.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>45</sup> I, 309 (Ward's tr.).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Appendix for Curtius' 'Combination'; cf. Lenschau, *op. cit.*, pp. 1014 ff., who brings in the evidence from coinage, but strangely puts Corinth on the side of Miletus and Eretria in the Lelantine War (p. 1020) whilst Dr. Gardner (*Cl. Rev.*, 1920, pp. 90 ff.) on numismatic grounds, thinks far too much is made of the supposed extent and significance of the Lelantine War. He thinks it was a small affair. Cf., however, Speck, *Handelges. d. Alt.*, II, pp. 80, 81; Cary in *C.A.H.*, III, pp. 622 f.; Burn, *J.H.S.*, June, 1929, pp. 14 f., 33-37.

<sup>47</sup> I, 15.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Hall, *O.C.G.*, pp. 256 ff. Cf. Wilisch, *Beiträge*, II (*Jahresber.*

The war is generally called the War of the Lelantine Plain from the fact that Eretria and Chalcis contended for the complete possession of the fertile tract which lay between them and had hitherto belonged to them jointly. Holm,<sup>49</sup> in fact, thinks that it was over this fair territory the struggle arose, but it is not too much to assume, in view of Thucydides' statement, what most historians have assumed—that it was a trade war.

Curtius (in his *History of Greece*, I, p. 252) assigns the war to the beginning of the 7th century; in his *Studien* (*Hermes*, X), he refers it to the 8th. The Appendix gives reasons for following Bury in dating it to the end of the 7th.

This war had wide and complicated consequences. Chalcis and Eretria were worn out. The long and dreary struggles had exhausted their powers. Other cities were springing up to take their places. The brilliant Cypselids had come to power in Corinth, and did not scruple to avail themselves of their ally's exhaustion. They fostered the commercial instincts congenial to their people to the fullest extent; and thus we find in the early part of the 6th century Periander completely abandoning the old ally Samos and leaguings with Miletus. This, no doubt, was due to the shifting of the balance of mercantile power. Chalcis and her alliance had to take the second place, and Periander was not content to be on the weak side for mere sentimental reasons. Aegina is also coming into prominence and beginning to share with Corinth the place hitherto held by the cities of Euboea.

Periander, however, was drawn to friendship with Miletus also by the fact that Thrasybulus was tyrant there, and the natural sympathy of tyranny no doubt welded their friendly relations. That he was on friendly terms with the Lydian dynasty also is shown by the fact that he was able to inform

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*Gymn. in Zittau*, 1901), p. 9, who brings it into relation with the tremendous industrial and commercial activity of Corinth in the eighth and seventh centuries. Cf. also Lenschau, *l. c.*, pp. 1012, 1014.

<sup>49</sup> Holm, I, p. 271.

Thrasybulus of an oracle delivered to Alyattes who was at war with Miletus, thus enabling the tyrant to outwit the Lydians and save the place.<sup>50</sup> Periander's arbitration between Athens and Mitylene in their war for the control of the entrance to the Hellespont, has already been mentioned. Bury refers also to his probable connection with Egypt.

The foreign relations of Periander extended to Egypt, and there are two indications of his intercourse with the Egyptian monarchs, Necho and Psammetichus II. His nephew and successor was called after the last named king. Moreover we may guess that the canal works of Necho suggested to Periander undertakings of the same kind—the small canal which he actually cut at Leucas, and the great canal which he designed to cut through the Isthmus of Corinth itself. But a Greek tyrant had not at his command the slave-labour of which an Egyptian king disposed, and the design fell through—an enterprise more than once attempted since, but not accomplished till our own day. Had Periander had the resources to carry out his idea, the subsequent history of Greek military and naval operations would have been largely changed.<sup>51</sup>

### III

#### ARGOS AND CORINTH

We now come to a most vexed problem, the date of Pheidon of Argos, which requires examination in view of a statement by Plutarch that he invaded or conquered Corinth.<sup>52</sup> There is an extraordinary conflict of opinion about the period of Pheidon's reign, the main facts of which are generally agreed upon.

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<sup>50</sup> Cf. Her., I, 20.

<sup>51</sup> *Hist. of Gr.*, p. 152.

<sup>52</sup> For the supposed relations between Argos and Corinth in general see Lenschau, *l. c.*, pp. 1011 ff. and Wade-Gery in *C.A.H.*, III, pp. 528 f., 539-543. It is indeed noticeable, as both these authorities have pointed out, that Corinth follows Argos in using the Eastern (blue) Alphabet. For Corinthian alphabet see Wilisch, app. to *Die altkor. Thonindustrie*; Drerup, *Musée Belge*, V, pp. 136-148; Roberts, *Gk. Epig.*, I, pp. 119-137 with table, pp. 384 ff.; cf. also inscriptional evidence in *A.J.A.*, 1903, pp. 26 f., no. 1, pp. 147 ff.



Pausanias<sup>53</sup> gives as date of Pheidon the eighth Olympiad. As already mentioned, doubt has been thrown on the authenticity of the Olympiad register by Mahaffy; but on other grounds a great number of historians have accepted the eighth century as the period of Pheidon's reign. "There seems good reason for referring him," says Grote,<sup>54</sup> "to the period a little before and a little after the 8th Olympiad—between 770 B. C. and 730 B. C." This view is also taken by Clinton<sup>55</sup> who places Pheidon between 783 and 744.

Boeckh,<sup>56</sup> too accepts the eighth century, and Müller,<sup>57</sup> in his *Dorians* writes:

The finishing stroke of his achievements was manifestly the celebration of the Olympic games, over which he, as descendant of Hercules (the first conqueror of Olympia), after having abolished the Aetolian-Elean Hellanodicae, presided, in conjunction with the inhabitants of Pisa, the ancient town of Pelops, which at this time, and many centuries after this time, had not relinquished its claims to the management of the festival. This circumstance also enables us to fix with certainty the period of his reign, since, in the Elean registers, the 8th Olympiad was marked as having been celebrated by him (747 B. C.).

Mahaffy,<sup>58</sup> of course, will not accept this.<sup>59</sup>

"All the rational inferences," he says, "to be made from his life and work point to a much later date; so that by a single emendation the twenty-eighth Olympiad—also an irregular festival, according to Hippias' list—was substituted; and thus Curtius has made a most instructive and interesting combination by which this tyrant and his relation to Sparta become part of the rational development of Peloponnesian history."

Somewhat similar to Grote's view is Holm's,<sup>60</sup> who thinks

<sup>53</sup> VI, 22, 2.

<sup>54</sup> IV, p. 238 (1888 ed.). He cites as authorities: Ephorus, Frag. 15, ed. Marx; ap. Strabo, VII, 358; Theopompus, Frag. lib. IV.

<sup>55</sup> *Fast. Hell.*, I, App. I, p. 249.

<sup>56</sup> *Ad C.I.G.*, 2374 (II, p. 335).

<sup>57</sup> *Dorians*, I, p. 173; cf. *Aeginetica*, p. 63.

<sup>58</sup> *Problems in Gk. Hist.*, p. 60.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. also Ephor. ap. Strab., 358.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Holm, I, p. 204.

that Pheidon became King of Argos probably about 770 B. C. Professor Percy Gardner<sup>61</sup> also insists on Pausanias' date. But he evidently assumes a second Pheidon of Argos whose son is mentioned by Herodotus as one of the suitors of Agariste and who was the Pheidon that introduced coinage into Greece.<sup>62</sup>

Freeman<sup>63</sup> accepts the eighth century as the only possible period which fits in with the account in Plutarch of Pheidon's designs on Corinth. The distinguished Herodotean scholar, Mr. Wells, argues most convincingly for the eighth century date.<sup>64</sup> He remarks: "The objections to the eighth-century date of Pheidon are largely hypothetical, and the hypotheses on which they are based are not in themselves probable." There is no need to reproduce here the convenient summary of his conclusions (pp. 61 ff.).

The seventh century date has support from authorities no less distinguished than the foregoing. We have quoted above Mahaffy's reference to Curtius who, it seems, was the first to place Pheidon's Olympiad in 668, changing the eighth Olympiad in the text of Pausanias to the twenty-eighth. He states dogmatically in his history<sup>65</sup> that Pheidon 'celebrated the twenty-eighth Olympiad in company with the Pisaeans.'

If Curtius places Pheidon's Olympiad in 668 he cannot, plainly, call him "The tenth Temenide," as he does two pages back. Curtius seems to have followed in the steps of Weissenborn,<sup>66</sup> who made free with the text of Pausanias and endeavoured to show that Pheidon cannot have flourished before 660 B. C. On his attempt Grote observed: "His arguments do not appear to me very forcible and certainly not

<sup>61</sup> "The Earliest Coins of Greece Proper," *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, V, 1911; *Hist. of Anc. Coinage*, pp. 111 ff.

<sup>62</sup> *Dict. of Antiq.*, II, p. 448; *History of Coinage*, pp. 111-113.

<sup>63</sup> *Hist. of Sicily*, I, p. 578.

<sup>64</sup> *Studies in Herodotus*, pp. 54-62.

<sup>65</sup> I, p. 256.

<sup>66</sup> *Beiträge zur Griech. Alterthumskunde*, p. 18, Jena, 1844.

sufficient to justify so grave an alteration in the number of Pausanias."

In recent years, however, the seventh century view has been defended by many able scholars.

The historical perspective, the political situation in Peloponnesos, so far as ascertainable, favours the fixture of the Olympiad of Pheidon about the middle of the seventh century (This is likewise the mature judgment of Busolt, *Gr. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 623). For conventional purposes *Ol.* 28 is the most suitable as the Olympiad of Pheidon.<sup>67</sup>

Beside Busolt, Bury<sup>68</sup> has accepted the seventh century.

What we know points to his having flourished about the middle of the seventh century and this view is now winning its way into general acceptance. It has been strengthened by the careful investigation of Busolt (*loc. cit.*). To the arguments which have been urged by others I would add one more. If the traditional date (1st half of the 8th century) were true, it is almost inconceivable that the romance of the wooing of Agariste would have made Pheidon a contemporary of Cleisthenes of Sicyon; on the other hand, this is by no means unintelligible if Pheidon flourished in the middle and third quarter of the 7th century. Story could violate chronology by bringing Solon into relation with Croesus, but it would never have dreamed of bringing Lycurgus into relation with Croesus. We may further observe that the decline in the Argive power after Pheidon's death synchronises most happily with the Messenian war in the last quarter of the 7th century. The weakness of Argos left Sparta free to deal with Messenia.

This passage is a note on the text of p. 140, where Bury deals with Pheidon's intervention on behalf of the Pisatae after the Eleans had usurped the control of the Olympian festival, which, we presume, Bury dates about 672.<sup>69</sup>

Bury's reconciliation of the date 668 with the appearance of Pheidon's son among the suitors of Agariste demanded too

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<sup>67</sup> Cf. Macan, *Her.*, IV-VI, Vol. I, 383. Cf. C. T. Seltman, *Athens, Its History and Coinage*, pp. 116 ff.

<sup>68</sup> *Hist.*, p. 860.

<sup>69</sup> It is a fact that the Eleans usurped the festival again about 572, but the date which Bury refers to in connection with Pheidon must be *circa* 672, though his marginal reference on p. 140 giving 572 and referring to the final settlement, has produced confusion.

much. Dr. Macan thinks that "though some of the suitors were older than others (see on Herodotus, VI, 128) none can have been as old as this."

The notion of Macan and Bury that political conditions in the Peloponnese render the seventh century a suitable period in which to place the career of Pheidon does not seem to me to carry conviction. We know practically nothing of the relations between Argos and Sparta, either *circa* 747 or *circa* 668; they are lost in obscurity. To urge as the reason for 668 that the decline in the Argive power after Pheidon's death synchronises most happily with the Messenian conquest by Sparta, is of little help.

What forced Argos to take the second place was not that the Spartans were free to deal with her, but that no man of any ability whatsoever came after Pheidon to keep a united front of the scattered elements of the Argive confederacy against the ambitions of the Spartans. It is more likely that Sparta took the lead by the beginning of the seventh century.

As Mr. Wade-Gery (*C.A.H.*, III, p. 528) says:

The masterful and picturesque personality of King Pheidon is like champagne to the unaccustomed head of the historian of the Greek twilight; a sober judgment will remember how much more it costs to construct empires out of flesh and blood, than on paper.

Mr. Wade-Gery places Pheidon in the early seventh century, and so does Professor Ure.<sup>70</sup>

Grote thinks that the dominion of Argos referred to by Herodotus (I, 82) was true of the age of Pheidon; the Messenian wars had not begun therefore by Pheidon's time, and there is consequently no evidence in support of Professor Bury's theory that the weakness of Argos after Pheidon's death left Sparta free to deal with Messenia.

Such are the views of some of the outstanding authorities on the question. We need hardly regard either of the extreme views, one of which, that of the Parian Marble, dates Pheidon in 895, and that implied in Herodotus which makes him con-

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<sup>70</sup> *Origin of Tyranny*, pp. 172-183.

temporary with Cleisthenes of Sicyon. Some authorities have accepted this latter date, e. g., Trieber,<sup>71</sup> who puts Pheidon's *floruit* between 600-588. We shall see that such a date is totally untenable, but for the present we may consider that the dispute reduces itself to the problem whether it was in the eighth or seventh century Pheidon reigned.

Most of the critics quoted above have given their reasons for their choice of period with reference to various considerations of Peloponnesian history. We shall approach the subject from a different standpoint, and, having examined the question from a Corinthian point of view, see which century fits in better with our knowledge of the course of Corinthian history.

At the outset we must give some account of the part Pheidon played in the history of his country.

It is beyond question that Pheidon occupied a very important position in Greece. He evidently attempted to do for the north of Peloponnese what Sparta afterwards succeeded in doing for the south. He not only re-united the inheritance of Temenus, but also extended the sway of Argos over Sicyon; that he was master of Aegina is proved by the statement that he stamped his coins in that island; that he forced Corinth to fight as his auxiliary is proved by the story of the thousand youths. He allied himself with the Pisatae against the Eleans and thus came into collision with the Spartans. Ephorus says that the latter had turned their arms against him because he had wrested from them the hegemony of the Peloponnese. Pheidon is said to have been defeated by the united forces of the Spartans and the Eleans, and Elis is said to have regained Pisatis and Triphylia with Sparta's help.

The eighth century date is certainly confirmed by a narrative which connects him with times somewhat before or even contemporaneous with Archias. The story is told by Plutarch, and with a slight variation by the scholiast on Apollonius.<sup>72</sup> Pheidon, King of Argos, had designs on the liberty

<sup>71</sup> Cf. "Pheidon von Argos" in *Historische Aufsätze dem Andenken an Georg Waitz*, pp. 1-16.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Plut., *Amat. Narr.*, II, p. 772; Schol. on Apoll. Rhod., IV, 1212.



of Corinth as part of his schemes to unite under his sway the whole Peloponnese. He therefore demanded a thousand of the best Corinthian warriors, who were sent under a captain named Dexander. He intended their destruction to facilitate his absolute mastership of the place. He evidently had conquered it already, as Grote thinks,<sup>73</sup> and now purposed to save himself the trouble of keeping it in subjection. He told his design against the warriors to one of his confidants, Habron, who in turn told Dexander. The hostages then made their escape to Corinth. Habron, in terror of Pheidon, fled also, and settled in a village called Melissos, where a son was born to him whom he named Melissos after the place. The latter's son Actaeon was the most beautiful youth of his time, and excited the passions of Archias, who in trying to kidnap him in a drunken revel, caused his death. The deed brought the vengeance of the gods upon Corinth, and Archias had to leave for Sicily.

If this story of Plutarch is correct, it definitely places Pheidon in the eighth century.

Now according to this narrative of Plutarch the settlement of Habron in the Corinthian territory may have been forty-five years before the death of Actaeon, his grandson, and the attempt of Pheidon upon Corinth in the beginning of his reign might be forty-seven or forty-eight years before the foundation of Syracuse in B. C. 734. We may assume that he reigned forty years, B. C. 783-744; that he presided at the eighth Olympiad in the thirty-sixth year of his reign; and that he was put down by the Lacedaemonians three or four years afterwards.<sup>74</sup>

We have dated the overthrow of the Corinthian kings *circa* 747 B. C. The later members of the dynasty, we have observed, were men of no importance; nothing is recorded concerning them. They were probably weak rulers whom Pheidon's ambitious schemes could easily circumvent. Plutarch's narrative is the only account we have of Pheidon's relations with Corinth, and it certainly shows that Pheidon's

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<sup>73</sup> Grote, II, Ch. IV, p. 238.

<sup>74</sup> Clinton, *l. c.*

date must be in the eighth century. It confirms Pausanias' date of his Olympiad in 747 B. C. I do not think that the advocates of the seventh century date have sustained their case by any important arguments. Nor does it, to my mind, fit in better with the shifting of the balance of power in Peloponnesus than the old date.

It might be urged that, from the point of view of Corinthian history, the seventh century date suits Pheidon's dominion over the place better. It has already been pointed out that the loss of Corcyra in 664 probably hastened the fall of the Bacchiads. It might also be suggested that Pheidon's subjection ruined their prestige, weakened their power, and helped the rise of Cypselus. If that were true, we should certainly have heard of it from Herodotus. The assumption is alike unsupported by the accounts of the ancient authorities and the probabilities of the case. It is very improbable that a powerful dynasty, like the Bacchiadae, could be bullied into submission by the tyrant king of Argos, whereas in the case of a weakling king the hypothesis is very reasonable, and the date (c. 747) has the convincing support of ancient authorities.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the Pheidon mentioned by Herodotus<sup>75</sup> cannot be the great Argive ruler, whether he is dated in the eighth or seventh century. Either Herodotus made a mistake or the text is corrupt or his reference is to 'another man of the same name.' We quote the points which Macan has summarized: "The appearance of a son of Pheidon among the suitors has been objected to on three grounds:

(1) as an anachronism. Pheidon's date has been put approximately from one to two centuries before Kleisthenes, the Olympiad referred to below being taken for the 8th -748 B. C. or the 28th -668 B. C. Though some of the suitors were older than others (see c. 128), none can have been so old as this!

(2) The anti-Argive policy of Kleisthenes makes a suitor from Argos out of place (*cf.* 5. 67, *supra*).

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<sup>75</sup> VI, 127.

(3) A Dorian suitor spoils the otherwise non-Dorian complexion of the list. Even if the anachronism were avoidable, the argument remains against believing that a son of the Dorian despot of Argos was among the suitors of Agariste; but neither anachronism nor improbability proves the unauthenticity of the passage."

One more argument might be advanced. It is improbable that Pheidon could have reduced Corinth during the reign of her powerful ruler Periander. This in itself proves that the Pheidon mentioned by Herodotus is not the great dynast whose date has provoked such discussion.

In conclusion it may be mentioned that there was a Pheidon of Corinth too, one of the most ancient legislators of Greece.<sup>76</sup> He had in view an extremely novel arrangement in social politics. He proposed a scheme for providing for a fixed and unchangeable number of citizens, without attempting to equalize property. As Aristotle<sup>77</sup> reminds us, this is just the opposite principle to that maintained by Plato in his *Laws*.

The scholiast on Pindar, *Ol.*, XIII, 20, appears to confound this Pheidon with the Argive tyrant. Müller<sup>78</sup> seems to explain the scholiast's words by assuming that Pheidon of Argos is sometimes called a Corinthian owing to Corinth having belonged to his dominions. This explanation, however, hardly justifies the words used by the scholiast. It is extremely probable that the Corinthian lawgiver is the person mentioned by Nicolaus of Damascus (frg. 41) as having perished in an attempt to render assistance to the Corinthians when in a state of revolution on some occasion. It certainly cannot be the Argive tyrant, as Curtius<sup>79</sup> would have us believe. Nicolaus must be his only authority for the state-

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<sup>76</sup> This Pheidon is discussed by Wilisch, *Beiträge*, I, p. 8, and Ure, *op. cit.*, pp. 182 ff. Cf. Lenschau, *l. c.*, p. 1014, for Philolaus, the Bacchiad, who, according to Aristotle (*Pol.*, 1274 a, 31, 33, 1265 b, 12), gave laws to Thebes and influenced it in favour of Corinth.

<sup>77</sup> *Politics*, II, 6, 13.

<sup>78</sup> *Dorians*, I, p. 173.

<sup>79</sup> I, 257.

ment that Pheidon of Argos "marched upon Corinth and there, about the time of the thirtieth Olympiad, fell in a hand-to-hand fight with the party of his opponents."

But why should Pheidon, their tyrant, be keeping the Corinthians when in a state of revolt? It is Müller's view also that the Pheidon mentioned by Nicolaus is the Corinthian lawgiver.

Towards the end of the eighth century, when Pheidon had passed away, Argos gradually lost all pretence to headship in the Peloponnese. Sparta instead came to be the leading power and for the next two centuries was growing to an hegemony, her claim to which seemed to be strengthened by her mission as overthrower of tyrants.

We have already referred to her formation of a Peloponnesian confederacy in which Corinth readily joined. We have no clear idea at what particular time this league came into being. But we may judge from the general course of Spartan history that it arose by the middle of the sixth century when the conquest of Thyreatis from Argos placed Sparta at the head of the peninsula. The League was the mainstay of oligarchy in Greece and was in itself a combination of oligarchies. It was a "crop of oligarchic governments whose main support was Sparta itself, a harmonious balance between opposing principles."<sup>80</sup>

The aristocracy of merchants which succeeded the tyranny at Corinth, accepted it as a defence against outside dominion. Participation in the confederacy freed Corinth from any democratic influence. But we must not assume that Corinth was led by Sparta in everything that she did. The whole history of the Peloponnesian League goes to show the contrary. There were two kinds of states in the League, subject allies, and communities with which merely a defensive

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<sup>80</sup> Cf. Greenidge, *Hdbk. Gk. Const. Hist.*, p. 62.

alliance had been concluded. To the latter class belonged Corinth. We shall observe in the course of our narrative that Corinth always acted independently of Sparta. As Greenidge says:

Had Sparta's hegemony in Peloponnese rested like Rome's in Italy, everywhere on conquest, the league might have developed into a protectorate and the protectorate into an empire; but Sparta, incapable of incorporating even her immediate dependencies of Laconia, had powerful rivals in Elis and Corinth, even within the states of her confederacy.<sup>81</sup>

Corinth was in no way beholden to Sparta for her actions during the Peloponnesian war.

The behaviour of Corinth and Elis during that war showed that Sparta was not powerful enough to enforce obedience on some of the states of her confederacy, and that the conditions of the league and even the resolutions of the Council could be neglected with impunity.

But already in the Persian war Corinth had shown entire initiative and freedom of action. On this Grundy<sup>82</sup> remarks:

The Peloponnesians, and especially the Corinthian opponents of the war policy of Themistocles, were not people who could be kept in order even by the strong hand of Sparta, unless history draws a very misleading picture of the circumstances within the Peloponnesian League.

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<sup>81</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 62, 110.

<sup>82</sup> *Great Persian War*, pp. 543 ff.



## CHAPTER VII

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### THE PERSIAN WAR: BEFORE AND AFTER

We have seen that Corinth readily joined the Peloponnesian confederacy, while Argos did not. Argos and Corinth were in opposite camps ever since the days of Pheidon, and this hostility was very much accentuated towards the middle of the sixth century by the growth of Aegina, whose cause was favoured by Argos, as commercial rival of Corinth.

The question has been raised whether Periander conquered Aegina in the expedition which he made against his father-in-law, Procles of Epidaurus. There is no evidence to be found on the point in ancient authorities. Holm<sup>1</sup> thinks it likely (1) that Periander seized the island, and (2) that it was at the time subject to Epidaurus. Bury thinks it was a commercial rival of Corinth in 550 B. C. We must assume that it regained its independence in the interval. It is quite evident that Aegina and Corinth had been rivals in the seventh century, when they took different sides in the Lelantine war.<sup>2</sup> Bury's belief that they were rivals also in the sixth seems based on the hypothesis that at the overthrow of the tyrants Aegina regained her freedom under the influence of Sparta's mission of liberation. In that case Aegina probably joined the Peloponnesian confederacy after the defeat of Argos in Thyrea (*circa* 550), if not before, leaving Argos and Achaea as the only states in the peninsula which were outside the confederacy.

The few references we have to Corinth's part in the history of Greece at this stage concern isolated events. The first relates to Corinth's action in regard to Samos. Polycrates, tyrant of the island, was causing trouble to Corinthian trade in the

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<sup>1</sup> I, p. 308.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Hall, *A.H.N.E.*, p. 531.

East. Corinth longed for an opportunity of overthrowing him, and it was afforded in a curious way. Cambyses had gone to conquer Egypt whose King, Amasis, had been Polycrates' close ally and friend. Their alliance was based on the common interest of antagonism to Persia. When, however, the Persians came to conquer Egypt, Polycrates, instead of helping Amasis, sent forty ships to aid the forces of the invader, as he considered that Amasis could not, even with his own help, resist them. He, therefore, thought he would be on the safe side, and threw his honour to the wind. The forty ships he manned with those Samians whom he most suspected of designs upon his power, in hope of getting rid of them.<sup>3</sup> The crews, after proceeding as far as Carpathus, turned back to overthrow the tyrant. Failing in their attempt, they appealed to Sparta, as the recognized liberator. "Their appeal," says Bury, "was strongly backed by the Corinthians." There was something more.

What followed is peculiarly interesting as being the first example of the way in which Corinth could and did force the hand of the Lacedaemonians in matters of policy.

The Lacedaemonians had indeed grievances against the Samians; but it is unlikely that they would have undertaken the expedition had they not been urged thereto by Corinth. The grievance on the side of Corinth was of a kind that was fated to reappear on many momentous occasions in the course of the next century. Corinthian trade had been interfered with by the Samians. The piratical enterprise of Polycrates was sure to be directed against the trade of a state which had broken off its old commercial relations with Samos and transferred its connection to Miletus.<sup>4</sup>

Neither Bury nor Grundy makes any mention of the non-sensical causes which Herodotus asserts to have influenced the Lacedaemonians and Corinthians in sending a force against Samos<sup>5</sup>; it is evident that they are not the real reasons. Sparta was looked upon as the recognized destroyer of tyrants. Responding to the Samians she played a traditional rôle.

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<sup>3</sup> Her., III, 44.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Grundy, *Great Persian War*, p. 37.

<sup>5</sup> Her., I, 70; III, 46-48.

But in addition, as Grundy well points out, Sparta's hand was forced by Corinth for her own selfish interests. We have here an anticipation of what afterwards occurred in the Peloponnesian war.<sup>6</sup> It seems, therefore, that the cause Herodotus alleges for the Corinthian attitude is totally unfounded. We are told the story of Periander's treatment of the three hundred Corcyraean youths, who were rescued by the Samians. The Corinthians bore the Samians a grudge for this and therefore joined the expedition against them.

What an unreasonable cause! Was the memory of Periander so exceedingly loved and venerated by the Corinthian oligarchy as to make them avenge themselves on the Samians for having frustrated a shameful deed of his done in a passion? The matter is too obvious to need comment.

Corinth's next interference in external affairs was in relation to Athens. The brilliant tyranny of the Peisistratids had passed away, the last of them having been expelled by the aid of Sparta, in 510. But the democracy of Cleisthenes did not please the Spartans, who readily, though unsuccessfully, combined with Isagoras in his attempt to overthrow the popular leader scarcely two years after the liberation. King Cleomenes, ὁμῶς Λακωνικὸν πνέων had to retire from the acropolis discomfited. But Spartan hatred of the democracy would not accept this setback. A second attempt was made in which there was a regular Peloponnesian host engaged, recruited by Cleomenes from the various allies of the confederacy. What an influence Sparta had at this time over the mind of the allies is revealed by the fact that without question they joined her in a mission of inconsistency. For the same Sparta which had overthrown one tyrant was now going to set up another.

It is to the credit of the Corinthians that they were the only people with sufficient independence of spirit to declaim

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<sup>6</sup> An interesting account of the relations between Sparta and Athens in the fifth century will be found in *J.H.S.*, 1908, pp. 76-96, by G. B. Grundy. Cf. also Dickens in *J.H.S.*, 1912, pp. 38 ff.

against the injustice of the procedure. The Peloponnesian army had advanced as far as the plain of Eleusis and was there met by the Athenians. Just as the hosts were about to engage, the Corinthians drew off, and so completely foiled the plans of the Lacedaemonians<sup>7</sup> (506 B. C.).

Bury sees in Corinth's action on this occasion, in addition to mere considerations of justice, a balance-of-power motive at work. "At this time Aegina was a most formidable commercial rival of Corinth, and it therefore suited Corinthian interests to encourage the rising power of Aegina's enemy."<sup>8</sup> This indeed may be so, but the elementary sense of justice must have been the chief cause, when she realized what she was doing. If purely diplomatic interests were at work, would she not have refused to join the expedition at the very outset? Our contention is perfectly illustrated by the action of the Corinthians in the very next year.

The Lacedaemonians, not content with this setback, went to extremes in their desire for revenge against Athens. They actually called back the tyrant they had ejected. It was not Isagoras now; it was Hippias, recalled from Sigeum, to be foisted by force on their enemies. But Corinth would have no nonsense this time. At the meeting of the confederates at the isthmus, Socles made his famous speech against tyrants, that vehement harangue to which we are more indebted, perhaps, than to anything else for our knowledge of the early history of Corinth. "If you are determined," said Socles to the Spartans, "if you persist against all justice in seeking to restore Hippias, know at least that the Corinthians will not approve your conduct." The Corinthians took the other allies with them, and all together besought the Lacedaemonians not to commit the injustice. And so, says Herodotus, the enterprise failed.

Corinth's outstanding justice to, and friendship for, Athens at this time are remarkable. A few years previously (510-

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Her.*, V, 74, 75.

<sup>8</sup> *Hist. of Gr.*, p. 216.

509) Athens and Thebes had come to handgrips about Plataea. The latter wished to remain independent of the Boeotian confederacy. Thebes tried to bully her into submission, and the Plataeans applied for help to the Spartans, who gave a lame excuse for not assisting them and recommended them to the Athenians! This they did, Herodotus rightly remarks, not so much out of good-will to the Plataeans as because they wished to involve the Athenians in trouble by engaging them in war with the Boeotians. So it turned out. Athens was glad to protect Plataea, that the city might be a thorn in the side of Thebes—"to have a small friendly power on the other side of Cithaeron, a sort of watch-tower against Thebes." The Thebans, enraged at the alliance, immediately marched against the Plataeans. The Athenians sent a force to aid their allies, and the two armies were about to engage, when a Corinthian contingent appeared on the scene. They had chanced to be in the district at the time, we are told; but what could have brought them there? They evidently saw the turn things were taking in Boeotia. When the battle was now at hand they offered arbitration and their offers were accepted by both parties. They ruled that if any of the Boeotians did not wish to belong to the Theban confederacy, they should not be coerced. They then went back to Corinth.<sup>9</sup>

We have still another instance of the friendship between Athens and Corinth in the early years of the fifth century. Athens and Aegina had been bad friends since the early sixth century. Commercial jealousies kept them in perpetual estrangement. Athens found an excellent excuse for injuring her rival in 491 B. C., when Aegina medized. The Athenians, who had been members of the Peloponnesian League since Sparta's overthrow of Hippias,<sup>10</sup> immediately repre-

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. Her., VI, 108.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 258, who cites in his note, Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen*, II, pp. 280 ff.; Macan, *op. cit.* (Hdt., IV-VI), II, App. VIII.



sented to the Spartans that Aegina had acted thus through enmity to themselves, in hope of ultimately overthrowing them by Persian aid. The Aeginetans were, therefore, traitors to Greece. The Spartans took up the matter, and Cleomenes proceeded against Aegina and took hostages, whom he deposited with the Athenians.<sup>11</sup> Aegina was thus compelled to be patriotic, but complications were soon to arise. When Cleomenes died, the Aeginetans sent envoys to Sparta, asking back the hostages, but no efforts would induce the Athenians to give them up. The Aeginetans prepared to avenge themselves. It chanced that the Athenian 'theôris' was lying off Sunium. The Aeginetans ambushed it and captured a number of Athenian nobles.<sup>12</sup>

At this outrage Athens was fired with the most desperate determination to destroy Aegina by any and every means. She conspired with a citizen of the place named Nicodromus to capture it on a certain day. The attempt failed, owing to a hitch in the time-table, consequent on Athenian delay in mustering sufficient ships for the enterprise. Their fleet was not strong enough to engage the Aeginetans (487). They therefore appealed to Corinth for a loan of some ships.

In those days the Corinthians were on the best of terms with the Athenians, and accordingly they now yielded to their request and furnished twenty; but as their law did not allow them to be given for nothing, they sold them to the Athenians for five drachmas apiece.<sup>13</sup>

This loan is mentioned, as an old favour conferred, by the Corinthian ambassador at Athens, when asking the latter's help against Corecra before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.<sup>14</sup>

The date assigned by Bury to Athens' attempt against Aegina is 487. Dr. Grundy, following Macan, to whom he

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. Her., VI, 49, 73.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Her., VI, 85, 87.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Her., VI, 88, 89.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 41.

refers, sets it down as 498;<sup>15</sup> but it is plain from the testimony of Herodotus that the affair took place a considerable number of years after the seizure of the Aeginetan hostages by Cleomenes in 491 B. C. The Athenian attempt was consequent on the refusal to hand over the hostages after Cleomenes' death, and the resulting reprisals of the Aeginetans.<sup>16</sup>

### THE PERSIAN WARS

In entering on the history of Corinth during the Persian wars, it is well to remark that it is not relevant to our purpose to discuss the campaigns in detail, the part each state played in them, the strategy and tactics of the various battles, and the different accounts of authorities—all of which is found in greater or less degree in the historians, and with full scientific minuteness in Dr. Grundy's *Great Persian War*. What is proper to discuss, however, is the attitude of Corinth, whether her help was genuinely patriotic, whether Herodotus represents her behavior in a true or false light, and particularly whether the relations between Corinth and Athens during the contest supply the first indication of that enmity which was soon afterwards to be fanned into flame, and not to die out till the power of the Athenians was overthrown, and their city made the footstool of the conqueror.

In discussing the war between Athens and Aegina in 487, we have anticipated somewhat. Three years before, Athens had fought the Persian single-handed at Marathon and defeated him. Notwithstanding the national danger, Sparta was inexplicably deaf to the urgent entreaty of the Athenians for aid. She did not even order any member of the league to go to the assistance of Athens; she was to go herself when the full moon had passed; but when the full moon had passed, Marathon had been won without her. "It is impossible," says Grundy, "to say how far this excuse for delay was genuine."

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<sup>15</sup> *Great Persian War*, pp. 205, 367.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 368.

Corinth cannot fail to have admired the brave stand of Athens alone on this occasion, and therefore was more anxious than ever to repeat her old acts of friendship by lending her ships to punish the 'medizing' Aegina.

Darius passed away, and ten years afterwards Xerxes came to carry out the defeated plans of his predecessor. Greece was warned betimes of his coming, and in the autumn of 481 an Hellenic congress met at the Isthmus of Corinth to discuss measures of defence. The Isthmus is marked out by nature as the assembling place of a united Hellas against the Persian invader. It is practically the central point of Greece where all routes both by land and sea converge. Sparta, naturally, as head of the Peloponnesian League, assumed the presidency of the congress, and it was from Sparta that the two leaders of army and fleet, respectively, were chosen—Leonidas and Eurybiades.

It is important to repeat what historians of the war, especially Dr. Grundy, have shown, that the heart of the Peloponnesians throughout the whole campaign was set on the defence of the Isthmus. They showed no consideration for the fate of Northern Greece, no gratitude for the brave fight which the Athenians fought at Marathon alone. They were ready to sacrifice them, with their homes and property, to the foreigners.

We would gladly exclude Corinth from a part in this policy, but there is no evidence of her opposition; rather the incidents of the war, especially Adeimantus' contention with Themistocles before Salamis, go to show the contrary. Corinth indeed despatched her quota of soldiers—a big one for a city composed of merchants—and of ships to every fight. She sent four hundred men to Thermopylae.<sup>17</sup> Her triremes at Artemisium were in number second only to those of the Athenians.<sup>18</sup> Her contribution to the army at Plataea

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. Her., VII, 202.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Her., VIII, 43.

was third highest. Her forces gained particular distinction at Mycale.<sup>19</sup>

At the same time there can be no doubting of the fact that she was the chief advocate of the policy which, even from the very start of the war, aimed at placing the line of defence at the Isthmus. We might assume that Corinth on this as on most other occasions directed the Spartan policy. It was only the threat of the Athenians to withdraw their fleet that saved Greece, for, as Dr. Grundy<sup>20</sup> observes, "if they (the Peloponnesian League) could have their way, the defence of the Isthmus would be the beginning and the end of their design." In another place the same scholar remarks:

The fact which stands out with most prominence in the general history of the war of 480 to 479 is that the Peloponnesian Greeks were ever hankering after the Isthmus as the line of defence against the huge Persian expedition. Not merely one, but apparently several fortified lines had been already (before the battle of Thermopylae) begun there.<sup>21</sup>

Corinth, certainly, was the prime mover in this business. Her city and ports were to be saved at all costs. Her *diolkos*, the great highway of trade, was not to be interfered with; her rich agricultural plain was not to be ravaged by any mischance, while the Peloponnesians journeyed far to the north to contend with the invader. Dr. Grundy has a word to say for their point of view, selfish though it was.

It is, at any rate, quite plain from Herodotus' account of Artemisium that a very large section of the Greeks there present longed to seize upon any excuse for a retreat to the Isthmus. Was it, after all, considering their knowledge at the moment, so selfish a policy to fix the defence at a line in which they had some sort of confidence, rather than at one where the chances of success were impossible of calculation? The game they were playing must have seemed so desperate that the Peloponnesians may well have conceived it a wiser policy to try, with some hope of success, to save a part of the land,

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. Her., IX, 105. Cf. Wilisch, *Beiträge*, II, B., *Wehrkraft*, pp. 30-47.

<sup>20</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 253.

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 270.

than to attempt to save all, with a prospect of disastrous failure. Selfish consideration of their own special interests would naturally contribute to the formation of their views on the strategical question; but, at the same time, they had what must have seemed to them some very sound general arguments in support of those views.<sup>22</sup>

If they had, they must plainly have counted on the absolute fidelity of Athens in all circumstances. For if Athens, being continually neglected, came to terms with Persia and withdrew her fleet, then no amount of defences at Corinth would check the invader. This was pointed out to the ephors by Chileus of Tegea. He reminded them that in the event of the Athenians being alienated, wall or no wall, many doors were open to the enemy into the Peloponnesus.<sup>23</sup> What he meant, plainly, was that with the fleet, of which the Athenians were the mainstay, practically disbanded, the Persians could easily land in various places on the shore of Argos or even at the Corinthian ports.

There can be no question of the patriotism and loyalty of Corinth in the war. She was at one with Sparta in opposition to the northern policy, and, being more or less the spokesman of the Peloponnesian confederacy, she comes into greater prominence than any other in opposing the schemes of Themistocles. Thus we have the tale that Adeimantus, the Corinthian admiral, as well as Eurybiades, had to be bribed by the Athenian leader to remain at Artemisium for the protection of the Euboeans.<sup>24</sup> This anecdote, incredible in itself—"for Eurybiades and the Peloponnesians were bound to stay at Artemisium so long as the land army was at Thermopylae"<sup>25</sup>—nevertheless shows the anti-Athenian spirit in the Corinthian contingent, and above all the special desire of the Corinthians to retire to their own walls to fight the Persians. Corinth evidently would not shed many tears for the sacrifice

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<sup>22</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 272.

<sup>23</sup> Her., IX, 9.

<sup>24</sup> Her., VIII, 5.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 274.



of Athens, even at this early stage in the war. Speaking of the story of the bribe, Dr. Grundy remarks:

The real significance in this, as in other similar stories in Herodotus relating to this time, is that it brings into relief the existence of a strong party within the fleet which was wholly opposed to the Northern policy. It also for the first time indicates the part which Corinth seems to have played in the war as leader of this party of opposition to the Athenian policy.<sup>26</sup>

I shall deal presently with the bickering between Corinth and Athens, and the course of its development. Here I am only concerned to justify as patriotic the attitude of Corinth in the various campaigns.

She was at one with Sparta in doggedly opposing the 'Northern Policy,' but she comes more into prominence; for whereas Sparta worked silently, the Corinthians spoke out their minds on the question of defence. In the retreat from Artemisium, Herodotus tells us pointedly that the Corinthians led the way, whilst the Athenians were the last to leave—another instance of practical display of policy on the part of the Corinthians. There was, however, nothing unpatriotic about their action. There was no further benefit in staying where they were. But it is the opposition which Themistocles met with from Adeimantus at Salamis that especially reveals Corinth as exponent of the Isthmian policy. Eurybiades, to whom Themistocles' speech was in particular addressed, acted, but remained silent; the Corinthian leader did all the talking.<sup>27</sup> We might also recall the remark of Aristides, on his arrival from Aegina, to Themistocles, about the surrounding of the Greek fleet: "I who have seen the situation with my own eyes tell you that neither the Corinthians nor Eurybiades himself will be able to sail out." The emphatic reference to the Corinthians needs no comment.

In none of the instances quoted, nor at any time in the war, can Corinth be accused of playing an unpatriotic part. Her

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<sup>26</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 329.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Her., VIII, 59.

help was genuine according to her lights, which indeed were somewhat obscured by her rising antipathy to Athens. This is her record, as the story appears to us from Herodotus. Dr. Grundy recognizes the fact that Corinth cannot be criticized for her actions in the war, but at the same time thinks that Herodotus does not give a fair account of her good intentions. Speaking of the influence of contemporary political feeling on Herodotus' work, he says:

The most noticeable instance of its influence upon him is shown in his treatment of the Corinthians. This people could not be accused of having played an unpatriotic part in the war, and yet no opportunity is lost of placing their conduct in an unfavourable light. They are represented as being foremost in opposition to such measures as after-events proved to have been the greatest benefit to the national cause, and, finally, a distinct, and almost certainly unfounded, charge of cowardice at Salamis is brought against them. That Herodotus thought the war policy which they advocated, the defence of the Isthmus, a mistaken one, is evident; but this view of his is not sufficient to account for his treatment of them. That can only be attributed to an Athenian tradition which had been strongly influenced by the bitter and long-continued hostility which arose between Athens and Corinth some twenty years after the events of 480.<sup>28</sup>

As to their being represented by Herodotus as "foremost in opposition to such measures as after events proved to have been the greatest benefit to the national cause," it has already been pointed out that the Corinthians merely voiced on each occasion what every single state of the Peloponnesian Confederacy, and Sparta herself felt. If we stigmatise Herodotus' representation of the Corinthians as unfair, we must add that he places the Spartans in no less unfavourable a light.

As to the "distinct charge of cowardice at Salamis," Dr. Grundy says elsewhere:

Herodotus does indeed relate a story which he *expressly states to be of Athenian origin*, to the effect that the Corinthians under

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<sup>28</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 563; cf. however, Wells, *Studies in Herodotus*, pp. 151 ff., where Meyer's views are criticised.

Adeimantus retired from the Greek line and began to make their way to the western straits but were stopped by a mysterious messenger who announced the victory of the Greeks; whereupon the would-be runaways returned to Salamis. *Herodotus evidently places no credence in the tale, nor need the modern world do so. He says, moreover, that the truth was denied by all the other Greeks.*<sup>20</sup>

There is, therefore, it seems to me, in Herodotus' account no evidence of his prejudice against Corinth. In the course of the present chapter we have had occasion to bring forward many actions, both before the war and during it, highly creditable to her. Without exception they are derived directly from the history of Herodotus.

The outstanding feature of the Great Persian War for one concerned with Corinth's history is that in it we have mirrored the gradual development of strained relations between that city and Athens. Several instances have already been given of the friendship which existed between them up to the advent of Xerxes. The last act of good-fellowship was the loan of ships in 487; but for the next seven years, we can well suppose, conditions were arising which inevitably caused estrangement. How did they come about? Corinth was destined by nature to be a commercial state. To preserve her vocation intact, it was necessary for her to live in a Greece where power was properly balanced. Should any city rise to preëminence and draw under her own sway the lesser independent powers, Corinth's prosperity was doomed. She, too, would, perforce, become a unit of empire; she would have a limit set to her mercantile activities by the bigger partner which would be sure to subordinate Corinthian interests to its own.

We find, therefore, through the sixth century and the early portion of the fifth, the following position in the region of the Saronic Gulf: Aegina is Corinth's great commercial rival, far surpassing Athens in naval power. Athens is but in the early stages of her growth. As Athens developed she was

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<sup>20</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 405.

regarded with jealousy by Aegina, and Corinth saw an opportunity of supporting the weaker against the stronger. Athens was to be upheld and fostered. This is exemplified in the instances already adduced. Athens' navy was inferior to Aegina's in 487, as is proved by the Corinthian loan; but in the next seven years Aegina fell far behind. The war begun by Athens against her in 487 was long protracted, till by the end of the decade, Aegina's power was broken and Athens had now become the city with which Corinth was destined to contend. The naval power of the Athenians had grown enormously from the time when (about 484) they adopted the advice of Themistocles to make their fleet their fortune. Athens was now virtually Corinth's rival. The growth of her navy, which soon surpassed that of any other state in Greece, may well have made Corinth tremble for the fate of her commerce. The advent of the Persian stayed hostilities for a time, but even during that time there is plain indication of the Corinthian feeling towards Athens. She was sincerely opposed to the northern policy of the latter but she could hardly help showing opposition in any case.

The story of the bribe at Artemisium and Grundy's remark thereon have already received our attention. It was at Salamis, however, that Corinth's attitude became particularly clear. Here Adeimantus opposed tooth and nail the plans of Themistocles, the creator of Athens' greatness, whose genius in naval strategy he failed through prejudice to recognize. They finally turned to abusing each other, the Corinthian telling Themistocles that he had no right to speak as he had no fatherland (Athens being by this time in the hands of the Persians). Themistocles in turn railed long and bitterly against Adeimantus and the Corinthians, and reminded them that Athens was a more powerful state than Corinth so long as she had two hundred ships at her back. This was the piercing taunt which was sure to strike home. Themistocles in anger finally declared that none of the Greeks could repel an Athenian attack.

After the Persian had been repulsed, matters were quiet for

a time. No occasion arose for any display of feeling; but that this feeling was growing more and more is quite evident. Themistocles' proposals for an increased fleet were now eventuating in an Athenian empire. Corinth was trembling for her trade. The upstart Athenians had usurped Corinth's very existence. Party strife in Athens seemed to appease Corinthian jealousy for a while, but with the advent of Pericles things assumed quite a new and dangerous appearance. This leader aimed at the complete superiority of Athens, not only in culture and thought, but in empire also. He planned the reduction of the whole of Greece to a dependency of Athens by securing the great trade routes, especially the corn-routes. This has been shown convincingly by Dr. Grundy.<sup>30</sup> Athens had already control of the Pontic corn supplies. She now sought to control the Sicilian also. She did not rest here, however. Almost simultaneously an attempt was made to acquire the Egyptian too.

The first act in the Sicilian scheme was the settlement of Naupactus at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf (459 B. C.).<sup>31</sup> Here the Messenians, expelled from Ithome, were given a settlement.

This was a blow which struck home. Athens had now the means of intercepting and harrassing the Corinthian argosies which sailed forth with merchandise for the far west. War was a question of months, and the occasion soon came.<sup>32</sup>

It was Megara which brought it about. She quarreled with Corinth about boundaries, and, revolting from the Peloponnesian League, allied herself with Athens.<sup>33</sup> This was a deathblow to Corinthian interests. The hated rival was not only at her very door, but 'sat astride the isthmus' as well as herself. The Athenians made the very most of their opportunities. They built the long walls of Megara to the port

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Thuc. and Hist. of his Age*, pp. 183-205.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Appendix.

<sup>32</sup> Bury, *Hist. of Greece*, p. 353.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Diod., XI, 79; Thuc., I, 103.



Nisaea. This occupation of Megara, Thucydides particularly reminds us, was the crowning cause of Corinth's excessive hatred of Athens. There was something to be said for the spread of Athenian power till now, but the occupation of Naupactus, above all of Megara, made clear to Corinth her rival's real intentions.

Aegina at this point comes forward to play her part. We have shown how the Corinthian attitude to this state changed; how, instead of being a competitor, she became an ally of Corinth against Athens, which was quickly arriving at a stage of power that was likely to absorb both. From the last years of the eighties, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Corinth and Aegina preserved a fast friendship based on mutual interest.

Sparta was also requisitioned, but, as Curtius says:

What was for Sparta a question of power and honour was for Corinth a question of existence. Her life was at stake. Shut up in her gulf and cut off from her colonies, Corinth could not stand. She must exert herself to the utmost, while Athens was confined to her own waters by an unsubdued rival. She must do anything to prevent the fall of Aegina and next she must take all measures in her own waters to maintain her endangered power.<sup>84</sup>

Sparta was very slow to move. Corinth, however, forced her. Technically, she should have proceeded against Megara without any compulsion. Megara, a member of the League, had revolted to the power which must have appeared to Sparta at this time to be contemplating panhellenic conquest.

Unfortunately, we have very little information regarding the exact course of events at this critical period in Corinth's history. All that we know is confined to scattered references, in a few authorities, to some battles on the coast of the Saronic Gulf and the Acte of Argolis. Thucydides in his chapters on the growth of the Athenian empire gives a bare outline of events.

A Corinthian force helped by Epidaurians repulsed an

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<sup>84</sup> Cf. Curtius, *Hermes*, X, "Studien zur Geschichte von Korinth."

Athenian squadron which had made a descent on Halieis.<sup>35</sup> Some time afterwards the Athenians in a sea-fight defeated the Peloponnesian ships off the island of Cecryphaleia. Aegina, which had in the meantime entered the struggle, was the scene of a great battle between the Athenians and the home forces, in which the allies on both sides took part. The Athenians gained the day and took seventy ships. They immediately landed and proceeded to blockade the town. Corinth in extreme fear for her friend thought to create a diversion in her favour. An army of the allies was organized. They took the heights of Geraneia and crossed into Megara, thinking, says Thucydides, that with Aegina and Egypt on her hands, Athens could render no assistance to the Megarians. They, however, miscalculated Athenian ability and resources. All the best men were either in Egypt or Aegina, but the *Strategos*, Myronides, collecting a force from those who were either too young or too old for active service, poured into the Megarid and routed the Corinthian forces in two battles. This was a serious disaster to Corinth. It showed that the Athenians were well-nigh invincible.

Next year (457), however, they received somewhat of a setback. Not only did Sparta restore the position of the Dorians against the Phocians in the north, but defeated an Athenian force, at Tanagra, which had tried to intercept her returning army. The Spartans marched defiantly across the Isthmus, caring nought for the Athenian garrisons in the Geraneian passes or for the army of occupation in the lower regions of the plain.<sup>36</sup> Corinth might well be hopeful that, with Sparta roused to definite action at last, Athenian aggrandizement would in some degree be hindered. But her hopes were dashed to the ground—nine weeks later, when Myronides, of Megarid fame, brought off the great victory of Oenophyta. The result of this victory was that Athens assumed the hegemony of all Northern Greece. Not only did it give Athens a firmer con-

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<sup>35</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 105; Bury wrongly records an Athenian victory.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 107-8.

trol of the Corinthian Gulf, but it rid her of the embarrassment of having Boeotia, a Peloponnesian ally, vexing her northern frontier.

Corinth was once more in the depths of despair. With as much freedom to sail in the Gulf as Corinth herself, and even with certain advantages from the nature of the position of Naupactus, with the northern states at her feet, and with her army of occupation ready at the first favourable moment to cross the border, Athens must have inspired Corinth with a hatred of herself not likely soon to die. Worse was to happen. Aegina fell at the end of the year or early in 456. She had to pull down her walls, surrender her fleet, and become a tribute-paying, subject state. Thus the one possible rival of Athens with which Corinth might combine, was completely humbled. Sparta, after all, could avail Corinth nothing. The Spartans were impotent before the naval Empire of the Athenians. Not only did they not dare to redeem the result of Oenophyta, but they were themselves actually the object of attack. A force under the *Strategos*, Tolmides sailed round Malea and burned Gythium, the Spartan naval arsenal. He continued his journey round Peloponnese, reducing Cephalenia and Zacynthus, and captured Chalcis, the Corinthian colony, thus gaining another footing in the Gulf (455). The Sicyonians were also terrorized, Tolmides and his forces landing and defeating them.<sup>37</sup>

Corinth was hemmed in on all sides. Control of her own gulf was practically lost. With Sicyon reduced on the western border, and Megara hostile on the eastern, and garrisoned by Athenian forces, her case must have looked hopeless. Her fleet, we must assume, was drawn up, waiting to defend the town. Ships certainly could not appear with any degree of safety in the western gulf. The Saronic was out of the question since the reduction of Aegina. The strain in those days in Corinth must have been severe.

A slight feeling of relief was probably given by the failure

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<sup>37</sup> Thuc. I, 108; Diod., XI, 84.

of the great Egyptian expedition.<sup>38</sup> Dr. Grundy has given sufficient reasons for believing this to have been part of Pericles' great scheme to dominate all Greece by the control of the three great sources of corn supply. If the Corinthians recognized in the Athenian movements the ultimate motives which Dr. Grundy has seen in them, the Egyptian failure must have been somewhat consoling to them. It might have been some elation they displayed which led Pericles to go in person on an expedition to the Gulf in 453. He set out from Pegae and sailed along the Corinthian coast to Sicyon. The force which came out to meet him was defeated. Continuing, he brought over Achaea to the Athenian alliance, and attempted to capture Oeniadae, in which he failed.<sup>39</sup> But even without it, the Athenian position in the Gulf was secured. The whole Achaean coast-line, in addition to the places already gained, gave Athens sufficient control of the western corn supply.

Modern historians do not sufficiently bring out the helplessness of Corinth at this stage of her history. She must have been completely excluded from her great avenues of trade. It is easy to see in the two attacks on Sicyon that they were intended as a lesson for Corinth. Besides, the incidental hint of Thucydides, that Pericles' fleet sailed along the Corinthian coast, shows the fearlessness with which the Athenians moved in the Gulf at Corinth's very door. The Corinthian Gulf had by 452 become, as well as the Saronic, an Attic lake. Corinth's position continued dangerous for almost five years. During all that period she could do no more against Athens than merely defend her city and territory. She, however, was biding her time.

Corinth would never acquiesce until she had won back her old predominant position in her western gulf; so long as she was hemmed in, as Athens had hemmed her in, she would inevitably seize the first opportunity to strike for her relief. Some Athenian politicians would have been ready to retreat from the positions which

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<sup>38</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 104, 109, 110.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 111.

had been recently seized and of which the occupation was most galling to Corinth but Pericles who had won those positions was a strong imperialist. The aim of his statesmanship was to increase the Athenian empire and spread the political influence of Athens within the borders of Greece.<sup>40</sup>

Corinth, however, was not to play any part in her own relief. The loss of Boeotia in 447 through the disaster of Coronea, followed by the revolt of Megara and Euboea almost simultaneously, necessitated a great climb-down for Athens.<sup>41</sup> The Thirty Years' Peace (447-6) was made with the Peloponnesians by which Athens agreed to give up all claims to Megara. She also surrendered Troezen and Achaëa. The important thing for Corinth was that Megara was no longer in Athenian hands. Thucydides is the only authority who mentions any of the conditions of the peace. As he says nothing of Naupactus or Chalcis, we must assume that Athens retained them. They were not of much value to her now, with the control of the Isthmus completely lost. Corinth was undoubtedly well satisfied with the turn things had taken. We shall see in the next chapter how this satisfaction was turned into disappointment.

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<sup>40</sup> Bury, *History of Greece*, p. 360.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 113-115; Diod., XII, 5, 6, 7.



## CHAPTER VIII

### THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

In the last chapter we have watched the struggle which Corinth had to make for its very existence against the enormous development of the Athenian empire. We have seen that the overthrow of Pericles' plans was not due to any effort made by Corinth, eager though she had been to wreck the dominating structure which he had built, but to the elements of revolt within the empire itself. However, it is quite reasonable to suppose that Corinthian money was at the bottom of the great change which occurred in North Greece, Euboea, and Megara. Corinth could now draw an easy breath. Her confidence was restored. The Thirty Years' Peace was an admission by Athens that her great plans of panhellenic conquest had failed. It was in particular gratifying to Corinth, as her western trade was restored completely. With the loss of Pegae, the western Megarid port, and the seaports of Boeotia and Phocis, Athens could no longer hope to compete in the slightest degree with Corinth's commerce in the Corinthian Gulf. Further, the failure of Athens' attempt to secure a monopoly of the Sicilian corn supply, following upon the disastrous results of the Egyptian speculation, completely assured Corinth of her position in Greece. She was now practically sole mistress of the commerce in her own Gulf. She could move with a sense of freedom in the Saronic Gulf too.

The next landmark in the history of the relations between Corinth and Athens is the revolt of Samos<sup>1</sup> from the latter in 440. Three years before this, Athens did a thing which must have been exceedingly pleasing to Corinth. Pericles founded the colony of Thurii,<sup>2</sup> and did his best to make it a

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 115-117.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Diod., XII, 10, 3.

panhellenic settlement. Envoys were sent throughout the Peloponnese to solicit colonists from each state. This conciliatory attitude of Pericles cannot fail to have gratified Corinth. It showed that for the present, at any rate, Athens had given up hopes of disturbing Corinthian interests in the west and wished rather to placate her. It is no wonder, then, that when Samos revolted from the Athenian alliance in 440, Corinth refused to allow the Peloponnesian League<sup>3</sup> to interfere on behalf of the revolting ally. Corinth's attitude to the Samian revolt has often been wondered at by historians. Those who wrongly desire to establish the theory that Corinth and Athens were friendly down to the Peloponnesian War, quote it as a clear instance in proof of their contention; but there was no friendship involved. As Dr. Grundy<sup>4</sup> has pointed out, it was pure policy on Corinth's part. Athens' action in connection with the colonization of Thurii showed plainly that she had renounced the idea of getting control of the western sea-route. Corinth therefore would have been very unwise to antagonise her just at that time when all things were going well.

But there was another and still more important consideration which it is to the credit of Dr. Grundy to have suggested. Byzantium had joined in the Samian revolt. The Pontus corn supply was therefore seriously threatened. If it were lost, Athens would have been absolutely forced, whether she liked or not, to bend all her energies towards the resumption of the western policy which had been the cause of the turmoil for the past thirteen years. The good of the Thirty Years' Peace would consequently have been undone, and it is plain that Corinth could not have stood long before Pericles if he had to make a desperate attempt to get corn for his starving city population. Corinth acted very diplomatically in hindering the giving of any Peloponnesian help to the Samians.

Athens, however, was not long destined to keep out of

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 41.

<sup>4</sup> *Thuc. and the Hist. of His Age*, p. 198.

western politics. Five years after the Samian revolt, occurred the famous affair of Epidamnus. Here for the first time in the course of our enquiry we find an episode of the highest importance in Corinthian history narrated in full detail by a contemporary historian. But the affair of Epidamnus is not only of great interest in itself; it is the direct and immediate occasion of the deadly turmoil which we call the Peloponnesian War. It therefore leads us at once to a question which has occupied the attention of several distinguished scholars during the last twenty years—the question of the adequacy and intelligibility of Thucydides' account of the origin of that conflict. For these reasons it appears desirable to reproduce here by citation or summary the story as the great historian tells it. His narrative of the sequence of events is undisputed and needs no criticism, while his conclusions about the origin of the war we should do well to keep before us if only to enable us to estimate clearly the worth or worthlessness of the various charges which have been made against them.

The city of Epidamnus<sup>5</sup> is a colony from Corecra founded by Phalius . . . who had according to the old custom been summoned for the purpose from Corinth, the metropolis. The colonists were joined by some Corinthians and other Dorians. As time went on, the city of Epidamnus became great and populous, but the inhabitants becoming involved in factions for many years, arising, it is said, from a war with their barbaric neighbours, became enfeebled and lost a considerable share of power. At last, before the war, the people expelled the nobles, who, uniting with the barbarians against the city, proceeded to plunder the inhabitants by land and sea. Being hard pressed, the latter sent ambassadors to their mother-city, Corecra, asking them not to allow their destruction, but to reconcile the expelled parties with them and to put an end to the war which the barbarians waged against them. Having come, they sat as suppliants in the temple of Hera and made this request. But the Corecraeans would not receive their supplication and sent them away unsuccessful. The Epidamnians recognising that they could count on no help from Corecra were at their wits' end as to how they should manage the affair. They sent ambassadors to Delphi to ask

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 24 ff.

the god whether they should hand over their city to the Corinthians from whom their oecist came, and try and obtain some assistance from them. The god bade them do so and make them their leaders. So, in obedience to the oracle, the Epidamnians came to Corinth and handed over the colony, pointing out that their oecist was from Corinth, and revealing the oracle. They therefore entreated them not to suffer them to be destroyed but to help them. The Corinthians justly consented to do so, thinking that the colony was theirs just as much as Coreyra's. Besides they were influenced by hatred of the Coreyraeans who neglected them though they were their colonists. For they gave them neither the customary compliments at the public gatherings nor first place at the sacrifices to a representative of Corinth, like the other colonies. Instead they treated Corinth with contempt. They were at this time equal to the richest of the Greeks in wealth and were more powerful than the Corinthians in military equipment. In their navy too, they sometimes prided themselves on great superiority, bearing in mind that their island was once inhabited by the Phaeacians who had great renown in naval matters. They paid particular attention to their fleet, all the more because of this, and they were extremely powerful. The Corinthians with all these causes of complaint sent help to Epidamnus, inviting any who wished to go as colonists and bidding troops to proceed there from Ambracia, Leucas and Corinth itself. They went on foot to Apollonia, another colony of Corinth, fearing the Coreyraeans might prevent them if they crossed by sea. When the Coreyraeans heard of the arrival of the settlers at Epidamnus, and that their colony had been handed over to the Corinthians, they were enraged. Sailing immediately with twenty ships, and afterwards with another contingent, they ordered them in a threatening manner to receive the exiles (who had come to Coreyra and, showing their ancestors' tombs, and their relationship, had begged the Coreyraeans to reinstate them) and to dismiss the troops and the settlers that the Corinthians had sent. The Epidamnians, however, would not listen to them. The Coreyraeans then proceeded against them with forty ships, taking with them the exiles, intending to restore them, and also taking on the Illyrians to help them.

Thus Corinth and Coreyra were embroiled all of a sudden. Even if we had not already referred to the intense hatred that existed between them from the earliest times, the foregoing passage from Thucydides would be sufficient to show that they were always ready to fly at each other's throats. One might reasonably ask why Coreyra would not help its

hard-pressed colony. Thucydides himself has supplied us with the answer in the parenthetical clause above. The nobles of Epidamnus were particularly connected with Corcyra from whence their forefathers had come and where the exiles could still show their ancestral tombs and their kinship. Corinth, it seems, was justified in coming to the relief of the oppressed colony, but whether she had any ulterior motives in doing so may be discussed later.

The rest of Thucydides' story can be summarised. As soon as Corinth heard that her enemies were besieging Epidamnus (and, of course, her own relief body in the town), she immediately got together an army and proclaimed a colonization of the place. Megara amongst other states was asked for an escort of ships to ensure the safety of the colonists *en route*. She gave eight. Corcyra was badly frightened, never thinking that Corinth would interfere in what she regarded as her own private affairs. She must, however, do her best in view of the serious attitude Corinth had adopted. She therefore sent ambassadors to Corinth who were accompanied by *Sicyonian and Lacedaemonian* representatives. Evidently the Peloponnesian League wanted to patch up the dispute. No wonder, indeed; they did not wish to have a war between Corinth and Corcyra at this time when the great Athenian empire was the chief object of their care. If it were to break out just then, Athens could hardly stay out of it, and Sparta was not ready to tackle her for a while.

Corcyra reminded Corinth that she had no right to interfere at Epidamnus, and therefore requested the withdrawal of the Corinthian troops and colonists. However, if Corinth did lay claim to the place, she was ready to submit the matter to an arbitration court formed from such members of the Peloponnesian states as they should mutually agree upon. Corcyra was even ready to leave the decision to Delphi. Now, either of these umpires would have been decidedly favourable to Corinth, but she rejected both. Her high-handed action showed that she would have war at any cost. Now, if ever,



when Athens was humiliated by the Thirty Years' Peace and in a state of truce with Corinth, was her chance of dealing with Corcyra definitely. Corcyra went a step further in her efforts at compromise. She was willing to raise the blockade of Epidamnus if the Corinthian forces were withdrawn, or to suspend hostilities in *statu quo* till the decision of the arbitrators was given.<sup>6</sup>

Corinth would listen to no reason on the matter. Instead, she sent out a huge expedition against her hated daughter. Arriving at Actium they were met by a Corcyraean herald forbidding them to advance. Corcyra's last attempt at negotiations was turned down. Her fleet had to come out against the Corinthians. It won a complete victory. On the same day her forces besieging Epidamnus reduced it. The Corinthians were imprisoned pending a decision as to their disposal, and the contingents from other parts of the Peloponnese were sold as slaves. We cannot help congratulating Corcyra on her victory. Whatever may be said of her neglect of the Epidamnian demos, and the justice of Corinth's interference, Corcyra repeatedly showed that she was ready to make friends with Corinth. Corinth's scornful rejection of terms of every sort met with its due reward at Actium. The Corinthians had to return home discomfited, and Corcyra now availed herself of her supremacy in the Ionian Sea to injure the allies of Corinth. Her first care was the devastation of her sister colony, Leucas, which had contributed the highest number of ships to the Corinthian fleet. Towards the end of the spring (435), however, Corinth established a camp at Actium to protect her suffering allies. The Corcyraean army and fleet took up their position at the southeastern extremity of the island near Cape Leucimne to watch the movements of the Corinthians along the opposite shore. In these positions they watched each other closely without once engaging, till the coming of winter made each side return home.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 28.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 29-30.

But in the meantime Corinth had got to work in real earnest in building a preponderating fleet. She had been enraged at the result of Actium, and proceeded immediately afterwards to mobilise her forces. Reserves were got together from everywhere in Greece by the prospect of high pay. These preparations went on for two years, 434-3. Corcyra might well be alarmed. She was in alliance with nobody, and what could she do against the whole Peloponnesian confederacy which Corinth was sure to stir up against her? Athens was her only hope, and there she sent ambassadors to solicit help. As soon as Corinth heard of Corcyra's move, she also sent ambassadors to counteract the Corcyraeans, fearing, as Thucydides rightly remarks, that the interference of Athens would prevent her having her own way in dealing with Corcyra. So the envoys from the two hostile states appeared together at Athens. Thucydides presents their respective arguments in the form of speeches which he puts into the mouths of their representatives but which, on his own assurance,<sup>8</sup> represent exactly or very closely what they said.

The Corcyraeans having admitted the mistaken nature of their policy hitherto,<sup>9</sup> in not belonging to any alliance, pointed out the expediency for Athens in accepting them as allies now. Their main argument was the argument from expediency. It was based on the assumption that a war was bound to come in any case. It was shown that the Corinthians would set in motion the League, of which the head, Sparta, was only awaiting a favourable opportunity of reducing Athens finally. That was perfectly true. What was done by 446 had now to be partly done over again and brought to completion. Therefore Corcyra rightly pointed out to the Athenians what Corinth's real intentions were: to arouse the whole Peloponnese against herself. Corcyra could not stand any length of time against this. With Corcyra re-

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 22.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Adcock, "Anc. Greek Diplomacy," *Proc. Class. Assoc.*, 1924, p. 115.

duced, and the Corcyraean fleet taken over, and in particular with her relations with the west secure, Corinth could boldly attack Athens, whom, in her heart, she hated perhaps more than she did Corcyra.<sup>10</sup>

It was a straight issue for Athens. She could not fail to accept the Corcyraean alliance. Corcyra's enemies were Athens' enemies, whatever appearance they put up. Athens<sup>11</sup> could not allow the Corcyraean fleet to go over to her adversaries. Most of all, she could not neglect the voluntary offer of what was bound to give her back the footing in the west which she had so suddenly lost (447-6). The Corcyraeans took care, therefore, to point out that their island was admirably situated in the line of route to Italy and Sicily. Their last words,<sup>12</sup> however, must have been the most effective of all.

To put the matter in a nutshell, this will determine you not to reject us. There are three navies worthy of the name in Greece, yours, ours and Corinth's. If you allow the two latter to combine, by Corinth taking us over, you will have to fight the Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians together. But if you accept us as your allies, you will, by the addition of our fleet, be in a position to contend against them with superior numbers.

This exposition of her case by Corcyra left Athens no course but to accept her offer. Yet the Corinthian envoys thought to produce some effect by a statement of their claims. After having pointed out that the neutrality of Corcyra hitherto had been prompted by the base motive of having nobody to witness her evil doings, and having shown that the war with Corcyra was the result of long-standing insolence and unfilial treatment—a fact attested by the love with which all their other colonies regarded Corinth, they went on to justify their action in not receiving the Corcyraean offers of arbitration. They, however, misrepresent, in a most barefaced manner, Corcyra's readiness to patch up the dispute. They leave out of sight altogether the last most accommodating offer of

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 31-34.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 35.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 36.

Corcyra and go into an irrelevant discussion to obscure the real issue.<sup>13</sup> They next show that acceptance of the Corcyraean alliance by the Athenians would break the treaty and leave them no way out of becoming Corinth's enemies! Old acts of friendship which we have already treated in detail, and especially their action in regard to the Samian revolt, were produced in imposing array. Athens owed no ties of allegiance to Corcyra, whereas she was bound to Corinth by the close bonds of the Peace. Athens' attitude to war, therefore, was plainly bound to be one of neutrality, or, if she took sides at all, Corinth was to be supported. Here Thucydides reveals the real intentions of the Corinthians. If Athens held aloof they were free to deal with Corcyra in a very summary fashion. With the Corcyraean fleet acquired, with the Corcyraean trade position and revenue captured, Athens would present no difficulty, exhausted as she was by the series of disasters which led to the Peace of 446. They then preached a sermon on justice. Athens should not commit a wrong for the sake of making a great naval alliance. She should in addition repay what she owed. Such ethical considerations in a question of expediency in Greek interstate politics justly give the impression of hypocrisy. All Corinth wanted was Athens' neutrality. With that obtained the coast was clear.<sup>14</sup>

Athens, after much consideration, concluded a defensive alliance with Corcyra. She was naturally not very enthusiastic about it, but it was necessary as a matter of policy. Thucydides says that the motives of the Athenians were to let Corcyra and Corinth weary each other out, if possible, as it would be no bad preparation for the struggle which Athens was bound to have some time with Corinth and the other naval powers. This would pave the way for her to regain supremacy, but after-circumstances changed the policy. Now, though Corcyra was a neutral state, and could therefore be received as ally by either confederacy according to the

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 37-39.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 40-44.

treaty,<sup>15</sup> yet her case was not properly covered by the treaty. As Corinth pointed out, that condition was not intended for states like Corcyra, which, when involved in a state of war with a member of one of the confederacies, sought the alliance of the other. The scholiast, therefore, in Ch. 35, seems to give the most reasonable judgment when he says that the Athenians were justified in accepting the Corcyraean alliance according to the letter, but not according to the spirit of the Thirty Years' Peace. The Corinthians, however, sought to establish a legal fiction in their own favour by insisting that Corcyra was not a neutral state at all in the strict sense, but being their colony, was bound to side with them in all matters of external policy. For that matter, many of the neutral states at the time of the treaty were colonies of cities which had already joined one or other confederacy, and the treaty surely cannot have meant to prevent them from joining whatever confederacy they pleased.

Circumstances thus brought Corinth and Athens to the verge of war in the summer of 433. Athens sent ten ships to help the Corcyraeans in case they or their allies were actually attacked. This was a specious adherence to the treaty, but Athens knew in her heart that the alliance instead of being defensive would very soon be offensive. A great battle took place between the Corinthian and Corcyraean fleets off the islet of Sybota, between Leucimme and the mainland of Thesprotia, about August 21, 433 B. C.<sup>16</sup> in which the ten Athenian ships stood aloof from the fighting, though occupying a position on the right wing of the Corcyraeans, facing the Corinthians themselves. They managed for a long time to obey the orders from home, but when

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<sup>15</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 35; 40.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 295. The publication of B. D. Meritt, *The Athenian Calendar in the Fifth Century*, has made it possible to be more exact in the chronology of the years 435-431 B. C. Cf. Hubbell, *Cl. Phil.*, XXIV, 1929, pp. 217-230. For the inscription (*I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 295) which records the payments to the generals for this naval expedition, cf. Johnson, *A.J.A.*, XXXIII, 1929, pp. 398-400.



the Corcyraeans were being hard pressed, they had of necessity to share the fight on their behalf.<sup>17</sup> Even with the interference of the Athenians, the Corcyraeans were undergoing a sore defeat, and it was not till their enemies desisted, towards nightfall, twenty Athenian vessels on the horizon that they desisted from the rout. The two hostile fleets then withdrew to their respective positions, and next day the Corinthians declined the challenge of their opponents. They evidently were completely taken aback by the action of the Athenians; they had been caught in their own trap, and now only cared for their retreat. "They were afraid," says Thucydides, "that the Athenians considering the peace as having been already violated would hinder their journey home."<sup>18</sup> They would therefore make one more attempt to change Athens' attitude; some heralds without a flag, and therefore completely without protection against an enemy, were sent in a small boat to expostulate with the Athenians. 'You act wrongfully, Athenians,' they exclaimed, 'in starting the war and breaking the truce; for you have taken up arms to hinder us in punishing our enemies; if you really intend to prevent us sailing against Corcyra, or anywhere else we like, take the speakers first of all and treat them as enemies.' It was not the fault of the Corcyraeans present who heard the heralds that they were not taken at their word; by violent shouts they urged the death of the men in the boat. The Athenians only replied in dismissing them: 'We neither begin war nor break the truce, Peloponnesians; we have come merely to aid our allies, the Corcyraeans; if you wish to sail anywhere else we will not stop you, but if against Corcyra or any of her possessions, we shall do all in our power to prevent you.' This answer, whilst clearly indicating Athens' firmness, at the same time showed the Corinthians that they might go back home in peace. This they did, and took Anactorium on the way, evidently getting rid of the Corcyraean element in the

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 45-49.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 50-52.

colony, and making it wholly Corinthian. Corinth's refusal to fight on the second day was a virtual admission of defeat; so the Corcyraeans raised a trophy; but the Corinthians also raised one, having come off best in the first day's battle. However, the net result for Corinth was failure to coerce Corcyra, owing to Athens' interference. If she never hated Athens before, she had reason to do so now.

"Thus," says Thucydides, "the Corcyraeans had the best of the war against the Corinthians, and the Athenian ships sailed home; but this was one of the first causes of war which the Corinthians had against the Athenians, because the latter had fought along with the Corcyraeans against them during a time of truce."<sup>19</sup>

Corinth naturally longed for revenge, and Athens expected it. So she moved first. Potidaea, originally a colony of Corinth, was a tributary ally of Athens at this time, but she had not broken her connection with the metropolis, from which certain magistrates were sent to the colony each year. These have often been compared to the *episcopi* in the subject cities of Athens, and harmosts of Sparta, but what their precise functions were, we do not know. They would, however, seem to have been functionaries whose survival signified rather a union of affection and religious observance, than a political connection. Potidaea would naturally be the first place where Corinth would foment rebellion, especially as the neighbouring king, Perdiccas of Macedon, was hostile to Athens, and actually helped the Potidaean revolt afterwards. Athens therefore ordered Potidaea to pull down her walls on the side of Pallene, to give hostages and no longer to receive the Corinthian magistrates (433-2 B. C.).

The Potidaeans, in despair at an injunction so sudden, sent ambassadors to Athens to beg off such harsh treatment. In the meantime they must have learned the change in the international position, or the Corinthian influence must have predominated; for we find part of the embassy going to Lacedaemon, accompanied by Corinthians, who laid the case of

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 52-55.

Potidaea before Sparta. Athens would not listen to the Potidaean expostulations; Sparta, on the other hand, promised to invade Attica if the Athenians attacked Potidaea. Meanwhile this condition was on its way to fulfilment; for the Athenians had sent a sea and land force against the place. When these arrived, they found that Potidaea and many other towns of Chalcidice had already revolted (July 1, 432 B. C.), thanks to the machinations of Perdiccas. He, therefore, was the first to be got rid of, and they proceeded against him, only to leave an opening for Corinth to send a force to help Potidaea. This arrived forty days after the revolt, about August 9, 432 B. C.<sup>20</sup> under the command of Aristeus, son of the famous Adeimantus.

With these hostile forces already before the town, the Athenians had to abandon the campaign against Perdiccas, and, having patched up a temporary peace with the latter, moved in full force against Aristeus, who, along with the Potidaean army, had taken up a position on the isthmus on the side towards Olynthus. An engagement here resulted in an advantage for the Athenians, but Aristeus was able to return to Potidaea, where he was blockaded by the Athenians (Sept. 7, 432 B. C.), at first only on the mainland side so as to cut off the place from all communication with Olynthus and the Chalcidians. Soon, however, they saw the necessity of blockading the Pallene side too, but they had not sufficient troops to spare a detachment for this purpose. The arrival of Phormio with reinforcements completed the siege. He landed at Aphytis on Pallene, and made his way to Potidaea, ravaging the country as he went along. Potidaea was now completely invested, while the Athenian fleet lying in the harbour prevented any supplies from sea. The reduction of the place was a mere matter of time. Recognising the dearth of provisions, Aristeus proposed to the citizens to escape at the first favourable wind in order that supplies might last longer. They were to take their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet.

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<sup>20</sup> Cf. Hubbell, *Cl. Phil.*, XXIV, 1929, pp. 220-225.

Five hundred defenders were to be left behind, of whom he wanted to be one himself. The citizens would not accept the proposal. He then left the place to try and procure some relief from the Peloponnese and to create a diversion in other parts of Chalcidice. Both he succeeded in doing; it was only the first, however, that had any real effect.<sup>21</sup>

Thus towards the end of 432 Corinth and Athens were already involved in desperate hostilities. The Potidaean episode coming on top of the Epidamnian was quite enough to bring about the struggle between the two states, and with Corinth all powerful in the Peloponnesian confederacy and Athens in her own, it demands no foresight to see that the struggle would soon assume panhellenic proportions. Some boldness is required on the part of modern critics of Thucydides' competence, who hold that he does not delineate the real causes of the war, either through failure to appreciate economic factors, or through inability to comprehend the idea involved in the word 'cause.' To repeat, then: Athens' alliance with Corcyra, and the siege of Potidaea, afforded more than sufficient grounds to set Corinth organising the whole Peloponnesian confederacy against her.

Thucydides states the grievances of each side in the Potidaean affair. The Corinthians were angry because Potidaea, a colony of their own, with a Peloponnesian garrison in it, was being besieged; Athens' contention was that the Peloponnesians had caused a tribute-bearing ally of hers to revolt, and had come and fought with Athens openly on the side of the Potidaeans. As the historian observes, the Peloponnesian war had not yet broken out. The peace still existed nominally, for hitherto Corinth had not secured the help, officially, of Sparta and the League in her efforts against the foe. She, however, had obtained two excellent levers to move the unwieldy but powerful mass of Spartan jealousy. Sluggish and latent though it was, that jealousy was ever present and could be set in motion at any time by the application of

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 56-65.

sufficient leverage. This Corinth now possessed, although it required some manipulation before she could set her levers in the most advantageous position. So we have the two assemblies of the Peloponnesian allies at Sparta, in September, 432 B. C., in which Corinth adjusted her levers so as effectually to attain the desired result.

First let us consider Thucydides' estimate <sup>22</sup> of the cause of the war:

The real cause of the war, though the least was said about it, I conceive to be the growing greatness of Athens and the fear with which it inspired the Lacedaemonians which caused them to go to war. But the grievances openly alleged by both parties were as follows. These led them to break the truce and engage in war.

Thucydides then goes on to relate the Epidamnian and Potidaean affairs as "the grievances openly alleged." This passage, assailed by more than one critic, can be accepted if one looks at the Peloponnesian war from the proper point of view, and that is the attitude of the Corinthians. It is clear that, while Corinth was the prime instigator of the war in her own interests, yet she could never have set in motion the whole Peloponnesian Confederacy had not Sparta been afraid of the increase in the Athenian power. It was this which made her willing to listen to Corinth's representations, though it was hard to rouse her into action, owing to her natural slowness and want of initiative. Sparta was not ready to strike at the moment, but when Corinth set forth, in their true significance, the results which would follow Athens' hold over Corcyra and her investment of Potidaea, and when she further threatened <sup>23</sup> withdrawal from the League, Sparta was forced to an immediate decision. We are told that Corinth regarded the danger to Potidaea as very near home to her, and not only sent volunteers from her own citizens but hired forces to aid her throughout all Peloponnesus.<sup>24</sup> Sparta had prom-

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<sup>22</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 23.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 71.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 60.



ised to invade Attica in case Athens attacked Potidaea.<sup>25</sup> When the city was by now in a state of siege, neglected by the usual Spartan inactivity, Sparta could no longer withstand Corinth's expostulations, but had to bring on at once a war which she would have preferred to postpone for a season.

Potidaea's plight set Corinth to work in real earnest. Seeing her own army blockaded there and her only eastern colony all but lost to her, she made no delay in assembling the allies at Sparta. Her promptitude shows that she was the life and spirit of the League and Sparta only the nominal head.<sup>26</sup> Every state was represented. Even the Aeginetans appeared. Though they did not send envoys openly, they were in secret the prime supporters of the Corinthians in instigating the war. Each of the allies made complaints against Athens, the Megarians bringing up the famous decree of Pericles. The arch-enemy then came forward and in stirring invective simply left Sparta no choice but to declare war. The Corinthian envoy prefaced his remarks by a most pointed criticism of Spartan dilatoriness leading them, he said, to what seemed positive neglect of Athenian schemes against both Corinth's colonies and the members of the Confederacy. Corcyra and Potidaea, Megara and Aegina, afforded a list of grave charges. It was not, however, so much Athens who had enslaved Greece as Sparta in neglecting to stop her. A wonderful contrast was then drawn between the Athenian and Spartan characters. If Sparta could only recognise the true mentality of her opponent she should have no hesitation about declaring war.<sup>27</sup>

Some Athenians who happened to be at Sparta took occasion to justify the conduct of their city, with the result that their speech, if anything, added to the effect of the Corinthian

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 58.

<sup>26</sup> Hubbell would put the first meeting of the council on September 18, 432 B. C., and the second between September 25 and 30. Cf. *Cl. Phil.*, XXIV, 1929, p. 225.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 67-72.

criticisms. It showed that the Corinthian exposition of the case was true, and that Athens really meant to retain her empire and maintain her position as the leading power of Hellas. The Athenian speaker justified the Athenian Empire in its growth and in its present condition. He urged Sparta not lightly to undertake a war against so powerful a foe. While offering arbitration he boastfully asserted that though Athens did not want war, she would know how to strike if war came. She was, then, going to make no concessions, and considered that she had justly acquired what she possessed. Sparta's pride was at last roused, her dormant jealousy finally awakened.<sup>28</sup> In her deliberative assembly, composed of Lacedaemonians alone, the majority immediately accepted the Corinthian point of view. King Archidamus was the only one to raise a calculating voice. Sparta could not, he maintained, under present circumstances hope to contend successfully with Athens. He, therefore, while recognising the justice of Corinth's expostulations, advised the Spartans to delay yet a while and make adequate preparations for embarking on so colossal an enterprise. His watchword was "the more haste, the less speed." But while they equipped themselves properly for the contest, let them try to avoid the perilous task by attempting arbitration. They could lose nothing by waiting but rather gain all by adequate preparation; let them send ambassadors to Athens to inveigh against her action in regard to Potidaea and the other grievances of which the members of the confederacy complained.<sup>29</sup>

Sthenelaidas, the ephor, concluded the debate, who, though his speech was really a refutation of Archidamus' point of view, never mentioned this but turned upon the Athenians in a short but bitter invective:

I do not understand these long speeches of the Athenians. They have lauded themselves to the skies but they have made no attempt to refute the charges against them—that they are guilty of injustice

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<sup>28</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 72-78.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 79-85.

to our allies and Peloponnesus. If in former days they proved good men against the Medes and are now evildoers against us, they are worthy of double the punishment, since they have, from being good, become evil. But we are the same now as then, and if we behave like reasonable men we will not overlook the unjust treatment of our allies, nor will we delay to help them, seeing that they cannot delay their sufferings. Others indeed have money and ships and horses, but we have brave allies whom we must not betray to Athens. Nor must we adjudicate by arbitration and by words, when they are practicing injustice not by word merely. We must on the contrary help them with all speed and with all our strength, and let no one point out to us how we ought to deliberate when we are being wronged. It behooves those who intend to do wrong to deliberate for a long time. Therefore, Lacedaemonians, vote for war in a manner worthy of Sparta, and do not allow the Athenians to become more powerful than they are. Let us not betray our allies completely, but let us with the aid of the Gods attack the wrong-doers.<sup>80</sup>

If Archidamus' words of consideration had damped in any degree the suddenly awakened ardour of the Spartans, Sthenelaidas' powerful speech annulled their effect and fired his audience still more. Their minds were now all aglow with enthusiasm for war and hatred of Athens. He put the question to the vote and the vast majority declared for war. The allies were recalled and told of the Lacedaemonian vote. A general assembly of all the confederates was then arranged by Sparta to vote for war in common. Thucydides again emphasizes the fact that Sparta's final decision was the result not so much of the speeches of her allies as of the fear of Athens and her growing power. So it was; but if it had not been for Corinth's untiring representation of Athens' doings and intentions, Sparta's fears would have remained dormant. This Thucydides implicitly acknowledges in the speeches which he puts into the mouths of the Corinthians, though he does not directly draw attention to the fact. "Thucydides makes it quite clear that she (Sparta) would have ignored the causes of the disputes of the period preceding the Pelopon-

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<sup>80</sup> Thuc., I, 86.

nesian War had Corinth allowed her to do so.”<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, Thucydides’ considered judgment, that the real cause of the war was Spartan fear of Athenian aggrandisement, has been questioned, but his diagnosis is absolutely tenable.

Sparta might well be afraid of Athens notwithstanding the humiliation of 446. Her power was growing enormously. Mr. Grundy cannot understand why fear of Attic expansion should have been the determining factor in making Sparta go to war in 431 when Athens was really far weaker than she had been from 460 to 450.<sup>32</sup> This implied rejection of Thucydides’ statement of the real cause has been, we think, fully answered by Mr. G. Dickins:<sup>33</sup>

It is true that Athens was weaker in 431 than she had been in 460, but this is not an adequate statement of the facts. For, in the first place, the Athenian expansion of the sixties had actually driven Sparta to war. Few would deny that the war which broke out in 461 was due to Spartan fear of Attic expansion, and that war went on until more by Athenian disasters than by Spartan valour it came to a successful end in 445. Sparta, in the shape of the ephors, did not desire the annihilation of Athens, but her strict adherence to the *status quo* of 477, to the dual hegemony, and to a purely maritime empire. Attic expansion in the sixties had made her fear that the balance of power was threatened. The peace of 445 fulfilled, or nearly fulfilled, Spartan desires and forced a re-acceptance of the *status quo*.

But if Athens was weaker in 431 than she had been in 460, she was far stronger than she had been in 445. Since the peace, she had repaired her treasury and fleet, had put down all disaffection in her league, and was on the point of stretching out her arms to Sicily. The *status quo* was threatened again in 431 very much, as it had been in 461, and the expansion of 445 to 433 was analogous to that of 477 to 461.

There is a further consideration, however. Notwithstanding the set-back of 445, Athens was in such a position of superiority to Sparta as compared with their relative standing

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<sup>31</sup> Grundy, *Thuc. and Hist. of his Age*, p. 234.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 323, 408, 409.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Dickins in *Cl. Quart.*, Oct., 1911, pp. 238 ff.

after the retreat of the Persians, that Sparta cannot have failed to recognise it, though, by reason of her natural temperament and the fact that the matter was not brought home to her by any definite events or by the representations of any member of her confederacy, she had taken no serious measures against the Athenian empire. The case, however, was quite clear when Corinth, the *enfant terrible*, as Dr. Grundy calls her, of the Peloponnesian confederacy, had, for the safety of her commerce, to make Sparta fight, and stopped at nothing in achieving that end. As Thucydides himself puts it, after his summary of events from 478 to 435:

During this time the Athenians had made their empire stronger, and they themselves reached a high degree of power. Though the Lacedaemonians saw it, they did not prevent it, except for a short while, but remained quiet most of this time, being, even before this, slow to fight unless they were compelled. Besides, they were still during that time hampered by wars at home. But now the increase in the power of the Athenians could be no longer overlooked, and they were laying hands on Sparta's allies. They could no longer endure it. They resolved therefore that they must make the attempt to devote all their energies to destroying their enemy's power, if they could, by embarking upon the war.<sup>34</sup>

The general meeting of the confederates which Sparta had proclaimed was the next event. In the meantime, the Corinthians, to make assurance doubly sure, had gone the round of the different states impressing upon them the necessity for war. They were on their guard against any possible hitch in the proceedings, fearing that Potidaea might be utterly lost.<sup>35</sup> Envoys from the states made their complaints once more and repeated their demand for immediate war. The Corinthians, after all had uttered the sentiments in which they themselves had schooled them, came forward last and showed clearly, once again, that they were chiefly responsible for the war.

This final speech <sup>36</sup> was a popular appeal to the suscepti-

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 118. Cf. Adcock, "Anc. Gk. Diplomacy," *Proc. Class. Assoc.*, 1924, p. 98.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 119.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 120-125.



bilities of the allies. It consists of a string of common-places calculated at once to alarm and inspire the audience:

Your political freedom is at stake and your means of livelihood no less. Yet do not shrink; we are bound to win: "We have the men, we have the ships, we have the money too"; or if we have not at the moment, we very soon will have. If we do not hang together we'll hang separately. But if we are united, Heaven will help us. Finally, if we are Dorians worthy of the name, we cannot leave a Dorian city to its fate.

Like all efforts of the kind down to the most recent times, the speech will not bear too accurate an examination. How far Athens was an economic danger to the minor states of Peloponnesus, is a disputed question on which something will be said later. It is strange to find that the ten years' war which followed was not marked by the adoption of any of the proposed schemes. The Peloponnesians did not obtain money from Olympia and Delphi; they did not produce a secession of Athenian allies; they did not, through mercenaries or otherwise, defeat the Athenians on sea, nor did they establish a fortified post in Attica. Lastly, the small nationality, Potidaea, for whose defence honour bade them arm, was lost to the Dorians before the war had well got under weigh. The speech, however, served Corinth's purpose in fanning the enthusiasm for war and producing a conviction of certain victory.

The foregoing pages have attempted to reproduce Thucydides' statement of the case as a whole. It is very easy to take a particular statement a writer has made, or even a group of statements, and to form from them a plausible criticism, whereas if one reads the writer's exposition as a whole, one sees the case in an entirely different aspect. Therefore each point has been given as Thucydides deals with it. It has been shown in addition that, though he leaves the inference to the reader, Corinth was to him the prime instigator of the trouble.

Let us now return to the modern critics of Thucydides. They have rationalised him to such a degree as in some cases

actually to imply that he did not know how to write history, in others that he was quite ignorant of the problem of food supply in the Greece of his own day and the important part it played in international politics. This kind of criticism began as early as 1899 with Nissen, who was severely taken to task by both Busolt and Beloch; and, in spite of the fact that Eduard Meyer<sup>37</sup> discusses the problem in great detail, and establishes, beyond any reasonable doubt, the reliability of the Thucydidean account, there are several writers both in England and Germany who treat us from time to time to a reconstruction, in whole or in part, of the "real facts of the case."<sup>38</sup> In a short work like the present all these arguments cannot be dealt with. Only such as have any connection with Corinth's part in the war can come up for consideration. Mr. Cornford thinks that Thucydides, for all his elaborate professions, *assigns no 'cause'* and, in fact, did not know the meaning of a 'cause' as we understand it. The Megarian Decree, which was, according to him, the 'real cause', Thucydides hardly mentions except in an entirely incidental fashion, and as a matter, in reality, of trifling importance.

There are said to have been three Megarian Decrees,<sup>39</sup> of which the most stringent was passed probably in 432. It excluded Megarian products, not only from Athens itself but from all the ports within the Athenian empire. What was the object of this decree? Thucydides tells us that Athens' excuse for putting on the embargo was that Megara had cultivated the sacred borderland and harboured runaway slaves, but plainly this is not his own view. The probable reason is that Athens was led to punish Megara for her part in the

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<sup>37</sup> *Forschungen*, II, pp. 304-326.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. also the valuable defence of Thucydides by Porzio, *Atene, Corinto, Pericle*, especially pp. 64-88. Note, too, this writer's remarks on Corinth's interest in the war, pp. 30-33.

<sup>39</sup> Fully discussed by Bonner, *Cl. Phil.*, XVI, pp. 238 ff. Cf. Highbarger, *The History and Civilization of Ancient Megara* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Archaeology, No. 2), pp. 160-172.

battle of Sybota.<sup>40</sup> The fact, however, that Thucydides does not trouble to give the real reason shows how little importance he attaches to the Decree. Mr. Cornford, however, reads the greatest significance into the Decree, and imagines that Thucydides has minimised it in order to save the reputation of his friend Pericles. The Decree was forced on Pericles by the traders of the Peiraeus, who could not tolerate the thought of Corinth controlling the isthmus and exacting toll on every article they exported to, or imported from, the west. Corinth, however, was too strong to be attacked. They would therefore reduce Megara by a process of starvation and so obtain a position equal to that of Corinth on the isthmus. They would then pay no more toll. "What would become of the riches of Corinth when the Peiraeus had established an alternative channel for trade across the isthmus"?<sup>41</sup>

In this clever hypothesis Mr. Cornford is ably seconded by another eminent supplementer of Thucydides. Dr. Grundy,<sup>42</sup> speaking of the significance of the Megarian Decree, remarks:

Of the gravity of the decree, he (Thucydides) neither expresses nor implies an opinion. But there is much reason to believe that its issue was an act of tremendous significance in the politics of the day, and it is possible to conjecture wherein that significance lay. Without prejudging the question of the population of the Megarid, the general fact may be stated that it was very great, relative to the productiveness of the territory of the state. Megara had ceased to play a prominent part in the carrying trade of Greece, but she had retained her prominence in the world of manufactures. Her population was certainly far larger than could be supplied by a region of small area, the greater part of which was absolutely unproductive. The exclusion of the Megarian from the Attic market meant his exclusion from all participation in the food products of the Pontus region, the most important source of corn-supply for the Greek world. To a state situated as Megara, the decree meant starvation; to her colleagues in the Peloponnesian League it meant that Athens aimed at getting control of the isthmus by forcing Megara to submission. Moreover, if Athens were allowed to mete such measure to

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. Bury, *Hist. of Greece*, p. 394.

<sup>41</sup> *Thuc. Mythistoricus*, p. 36.

<sup>42</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 78.

Megara with impunity, she might extend the policy to the other states of the Peloponnesian League; and there were doubtless many of them to whom an exclusion from this source of corn-supply would have been a serious matter.

The only basis for all this conjecture is the comic description of Aristophanes in his *Acharnians*, where he introduces a starving Megarian who tells a piteous tale of the acute famine in Megara. But need we believe things which the poet says to make his audience laugh? Are they to be taken for sober history? <sup>43</sup> The comic picture of the importance of the decree is as worthy of acceptance as the story of the stealing of Aspasia's courtesans.<sup>44</sup> What, on the other hand, are the facts? The Sicilian corn supply of which Dr. Grundy speaks, was, in his theory, completely cut off by the Athenian fleet at Naupactus. On his showing also, Megara got nothing from the Pontic region. How, then, did she live throughout the whole ten years' war? With no supplies available from either herself or the Pontus, Megara, withal, stood a starvation of ten years. Not only that, but Athens in addition to the squadron stationed at Salamis to watch Nisaea, thought it incumbent on her to invade the Megarid <sup>45</sup> twice each year in the hope of gaining it—hardly a necessary mode of procedure against a state on the verge of absolute starvation. The first incursion into the Megarid was made by the entire Athenian forces, including the metics, led by Pericles. The army was the largest with which Athens had ever invaded any single place and was backed up by the fleet. They effected nothing, but ravaged the country. If the Megarians were starving could they have withstood so formidable an attack? Could they have endured the invasions actually made twice each year by the whole of the Athenian forces? Could they have supported the Peloponnesian garrison which had to defend Nisaea? Finally, it was not till civil strife broke out

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<sup>43</sup> Cf. Porzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-64, 80.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Aristoph., *Achar.*, 524.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Thuc., II, 31; IV, 66.

that this post came into possession of the Athenians. We may admit that the Megarians were very much straitened for supplies, but that the Decree appeared to Corinth and Sparta in any other light than that in which Thucydides placed it, is the purest conjecture.

In what light did the Megarian Decree present itself to Thucydides? Corinth, he plainly shows, attached no importance to it. Neither did Sparta when deliberating on the desirability or necessity of war. Yet, in the final negotiations they gave the Athenians to understand that if the Decree were annulled, war would not come. Corinth had actually been ready to bargain about it, as Professor Bury<sup>46</sup> well shows:

Corinth now said to her (Athens) in effect: "Leave us a free hand in dealing with Coreyra and we will leave you a free hand in dealing with Megara." The Corinthian ambassador put this diplomatically, at least in his speech before the popular assembly. He did not say: "You have improper designs on Megara and we will connive." He said: "Your conduct in regard to Megara has been open to suspicion; you can allay these suspicions by doing what we ask." It came to the same thing.

This proposition on the part of Corinth shows that in her eyes, the independence of Megara was not of crucial importance. Her interests there weighed much less than her interests elsewhere. It was the alliance of Athens with Coreyra, followed by the affair of Potidaea, that determined the collision of Corinth with Athens, and it was this collision which precipitated a war which would in any case have come later. On the other hand, once war was decided on by Corinth and the war-party at Sparta, the grievance of Megara formed an imposing item in the list of Peloponnesian complaints and the alliance of Athens with Coreyra, though it had been the first of the effective causes which led to the war, could not appear at all. It could not be represented as either illegal or immoral. The attack on Potidaea could form a count, but it arose out of a complicated situation and a great deal could be said on both sides. It was, therefore, an obvious stroke of diplomatic tactics to move the Megarian question into the foremost place and represent the cruelty of Athens to Megara as the principal of her offences. The Lacedaemonians said: "Yield on this question and there will be no war." It was a demand which no proud state, in the position of Athens,

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<sup>46</sup> *Anc. Gk. Historians*, pp. 97, 98, quoting Thuc., I, 42.



could have granted, and concession would have been simply an invitation for further commands. The reply was: "We deny your right to dictate; but we are perfectly willing to submit all your complaints to arbitration in accordance with the instrument of the Thirty Years' Peace."

Notwithstanding this convincing answer to Mr. Cornford's criticism of Thucydides' attitude to the Megarian Decree, we find Dr. Grundy again magnifying its importance. This writer who reconstitutes for us, that we may understand Thucydides, the economic background determining the course of events, which their contemporary historian knew nothing about, sees, as might be expected, in the Megarian Decree a very cogent reason for war. On the authority of Thucydides (I. 119) he says that "Corinth seems to have won over the other Peloponnesian states to her side before she succeeded in getting the adherence of Sparta." This statement he explains by an incidental reference in the Corinthian speech, at the second assembly of the allies, to the dependence of the inland on the maritime states for their food supply. The states on the coast are, presumably, Sicyon, Corinth itself, and Megara. The members of the Peloponnesian League were therefore intimately concerned with the embargo on Megara. Their sympathy with Megara (which is an assumption of Dr. Grundy,<sup>47</sup> for Thucydides says nothing about it) "cannot be attributed to a feeling of *esprit de corps* among members of the league, for the league was essentially one which had been forced upon them by Sparta. It cannot have been because they feared Athens was trying to force Megara into the same relations with regard to her as had existed in the fifties of the century. That was a matter which was important to Sparta, to whom the blocking of the Isthmus would have meant a dangerous increase of that influence which she had for her own safety to exercise in Northern Greece, and to Boeotia and Corinth as neighbours of the Megarid. The attitude of the members of the Peloponnesian League is only

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<sup>47</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 325 ff.

explicable on the assumption that the real significance of the decrees was that they excluded Megara from participation in the Pontus corn-trade; and that the measure which Athens had already meted out to Megara might in the future be meted out to them also."

This imaginary attitude of the Peloponnesian states is neither expressed nor implied in Thucydides. Dr. Grundy's only ground for such a far-fetched hypothesis seems to be his statement quoted above—that Corinth won over the other states of the League before she succeeded in getting Sparta. This, as far as my examination goes, cannot be got from Thucydides (I, 119). Already in Ch. 87, after Sthenelaidas' speech, Sparta had declared for war. Dr. Grundy's account is inconsistent with itself. If Megara imported only enough for her own needs from the Pontic region in exchange for her textile exports, what interest could the Peloponnesian states have in an embargo on Megarian trade? Dr. Grundy himself says in a passage cited above that the Megarians no longer possessed a carrying trade of importance. Hence the cessation of trade between Megara and the Athenian empire could have directly affected the Peloponnesian states but little. Nor is it easy to understand the purport of the last sentence of the passage just quoted. On the previous page Dr. Grundy has thus paraphrased the warning of the Corinthians to the inland allies:

If you let the Athenians get hold of Coreyra, the route to Sicily, and, consequently, the Sicilian corn trade, will be in their hands. Of course, states like Corinth, which actually carry on that trade, will suffer most, but your turn will come when you are unable to obtain through Corinth that corn which you purchase through your manufactures and home-grown commodities.

From this it may be inferred that the inland states, in Dr. Grundy's opinion, obtained their supplies from the west per Corinth. If this be so, how could the exclusion of Megara from the Pontic corn-trade be regarded with alarm, as a measure which might in the future be meted out to them also?

Too much entirely is made of the Megarian Decree, and, when everything is considered, Thucydides holds his place against all his critics.<sup>48</sup> Mr. Cornford's clever exposition of its enormous importance is totally unreasonable. Especially so is the suggestion that the Decree was forced upon Pericles by the Peiraeus traders, and that Thucydides has deliberately suppressed this fact. But Dr. Grundy<sup>49</sup> will not, for all the importance he attaches to it, accept so extreme a suggestion as this.

Why he should have suppressed such a fact, had it been a fact, it is difficult to conceive. His admiration for Perikles, his obvious belief that the war brought ruin to that Periklean democracy of which he admired so many elements, would have led him to dissociate his hero from a responsibility for the beginning of that course of events which was to lead to such disaster. Yet he is emphatic in his assertion that Perikles is an out-and-out supporter of a war policy.

Yet Dr. Grundy cannot rid himself of the idea of the extreme significance of the Megarian Decrees. He thinks that they "were probably issued to bring to an end, a state of disturbed peace far more dangerous to Athens, with a number of discontented allies on her hands, than a state of actual war. The war must come; it was better that it should come soon." This is a strange statement. Surely any state could deal better with discontented allies in peace than in war. With her forces unimpaired and undivided, Athens was more likely to be able to suppress discontent in any quarter than she could do when engaged, with her forces scattered, in watching the various departments of the Peloponnesian Confederacy, and when her enemies were bound to be continually on the *qui vive* to foster or aid her discontented subjects.

It may be finally asked why Corinth at any rate was not more anxious about the Megarian Decree. If Athens had

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<sup>48</sup> Cf. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alt. Ges.*, II, pp. 296-327. Cf. also Porzio, *Atene, Corinto, Pericle*, passim, particularly valuable for its criticisms of Beloch; and Deonna, *L'Éternel Présent*, especially opening chapter.

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 328.

really intended to starve Megara into submission by stopping her exports, why did Corinth not draw attention to the fact? If Megara were reduced thus, Corinth would then be in the exact position which she had fought so strenuously against in the fifties. Athens would not only be her immediate neighbour but have equal control of the isthmus and of the Corinthian Gulf. What Corcyra was in the west, Megara would have been in the east, a standing menace to Corinth's commerce. Hemmed in on two sides and confronted by Corcyra, Naupactus, and Pegae, Corinth would have been totally helpless. Corinth's attitude to the Megarian Decree was a totally secondary consideration and, as Bury pointed out, only to be used as a plausible grievance in the final negotiations. This was what after events showed. Megara not only withstood the supposed starvation, but invasions twice yearly by the whole Athenian forces failed to reduce it. Unless we suppose that Thucydides consistently suppressed the importance of the Decree by magnifying the stout resistance the Megarians made, we must accept the place he assigns it in considering the causes of the war. Dickins well says:

Our conclusion, then, on the whole matter is that the criticism of Thucydides has failed and that his ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις still holds. The position of affairs after 440 was an enriched and growing Athens on the one side, watched on the other by a jealous Sparta with a war-party always on the *qui vive*.

To this powder-magazine comes the spark of the Corintho-Corcyraean difference. What was Pericles to do? He had not yet begun to save for war, because he did not anticipate it so soon, though he knew, as all Greece did, that it was inevitable in the end. If he let Corcyra go, he was losing 200 ships (Corcyra would never have fought Corinth without Attic help), and he would have lost his bridge to the west. If he accepted, he made war certain, as soon as Sparta realized the position; but he would have his bridge to the west, and he thought Athens was impregnable. She was to be on the defensive throughout, and Sparta was at last to admit that she could do nothing. Then the Peloponnesian League would break up, as it had done in 473 and 464, and as it actually did in 421. Athens would be left mistress of the Greek world.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> *L. c.*, pp. 247 f. Cf. however, Grundy, *Cl. Quart.*, VII, pp. 59-62.

Though Corinth contributed so much to the declaration of hostilities, we do not find her in a very prominent position in the actual fighting of the ten years' war. But we may be sure that, though we have not detailed accounts of her part in each action of the struggle, she was nevertheless behind the scenes, guiding and controlling events. We cannot, however, narrate in detail the whole campaign, but must select those parts of it in which Corinth actually was, or was likely to be involved. For this purpose, no section of the struggle is so interesting as the operations in Northwest Greece, which lasted unremittingly for seven years from the outbreak of the war.

The scene of conflict was the Corinthian Gulf and the northwestern coast-line, along which the Corinthian colonies lay. These were particularly implicated in it, and the fact that they were, is enough to assure us that Corinth was the chief opponent of Athens in that region. In the very first year of the war, we find an Athenian fleet which cruised around Peloponnese capturing the Corinthian colony of Sollium on the Acarnanian coast.<sup>51</sup> On the same occasion they took a place called Astacus (which Dr. Grundy wrongly states to be a Corinthian colony also). They further won over Cephallenia, and this gave them the control of the approach to the Corinthian Gulf, the mouth of which they already controlled from Naupactus. That winter, however, the Corinthians made an attempt to gain Astacus,<sup>52</sup> evidently intending to make up for the loss of Sollium. They also made an unsuccessful attempt on Cephallenia, which Athens had so recently acquired. In the summer of 430 the Peloponnesian fleet attacked Zacynthus without result.<sup>53</sup> In the autumn the Athenian fleet sailed to the help of the Amphilochean Argives, who had been expelled by the Ambraciots. Amphilochean

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As we read proofs, we find a new champion of Thucydides in C. N. Cochrane, *Thuc. and the Science of History*.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Thuc., II, 30.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Thuc., II, 33.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Thuc., II, 66.



Argos, which was situated on the eastern shore of the Ambracian Gulf, was always in a state of hostility towards the Corinthian colony in the north. It is quite likely that the action of the Ambraciots was instigated by Corinth. Phormio<sup>54</sup> arrived with thirty ships, and restored the Amphilochians, selling the Ambracian occupants of their town into slavery. Towards winter, he took up his station at Naupactus, having been sent there with twenty ships, Thucydides tells us, to prevent any one sailing into or out of Corinth and the Crissaeon Gulf. Next year (429) the Lacedaemonians, urged on by Corinth in her anxiety about her allies, made a determined effort, at the request of Ambracia, to get hold of Acarnania. Cnemus, the commander of the expedition, advanced as far as Stratus, where his large and motley army suffered a severe defeat.<sup>55</sup> In the meantime the Corinthians had sent a fleet intended to support Cnemus, which was badly defeated by Phormio in the open sea outside the mouth of the Gulf.

The Spartans, however, made more determined efforts still. Three commissioners were sent out to reorganise the fleet and advise the commander.<sup>56</sup> Cnemus took up his position at Panormus on the coast of Achaea, near the narrows of the Gulf, and Phormio was stationed at Antirrhium on the opposite coast. By most skilful tactics, Phormio turned what was likely to be a defeat into a victory off Naupactus.<sup>57</sup> Phormio, towards winter in the same year, made an expedition into Acarnania to assure himself of Athenian ascendancy in all the towns of that region. Those whom he distrusted he expelled. He had intended attacking Oeniadae, the only Acarnanian town which, for one reason or another, supported the Peloponnesians. He was, however, prevented from doing so by the floods of the Achelous, on the banks of which Oeniadae was built.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Cf. Thuc., II, 68, 69.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Thuc., II, 80-82.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Thuc., II, 85.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Thuc., II, 86-92.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Thuc., II, 102.

Phormio at this stage seems to disappear from the war, for next summer (428) we find his son Asopius renewing the attempt which his father had made on Oeniadae.<sup>59</sup> He failed and was slain in a descent on Leucas.

These operations in the Acarnanian region must have been a great distress to the Corinthians. Not only was the mastery which the Athenians had plainly established in the Gulf, vexatious to them, but they were in actual terror for the fate of their most important colonies. Anactorium hitherto had escaped, but the Ambraciots had been severely punished by Phormio for their interference with the Amphilochians. Leucas was also attacked, and though the expedition had failed, Corinth did not know what was to happen to her colonies next, with the Athenians possessing the mastery they did in her own gulf and in the very region where she had centred all her thoughts and had hoped to establish an empire.

During 427 there was a lull in the operations in the Acarnanian region, probably due to the attention of the Athenians being directed to the civil war in Corcyra. We need not enter into the story of this bloody episode, perhaps the worst instance of the appalling results of the revolutionary spirit, when once let loose, in the life of Greece.

Next year, while the internecine outrages in Corcyra were still at their height, a new Athenian general appeared to take the place of Phormio and Asopius. Demosthenes sailed round the Peloponnese and renewed the attempt on Leucas. Before he had accomplished anything he was persuaded by the Messenians of Naupactus to make an expedition into Aetolia. Here he met with disaster and, worse still, alienated the Acarnanians, who had been disgusted at his abandonment of Leucas, which they thought he could take by blockade.<sup>60</sup> He returned with difficulty to Naupactus, but soon had a chance of retrieving his fame, for the Peloponnesians, at the request of the Aetolians, had sent a force to attack Naupactus

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<sup>59</sup> Cf. Thuc., III, 7.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Thuc., III, 94-98.

by way of retaliation. Demosthenes, who was with the remnant of his defeated army in the neighbourhood of Naupactus, persuaded the Acarnanians to come to the assistance of that town, and so saved the place. The Peloponnesian forces retired to the neighbourhood of Pleuron and Calydon, with the intention of helping the Ambraciots in another attack on Amphilocheian Argos. Towards the winter, the Ambraciots marched down and took the fort of Olpae, situated on a hill by the Ambracian Gulf, a little north of Argos. The Peloponnesian forces marched northwards to join their allies; Demosthenes leading the Acarnanians and the Argives inflicted a signal defeat on them between Olpae and Argos. By a most politic arrangement with the Lacedaemonian commander, intended by Demosthenes to throw complete discredit on the Peloponnesians, the Ambraciots were treacherously deserted by their allies and were slaughtered. A greater disaster still was to be inflicted upon them. Reinforcements from the town, approaching as they thought to help in the battle, were ambushed by Demosthenes at Idomene, a few miles north of Olpae. Vast numbers of them were slain, so many that Thucydides says he would not venture to tell how many, as it would seem incredible for the size of the city. He tells us further that during the whole war no state suffered so great a calamity in so few days. He paints a sorry picture of their almost total annihilation and of the anguish and despair of their herald, who had come from the flying Ambraciots after the first day's defeat, when he heard of the second and greater disaster. Demosthenes wished to take the town itself, but the Acarnanians dissented, though it would have presented no difficulty. They did not want the Athenians to settle so near them, considering, we are told, that they would be worse neighbours than the Ambraciots.<sup>61</sup>

This was a terrible blow to Corinth. Her most faithful ally was utterly reduced. The Athenians had not only mastery of the gulf but had the whole of Acarnania most actively

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<sup>61</sup> Cf. *Thuc.*, III, 100-102; 105-114.

engaged on their behalf and especially anxious to secure Leucas.<sup>62</sup> Hence Leucas was in perpetual danger and narrowly escaped being captured by Demosthenes, when he abandoned it to take on the Aetolian expedition. Cephallenia, a few miles south of it, was in the hands of Athens; so that she could invade it at a moment's notice.

Corinth now found herself in this position: Chalcis, lost in 454, had actually become an Athenian base of operations (Thuc., II, 83). Sollium had been taken in the first year of the war. Ambracia had been bled white. Leucas might be taken at any moment, and the Acarnanians had openly shown by the terms of peace which they, in union with the Amphilocians, had concluded with Ambracia after its reduction that the last remaining colony of Corinth on the mainland, Anactorium, was not to be spared long. For they had made it one of the conditions that Ambracia should not assist Anactorium,<sup>63</sup> and so it fell out. The very next year (425) Anactorium was captured by a combined force of Athenians and Acarnanians,<sup>64</sup> and in 424 the long sought Oeniadae was reduced by Acarnania, and forced to join the Athenian alliance.<sup>65</sup>

The only other Corinthian colony was Apollonia. We hear nothing of it in the war, but it too was undoubtedly lost to Corinth, for it could not, even if it so desired, have remained faithful to the metropolis. The Athenian fleet at Coreyra and the army of occupation in Epidamnus would have reduced it in a moment. Corinth therefore lost by the war not only whatever advantages she had derived from a neutral Coreyra, but Epidamnus, Apollonia, Ambracia, Anactorium, Sollium; Coreyra which long ago had foiled Corinth's hopes of establishing an empire, had now, by her unmitigated and untiring hostility, brought Corinth into the position of a mother robbed of her children.

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<sup>62</sup> Cf. Thuc., III, 95.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Thuc., III, 114.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Thuc., IV, 49.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Thuc., IV, 77. :

Dr. Grundy<sup>66</sup> has explained all this fighting in the region of the Corinthian Gulf and North-West Greece as manifesting the desire of the Peloponnesians to turn the position of Coreyra by establishing an overland corn-route from Oeniadae along the line—Stratus, Acarnanian lakes, Limnae, Amphiloehian Argos, Ambracia; and thence by road near the coast to Apollonia and Epidamnus. This imaginary route, not even hinted at by Thucydides, would have had to pass through a hostile country for over sixty miles, till it reached the first friendly place, Ambracia. Surely the Peloponnesians did not dream of this impossible route. And are we to suppose that Apollonia was still faithful to Corinth? The idea is most improbable when one considers the combined Athenian and Corcyraean fleet ready to pounce upon it in a moment from Coreyra. Dr. Grundy's fixing on Epidamnus as the terminus of this dangerous and difficult route cannot be explained. Had not Coreyra reduced that town before the war started at all? Mr. Dickins<sup>67</sup> lets the suggestion off very lightly when he says:

The theory that the Peloponnesians gravely proposed to import corn overland from a point north of Coreyra, through modern Albania and Aetolia to Oeniadae, and thence by sea to Cyllene is hardly credible. Not only would it be impossible physically and financially to import corn on mule-back through a wild stretch of barren country, but the Athenian privateers from Naupactus and Cephallenia would have stopped it at the end of its long journey.

In any case, the object assigned by Dr. Grundy to the Peloponnesian activities in North-West Greece was not attained. Any foreign corn they imported continued to come by sea. Hence, either the Athenian blockade of Peloponnesus of which Dr. Grundy makes so much, was not very successful, or the amount of foreign corn required not very great, or the Peloponnesians, during the last years before the Peace of Nicias, were very hungry. Dr. Grundy, it is true, ob-

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<sup>66</sup> *Thuc. and Hist. of his Age*, pp. 348-359.

<sup>67</sup> *L. c.*



serves: "With the Attic market closed and the Gulf blockaded by the squadron at Naupactus, it is easy to believe that the starving Megarian of Aristophanes' play is not a fancy picture."<sup>68</sup> If the Megarian was starving, the Corinthian, as soon as his populous city was cut off from the Sicilian supply, must have found himself in a similar plight. Yet the Megarians and Corinthians were foremost in protesting against the peace, and in attempting to renew the war. If they had been starving for years before 421, they must have been endowed with truly dogged temperaments.

There is no evidence of famine in Peloponnesus outside Aristophanes' picture which, even if it were true, applies only to Megara. We are then driven to adopt one or both of the hypotheses, that the amount of foreign corn required was not very great, or the rigour of the blockade not very severe. In fact, from Thucydides' account of what went on in the Corinthian Gulf, we are inclined to infer that even here the Athenians attained only partial success in checking the movements of the Corinthian merchantmen. "The truth is that Dr. Grundy overestimates the possibilities of blockade. The history of the war itself is sufficient to show that an Athenian blockade of Peloponnesus was impossible."<sup>69</sup>

As to the significance of the fighting in North-West Greece, Bury's explanation seems preferable. In a short paragraph which he calls the "key to the operations of the war" he gives what appear to be the real reasons for the operations in that region. To quote his own words:<sup>70</sup>

The key to the war is the fundamental fact that it was waged between a power which was mainly continental and a power which was mainly maritime. From the nature of the case, the land-power is obliged to direct its attacks chiefly on the continental possessions of the sea-power, while the sea-power has to confine itself to attacking the maritime possessions of the land-power. It follows that the small land army of the sea-power and the small fleet of the

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<sup>68</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 340.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Dickins, *l. c.*

<sup>70</sup> *Hist. of Greece*, p. 399.

land-power are each mainly occupied with the work of defence, and are seldom free to act on the offensive. Hence the maritime possessions of the maritime power and the inland possessions of the continental power are not generally the scene of warfare. These considerations simplify the war. The points at which the Peloponnesians can attack Athens with their land forces are Attica itself and Thrace. But the war is hardly ever carried into the Aegean or Asiatic coast except in consequence of some special circumstance, such as the revolt of an Athenian ally. On the other hand, the offensive operations of Athens are mainly in the west of Greece, about the islands of the Ionian Sea and near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf. That was the region where they had the best prospect, by their naval superiority, of detaching members from the Peloponnesian alliance. Thrace, Attica, and the seas of Western Greece are, therefore, the chief and constant scenes of the war. There are episodes elsewhere, but they are to some extent accidental.

This "key" supplies an exact solution to the operations in the north-west. Athens, by her activities there, robbed Corinth of almost all her colonies. It has the additional advantage of making no demands on the account of Thucydides, as Dr. Grundy's hypothesis does. Athens confined herself to attacking the maritime possessions of the land power (i. e. Peloponnesus), and did so most successfully; but it was on Corinth the blow fell. She was not safe even at home. In the very same year that she lost her last colony on the mainland of Greece, Nicias made an attempt on Corinthian territory. It came immediately after Cleon's surprise success at Sphacteria, and was probably an attempt of Nicias to maintain his reputation in view of Cleon's recently acquired military glory; but (and this is a point not noticed by any of the historians), it may well have been the wish of Athens, after depriving her of her colonies, to attack Corinth herself next. Athens naturally regarded Corinth as the *fons et origo mali*. We cannot wonder if she went out of her way to do as much damage to her as possible, at first abroad, and afterwards at home. Thucydides describes the attack in detail and the fight round the hill and village of Solygeia, about seven miles from Corinth.<sup>71</sup> We need not delay over

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<sup>71</sup> Cf. Thuc., IV, 42-45.

his account of it, as it led to nothing in particular. After a partial success against the Corinthian forces, Nicias was glad to withdraw when reinforcements arrived from Corinth and Cenchreae and the neighbouring Peloponnesian states.

The rest of the ten years' war presents nothing of importance for Corinthian history. The Athenians failed in Boeotia in 424 and during the next two years lost their empire in Thrace. Corinth might well be glad of this. Even during this time a lull had come upon the war in Greece itself, and there was a year's truce in 423. Sparta, wearied out, was as anxious for peace as Athens. Nicias was for peace and so was Pleistoanax. The deaths of Cleon and Brasidas in 422, at the battle of Amphipolis, left the way open for Pleistoanax and Nicias, who thoroughly understood each other. So peace came early in 421.

The peace of Nicias,<sup>72</sup> however, was decidedly unfavourable to Corinth. She, who had done so much for the war, was evidently not considered by Sparta in the negotiations for peace. The understanding was in the main that there should be "a mutual restitution of prisoners and places captured during the war." Athens, however, insisted on retaining Corinth's two very important colonies, Solium and Anactorium, and Sparta gave way. Corinth was justly enraged at such weakness on Sparta's part. It was bad enough that the Lacedaemonian commander's treachery had brought destruction on her colony of Ambracia; but now that Solium and Anactorium were betrayed too, what might not Corinth devise against Sparta?

A most extraordinary concatenation of treaties and alliances now arises between the various Greek states. Argos, which had remained neutral during the war, produced by her activities a tangled skein of international relations. These it is not our business to unravel except in so far as Corinth was involved. It was Corinth that began the work. As Holm remarks: 'The Corinthians, who had been the cause of

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<sup>72</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 17-30.

the whole war, were the greatest malcontents.' So bitter was Corinth's hatred of Athens that the alliance that followed between the Athenians and Sparta was beyond measure exasperating. She sent to Argos and represented that Sparta could have no good intentions in this alliance with the Athenians whom she had previously hated so bitterly.<sup>73</sup> She was evidently planning to subdue the whole of Peloponnese; it was Argos' duty to see to its safety. Corinth therefore urged Argos to pass a decree inviting any Hellenic state that so wished, to make a defensive alliance with her. The Argives gladly acceded to the request; only Athens and Lacedaemon were excluded.<sup>74</sup> Argos was soon joined by Mantinea, Elis, and not long afterwards by the Corinthians themselves and the Chalcidians.

Sparta had previously tried to prevent Corinth from making this alliance, and accused her of being the cause of the agitation prevalent throughout Peloponnese. Sparta also represented to her that she could not desert her and ally herself with Argos without violating her oaths and thereby aggravating her wrong-doing in not accepting the treaty with Athens. Corinth answered by bringing forward the other allies—Boeotia and Megara—who had refused to accept the treaty. She did not give her real grievance, loss of her colonies; her pretext was that she could not desert her allies in Thrace, whom she had sworn to protect when they had revolted with Potidaea.<sup>75</sup>

So Corinth broke with Sparta. She combined with Argos in trying to bring over Tegea, but failed.<sup>76</sup> Her fears were now excited; she thought that no more states would join the alliance and that in this weak condition they were at the mercy of Athens. There was no hope of Megara and Boeotia, as they were prejudiced against the Argive democracy,<sup>77</sup> however much they disliked Sparta for her treatment of them

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<sup>73</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 27.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 28.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 29-30.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 32.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 31.

in the peace. The Boeotians had made a truce with Athens, terminable at ten days' notice; Corinth thought that if she had a similar understanding she need have no fears for her safety. First she urged the Boeotians to join the Argive alliance and, in addition, to obtain for her from Athens the same terms as they had themselves received. If the Athenians refused, let the Boeotians annul the armistice and make no truce in the future without Corinth. Boeotia would not accept the Argive alliance. Her intercession at Athens on Corinth's behalf proved vain, and so the proposed friendly relations came to nothing. Corinth's strained relations with Sparta were not destined to last long. The latter was distrusted by Athens owing to her inability to compel her allies to accede to the terms of the peace.<sup>78</sup> A change of ephors at Sparta resulted in the reconciliation of Corinth. The newly-elected officers were opposed to the peace treaty and favoured an alliance with Argos. They advised Boeotia and Corinth to act as much as possible together. They urged Boeotia to join the Argive alliance, and they gave both the Corinthian and Boeotian envoys at Lacedaemon instructions to try to bring Sparta herself into the Argive alliance.<sup>79</sup> The attempt fell through both at Thebes and Sparta, but Corinth's great gain was to have assured herself against any possible action on the part of Athens. This she exceedingly feared, as is shown by her behaviour after the set-back at Tegea. For the present she almost drops out of the story, till the breach between Athens and Sparta took place as the result of Alcibiades' machinations.<sup>80</sup> Athens then made an alliance with Argos, Elis and Mantinea, which placed Corinth in a rather peculiar position.<sup>81</sup> In the first place, the old alliance between Athens and Sparta remained. Then Corinth, which was an ally of Argos, would not accede to the new alliance of Argos and the Athenians. "The Corinthians," says Thucydides, "stood

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<sup>78</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 35.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 42-46.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 36, 38.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 47.



aloof from their allies and again turned their thoughts to Sparta."<sup>82</sup>

Corinth at this time seemed to be hovering between the Argive-Athenian and the Spartan alliance. She was naturally very wroth with Sparta for her treatment of her in the peace; but still this feeling was only of recent growth and perhaps, after all, she may have come to recognize that Sparta had to make concessions. Her hatred for Athens on the other hand was of too long standing to permit of any compromise now. Athens was more powerful than ever, and had crippled Corinthian commerce to such a degree during the war that Corinth could not but detest her all the more. So Corinth wavers while both sides court her favour, as is shown by a passing remark of Thucydides, "The Argives and the allies came to Corinth to try and bring her over. They found the Lacedaemonians there before them."<sup>83</sup> A long discussion followed, both sides urging their claims on the sulking state; but before any decision had been adopted, an earthquake occurred, which compelled the dissolution of the conference. Corinth, however, showed her hostility to Athens next year (419). Alcibiades, who had made a tour of the Peloponnese, induced the people of Patrae to build long walls down to the sea. He also proceeded to build himself a fort on the promontory of Rhium at the mouth of the Gulf. This would naturally be an additional menace to the Corinthians and they therefore came up with the Sicyonians and prevented him.<sup>84</sup> Alcibiades and the Argives exerted themselves very strenuously to gain Epidaurus, which bounded the Corinthia on the south. Their object was to secure the neutrality of Corinth by the occupation of her southern frontier.<sup>85</sup> These intentions must have finally decided Corinth to join her old ally; for next year (418) we find her contributing 2,000 hoplites to the Lacedaemonian forces against Argolis.

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<sup>82</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 48.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 50.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 52.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 53.

The Corinthians also came to render assistance at Mantinea, but were late for the battle and so returned home.<sup>86</sup>

The defeat of Mantinea broke up the Argive-Athenian alliance and confirmed Corinth in her re-adoption of the Lacedaemonian. During 417 and 416, for some reason or other, she remained inactive in the war between Argos and Sparta. Corinth, however, was now again definitely reconciled to Sparta, though we hear no more of her doings till her entry into the great conflict which at last brought her hated rival to her knees.

Athens had long been devoting her attentions to Western Greece beyond the seas. As early as the days of Themistocles this tendency may be observed. Dr. Grundy has pointed out<sup>87</sup> that Themistocles, fearing that the Persians might at any moment cut off the Pontic corn-supply, had been planning to fall back upon the Sicilian resources. Corinth no doubt was jealous of this action of Athens, and it perhaps contributed as much as anything else to the hostile attitude she displayed towards her during the Persian war. Pericles, the political heir of Themistocles, maintained the same policy, and, two years after Tolmides had captured the Corinthian colony of Chalcis,<sup>88</sup> Pericles established the first Athenian foothold in Sicily by an alliance with Segesta. It was bad enough in Corinth's eyes that Athens had secured as complete a control of Corinth's own gulf as she had of the Saronic, but the fact that she was stretching out her arms to Sicily was most exasperating. The humiliation of 446 put an end for a while to Athenian ambitions and the colonization of Thurii showed Corinth that she did not meditate any further aggrandisement. The breach with Corinth, however, resulting from her alliance with Corecya, justified Athens in renewing her Sicilian connections. She made an

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<sup>86</sup> Cf. Thuc., V, 64, 75.

<sup>87</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 160.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Thuc., I, 108.

alliance with Rhegium and Leontini in 433.<sup>89</sup> These endeavours to establish a connection with Sicily and Southern Italy were prompted by the desire to uphold the Ionian states against the Dorian, of which Syracuse, the daughter of Corinth was the greatest member. Syracuse, ever faithful to her metropolis, had been pushing her conquests everywhere, and was likely to absorb all the Ionian cities in Sicily. As Bury has pointed out, Athens had no idea of dominion at this stage: "The growth of her connection with Italian and Sicilian affairs was forced upon her by the conditions of commerce and the rivalry of Corinth."<sup>90</sup>

We have seen how, in the early years of the war, the Athenians completely paralysed Corinth in her gulf, and how in addition they robbed her of almost all her colonies. During this time also they sought to do what damage they could to Syracuse, which was using every endeavour to conquer Leontini. The alliance of 433 led to no immediate help being sent to the Ionian towns of Sicily, but in 427 an expedition was despatched under Laches to help the Leontines. It had also a more important purpose. Thucydides tells us that the Athenians sent it on the plea of the common origin of themselves and the Leontines, but in reality to prevent the exportation of Sicilian corn to the Peloponnese and to make preliminary investigations with a view to the total subjection of Sicily.<sup>91</sup> We also hear of an expedition under Sophocles and Eurymedon two years afterwards.<sup>92</sup> The delay of this fleet, first at Pylos and next at Corcyra, resulted in the loss of Messana, the only place gained by the expedition of Laches.

The famous congress of Gela put an end to Athenian schemes for a number of years, and two years after the visit of Eurymedon and Sophocles, Leontini was afflicted with civil strife which resulted in its becoming a Syracusan for-

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<sup>89</sup> Cf. Hicks-Hill, *Greek Hist. Inscriptions*, Nos. 51, 52.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Bury, *Hist. of Greece*, p. 464.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. Thuc., III, 86.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Thuc., IV, 2.

tress. Corinth, on the whole, need not have felt over anxious for the fate of her commerce. It is true that she had lost her colonies by the war, and that the only two of any importance remaining were kept from her in the peace. Yet her ascendancy in Sicily was assured. Her daughter-state was supreme there, as has been shown in the foregoing sketch of Sicilian politics. The seven years of truce, hollow as they were, gave her freedom once more to move in her gulf, to re-establish her commercial relations, and to rebuild her trade. She showed Alcibiades, when he tried to set up a fort at Rhium, that she would not allow any further interference. Ambracia was also recovering from her disaster, and Corinth was doing her very best to strengthen her, as was shown by her despatch of a garrison for the place immediately after its prostration in 426.<sup>93</sup>

Corinthian fears, however, were suddenly aroused by Athens' determination to invade Sicily in 415. This once again rendered Corinth's position highly critical. There was nothing she would not have done to postpone the crisis, and this has suggested to Bury the theory, that Corinth was at the bottom of the sacrilegious mutilation of the Hermae before the expedition started.<sup>94</sup> This is borne out by the facts of the case. Corinth's efforts in the war were most strenuous. The Corinthians on being entreated for help resolved to assist the Syracusans with their whole heart and soul. They also associated themselves with a Syracusan embassy to Sparta and urged the Spartans to prosecute the war more openly against Athens at home and to send succour to Sicily. It was the irony of fate that they should there find their old acquaintance, Alcibiades, advocating the same policy.<sup>95</sup> It was a result of Alcibiades' brilliant speech that the dilatory Spartans agreed to appoint Gylippus. It was arranged that the Corinthians should join him, and the two contingents mustered off Leucas; but here they heard of the great Athe-

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<sup>93</sup> Cf. Thuc., III, 114.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Thuc., VI, 88.

<sup>94</sup> *Hist. of Greece*, p. 469.

nian success at Syracuse, and Gylippus in despair of doing anything for Sicily and intending only to save Italy, sailed off hurriedly for Rhegium with a small fleet, of which only two vessels were Corinthian. The Corinthians remained in order to man two ships from Leucas and two from Ambracia,<sup>96</sup> in addition to their own ten. The faithful Ambracia seems to have recovered by this time from Demosthenes' terrible chastisement. As soon as they were ready they set out. In the meantime Gylippus had changed his mind when he heard that the northern wall across Epipolae was not completed, and had crossed to Sicily. But a zealous Corinthian commander, though his ship was the last of the Corinthian fleet to start, had arrived there before Gylippus and his comrades. He found the Syracusans on the point of holding an assembly to consider whether they had not better capitulate. This he prevented by assuring them that both Gylippus and the Corinthian fleet would soon arrive.<sup>97</sup> The counsel brought them courage and ultimately gave victory. When Nicias heard of the expected Corinthian fleet he sent a force of twenty vessels to intercept it, which the Corinthians cleverly eluded.<sup>98</sup> On landing, they immediately set to work to help the Syracusans in completing their fortifications. They also joined the Lacedaemonians in sending to their respective cities to solicit further help. The requests in both quarters were heartily acceded to; but Corinth, as was natural, displayed the greater enthusiasm in the cause of her besieged daughter-state. Thucydides tells us that the Athenians had to send twenty vessels to coast round Peloponnese in hope of preventing succour being sent from Corinth or any of the Peloponnesian states.

For the Corinthians, whose ambassadors had arrived and announced to them the favourable turn of affairs in Sicily, considering that their fleet which they had sent already was of no mean advantage, were much more encouraged, and were now preparing to des-

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<sup>96</sup> Cf. Thuc., VI, 104.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. Thuc., VII, 2.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. Thuc., VII, 4.



patch a force of hoplites and merchant vessels to Sicily, while the Lacedaemonians acted similarly for the rest of Peloponnese. The Corinthians also manned a fleet of twenty-five ships, intending to try conclusions with the squadron on guard at Naupactus and thus rendering it less easy for the latter to prevent the departure of the Corinthian merchant ships by compelling them to keep an eye on triremes drawn up against them.<sup>99</sup>

They did not stop here. They joined the Syracusans in instigating an immediate occupation of Decelea in accordance with Alcibiades' suggestion.<sup>100</sup> The twenty-five ships destined to watch Naupactus spent the winter of 413 on duty in the Gulf till the merchantmen for Sicily were out of danger, "thus," says Thucydides, "accomplishing the end for which they had been originally manned, namely, to divert the attention of the Athenian squadron from the merchant-ships to the triremes."<sup>101</sup> They next made an attack on the Athenian squadron and a drawn battle took place. The significant fact, however, is that Corinth had by now grown so courageous that she was not afraid to tackle Athens single-handed. The growing success of Syracuse had, no doubt, emboldened her. It was Corinth's opportunity against Athens, now that the Athenian army and fleet were in the greatest straits in Sicily, and her territory at home was suffering from the occupation of Decelea. Further encouragement was arriving daily from the course of events in Sicily. It was a Corinthian, Ariston, the most capable seaman in the Syracusan service, who was responsible for the defeat of the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbour prior to Demosthenes' arrival.<sup>102</sup> They were everywhere exerting themselves and looking to the complete destruction of the Athenian armament. Nicias makes particular mention of them in his speech before the last desperate effort of the Athenians. He appealed to the allies to show the Corinthians whom they had so often defeated, and who would not dare to stand against the Athenian navy when it was in its prime, that, even in sickness and

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Thuc., VII, 17.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Thuc., VII, 18.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Thuc., VII, 19.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Thuc., VII, 39-41.

disaster, Athenian naval skill was far superior to the fortune or vigour of any other.<sup>103</sup> The whole tone of Nicias' speech on this occasion, and the foregoing remark in particular, showed that Athens' power had reached its breaking-point. Success was almost impossible, but everything depended on the coming battle. The result was the overthrow of Athenian hegemony for ever.

Corinth had at last achieved her long-cherished desires. She ought to have been satisfied with this but even Nicias she would not spare, and insisted on his death. He might live to do further mischief.<sup>104</sup> Thucydides writes the sad conclusion of the seventh book of his history, the mournful commemoration of the final overthrow of his country's imperial power:

This was the greatest of all the events of the war and, in my opinion, of any Hellenic war recorded; at once most glorious to the victors and most disastrous to the vanquished. These were conquered entirely and completely; in everything they underwent the direst sufferings; they were, as the saying is, destroyed with a total destruction, both their army and fleet; there was nothing that was not destroyed, and only few out of the many returned home.

The rest of Corinth's history within the period of this volume will not take long to tell. Athens had now to undergo the dissolution of her one-time glorious power; Corinth had at last triumphed. She was the most zealous of all in completing the task of her enemy's undoing; she was the life and soul of it. It was at Corinth that measures were arranged by the allies for helping Athens' revolting subjects. True, the Peloponnesian squadron suffered a serious set-back at Peiraeus, the desert harbour on the Epidaurian frontier, but this did not damp their ardour for the work, for reinforcements from Corinth arrived to their assistance. They remained in their position, defying the Athenian blockading fleet, till a favourable opportunity for escape presented itself. They then sallied forth, defeated the blockading squadron,

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<sup>103</sup> Cf. Thuc., VII, 63.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. Thuc., VII, 86.

and returning to Cenchreae renewed their schemes for helping Chios and Ionia.<sup>105</sup>

The Athenian dependencies fell away one by one, and with the advent of Lysander began the downfall of the empire. The fall of Athens itself was the consummation of Corinthian ideals, and had Corinth been permitted to wreak the fulness of her vengeance, not one stone of the city of Athens would have been left upon another.<sup>106</sup>

Let us bear in mind that it was Corinth, not Lysander, that really overthrew Athens; for it was the Sicilian disaster, not the subsequent events which proved the ruin of Athenian dominion. It was Corinth's influence in Sicily that provoked Athens' interference there.<sup>107</sup> The downfall of Athens really dates from 413; Aegospotami merely marks the transition of her power to Sparta.

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<sup>105</sup> Cf. Thuc., VII, 8-12, 20.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Xen., *Hell.*, II, 2, 20.

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Bury, *Hist. of Greece*, p. 485.

## APPENDIX I

### THE COINAGE OF CORINTH

The two outstanding systems of coinage in Greece were those of Euboea and Aegina, where, earliest in Greece, money was minted by methods learned from commerce with the East. Probably no later than the middle of the 7th Century the cities of Euboea issued coins on the Assyrian-Babylonian gold standard (130 grains), and the Aeginetans on the Phoenician silver standard (230 grains, but which deteriorated in Greece to 194-180 grains).

This is not the place to discuss the evolution of either of these standards. Corinth, probably already in the seventh century under the Cypselids, adopted the Euboïc.<sup>1</sup> As in most things, so in coinage, it has a position unique in Greece.<sup>2</sup> It had the same unit of value as the Euboïc, namely, a stater of about 130 grains, but whereas the Euboïc drachm was half of the stater,<sup>3</sup> the Corinthian was one third, and the obol again a sixth part of that, viz. (showing approximate highest weight under subsequent Athenian influence).

	Grammes	Grains <sup>4</sup>
Stater .....	8.80	135
Drachm .....	2.93	45
Obol .....	.49	7.5

Thucydides <sup>5</sup> draws attention to the peculiarity of the Corinthian drachm. Mommsen, Curtius, and Head thought that this peculiarity preserved a memory of the Asiatic origin

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Gardner, *Hist. of Coinage*, pp. 134 ff; Babelon, *Traité des Monnaies Grecques et Romaines*, II, 1, pp. 785 f., assigns the introd. of coinage to Cypselus. Glotz, *Le travail dans la Grèce*, pp. 86, 147, thinks the Euboïc standard was adopted through rivalry with Aegina.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Babelon, *Traité*, II, 1, p. 789.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gardner, *op. cit.*, pp. 124 f.

<sup>4</sup> Increased under Athenian influence; cf. Gardner, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

<sup>5</sup> I, 27.

of the weight. Competent numismatists,<sup>6</sup> however, think that the Corinthian drachms of about 45 grains were intended to pass as Aeginetan hemidrachms, of which the weight was much the same, and similarly, that the Corinthian stater of about 130-135 grains would readily exchange at the value of a didrachm with the tetradrachm of Athens. It is, after all, only natural to suppose that the Aeginetan "Tortoises" and Athenian "Owls" would meet in the Corinthian market. As a convenient medium of exchange between the two, the Corinthian "Colts" seem to have been especially adapted;<sup>7</sup> for so, as *πῶλοι*,<sup>8</sup> the Corinthian coins were known, since the constant type upon their *obverse* till later than 250 B. C., was Pegasus, the winged steed, which, alighting on Acrocorinth, impatiently stamped upper Peirene into existence because he was thirsty, and was, at last, tamed by Bellerophon with Athena's kind help. As a further distinguishing mark, the obverse of Corinthian staters invariably bears, along with Pegasus, the koppa (ϙ), initial letter of the name of the city.<sup>9</sup> In fact there is a very noticeable consistency in the types, both obverse and reverse, of all Corinthian silver coins. If we except a few archaic instances on the reverse of which there is an incuse pattern, first of the windmill, and then of the *swastika* form, the reverse type of all Corinthian staters, certainly<sup>10</sup> throughout the whole of the fifth, fourth, and greater part of

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<sup>6</sup> E. g. Head, *Hist. Num.*, introd., pp. xli, 335; *Brit. Mus. Catalog. of Gk. Coins (Corinth)*, p. xix f.; Gardner, *s. v. pondus* in Smith's *Dict. of Antiq.*; cf., however, his *Hist. of Anc. Coinage*, p. 137, where he seems not to favor this view which he attributes solely to Head.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Babelon, *Traité*, II, 1, pp. 788 f., who gives a table of correspondences.

<sup>8</sup> Poll., IX, 6, 76.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Aristoph., *Clouds*, 23, 438. Babelon, *Les Monnaies Grecques*, p. 35; *Traité*, II, 1, pp. 787, 793 f., with pl. XXXVI in third part.

<sup>10</sup> Gardner, *Hist. of Ancient Coinage*, pp. 134 f., thinks even from middle of sixth century. Cf. Babelon, *Traité*, II, 1, pp. 790, 807; Viedebant in *Philologus*, LXXIX, p. 304, can hardly be right in placing the change so late.



the third centuries B. C., is the Head of Athena Chalinitis, the bridler who assisted Bellerophon to subdue Pegasus.<sup>11</sup>

There are indeed adjunct symbols from the later part of the fifth century onwards, but they are of a trivial variety, and in the smaller coins the head of Aphrodite often appears in place of that of Athena. But there remains the fact of the invariable character of the types. An interesting comment on the history of Corinth is that the greatest finds of coins were made in the districts where the influence of Corinthian commerce extended—Italy, Sicily and Chalcidice in Macedonia. It is along the shores of their western trading centres,<sup>12</sup> in particular, that the merchantmen of old abandoned for the collectors of modern times the greatest number of Corinthian Pegasus staters.

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. Babelon, *Traité*, II, 1, p. 840. The American archaeologists at Corinth are destined soon to determine exactly the site of her sacred precinct.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Gardner, *Hist. of Ancient Coinage*, pp. 138, 204, 369 f.; Head, *Guide to Coins of the Ancients*, p. 27; Babelon, *Les Monnaies Grecques*, pp. 72 f. For more recent observations on Corinthian coinage, cf. Viedebant in *Philologus*, LXXIX, 1924, pp. 298-312, and Segré, *Metrologia e Circolazione Monetaria degli Antichi*, pp. 224-227.

## APPENDIX II.

### THE LELANTINE WAR AND THE NAUPACTIAN INSCRIPTION.

It seems desirable to append some remarks on the brilliant article of Curtius, "Studien zur Geschichte von Korinth." (*Hermes*, X, pp. 215-243). Some of his conclusions have already been criticised. Two of his more elaborate arguments will be considered here.

I. *The Lelantine War*. Since we have no definite evidence as regards Corinth's part in and the date of this war, any knowledge to be derived is a result of 'combination.' It was stated in Chapter VI that "Corinth probably took up arms for her friends the Chalcidians." This seems to be admitted by most modern authorities. The statement, however, is based on a 'combination' of the historical circumstances.

We know that Corinth was connected with Chalcis through trade and industry as well as through the cultivation of Hesiodic poetry. We see that both cities colonize in close association with Delphi, and the simultaneity as well as the propinquity of the colonies of both witness to a common advance. The founding of towns like Potidaea and Olynthus can only be explained on the hypothesis of mutual understanding. The same is true of Naxos and Syracuse, whose proximity Holm also regards as a sign of commercial friendship. Chalcis in Aetolia is, without doubt, on the site of an Euboean settlement in which originally a Corinthian population must have shared, so that the place later passed readily into the possession of Corinth; for it is expressly stated by Ephorus (ap. Strabo, 267) in reference to the founding of Naxos, that the Chalcidians applied to non-Euboean peoples for their settlements. In this way the other maritime places entered into the activity of colonization, as originally the Phoenicians did with the Greeks.<sup>13</sup>

Curtius then goes on to point out that Corinth and Eretria were always bad friends, a fact attested, he says, by the expulsion of Eretrians from Coreyra by the Corinthian colonists. This statement of Plutarch has already been questioned. Cur-

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. Curtius, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

tius, however, gives plausible grounds enough for his supposition of friendship between Corinth and Chalcis. His conclusion, then, is, "As no ground exists to assume a sudden change, the part played by Corinth in an outbreak of war between Chalcis and Eretria cannot appear doubtful."<sup>14</sup> Both Curtius and Burn in a recent article give to the struggle a date which cannot be accepted. I have cited the passage from Curtius' history, where he assigns the date as the beginning of the seventh century. When writing the *Studien* he went back to the eighth century. Let us hear how he tries to refute the objections to the seventh. Tradition<sup>15</sup> records that King Amphidamas fell in the war *νανμαχῶν* for his native city. Naturally, then, the war must come after 665 as Thucydides gives this date for the first sea-fight on record.

Now Curtius points out that *μονομαχῶν* has been suggested with great probability as the correct reading instead of *νανμαχῶν*. Even though we retain the original reading, Curtius gets out of the difficulty another way. This is how he does it. "The fact of a king fighting on board his ship is no proof of a sea battle." He next deduces from the mere meagre statement in Thucydides (1, 13) that, "It appears that Ameinocles, a Corinthian ship-builder, made four ships for the Samians," that this was at the time of the Lelantine war, and that Ameinocles was sent by the Corinthian government to do the job.

I find support for adequate dating in the sending of Ameinocles to Samos, which occurred at the end of the eighth century. . . . For if Corinth in so extraordinary a fashion allowed a foreign state to share in the art of building triremes, *which was kept as a state secret in the arsenals: if she sent her best artisan with his subordinates* in order to show the Samians how to build Corinthian docks and Corinthian ships, there must have been some reason for this in the political situation. . . . The mission of the Corinthian master

<sup>14</sup> Cf. A. R. Burn in *J.H.S.*, June, 1929, pp. 14-37.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Plut. ap. Proclum on Hes., *Works and Days*, 648. Cf., however, Lenschau in Bursian, *Jahresbericht über Griech. Ges.*, CXXII, 1905, pp. 162 f.

*ship-builder* to Samos was an event sufficiently important to be marked in the annals of the city; *Samos must have been particularly in need of such help*, and therefore must have been either threatened with, or engaged in, war. But Samos in the Lelantine war stood on the side of Chalcis against Eretria, and Chalcis was an old friend of Corinth, whereas the Eretrians had been expelled from Coreyra by Corinth.

The original passage, out of which so much has been made, runs as follows: *φαίνετα δὲ καὶ Σαμίους Ἀμεινοκλῆς Κορίνθιος ναυπηγὸς ναῦς ποιήσας τέσσαρας· ἔτη δ' ἐστὶ μάλιστα τριακόσια ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ὅτε Ἀμεινοκλῆς Σαμίους ἦλθεν.* That is all Thucydides says. It was hardly worth Ameinocles' while, expert that he was, to go to build four ships for the Samians in their great danger. The ships were not used in the war at all. "The ships in Samos which might be called upon to protect the island against Miletus did not engage in sea-fights, and this undoubtedly suits in the highest degree the essential character of the epoch of the Lelantine war, that it was a war between maritime cities, which was not decided on the sea, but by the land battles around the mother cities and their colonies."

Now at last we see the reason why the Corinthian government put on such a bustle about the Samian navy. We realize why "the fact of a king fighting on board his ship is no proof of a sea battle." Just imagine the Corinthians and Samians on the one side, and the Milesians and Megarians on the other, sailing along to Euboea, in their warships, landing, and "having it out" there.

The second great objection of Curtius to the seventh century date is this: "To me at least it is unthinkable that no adequate accounts should have come down to us about the greatest war prior to the Persian period, the first general Hellenic war, if it belonged to the century of the tyrants, about which we have such manifold information regarding the friendly and hostile relations of the Greek states in Peloponnesus, Middle Greece and Asia Minor, and about so isolated a subject as the battle between Coreyra and Corinth."

We do not know so much, after all, of the seventh century, certainly not as much as Curtius believes. His suggestion, however, that we know nothing of the Lelantine war and so much about the battle between Corinth and Corcyra cannot be accepted.

Thucydides certainly tells us more about the former than the latter (cf. I, 13 and I, 15) as Curtius himself admits in another place: "We find the words of Thucydides that 'the whole Greek world was divided into two armed camps,' significant in the sense that we may now name on the one side Miletus and Eretria and on the other Samos, Chalcis and Corinth." Why connect the building of ships by Ameinocles in Samos with the Euboean war? Thucydides, who records both, records them as separate and distinct events. If they had any connection with each other, surely the great historian would have suggested it. That the Samians, or Corinth, for that matter, had anything ever to do with the fight between Chalcis and Eretria is purely hypothetical, as we have admitted, and the result of a 'combination.' Thucydides did not make 'combinations.'

Our conclusion, then is that there are no sufficient grounds for the eighth century date. The reasons for dating it (with Bury) towards the end of the seventh century are two,<sup>16</sup> viz:

(1) There is no compelling reason for rejecting the tradition that King Amphidamas died *ναυμαχῶν*. The first sea fight is 665 B. C. Therefore, the Lelantine war is after 665 B. C.

(2) Theognis, whose date is in the early sixth century,<sup>17</sup> refers to the war as a recent event.

οἱ μοι ἀναλκείης· ἀπὸ μὲν Κήρινθος ὄλωλεν  
Δηλάντου δ' ἀγαθὸν κείρεται οἰνόπεδον,

<sup>16</sup> The arg. from Theognis is regarded as valueless by Dr. Percy Gardner, *Cl. Rev.*, XXXIV, 1920, p. 90. See text (supra).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Hudson-Williams, *Elegies of Theognis*, p. 8, whose conclusion is "that he was over thirty years of age before 570 B. C., and about sixty by 545 B. C."



οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ φεύγουσι, πόλιν δὲ κακοὶ διέπουσιν.  
ὥς δὴ Κυψελιδέων Ζεὺς ὀλέσειε γένος (891 ff.).

"But it seems to me inadmissible," says Curtius, "in a distich preserved under the name of Theognis, which treats of the overthrow of Cerinthus, to find a reference to the famous Lelantine war and to derive therefrom a limit of date." The fact, however, seems to remain.<sup>18</sup>

If the war of the Lelantine Plain is after 665, and if Theognis (c. 590 at earliest) refers to it as a comparatively recent event, then it must be dated in the end of the seventh century.

II. *The Naupactian Inscription.* The date, 459 B. C. has been given for the settlement of the Messenians at Naupactus. Curtius<sup>19</sup> seems to date it 455-4, thus placing it after the revolt of Megara to Athens.

There is a bronze tablet containing an inscription of a law made by the Opuntian Locrians to determine the relations which should exist between a colony, which they were to settle at Naupactus, and the mother country.<sup>20</sup> Curtius calls this plantation of the Eastern Locrians a 'Locrian synoecismus in Naupactus,' which he considers to be the work of the Corinthians. When Megara went over to Athens in 459, and so gave her a hold of the gulf almost equal to Corinth's own, the Corinthians answered by settling the Locrians at Naupactus, thus creating for themselves a "garrison-like establishment" to counteract Athenian influence. These were the Locrians (Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν) mentioned by Thucydides, from whom the Athenians wrested Naupactus and gave it to the Messenians. This conjecture is extremely improbable on three grounds.

(a) The authorities on Greek epigraphy are uncertain as to the date of the inscription. Hicks and Hill, e. g., give a

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Burn, *l. c.*, p. 34, who regards the lines of Theognis as useless; cf. Gardner in *Cl. Rev.*, *l. c.*

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Hermes*, X, pp. 239.

<sup>20</sup> Hicks-Hill, *Manual of Gk. Hist. Inscriptions*, No. 25, pp. 31 ff.

full list of references, research in which convinces one of the truth of Dittenberger's remark (*Inscriptiones Graecae*, Volumen IX, pars I, p. 85), "Sed cum paene nihil sciamus de illarum regionum per priora saeculi quinti tempora rebus, quid valet quod occasionem coloniae deducendae demonstrare non possumus." He is very doubtful about Curtius' hypothesis. (Cf. Oldfather in *P. W. s. v. Lokris*, p. 1195.)

(b) Curtius apparently dates the settlement of the Messenians in Naupactus as 455-4, i. e. in connection with Tolmides' tour round the Peloponnese. This means that in Thucydides (I, 103) he takes the old reading *δεκάτω*, which involves an admission that Thucydides is departing from his usual chronological order of events, for he records the settlement of the Messenians before the revolt of Megara (459).

(c) It was not the Eastern Locrians, but the Ozolian, whom the Athenians expelled from Naupactus when they settled the Messenians there. The Ozolians, of course, were the natural owners of the place.

Curtius imagines that he finds great support for his theory in Thucydides' words *Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐχόντων*, and explains that this genitive indicates, not that Naupactus belonged to the Locrian country, but these and similar words (cf. Thuc., I, 94, 2; 98, 2; VII, 57, 28; VIII, 62, 3) always in Thucydides indicate an occupation made in the course of warlike undertakings, or in strategic design. "This, then, fully suits the newly combined Locrian garrison in Naupactus, and I believe I dare maintain with the highest probability that Thucydides' words indicate the same settlement of which the record is preserved in the extant bronze tablet."

How could the Ozolian Locrians be garrisoning a place which was colonised with the E. Locrians only, as is expressly stated by the inscription? Curtius indeed, draws strange conclusions from the evidence of the tablet. "The new settlers at Naupactus come from the region of the E. and W. Locrians. Such a common action of the whole race, which

from time immemorial lived separate in two peoples, so energetic a political measure in which the dwellers by the Corinthian Gulf as well as by the Euboean Sound, took part, cannot possibly have arisen from the Locrians themselves who must have been given the impulse from outside." There is no evidence, however, in the inscription for a synoecism of the East and West Locrians.

Busolt and Bury also give the date of the settlement of the Messenians as 459. Holm mentions Curtius' view but implies that he rejects it. Dr. Grundy has shown that he too prefers 459 as the date. "The reference is of course to the well-known crux in the text of Thuc., I, 103. In Hude, Bekker and Stuart Jones (Oxford Ed.) the δεκάτῳ is maintained. Steup has restored it to Classen's text, though Classen preferred τετάρτῳ. Busolt and Holm prefer this latter reading. I must confess that the language of Ch. 103 seems to me to imply that the settlement of the Messenians in Naupactus took place before Megara called in the aid of Athens against Corinth. It is mentioned before the latter event, and Thucydides, careful in chronological details, gives no hint that he is departing from the chronological order of events. . . . I need only add that I believe τετάρτῳ to be the original reading."<sup>21</sup>

It is to be observed that it is not necessary to regard the settlement as taking place immediately after the expulsion from Ithome, which should be, according to the inclusive method of counting, 461. The probability is that they wandered about outside Peloponnese till the Athenians, who had formerly helped to besiege them, decided on taking them on in their own interests. Their settlement was possibly some months before the revolt of Megara.

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<sup>21</sup> *Thuc. and Hist. of his Age*, p. 234. Cf. the editors, e. g. Forbes, Marchant, and Morris, *ad. loc.*, who are practically unanimous in questioning δεκάτῳ.

## ABBREVIATIONS

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<i>A.A.</i>	<i>Art and Archaeology</i> (Washington, D. C.).
<i>A.H.N.E.</i>	Hall, <i>Ancient History of the Near East</i> .
<i>A.J.A.</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i> (Norwood, Mass.).
<i>A.J.P.</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i> (Baltimore).
<i>Ann. Arch.</i> and <i>Anthrop.</i>	<i>Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology</i> (Liverpool).
<i>Arch. Anz.</i>	<i>Archaeologischer Anzeiger</i> (Appendix to <i>Jahrbuch</i> ).
<i>Ath. Mitt.</i>	<i>Athenische Mitteilungen</i> (Athens).
<i>B.C.H.</i>	<i>Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique</i> (Paris).
<i>Berl. Phil. Woch.</i>	<i>Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift</i> (Berlin).
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## INDEX

---

- Acarnania, 225, 228  
 Acarnanians, 154, 155, 226, 227.  
 Achaea, 6, 175, 193  
 Achæan League. 27; Rome's ultimatum to, 31  
 Achæans, arrival of, 62; Aeolians and, 93  
 Achelous, 225  
 Achilles, 68, 70, 71  
 Acrocorinth, 2, 19, 22, 23, 39, 48-55, 244; garrison in, 19; fastnesses of, 28; view from, 52, 54  
 Actæon, 170  
 Acte of Argolis, 190  
 Actium, 11, 200  
 Adcock, 214  
 Adeimantus, 182, 184, 185, 188  
 Adrastid Kingdom, the, 75  
 Adriatic, Mycenæan finds at head of, 85  
 Aegae, 17  
 Aegina, 163, 178, 180, 191, 192, 210; Gulf of, 1, 24; growth of, 175; medizing of, 180; rival of Corinth, 187; Athens and, 188; ally of Corinth, 190; coinage of, 243  
 Aeginetans, 210  
 Aelian, 105  
 Aelius Aristides, 58  
 Aeolians, 93  
 Aesculapius, temple of, 21, 22  
 Aethiops, 149  
 Aetolians, 226  
 Agamemnon, 70, 81; supposed supreme power of, 65  
 Agariste, 167  
 Agesilaus, 9, 16  
 Agis, The Spartan, 31  
 Aegospotami, 242  
 Alcarnenes, Peloponnesian admiral, 25  
 Alcibiades, 235, 238, 240  
 Aleiphron, 32  
 Alemaeon, 73  
 Aleman, 107  
 Aletes, 94, 95, 120, 136, 159  
 Alexander the Great, 17  
 Allen, 64, 68, 93  
 Alphabet, Corinthian, 164  
 Alyattes, 130, 134, 164  
 Amasis, 176  
 Ambracia, 154, 225, 228, 232, 238, 239; founding of, 155  
 Ambracian Gulf, 155, 227  
 Ambraciots, 224, 226, 227  
 Ameinocles, 247  
 American School, excavations of, 30, 33, 34, 46  
 Amphidamas, King, 247, 249  
 Amphilocians, 226, 228  
 Amphion, a Bacchiad, 27  
 Amphipolis, battle of, 232  
 Anacharsis, 129  
 Anactorium, 154, 155, 205, 226, 232  
 Anthony, 11  
 Antirrhium, 5, 225  
 Antoninus Pius, 21  
 Aphrodisium, 100.  
 Aphrodite, temple of, 21, 22, 50, 53; cult of, 89; of Paphos, 91; origin of, 101; Fury, 163; Epitymbia, 163; head on coins, 245  
 Aphytis, 207  
 Apollo, Latous, 3; Homeric Hymn to, 5; Teneates, 26; Temple of, 42-45; date of temple of, 44; Peribolos of, 47.  
 Apollonia, 156, 228  
 Araxus, promontory of, 5, 6  
 Arcadia, 6  
 Arcadians, 70  
 Archias, 26, 97, 148, 150, 159, 169, 170  
 Archidamus, King, 211  
 Argive, Mountains, 2; territory, 4; plain, 66; Alliance, 235  
 Argives, 235  
 Argives, Amphilochian, 224, 227  
 Argolis, 2, 4, 235  
 Argos, 173, 175, 233; international relations of, 232  
 Arion, of Methymna, 129

- Aristeus, 207  
 Aristarchus, 63, 76  
 Aristides, 185  
 Aristocracy, post-Cypselid, 123;  
   of merchants, 134, 143, 173  
 Ariston, 240  
 Aristophanes, 218, 230  
 Aristotle, 56, 122; accounts of  
   the tyranny, 141  
 Arkwright, 59  
 Aroania, Mount, 1  
 Artabazus, 158  
 Artemisium, 182, 184; story of  
   bribe at, 185, 188  
 Asopius, 226  
 Aspasia, courtesans of, 218  
 Astacus, 224  
 Athamas, 108  
 Athena, 244; Hellotis, festival  
   of, 104  
 Athena, Chalinitis, temple of, 47;  
   on coins, 245  
 Athenaeus, 24, 29, 103, 104, 128  
 Athenagoras, 106  
 Athenian, empire, development  
   of, 195; Calendar, 204; em-  
   pire, 211; aggrandisement,  
   213  
 Athenians, 7, 207, 237; naval  
   power of, 188  
 Athens, 18, 164, 179, 180, 188,  
   200, 201, 202, 204, 212, 216,  
   234, 235; invasion of, 95; en-  
   mity with Aegina, 179; trade  
   and corn routes of, 189; inva-  
   sion of Sicily by, 238; over-  
   throw of hegemony of, 241;  
   downfall of, 242  
 Athikia, 27  
 Asia, trade with, 20  
 Asprokambos, 8  
 Astarte, 91  
 Atridae, 59  
 Augustus, 11  
 Aulis, assemblage of fleet at, 66.  
 Automenes, 97  
  
 Bacchiadae (Bacchiads), 97, 98,  
   118, 119, 120, 160, 171  
 Bacchiad oligarchy, 115-124, 119,  
   136-7, 161  
 Bacchis, 96  
 "Bath of Aphrodite," 36  
  
 Bellerophon, 244, 245; legend of,  
   76  
 Beloch, 116, 216  
 Blegen, 28, 61; Wace and, 62;  
   on Mycenaean Sites, 79  
 Boeotia, 7, 192, 194, 220, 232,  
   233  
*Boeotia, The*, 74  
 Boeotian Confederacy, 179  
 Boeotians, 179; truce with Ath-  
   ens, 234  
 Bonner, 216  
 Boulanger, 58  
 Brasidas, 232  
 Broneer, 48  
 Buck, 59  
 Burn, 247  
 Burrows, 59, 60  
 Bursian, 2, 3, 14, 15  
 Bury, 17, 64, 69, 167, 219, 230  
 Busolt, 167, 216  
 Byzantium, 196  
  
 Cadmus, 108  
 Caligula, 12  
 Calydon, 227  
 Cambyes, 176  
 Carpathus, 176  
 Carthage, 31  
 Cassius Dio, 11  
*Catalogue*, 65  
 "Cataloguer," the Greek, 65, 66  
 Cavaignac, 113  
 Cecryphaleia, 191  
 Cenchreae, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 232,  
   242; port of, 21, 75; pass of,  
   23  
 Cephallenia, 192, 224, 228  
 Cerinthus, overthrow of, 250  
 Chalcidians, 233, 246  
 Chalcidice, 207  
 Chalcis, 154, 162, 163, 192, 228,  
   247, 249  
 Chalcolithic days, trade in, 81  
 Chandler, 43  
 Chersias, 129  
 Chersicrates, 148, 149, 150  
 Chersonesus, promontory of, 24  
 Chileus, 184  
 Chliomodi, 26  
 Chios, 25, 242  
 Cithaeron, 179  
 Citium, 92

- Citizen-body, non-Dorian element in, 136
- Cleisthenes, of Sicyon, 161, 169; of Athens, 177
- Cleomenes, 180, 181
- Cleon, 231, 232
- Cleonae, 2
- Cleopatra, 11
- Clinton, 2, 165
- Cnemus, 225
- Cnossus, 100
- Codrus, 95, 159
- Colonies, 148-159
- Colonization, western movement of, 78
- "Colts," 244
- "Combination" of Curtius, 162
- Cooley, 41
- Corecra, 83, 125, 132, 133, 148, 149-153, 171, 197-206, 209, 210, 223, 228, 236, 237; enmity with Corinth, 151; democratic constitution at, 151; revolt from Bacchiads, 156; foundation of colonies by, 156; and Corinth, 198; alliance of Athens with, 208; civil war in, 226; expulsion of Eretrians, from, 246
- Corecraeans, independence of, 153
- Corinth, 2, 3, 6, 7, 20, 104, 134, 184, 192, 233; Gulf of, 1, 17; Isthmus of, 2, 10, 108, 182; Dorian School of, 15; citadel of, 19; fetter of Greece, 23; city of, 30; Roman, 30, 31, 33; total destruction of, 31; rebuilt by Caesar, 31; Cenchrean gate of, 33; Agora of, 33, 45; plan of, 34; Greek city of, 46; Roman remains of, 46; a commercial state, 55; wealth of, 55; Homer's references to, 62; in Mycenaean times, 62; in the Greek Catalogue, 63-76; Sisyphus, king of, 63; Homeric evidence for history of, 64; in the Achaeon period, 76; existence of, 81; as an emporium, 86; three roads from Mycenae to site of, 87; position as "un entrepôt," 88; supposed Phoenician occupation of, 89; loan of ships to Athens, 90, 180; legendary history of, 93; Dorization of, 95; early Dorian, 95; Aeolian inhabitants of, 95; traditional king lists of, 96; annual prytanis at, 97; period of oligarchs at, 97; industry at, 97; commercial relations of, 98; colonization under Bacchiads, 98; pottery, 98, 119; manufacture of weapons at, 98; relations with Etruria, 98; Cults and Myths, 98-114; pre-Dorian origin of cults at, 99; Minyan origin of cults at, 99; Mycenaean forms of worship at, 99; worship of Aphrodite at, 99; "Orientalism" at, 100; Mycenaean, 100; a cosmopolitan emporium, 101; worship of Black Aphrodite at, 103; festival of Hellotia at, 103, 104; connections in prehistoric times with northern Greece, 112; trade of, 119, 189; mercantile marine, 119; painters of, 119; sea-fight with Corecra, 125; ruled by Agamemnon, 135; character of Dorian conquest of, 136; tribes of, 136; under tyrant, 142; oligarchy at, 143-147; government of, 143; imperial policy of, 155; imperial nature of colonial system of, 157; empire of, 158; foreign relations of, 159-174; and Argos, 164-174; overthrow of kings of, 170; relations of Pheidon with, 170; and Peloponnesian Confederacy, 173; independent of Sparta, 174; rivalry with Aegina, 175; trade in the East, 175; friendship for Athens, 178, 179; relations with Athens, 177, 181, 187; patriotism of, 184; part in Persian War, 185; friendship for Aegina, 190; helplessness of, 193; western trade of, 195; attitude to Megarian Decree, 223; re-adoption of Sparta, 236; commerce of, 245

- Corinth Guide*, The new, 44  
 Corinthia, 3, 4, 25; ports in, 19;  
 coast towns of, 23; general  
 topography of, 28, 29.  
 Corinthian, territory, area of, 2;  
 war, 4; Gulf of, 5, 12, 19, 75,  
 189, 193, 224; topography,  
 34; Aphrodite, origin of, 91;  
 religion, 92; vases, 119; treas-  
 ury, 124; constitution, 135-  
 147  
 Corinthians, 7, 177, 178; build  
 triremes, 98; charge of coward-  
 ice against, 186  
 Corn supply, sources of, 193  
 Cornelius Nepos, 139  
 Cornford, 216, 217, 220  
 Coronea, 194  
 Craneion (Craneum), 32, 48  
 Creon, 105  
 Crete, 104; worship of Aphrodite  
 in, 100; influence on Hellenic  
 forms of worship, 102, 110;  
 influence on Corinth, 112  
 Crissaeon Gulf, 5  
 Crommyon, 3, 23, 24  
 Crommyonia, 23  
 Cults, Minoan-Mycenaean origins  
 of, 113  
 Curtius, 8, 9, 13, 15, 18, 25, 56,  
 90, 163, 166 *et passim*.  
 Cyclic poets, 149  
 Cyclopean masonry, 49  
 Cypriote nature goddess, 102  
 "Cybele", the, 120  
 Cypselids, 35, 139, 163, 243;  
 chronology of, 117; bowl of,  
 131; reign of, 142  
 Cypselus, 37, 115, 132, 153, 156,  
 160, 162, 171; overthrows oli-  
 garchy at Corinth, 97; origin  
 of name of, 119, 120; testimo-  
 nies of reign of, 122; chest of,  
 131; coinage introduced by,  
 243  
 Cyprus, 92  
 Damaïos, 111  
 "Damsels of Corinth", 45  
 Darius, 182  
 Dawkins, 83  
 Decelea, 86, 240  
 Delphi, 131, 199; Corinthian  
 dedications at, 123  
 Delphian Gulf, 5  
 Demaratus, 98  
 Demetrius Poliorcetes, 12  
 Demosthenes, 155, 226, 227, 240  
 Dexander, 170  
 Dickins, 213  
 Didymus, 105  
 Dinsmoor, 44  
 Dio Chrysostom, 32  
 Diodorus, 96  
 Diogenes, 32  
 Diolkos, 10, 11, 55, 183  
 Dionysus, cult of, 129  
 dithyrambs, 129  
 Dodwell, 5; vase found by, 25  
 Dorian, invasion, 87; constitu-  
 tion, 136  
 Dorians, 24, 94, 95, 101, 135, 161,  
 191  
 Dörpfeld, 20, 36, 44, 45  
 Dulichium, 72  
 Dussaud, 79  
 Echiades, 155, 159  
 Echinades, forces from, 72  
 Edwards, 48  
 Eetion, father of Cypselus, 27  
 Egypt, 164, 176, 191  
 Egyptian expedition, 193, 195  
 Elderkin, 39; account of Glauce  
 by, 37  
 Eleans, 167  
 Eleusis, 178  
 Elis, 6, 233; alliance with Ath-  
 ens, 234  
 Endt, 139  
 Epeians, 74  
 Ephorus, 138  
 Ephyre, 63, 76, 77  
 Epidamnus, 156, 197-200, 228  
 Epidauria, 3  
 Epidaurians, 190  
 Epidaurus, 2, 25  
*epidemiurgi*, 158  
*epikouroi*, 125  
 Epileucadii, 154  
 Epipolae, 239  
 Epirotes, the, 152  
 Epirus, 151  
*episcopi*, 206  
 Eratosthenes, 12  
 Eretria, 162, 163, 246, 247, 249  
 Eretrians, 150  
 Erymanthus, 6



- Eschatiotis, Lake, 9  
*Etymologicum Magnum*, 104  
 Euboea, 162, 163, 248; revolt of, 194; system of coinage in, 243  
 Euboeans, 150, 184  
 Eumelus, 93, 96, 149  
 Euphorion, 24  
 Euripides, 104, 105  
 Euripus Channel, 69  
 Eurybiades, 182, 184  
 Eurymedon, 237  
 Evagoras, 158, 159  
 Evans, 60, 113  
 Evenus, 5  
  
 Farnell, 100, 106, 109 *et passim*, Ch. IV  
 Fick, 59  
 Fikellura vase, 48  
 Fimmen, 79  
 Flaminius, 17  
 fountains, interest of tyrants in, 37  
 Fowler, 40  
 Francotte, 98  
 Frango-limióna, harbour of, 25  
 Frazer, 13, 52, 102, 113; referring to Isthmus, 17; description of view from Acrocorinth, 54  
 Freeman, 166  
 French School, 15  
  
 Galatáki, 22, 25  
 Gardner, 147, 166  
 Gela, congress of, 237  
 generals, election of, 145  
 Georgiades, 12, 20, 21, 22  
 Geraneia, 4, 10, 23, 24; heights of, 191; passes of, 191  
*gerousia*, 144  
 Gerster, 17  
 Glauce, 36-38  
 Glaucus, 63, 93  
 Glover, 116  
 Glotz, 79  
 Goebel, 29  
 Gonussa, 120  
 Gorgo, 9  
 Gorgus, 155, 159  
 Göttling, 32  
 Greece, trade with Western, 20; fetters of, 23, 53; shopkeepers of, 55; Corinth's place in, 55; introduction of coinage into, 166; Northern, 182, 220; problem of food-supply in, 216; North-west, 224, 229, 230; Western, 236; Coinage in, 243-245  
 Greek, market, remains of at Corinth, 46; tradition, 67; cults, 113; tyranny, definition of, 139  
 Grote, 19, 23, 157, 165  
 Grundy, 14, 177, 181-188, 213, 220, 229 *et passim*, Chaps. VII, VIII.  
 Guiraud, 88, 128  
 Gylax, 156  
 Gylippus, 238, 239  
 Gythium, 192  
  
 Habron, 170  
 Hagios Vasilios, 2  
 Halcyonian Sea, 4, 5  
 Haley, 59  
 Halieis, 191  
 Hall, 69, 88, 91  
 Harland, 62, 112  
 Harmosts, 206  
 Harrison, 112  
 Helen, bath of, 21, 22  
 Helicon, 6  
 Hellenic congress, 182  
 Hellespont, 158  
 Heracleid Kings, 96  
 Heracleidae, 94  
 Hera, 8  
 Hera Acraca, 8, 104; temple of, 105  
 Hera-Medea cult, 104-107  
 Heraeum, 8, 9  
 Hermæ, mutilation of, 238  
 Herodes Atticus, 12, 35  
 Herodotus, 13, 14, 27, 122, 186; representations of Corinthians, 186  
 Hesychius, 100  
 Heurtley, 88  
 Hexamilia, 14  
 Hierapytna, 100  
 Hieroduli, 52, 99  
 Hill, 37, 43, 47  
 Himerius, 111  
 Hippias, 178, 179  
 "Hippios", 111  
 Hippocrates, 152

- Hippotes, 94  
 Hoffmann, 4, 59  
 Hogarth, 92, 102  
 Holden, 145  
 Homeric Catalogue, authenticity of, 28  
 "hospitable damsels", 99  
 Hubbell, 204, 210  
*Hypothekae*, 129  
  
 Iamidae, 149  
 ideal city, characteristics of, 56;  
     Aristotle on, 57  
 Idomene, ambush at, 227  
*ἰεροδούλοι*, 50  
 Illyrians, the, 152  
 Ino, 108, 109  
 Inscriptions, 48  
 Ionia, 242  
*Ionía*, the, 74  
 Ionian Sea, 20, 200  
 Iphicrates, 9  
 Isagoras, 177  
 Isis, temple of, 21, 22  
 Isthmia, 14; festival of, 108  
 Isthmian, wall, 13, 15; sanc-  
     tuary, 14; games, 16, 17, 56,  
     108, 109  
 Isthmus, 4, 5, 10, 11, 17, 28, 191;  
     geological conditions of, 10;  
     passes over, 23; highway of  
     commerce, 55; scene of games,  
     56; overland trade across, 86;  
     defence of, 182, 183; blocking  
     of, 220  
 Italy, Mycenaean finds on eastern  
     shores of, 85; trade-route to,  
     151; Southern, connection  
     with Athens, 237  
  
 Jason, legend of, 93  
 Johansen, 120  
 Johnson, 48, 204  
 Julius Caesar, 12, 30  
 Kekhriés, port of, 22  
 Kiepert, 10  
 Kleniaes, twin villages of, 26  
 Korakou, excavation of, 78  
*Κορινθιαὶ κόραι*, 51  
 Korinthos, antiquity of name of,  
     59  
*Κωμηδόν*, 80  
*Krene*, 38  
 Kretschmer, 59  
  
 Kyllirioi, 150  
  
 Labda, 27  
 Lacedaemonians, 176, 178  
 Laches, 237  
 Lais, 45  
 Lapiths, 69, 70  
 "Laus Julia Corinthus", 35  
 Leaf, 28, 29, 60-88, 61, 62 *et pas-*  
     *sim*, Chap. III; Blegen con-  
     troversy, 79  
 Leake, 5, 8, 13, 22, 24, 25, 38, 39  
 Lechaëum, 8, 19, 20, 21, 31; Bay  
     of, 4, 5, 10, 11, 13; harbour  
     of, 19  
 Lelantine War, 150, 162-3, 246-  
     249  
 Lemnos, meeting place of fleet,  
     66; Minyan settlements in,  
     107  
 Lenschau, 116  
 Leonidas, 182  
 Leontini, alliance with Athens,  
     237  
 Leucas, 154, 156, 200, 226, 228,  
     238  
 Leucimne, Cape, 200, 204  
 Leucothea, 108  
 Liburnians, 150  
 Livy, 29  
 Locrians, Opuntian, 250; Ozo-  
     lian, 251  
 Locris, 6  
 Lolling, 26  
 Long Walls, 23  
 Luce, 48  
 Lutráki, 8, 11  
 Lycophron, 91, 132, 133  
 Lydian dynasty, 163  
 Lysander, 242  
 Lysippus, 41  
  
 Maas, 89  
 Macan, 14, 167, 168  
 Macedon, Philip V, of, 23  
 Mahaffy, 54, 115, 165  
 Malea, 11, 192  
 Manatt, 88  
 Mantinea, 233, 236; alliance of  
     with Athens, 234  
 Marathon, 181  
 Medea, 99; legend of, 93  
*Medea*, the scholiast on, 105  
 Megara, 4, 24, 160, 189, 191, 192,

- 199, 210, 216, 221, 233; Dorization of, 96; a Corinthian colony, 96; conquest of, 159; "dorized" by Corinth, 159; long walls of, 189; occupation of, 190; revolt of, 194  
 "Megarian Tears", 160  
 Megarians, 7, 161, 210, 218, 230  
 Megarian Decree, 216-224  
 Megaris, boundary line of, 23  
 Megarid, 3, 191, 218  
 Meges, 72; fortunes of, 73  
 Meillet, 59  
 Melas, 120  
 Melicertes, worship of, 89; *alias* Palaemon, cult of, 108-110  
 Melissa, 131  
 Melissos, 170  
 Mentès, 82  
 Merriam, 9  
 Meritt, 48, 204  
 Mertési, 25  
 Messana, 237  
 Messenian Wars, 168  
 Messenians, 189, 250, 251, 252  
 Meyer, 61, 62, 94, 130, 216  
 Methymna, *see* Arion  
 Miletus, 163, 176, 248, 249; Thrasybulus of, 162  
 Minoans, 91, 112  
 Minyae, 110  
 Minyan settlements, 111, 112  
 Minyans, of Pylos, 93  
 Molouris, rock of, 108  
 Molycreum, 153  
 Monceaux, 13, 15, 16  
 Mueller, 10, 25, 106, 165  
 Mummius, 30, 31; destroys Corinth, 27  
 Munich, 25  
 Musaeus, 106  
 Mycale, 183  
 Mycenae, 26  
 Mycenaean, civilization, 62, 100; Achaean days, Corinth in, 81  
 Mylonas, 60, 61  
 Myronides, 191  
 Mytilene, 164  
 Naupactian Inscription, The, 250-252  
 Naupactus, 94, 189, 192, 218, 223, 225, 227, 240, 250, 251, 252; occupation of, 190; Messenians of, 226  
 Naval engagement, earliest known, 151  
 Neandros, 119  
 Necho, 164  
 Necrocorinthia, 80; *see* Payne  
 Neleus, 74  
 Nemea, 2  
 Nero, 12  
 Nestor, 93  
 New Corinth, 2, 11, 18, 24  
 Newman, 57  
 Nicander, 24  
 Nicias, 231, 232, 239, 241; campaigns of, 24-25; speech of, 241  
 Nicodromus, 180  
 Nicolaus, 159  
 Nicolaus Damascenus, 121, 172  
 Nikolaus, St., 8  
 Nilsson, 99, 102, 113, *et passim*, Chap. IV.  
 Nisaea, 190, 218  
 Nissen, 216  
 "North Building", 46  
 Northern Greece, 191  
 Northern Policy, 185, 188  
 Odelberg, 100, 104, 108  
 Odeum, finding of, 37  
 Odysseus, dominion of, 72; wanderings of, 82  
 Oeanthe, Bay of, 5  
 Oedipus, rearing-place of, 26  
 Oeniadae, 193, 225, 226, 228; corn-route from, 229  
 Oenoe, 4, 8  
 Oenophyta, 191, 192  
 Ointment vases, Greek, 46  
 Old Corinth, 31  
 Oldfather, 251  
 Oligarchic council, election of, 144; formation of, 144; combination of judicial and executive powers by, 144  
 Oligarchical government, 134; people's voice in, 144; *see also* Corinth, constitution  
 Olpae, 227  
 Olympia, 124, 131  
 Olympian, register, 115, 165; festival, 167  
 Olynthus, 207  
 Oneian ranges, 10, 23  
 Oneium, 28

- Orthagorids, 161  
 Ortygia, islet of, 149  
 Otanes, 139  
 Ovid, 21  
 "Owls", 244  
  
 Pagae, 7, 195  
 Palaemon, 15, 109; temple of, 16, 108; *see* Melicertes  
 Panormus, 225  
 Parian Marble, 168  
 Parmeniscus, 105  
 Parnassus, 6  
 Path of the Fair Damsel, 109  
 Patrae, 235  
 Pauli, 59  
 Pausanias, 3, 22, 24, 26, 30, 33, 39, 96, 103, 165; description of Cenchreae by, 21  
 Payne, 119; *see* Necrocorinthia  
 Pegasus, 111, 244, 245  
 Peiraenum, 7, 8  
 Peiraeus, 25, 241  
 Peiraeus (of Athens), 20, 217, 222  
 Peirene, 32, 50, 122, 244; discovery of, 34-6; position of lower fountain of, 38-40  
 Peisistratids, tyranny of, 177  
 Peleus, kingdom of, 68, 69  
 Peloponnese, Dorian invasion of, 93; famine in, 230  
 Peloponnesians, 13, 16, 194  
 Peloponnesian League, 120, 179, 182, 183, 189, 199  
 Peloponnesian Confederacy, 146, 173, 175, 184, 201  
 Peloponnesian War, adequacy and intelligibility of the *cause* given by Thucydides, 197; real cause of, 209; reliability of Thucydides' account of, 216; key to operations of, 230  
 Perachora, 4, 7  
 Peraea, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10  
 Perdiccas, 206, 207  
 Periander, 11, 37, 124-134, 153, 156, 158, 162, 163, 164, 175, 177; revenge on Corecyraeans by, 91; fortification of acropolis by, 125; bodyguard of, 124, 127; Aristotle's account of, 126; military display of, 127; character and administration of, 127-8; patronage of literature and art by, 129; reputation abroad of, 130; domestic troubles of, 131  
 Pericles, 189, 193, 195, 196, 218, 222, 236; decree of, 210  
 Persian Wars, 181-188  
 Persians, 14, 51  
 Petra, 27  
 Phaeacians, 150, 151  
 Phalius, 156  
 Pheidon of Argos, 164-173  
 Pheidon of Corinth, 172  
 Philippson, 1, 6, 7, 18, 28, 29  
 Philolaus, 172  
 Phocians, 191  
 Phocis, 6, 7  
 Phoenician ship, dedication of, 15; cults, 92  
 Phoenicians, 84, 85, 89-92; purple-fisheries of, 21  
 Phormio, 207, 225, 226  
 Phyleus, 74  
 Pindar, 17  
 Plataea, 13, 158, 182  
 Plataeans, 179  
 Platner, 119  
 Pleistoanax, 232  
 Pleuron, 227  
 Pliny, 5, 12, 24, 25  
 Plutarch, 144, 145, 146, 246  
 Polybius, 11  
 Polybus, 26  
*Polychrysos Mycene*, 135  
 Polyclitus' Doryphorus, 47  
 Polycrates, 175, 176  
*Πολύτρετοι νεανίδες*, 51, 99  
 Pontic region, 218, 221; corn supplies of, 69, 189, 196  
 Porzio, 96, 115, 116, 127, 222  
 Poseidon, 8, 15, 16, 17; statue of, 22; cult of, 110-113  
 Potidaea, 125, 158, 206-211, 214, 215; siege of, 208  
 Powell, 45, 48  
 Procles, 131, 132  
*Probuli*, 144  
 Propertius, 20  
*Προστάρης τοῦ δήμου*, 152  
 Protesilaus, 72  
 Proto-Corinthian ware, 119, 120  
 Prytanes, 137  
 Psammetichus, nephew of Periander, 134; of Egypt, 164

- Ptolemy, 25  
 Pylades, 155, 159  
 Pylos, 236  
  
 Rhegium, 237, 239  
 Rheitus, 24  
 Rhium, 5, 235, 238  
 Rhodes, government of, 146  
 Richardson, 30, 34  
 Robertson, 44  
 Robinson, 8  
 Robinson; D. M., 46, 48, 119,  
     124, *et passim*  
 Roman theatre, at Corinth, 47  
  
 Salamis, 158, 182, 188, 218  
 Salona, Gulf of, 5  
 Samian revolt, 196, 203  
 Samians, 133, 176, 247  
 Samos, 163, 175, 195, 248, 249  
 Sappho, 47  
 Sardis, 91  
 Sargent, 128  
 Saronic Gulf, 2, 4, 10, 12, 20, 23,  
     24, 75, 187, 190, 192, 195  
 Schoenus, 11, 14, 19, 24; port of,  
     10, 75, 108; Bay of, 13  
 Schoemann, 106  
 Scironian Rocks, 3, 23, 24  
 Scott, 64  
 Scylax, 3, 24  
 Séchan, 104  
 Segesta, alliance with Athens,  
     236  
 "Separatists" and "unitar-  
     ians", controversy of, 64  
 Sepulchral Aphrodite, 103  
 Seven Doric Columns, 45  
 Seven Sages, 127  
 Shewan, 64, 66, 67 *et passim*,  
     Chap. III.  
 Sicilian, corn supply, 195; dis-  
     aster, 242  
 Sicily, 236; Mycenaean sites in,  
     83; connections with Athens,  
     237; ascendancy of Corinth in,  
     238  
 Sicyon, 2, 28; relations with  
     Corinth, 161  
 Sicyonia, 2  
 Sicyonians, 235  
 Sidus, plain of, 3; town or for-  
     tress of, 24  
 Sigeum, 178  
  
 Sikels, 150; slave market of, 82  
 Simonides, epigram of, 51  
 Sinis, 109  
 "Sisyphos Aiolides", 93  
 Sisyphus, 108; legend of, 76  
 Skias, 49  
 Slaves, 128  
 Socles, 28, 122, 178  
 Solium, 154, 224, 228, 232  
 Solygeia, 24, 25, 231  
 Solygeius, mountain of, 94  
 Sophocles, 139  
 Sophocles, Athenian admiral, 237  
 Sparta, 173, 176, 177, 182, 190,  
     207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 232,  
     233, 235; relations of with  
     Athens, 177; confederate as-  
     sembly at, 212; relations of  
     Corinth with, 234  
 Speck, 140  
 Speiraeum, Cape, 25  
 Speiraeus, 25  
 Sphacteria, 231  
 Spon, 43  
 Stadium, The, 16  
 Stephanus Byzantius, 26  
 Stillwell, 35  
 Sthenelaidas, 211, 221  
 Strabo, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 26, 30, 31,  
     33, 39  
 Stratus, 225, 229  
 Suidas, 136  
 Sunium, 86  
 Survey, French, 11  
 Sybota, islet of, 204; battle of,  
     217  
 Syracusans, 240; their embassy  
     to Sparta, 238  
 Syracuse, founding of, 148;  
     Athenian success at, 239;  
     Great Harbour of, 240  
  
 Tanagra, 191  
 Taphians, 84, 85  
 Taphos, 82  
 Tegea, 233  
 Teleboai, 73  
 Telestes, 95, 96  
 Temple Hill, 46  
 Temple, Greek, of fifth century,  
     47  
 Tenea, 2, 26, 27, 159; Apollo of,  
     27  
 Teneates, origin of, 27



- Teneatic Gate, at Corinth, 33.  
 Tenedos, people of, 26  
 Terra-cottas, Greek, 46  
 Theagenes, 160, 161, 162  
 Theatre, excavations in district of, 47  
 Thebes, 172, 179  
 Themistocles, 184, 185, 188, 189, 236  
 Theocritus, 149  
 Theodori, village of, 23  
 Theognis, 162, 249, 250  
 "theoris", the Athenian, 180  
 Thermopylae, 13, 182  
 Thesprotia, 82, 204  
 Thirty Years Peace, 194, 195, 196, 200, 204  
 Thompson, 65, 80  
 Thrasybulus, 126, 163  
 Thucydides, 5, 11, 23; Greek tradition recorded by, 67; modern critics of, 215  
 Thumb, 59  
 Thurii, 195, 196, 236  
 Thyreatis, conquest of, 173  
 Timoleon, 144  
 Timophanes, 145, 146  
 Tolmides, 192, 236  
 "Tortoises", 244  
 Towns, Inland, 26  
 Tozer, 39  
 trade, jealousies of, 152  
 Trieber, 169  
 "triglyphon fountain", 40-42  
 Trojan War, date of, 62; Boeotians in, 67  
 Troy, 27  
 Tsountas, 88  
 tyrannies of seventh century, 117  
*Tyrannos*, 138  
 tyranny, 134, 138-142; bias against, 138; a blessing in disguise, 140  
 "unitarians", see "separatists"  
 Ure, 116, *et passim*, Chap. V.  
 Vasiliko, 2  
 Vindex, 12  
 Vischer, 53  
 Vocha, plain of, 28, 29, 31  
 Vuliasméni, 9  
 Wace, 62, 79 *et passim*, Chap. III  
 Wade-Gery, 115, 116, 168  
 Walker Kosmopoulos, 61, 88  
 Wells, 116, 166  
 Wheler, 43  
 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, von, 36, 88  
 Wilcken, 79  
 Wilisch, 30, 37, 93  
 Wyse, 20, 54  
 Xenophon, 4, 19, 24; phil-Laonism of, 19  
 Xerxes, 13, 16, 158, 182, 187  
 Zacynthus, 192, 224  
 Zeus, colossus of, 124
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